Significance of Clinton’s diplomacy

Columnist M.B. NAQVI  analyses the visit of the US President to South Asia.

The major and immediate demand of the US President Bill Clinton on Pakistan was to de-escalate the Kashmir jehad insofar as it relies on foreign volunteers going into Kashmir. It is true that one of its dimensions is that the freedom struggle of the Kashmiris should not be termed and treated as an Islamic Jehad. If it had remained a purely Kashmiri affair for and by Kashmiris to gain freedom in whatever sense they might achieve it, it would have been better for foreign powers as well as for Pakistan. We have to go on analysing and assessing the implications for some time. It was a major demand, though by no means the only one. More on it presently.

The other part of Clinton demands also come under the vast canopy that is implied in ‘terrorism’. This is with regard to Taliban and Afghanistan. The Americans specifically want Taliban, with or without pressure from Pakistan, to surrender Osama bin Laden or to the country of his origin Saudi Arabia. In effect it would be much the same thing. It also includes a demand on the Taliban to be more moderate and be more respectful of human rights, as understood in the west particularly with regard to female education and employment. This again is a far-reaching demand and its ramifications will reach every nook and corner of Pakistan’s political and economic life. How so?

There are its ideological components. Besides, Clinton’s demands included the banning of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and various other jehadist set ups with private armies of their own. CE Gen. Pervez Musharraf did not, or could not, accept this demand. He has only indicated that he has asked these jehadis to exercise restraint —- whatever that means. Even otherwise it is hard to conceive this military government swallowing the entire lot of ideas and their implications propounded by the American President in his public broadcast to the people of Pakistan; that goes against the grain of Pakistan armed forces. And yet the threat of financial default —- behind which stares the likelihood of an economic collapse —- even in the year 2000 and surely in 2001 stares the Pakistanis. The ruling establishment has to say the unsayable and do the undoable to avoid that. The situation demands a painful choice: on the one side the US threatens no help and more isolation —- if Pakistan does not heed him —- and on the other promises all help and support to sustain it economically and politically if it does. In the latter case, there are hints that it would mean the availability of US diplomacy for the maintenance of peace and amity in South Asia which require a lot of US facilitation and some progress toward the solution of Kashmir problem —- in indeterminate indicative terms. A hard choice indeed!

As it happens, Afghanistan has been the only success story for Pakistan. Almost a whole country has been made amenable to Pakistan advice on the international sphere; few outsiders doubt that Taliban government will do as it might be recommended by Pakistani advisors. It should not, however, be mistaken to mean that Pakistan rules Afghanistan, as the Taliban would be quick to assert. But that Taliban are beholden to Pakistan cannot be gainsaid. Their ability to defy Pakistan advice can certainly be doubted. But Taliban have to have some autonomy and cannot afford to be seen as stooges of Pakistan. That would gravely hurt their soul mates in Pakistan, viz. the various Jehadist bodies with militias of their own and the Pakistan army itself. That is how terrorism demand of Bill Clinton cannot be fully acceptable to Gen. Musharraf. But can and would Gen. Musharraf say no to Clinton? That is a conundrum in Pakistan’s strategy, whether of civilian government or the military.

Under the same heading of fight against terrorism the American wishes, rather demands, have to be taken into account. They pertain to the domestic sphere of Pakistan. They want the Pakistan government to deweaponise all the private armies of the various Jehadist groups. They pose a serious threat to Pakistan’s modern institutions of state as well as democratic norms. This is a delicate field. The Jehadists have their links or are inspired by various rightwing political parties in the country. They also enjoy support from sections of the political, economic and other elites in the country, including sections of Armed Forces. Containing them is no joke and deweaponisation would be resisted. It might spark of unending troubles to democracy as it is ordinarily understood and to the modern state as Pakistan continues to be. How does Pakistan acquit itself on the question is at the heart of this whole business.

Then there is a certain set of recommendations from America that come packaged as ‘restraint’ on the nuclear and missile questions; earlier it was called ‘peace and security’. Now what does this mean? What it might boil down to is a specific detente between India and Pakistan over the nuclear weapons and missiles. It requires to be a set of groundrules of how to prevent an unintended war or accidents involving nuclear weapons and or missiles, especially if they have been deployed. A whole elaborate system of CBMs is recommended along with an elaborate command and control system (C3). This is the immediate and the most concrete manifestation of the rubric denoted by peace and security in the region —- that is now being enlarged.  But this is by no means all. It is a much wider canopy. What is desired covers a modicum of normalisation between India and Pakistan, though not necessarily friendship and burying of the hatchet. It is only a preliminary understanding denoted by normal diplomatic ties such as America continued to have with Soviet Union and which had progressively grown to cover a large number of ties. This is intended to prevent utter deadlock and is to be combined with the detente over nuclear matters under the twin canopies of ‘restraint’ and dialogue. This should suit all foreign powers of the world who want absence of war and stability in populous South Asia.

Can Pakistan oblige the US on all the three connotations of the fight against terrorism and whether it would be happy to normalise relations with India while the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved. This is a conundrum that is not easy to resolve. The American recommendation actually is that India and Pakistan may run their cold war over Kashmir and remain enemies but they should take proper care, as the Soviets and the Americans did, that unintended war does not break out or nuclear accidents do not happen and a command and control system (C3) should be put in place which should be such that no unauthorised group or terrorist organisation might preempt the proper governments in India and Pakistan created conditions in which a nuclear exchange in South Asia might take place. Up to a point, Indians and Pakistanis should be ready to accept the proposition that their cold war can continue but under failsafe safeguards for nuclear weapons, as the Americans suggest. But one element of it needs to be pondered over: it implies a freeze on Kashmir Jehad which is now termed respect for LoC. It is a big question and Musharraf government will be hard put to it to accept it.

Kashmir has been the core issue between Pakistan and India for over 52 years. It has occasioned three open wars between them. It can be said to have ignited a fourth but a limited war in Kargil area of Kashmir and is threatening a ‘limited war’ of George Fernandes’ concept that may neither remain limited to Kashmir or to only conventional weapons; it is already a near war situation. Pakistan has staked its all for its stand on Kashmir and the current Jehad in Kashmir is a very high cost venture. Can it climb down? Gen. Musharraf’s ability to do so —- including banning the Jehadist militias —- can be doubted. Stopping or sharply reducing the Kashmir Jehad will test Gen. Musharraf’s political ability to the maximum: American demand is based on, and is even couched in terms of, Indian condition-in-chief’s resuming the dialogue; the Indo-US bottomline is the unconditional stoppage of Kashmir’s Jehad. If Pakistan refuses, there will be no further help or support from the US, most countries of the west and most other —- in Clinton’s words more isolation and poverty for Pakistan. If it agrees America, and doubtless of many others’ help and support, especially the rescue of its economy, is promised, with a vague hint of help on Kashmir. A Hobson’s choice, that.

There is a further set of demands from Americans. They include high sounding and far reaching propositions regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is required to sign the CTBT, although the Congress in America has refused to ratify it. India is unlikely to do so. Many Pakistanis that are firm supporters of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent like Abdus Sattar, the foreign Ministers, have said that let us sign the CTBT because it has no teeth in it; it is unlikely to come into force; and it will not bind Pakistan down to anything practical in any immediate future. Only the tests will be banned. But fortunately poring over the implications and the international setting and vibes one gets from the American diplomatic activity is that Americans are far more relaxed than they seem, if only we concentrate on their other specific demands. At any rate, India and Pakistan are so hell-bent on retaining their nuclear deterrent that the Americans are in no position to be very hard and specific on this question. What is likely is that this set of demands about FMCT, MTCR and the NPT will go on being urged indefinitely for many years, may be decades, because no one seems to be in a frame of mind in which they would disarm even partially in South Asia.

All the rest are the small changes of diplomacy. The Americans have talked about cooperation in the narcotics field where the two sides already are cooperating. They may want to invite Pakistan in future into a wider network of anti-narcotic effort which is surely acceptable to Pakistan government, indeed it is already a part of it. Insofar as Clinton was concerned, matters like the money America owes and was refusing to pay up on the undelivered F-16 aircraft could scarcely figure during the few hours he had had in Islamabad. Surely a way can be found to compensate Pakistan, if bigger issues are out of the way. This and similar issues that figure in the large agenda between the two countries would need to be discussed at other levels in days to come if the chemistry becomes better in the meantime.

The question of questions recurs: could Pakistan accept American advice on terrorism vis-a-vis Kashmir, Afghanistan or the domestic political spheres? To a large extent, it is at bottom about the definition of Islam. Americans simplistically divide Muslims in two categories: militant and moderate Muslims. Nevertheless, there is some truth in this: there is the orthodox Islam, often driven by political ambition of politicians who propagate militancy and capitalise on it; that is Militant Islam of Middle East and Jehadists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. But there is the 1200 years old Islamic schools that emphasise personal piety and direct relationship with God and Prophet with absolutely no intermediaries. These schools include Sufiism and many others in all sects who find no place for any Nizam-e-Islam. But this is a sterile debate. Militant politics in the name of Islam is a 20th century phenomenon that borrows much from fascist and communist methodologies.

As we have seen the question boils down to is: can Pakistan freeze the Kashmir dispute, allows Indians and the Kashmiris to sort it out among themselves without Pakistani men and guns crossing the border? Indians can live with Pakistan’s verbal support, perhaps monetary help to the Kashmiri groups together with the diplomatic support that Pakistan embassies render them abroad. But the point is: can Pakistan do this? Without this there would be no dialogue with the BJP-led India. Conceivably domestic actions against jehadist groups’ private armies might become possible if India helps by being reasonable. These exist because of Kashmir jehad. If Pakistan government can stop that Jehad, the Americans and the Indians would be pleased as punch. But what can or would India do in return?

Insofar as Afghanistan and Taliban are concerned, no amount of American demarche and pleadings can make Pakistan force Taliban to change their distinctive political stripes. Insofar as America’s Pakistan’s official mind can be read, they accept the Taliban are there to rule. And Taliban will remain Taliban. Can they moderate their behaviour and tolerate girls going to schools, working in the offices and going about their business on the streets is the question. It is not easy for Pakistanis to answer that question. Insofar as Osama is concerned, it again is an impossible business. Gen. Musharraf in the end did not go to Afghanistan. He certainly spoke to Taliban discreetly and indirectly over their general behaviour regarding human rights, as understood in the west. But if anything is to come out of it, it has to be in the long run. The Americans will have to live with what is the reality in Afghanistan. The other and controversial part of Indo-American demands that want Pakistan should roll back the Jehad of Kashmir, it certainly means the perception in Pakistan will be one of virtual surrender. But necessity is mother of many a compromise. For Pakistan what is more important is its own survival as a viable state. Its economic situation demands, as Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz conceded, that IMF money should be available by June 30 and it requires IMF agreeing to a bigger loan agreement under the poverty alleviation appellation, for a greater amount and a greater debt relief, if not an outright writing off of much of the debt burden that is crushing Pakistan economy. Pakistan’s economic need is so urgent and requires such a big effort on the part of the Americans, the Japanese, the EU and the British, not to mention the other OECD countries with IMF and World Bank included, for reducing the debt burden of this country effectively for the next five or six years as a minimum, if not more and of course far more funds —- something like 25-30 billion in the next three years, comprising debt relief, new money from the IMF from old and new agreements plus private investments. Then only Pakistan economy can keep its head above water; floodwaters have already reached up to its neck. The economy is in the danger of drowning and collapsing completely. That can cause serious threat to the survival of the state. To keep afloat is the requirement. Insofar as the social, political and economic elites of this country are concerned, the only way they know, and the Musharraf government as well as the other civilian governments know, only one way of proceeding about it: going to the IMF, WB and the American government and asking for their help. They know of no other way out. They have now either risk drowning in economic troubles or recognise that discretion is the better part of valour —- certainly in politics.