The Clinton Visit
Washington’s not so independent think tanks

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA examines the role of US think tanks with respect to President Clinton’s visit to Pakistan.

Presidential trips seldom yield ground breaking developments in bilateral ties. They are high profile occasions often emphasizing the high points and identifying the low points, in the relationship of two countries. The agenda for the American lame duck President Bill Clinton’s South Asia visit therefore comes as no surprise; deepening of economic , political and strategic ties with India, expanding ties with Bangla Desh and meeting for problem resolution with Pakistan. The broader issue of South Asian security and stability too revolving around the nuclear question and the Kashmir issue will be discussed in Dehli and in Islamabad.

In the healthy American tradition of policy-influencing an Independent Task Force on US Policy Toward South Asia was set up to help the US President define the agenda for his South Asia trip. This Task Force comprised of 21 notable academics and former policy-makers who are widely acknowledged ‘old hands’ on US policy in South Asia. On March 13 this Task Force addressed a letter to Clinton recommending parameters for Clinton’s engagement. The Task Force defined the goal for the India visit is to “build a post Cold War relationship with India that expands economic and other forms of interaction and cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.” Clinton was advised to spend “the lion’s share” of his time in India discussing “the basic questions of post-Cold War international relations: the future mandate of the WTO; ground rules for humanitarian intervention ; managing relations with China and Russia; the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Meanwhile for the Pakistan trip the goal identified by the Task Force was “to persuade Pakistan to embrace economic reform, the rule of law and more responsible behaviour in the realm of terrorism.” In an effort to ensure American engagement with the Pakistani people it was emphasized that “It is essential that an opportunity be found for you to address the Pakistani people over local media. Such an address could remind Pakistanis of the long and close association between the two countries during the Cold War, urge that Pakistan join the majority of the world in its embrace of open markets and political freedom ; and underscore the importance for Pakistan to take steps that would make it possible to achieve a more normal, peaceful relationship with India..”

The fact that the March 13 letter of the Task Force has significantly influenced the American President’s agenda is obvious from the conclusions he draws in his March 20 article on his South Asian trip, published in The News. About his India trip Clinton writes that “After 50 years of missed opportunities it is time that America and India became better friends and stronger partners.” His agenda, in Clinton’s own words for the Pakistan trip is to “ speak directly to General Musharraf and to the Pakistani people about the steps we believe are important to building a hopeful future for Pakistan: an early return to democracy , a crackdown on terrorist groups, restraint on nuclear and missile programs and a real effort to create the conditions for dialogue with India. If Pakistan takes these steps we can get back on the path of partnership.”

The contrasting agendas proposed by the Task Group and by Clinton for the India and the Pakistan trip are inevitable . From the vast difference in the economic potential of two countries and the persistent , unresolved and widely publicized problems that exist between Pakistan and the US naturally differing agendas will flow. However, it is on the issue of peace and security in South Asia and specifically within the Pak-India context that the observations in the March 13 letter of the Independent Task Force require examination on several counts. At least five are noteworthy.

One, Pakistan is entirely held responsible for deteriorating Pak-India ties. Subjective conclusions are drawn in the letter about “Pakistan’s leaders appearing to be emboldened by the possession of nuclear weapons ,believing that India is now limited in what it can do in retaliation lest it risk a nuclear conflict. “ Derogatory and negative terms “reckless Pakistani action” and “hostile and unstable “ are also used for Pakistan .While referring to the Kargil episode as “a Pakistani attack on India the letter completely ignores the Indian actions committed against Pakistan: the August 10 1999 shooting down of the Pakistani naval plane killing 16 people on board. , Dehli’s forced cancellation of the Katmandu SAARC summit and keeping Pakistan out of the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative and military escalation along the LoC.

On the other hand , included in the letter are unsubstantiated allegations that “many Indians suspect a Pakistani hand” in the hijacking of the Indian plane. Also incorrectly parity between Indian and Pakistani officials is established in the area of issuance of “provocative public statements by officials in both countries.” The Indian ministers continue to issue belligerent statements warning Islamabad of fighting a “limited war” with Pakistan, of “teaching Pakistan a lesson”, of not ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in war etc.

Secondly, interesting factor in the observations made in the Independent Task Force’s March 13 letter to President Clinton is that all its observations on the Kashmir issue approximate the Indian position. The letter advises Clinton to “voice strong criticism of their provocative posture towards the Kashmir insurgency making clear that they and their country would not be better off if Pakistan foments a war with India over Kashmir or anything else.” Also without acknowledging the validity of the Kashmir struggle for self-determination, as underwritten by the UN Security Council resolution , the Task Force opts for pressurizing Pakistan to withdraw its support for the Kashmiri struggle.

It suggests that the President “Call upon Pakistan’s leaders to adopt a more realistic approach to what diplomacy might accomplish vis a vis Kashmir in the foreseeable future and drop their insistence that Kashmir constitute the core of any dialogue with India. “ Such a suggestion is merely reiterative of Washington’s consistent position, as almost an extension of the Indian position that normalisation of Pak-India relations can take place once Pakistan chooses to put Kashmir on the back-burner- a position that has been tried until the late eighties and failed. Also in Pakistan as in Indian Held Kashmir there is no confusion on unfortunately on the impotence of bilateral diplomacy on Kashmir.

It is precisely the juxtaposition of this reality with the systematic repression of the Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir by the 700,000 strong contingent of Indian army that has forced increased militancy within the freedom fighters and a degree of urgency in Islamabad over the initiation of bilateral or multilateral talks seeking political resolution of the Kashmir issue. However the Task Force, at least within the immediate context appears to be working for the containment, not solution of the Kashmir issue. Their advise therefore, is that Pakistan be asked to uphold the sanctity of the LoC by curbing the so-called “cross-border terrorism.” Active Pakistani support is sought to restrain and repress the supporters and perhaps participants in the Kashmiri freedom struggle who either live on the Azad Kashmir soil or have sought refuge there.

Three, in contrast with the strong censure of Pakistan for its support to the legitimate Kashmiri struggle, the Group has avoided condemning the Indian state for its terrorism against the innocent people of Indian Occupied Kashmir. The letter written by the academics and intellectuals chooses to completely overlook the excesses committed by the Indian state including torture, rape, killings of innocent civilians , all of which are regularly documented in reports issued by neutral groups including Asia Watch and Amnesty International. On Kashmir the Group advises what the Indian government is willing to hear. India is asked to “ to adopt measures that would provide the inhabitants of the region greater autonomy and civil rights.” Clearly enamoured by the glitter of the strong and mighty Indian state the Group must believe that the Indian state machinery can effectively crush the Kashmiri Azadi movement .

Four, instead of understanding the complex and ghastly issue of terrorism and its fallout on Pakistan, the America academics take a dangerously simple position on it . Much of what the Americans and the Indians do not like, from the groups supporting Kashmiri freedom fighters to those who have issued verbal threats to the United States, to those against whom the US may have some evidence on terrorist charges, from the Talibaan to Ossama Bin Ladin and from transnational Islamic groups born and armed by the CIA and ISI now operating autonomous of Pakistan, are all lumped under the rubric of “terrorism.” The intellectuals, seemingly unaware of the diplomatic blanks that their policy of putting states like Iran, Syria etc on the State department’s list of terrorist state have drawn, urge Clinton to privately “ let Pakistan’s leaders know that the United States will have little option but to designate their country as a state sponsor of terrorism (with all that it entails in the way of sanctions under current law) if they do not act more decisively against this threat.”

Using the stick of a terrorist label is advised against the Pakistan government.

Five, the Task Force chooses to ignore all efforts made by Pakistan to tackle the threats to internal and South Asian security and peace. For example, steps taken by the Musharraf government to restore law and order within the country beginning with the deweaponization, border controls, are ignored. The comments on terrorism reveal the inability of the Task Force to realize that successfully arresting the process of chaos and conflict is possible through a sensitively and patiently crafted process. Mere government proclamations cannot reverse chaos and conflict. On the regional security front the Task Force ignores the proposal that Pakistan presented in October 1998 to India for a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia. Steps for nuclear restraint and stabilization and for Conventional restraint and stabilization which included mutual and balanced reduction of forces and armament, were proposed. Similarly the goodwill gestures made by Musharraf including withdrawal of forces from along the LoC , an unconditional resumption of Pakistan-India dialogue too were ignored in the letter.

The task Force’s “independence“ and neutrality appear questionable given its complete failure to acknowledge that India was responsible for triggering the nuclear race in South Asia. While an obviously negative stance is adopted towards Pakistan by these academics as they use terms like “hostile” for Pakistan , excessive sensitivity towards India is demonstrated.

For example, on the nuclear issue the letter of the Task Force states that “ it is essential to resist the temptation to place ambitious nuclear weapons-related goals at the center of US aims.” Ruling out the possibility of persuading India to eliminate it’s nuclear arsenal, acknowledging the “inclination of many Indians to associate nuclear weapons to great power status and indicating that Clinton was not “well-placed to pressure India to sign the CTBT given the failure of the US Senate to ratify the treaty.” Clinton is advised to go for “modest but still significant goals in the nuclear realm which include “ultimately signing the CTBT, not exporting nuclear technology or weaponry “ .

On specific US policy towards Pakistan there is more form than substance to the Task Force’s recommendations. For example it calls for “providing an executive waiver for the sanctions currently in force against Pakistan as a result of the October military coup.” The fact is that the sanctions that come into force under section 508(Q)of the Foreign Appropriations Act affect military sales, military financing, military training , trade and development , OPIC and AID funded projects , and most of this is already under suspension because of the Pressler Amendment and the 1998 nuclear tests.

Also the recommendation that ,”the current process of designating state sponsors of terrorism needs to be reformed to divorce the designation from penalties” is unlikely to be well received in a country where everyone believes that United States provided the enabling environment during the eighties in which US and the then Pakistani government adopted policies which have hurt the Pakistani society above all. Designating Pakistan as a terrorist state, with or without financial implications, will be a counter-productive step which would have deep and dangerous repercussions for the American and Pakistani governments and people.

The members of the Task Force have also drawn a simplistic and inaccurate conclusion on assessing the views and opinion of the Pakistani people on matters related to the United States, the West , Pak-India relations. Perhaps talking to a select English speaking elite and opinion-makers the members of the Task Force have concluded that there exists a divide between those who are “hostile” versus those “seeking close ties” with the West. This divides the Pakistani people and politicians into a non-existent pro-West versus anti-West divide. On this issue even Clinton’s own observation that his “staying away would strengthen hard-liners in Pakistan who want their country to turn away from the world” is an incorrect one.

Such observations , made even by a handful of Pakistanis, incorrectly reduce the debate on specific issues to an ideological or civilizational divide. Thus making it possible to ignore the merits and demerits of Washington’s position on the nuclear issue, the Kashmir and the terrorism issue.

The emphasis of the Task Force of establishing a direct contact with the people of Pakistan to tell them about Pak-India relations, democracy , about “close Pak-US relations too is ill-advised”. Whatever the differences between the people of Pakistan and a military ruler or a democratically elected Prime Minister is an internal and even a divisive matter but on issues like Kashmir, relations with India, the behaviour of the US regionally and vis a vis Pakistan there may only be nuanced differences. Generally, a near national consensus exist among the people and the government. Obviously Washington has been attempting to adopt the ‘communication with the people ‘ line in its foreign policy towards the former communist bloc, towards Cuba, Iran and Iraq. Such a ‘divide and communicate’ approach has often made Washington more unpopular than popular with the people it has sought to engage.

The letter of the Task Force unfortunately is a disappointing document. Not for what it says about India but what it chooses to not say. Recognizing the indispensability of peace and security ,to the pursuit of American interests Washington finds it difficult to appropriately engage or even state the parameters and partners to the problem.

The letter almost lacks intellectual integrity. It reads like a propaganda letter written by paid Indian lobbyists. Whatever the reason, including of course familiarity and comfort, the Task Force members may have with their Indian colleagues, the Task Force has produced a document a low academic standing. It presents a fairy-tale reading of South Asia. It concludes simplistically charging Pakistan with a devilish role and crediting India with a glorified spirit devoid of any ill-doing.

The alertness displayed by the American academics and intellectuals in underscoring the socio-political problems within the Pakistani society appears missing in India’s case. They are fearful of “a nightmare of a Pakistan that comes to resemble Afghanistan or Sudan” but they fail to detect the obvious Hindu extremism that exercises control over sections of the Indian state power. The issue of recruiting the RSS, the rewriting of Indian history and the conflict with the India’s Historical Research society, the ‘Coming Home ‘ plan of forcible conversions of Christians to Hindus , the killings of Christians in Gujrat and the burning of churches.

The Indian media itself has widely reported the rising communalism in India. For example, a leading Indian paper The Hindu reported on March 17 that the “caste clash at Kambalapalli village in which seven Dalits were burnt alive to ``avenge’’ the killing of an ``upper’’ caste person. The paper maintains that “Although untouchability and other forms of social discrimination have been prohibited under the law, they are prevalent in some form or the other in most villages of the Karnataka state. Even today Dalits are forced to use separate tumblers and other utensils in several rural hotels and joints. Similarly on March 16 The Hindu reported that in New Delhi “the new chief of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh K. S Sudarshan has warned that “this is yet another epic war between Hindus and anti-Hindus after which even the opposition to Hindutva will change. “ All this the Independent Task Force has chosen to ignore.

In perhaps what would be a rare accomplishment the American academics have emerged as greater allies of the Indian state than even the American President and the Secretary of State whose statements on peace and security are more balanced that the letter written by the Task Force. The Task Force in its letter has merely restated the justification that State department officials made for accepting India’s Monroe Doctrine role in South Asia; in simple words Indian hegemony in the region .