Emerging Strategic Alignments
Challenges and Opportunities

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Brig (Retd) SAEED ISMAT, SJ writes about the future alliances that are emerging.

The whole pattern of international politics is changing with unprecedented rapidity. Developments in one region are shaping the strategies of distant states in another. Time and space dimensions have shrunk, which in turn, have changed the dynamics of national security. Powerful forces are at work pushing nations towards structural, economic and social readjustments. The emerging order presents new opportunities and challenges; the nations, which fail to come to grips with these changes, are ordained to collapse or wither away. Pakistan must look beyond India and see what is happening out there and what future holds for us.

This is an era of globalisation, American supremacy and emerging markets. New challenges, coalitions and consensus among nations are becoming increasingly noticeable. A complex system of cooperation and collaboration, of competition and coercion is developing in pursuit of national self-interest. New strategic alignments and economic coalitions are forming thus reshaping the security perspective. U.S. — China relationship and U.S. — India relationship shall impact significantly on the security issues and policies of many states in times to come.

China is already a major regional power, though not strong enough to contest the American global primacy. China’s military strength both current and likely over the next decade or so will not be capable of posing a serious threat to the United States itself. The Chinese nuclear forces are too weak in quantity and technology to be compared with that of the United States. At best, the Chinese nuclear forces have a minimal deterrent capability. However, in the event of a conflict in its neighbourhood where true Chinese vital national interests are at stake, it has the capability of imposing unacceptable damage on the United States and her allies. Particularly striking is the observation by Zbigniew Brezinski that: though Chinese leaders recognise that they need a stable and even cooperative relationship with the United States if their country is to continue developing. China is no longer American strategic partner. Today, with the Soviet Union out of the scene, China is neither America’s adversary nor its strategic partner. China will strive to avoid adversarial relationship with the United States, however, it could become a potential adversary if America provokes it excessively.

China has domestic self-interest in mind and sees vital economic benefits of collaboration with America. United States is thus crucial to China’s future and confrontation with Washington is simply not in her interest. Taiwan is a thorny issue and it complicates the relationship. Though most analogies can be misleading, there are some parallels between Kashmir and Taiwan. As Kashmir is a legacy of Indo-Pak partition, Taiwan is a legacy of Chinese civil war. It has survived as a separate political entity (though not a sovereign entity) being virtually a U.S. protectorate. Taiwan’s Relations Act enacted by U.S. Congress regulates American role in Taiwan without defining it as a sovereign state. Taiwan issue for China like Kashmir issue for Pakistan shall be the final determinant of U.S. — China and India — Pakistan relationships or perhaps, U.S. — Pakistan relationship as well. The important question however is, would China bargain away Taiwan in its quest to hold its peace with the United States? Keeping in view the internal dynamics of China, it is inconceivable that any Chinese leader would accept an independent sovereign Taiwan. It is also unlikely that Washington would be prepared to accept the risk of provoking China to such extreme limits. The solution to the issue of Taiwan lies in what happens inside China. If China remains stable and maintains the impressive economic growth, China’s influence will further increase very rapidly, and it shall be all set to be the key player of the Asian balance of power. Many pragmatic analysts in China describe their stand on Taiwan as a tactical retreat to gain time to be economically and politically strong enough to affect the ultimate and peaceful reunification of  China. The reunification is inevitable and could be possible within the first quarter of this Century. However, for various reasons if the modalities of the reunification are not peaceful and China is forced to resort to military means the reunification could be a distinct possibility in a much shorter time frame. This shall have horrendous implications, sparking off intense U.S. — China hostility. This, however, is less likely as the United States realises that Taiwan is an important  part of its peripheral interests, while for China it is a matter of abiding interest.

By the beginning of the new Millennium, the events in the Korean peninsula indicated that the prospects of Korean unification were drawing close. In the words of a notable expert on Korean affairs, Enders Winbush, ‘Unified Korea is a virtual certainty; the only questions remaining are how and when’.   Once it does happen, the continued presence of U.S. military forces in the Korean peninsula will become unnecessary. China is now being included in the emerging multi-lateral dialogue regarding the regional security. Four-way U.S. — Japan — South Korea -China defence consultations have already been initiated. The Korean unification does not only require Chinese inclination to resolve it peacefully, but perhaps it is not possible without Chinese approval and its active participation. It is certain that China will play a vital role in managing the projected reunification. Strategic consensus between unified Korea and China will follow as a natural outcome of this process.

China has always seen Japan as a historical rival. China and Japan are fully poised for a relationship of political and strategic competition in the years to come. Anti-Chinese expressions are common in the Japanese foreign and defence policy establishments. Japanese strategists are anticipating a U.S. military pullout or reduction in forces from the region when the Korean unification becomes a reality. Though the Chinese view Japan and Taiwan as extension of U.S. power, the U.S.  — Japan alliance is steadily showing signs of weakening. Under these circumstances, a complete review of Japanese defence policy is inevitable. A rearmed and more assertive Japan is a favoured possibility. Japan is already examining options for new orientations that could affect the Asian strategic equation. After the Korean reunification, China shall become increasingly powerful forcing Japan to seek allies in all directions. Japan may be compelled by geo-strategic considerations to develop special relations with India and Taiwan. This could start an era a unique strategic alignment aimed at flanking China from two directions and simultaneously improving the security of Japan’s sea lanes of communication with the Middle East since this is of vital security interest to Japan. Japan could also attempt to make common cause with Russia as well.

The disintegration of Soviet Union left the United States as a single most dominant global power, with China as the ascending power. India had aspired to this status for long. Both India and China started on roughly equal footing and wanted to be recognised as  premier states in the broader global sense and as  dominant regional powers in the regional context. China has apparently won the race. India’s proximity to China places limits on its ability to be perceived as a power beyond the immediate region of South Asia. The old dictum is still valid that, “It is hard to be a great power on the doorstep of a greater one”. India is strategically unique; it is clearly not a great power but it is not just another ordinary regional power. India is already the pre-eminent state of South Asia in terms of its size, population, economic base and military strength. India’s fundamental strategic objective has been to deny the outside powers a role in the affairs of South Asia and remain the dominant power in the region. India enjoys a special power status as an important emerging business market with great potential. It is fully conscious and confident of this recognition of its actual and latent power potential.

India had worked overtime to improve its relations with China since late 1980’s and substantial progress was noticeable. India was seeking to reduce tensions with China, which would also give her the option to deal with Pakistan with full vigour and confidence. China was pleased with the improvement of relations as well and aimed at reducing military rivalry with India to avoid ‘an enormous diversion from longer term security challenges in East Asia’. Pokhran II nuclear tests by India in the summer of 1998, in one sweep, blew away the peace dividends, which it had so painstakingly built over a decade. Beijing was now provoked to pay more attention to the nuclear and missile equation on its southern flank. China was obviously disturbed by the emergence of two new nuclear weapon states in its neighbourhood. The tests have set back the Sino-Indian rapprochement and the cooperative security arrangement with China has practically been grounded. By conveying nuclear hostility towards China, the BJP Government had heightened Chinese interest in devising new plans and capabilities to target India’s nuclear infrastructure and potential deployment bases. It was India’s ambition for international standing, which explain the objective for nuclear tests better than a specific security requirement. India, unlike China, has not been as successful in realising its latent economic potential. Of course, essentially it has all the ingredients for breaking into the ranks of the great powers. It has a large pool of scientists and engineers, a promising high-tech industry and a reasonably advanced missile and space programme. Yet, poverty, poor quality of life, illiteracy for its teeming millions, low per capita income, abysmally low per capita power consumption, rampant corruption and entrenched bureaucracy shall continue to remain as serious limitations.

The policy makers in the U.S. seem to appreciate the importance of India (a former adversary) as a strategic partner. Policy researchers in the United States also support the concept of India — Japan alignment because it not only makes strategic sense for both countries, but could lend support to the global strategic equation as seen by Washington. Taiwan could also be a partner to such an alignment if it were to remain successful in delaying the ultimate unification with mainland China with the support of a U.S. led Japan — India coalition. If Taiwan were to follow Hong Kong and Macao and on  the basis of one-China-two-systems formula merge with China, the alignment would almost become certain. The role of Russia in the emerging consensus will be interesting. While China and India will shape the emerging Asian order, Russian lilt may well be central to that order.

In the Central Asian Republics, Chinese influence is increasing and this shall not please India, Japan and Russia. They all see Central Asian Region as an important source of energy and a promising market. Many Indian writers have described Central Asia as, ‘India’s extended neighbourhood’. It would certainly be greatly disturbed by any increased Chinese or Pakistani presence there. However, it shall not be easy for India to tackle these challenges in Central Asia for it has neither the geographical contiguity, nor the military reach or adequate economic resources for the next quarter of a century.

China’s overwhelming share of its oil will continue to come from the Middle East. Japan on the other hand is totally dependant for its energy needs on the same area. This dependence will cause Japan and China to extensively expand their existing naval power to protect the sea lanes of communication. The Indian Ocean in years to come will witness intense naval and maritime activity. India will be spending a great deal more in its quest to raise a blue water navy. Other nations that can influence the sea-lanes are Indonesia and Malaysia. But, because of the inherent weakness of these countries, their national interest may well dictate a neutral stance. However, should they perceive that their national interests are best served by collaborating with one of the emerging strategic alignments, the potential of the favoured alignment shall improve its prowess immensely.

In addition to China, Russia, India and Pakistan, — the four nuclear powers in our part of the world, we may well see Korea (north and south Korea) and Japan going nuclear in not too distant a future. Iran shall also be a serious but more controversial candidate to acquire nuclear weapons. U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction are understandable, but apparently, it has in reality failed to produce the desired results. Many think-tank institutions in America now disagree with the U.S. administration’s strategy for dealing with proliferation concerns. As applied to South Asia, in the context of India and Pakistan, the ground realities shall demand a shift in American stated policy. It is s truism that no amount of American pressure can induce India or Pakistan to roll back their nuclear programmes and the newly acquired nuclear power status. The stated aims of U.S. Administration of non-proliferation in South Asia, though unrealistic, is perhaps an essential rhetoric directed at other aspiring nations to coerce them to abandon or delay their nuclear programmes. In fact, U.S. has apparently come to grips with this reality and in the future, shall be engaged with both India and Pakistan to devise means to create nuclear stability with a minimal non-provocative deterrence. We might well see active U.S. engagements in South Asia to lend advice, support and technological assistance to maintain and reinforce an environment of nuclear stability.

Pakistan is a nuclear nation and cannot be dismissed in this power play, be it in its regional or global context. There is a sense of responsibility associated with the nuclear power status that calls for mature policy making mindful of the changing strategic alignments. Pakistan’s policy makers have a task at their hands of defining how Pakistan perceives itself as a regional player and the role it seeks to play to further its aims and objectives in this Century. However, we must remain mindful of the fact that the source of major power in the emerging global context is economics and not military or nuclear ability. Economic strength and political stability are the primary source of usable power and not nuclear weapons.

The developing strategic alignments discussed should not be confused with the erstwhile groupings such as NATO, WARSAW, bilateral and multilateral security pacts, etc, of the previous century. In fact, the emerging alignments have little resemblance to the period of the bi-polar world. Here, United States shall be playing the lead role in the emerging balance of power contest with the new centres of powers of China, Korea, India and Japan. Understanding these strategic alignments may help policy makers, strategists, scholars and citizens to reshape and define Pakistan’s policy and strategies for the future.