India’s Futile Limited War

Columnist MALIK AYAZ HUSSAIN TIWANA explores the Indian threat of limited war.

Lately various high ranking Indian civil and military personalities have been blowing hot and threatening Pakistan with a limited conventional war. Their stated aim is to destroy the Pakistani military machine, cut Pakistan to size and occupy Azad Kashmir in a short limited war, without involvement of nuclear weapons.

This Indian doctrine seems to be the result of frustration on the part of certain hawkish Indian leaders in that country. It emanates from the Indian failure in stopping Pakistan from supporting the Kashmir freedom movement, the humility suffered in Kargil, the embarrassment due to the Indian airlines aircraft hijacking, the inability to tame the situation in occupied Kashmir and the failure of Indian diplomatic offensive to have Pakistan put in tight spot. This is also a convenient ploy to divert the attention of the Indian population from the political, social and religious storms gathering within India itself.

The present Indian leadership also might be under the misplaced impression that the situation within Pakistan is exploitable (as it was in 1971) or maybe they have become victims of their own media propaganda (which was aggressive and good quality) during the Kargil crisis and have started believing in their superiority. However, there is a vast difference between propaganda and reality.

Although, it is true that the Indian army is twice as big as Pakistan’s army, the Indian Navy and Air Force about three to four times bigger than Pakistan’s, numbers alone may not be the main deciding factor, when it comes to practical fighting. Factors such as training, technology, weapon lethality, battlefield intelligence, terrain, morale and above all motivation may end up to be the main deciding factors in an armed conflict. It is here amongst these some tangible and many intangibles, that Pakistan has certain advantages, at least for the present. The advantages of an adversary’s logistic stamina (which no doubt the Indian’s have) could be offset by intelligent choice of interdiction and strategic targets and could be degraded at a fast rate due to destruction and intense rate of operations.

I would like to take the Indian advocates of a limited conventional war, on a journey of the likely battlefronts. Starting from the north, the line of control in Kashmir runs through mountainous terrain and all major penetrants (attack routes) are extremely well guarded by either side. Also, strong points are located all along the LoC (Line of Control) and are defensible by well dug-in forces (as recently seen in the Kargil crisis). Due to this mountainous terrain, penetrations on either side, in both the 1965 and 1971 conflicts, were extremely limited to a few kilometers/strong points/hilltops. The gains and losses in the first Kashmir war of 1947-48 were more due to many other outside factors rather than due to tactical ingenuity. As such, any big offensive in Kashmir would soon peter out into a stalemate and a slugging match with incessant artillery duels between the two armies. Chemical weapons, though banned, could be used. If at all, any breakthrough could be possible only through a major ‘Air Envelope’, which in itself would demand the use of big airborne operations, carried out through helicopters and tactical air transport aircraft. Even if the ‘Lift Capability is available, its deployment and sustenance, in the face of Pakistan Air Force would be a very dangerous and a risky task.’

On the international border, in the plains of Punjab, the ground friction due to man-made defence lines along with numerous canals, nullahs and river distributaries would slow down an enemy advance to a snail’s pace till it comes to a grinding halt. There is sufficient greenery to provide good cover to a defending force and the attacking Indian forces would be exposed to devastating fire from well camouflaged defensive positions. An armour thrust is not likely to exploit its full potential and could bog down in the face of stiff anti-tank resistance from the Pakistan army.

The southern deserts are the only areas where armies could manoeuvre appreciably. But, whereas the desert might be a tactician’s paradise, it is also a Quartermaster General’s logistic nightmare, where even small logistic support could become difficult, especially if the opposing Pakistan Air Force is around interdicting the supply lines. Also, in the same context, a moving battle (which would have to be mechanized) in the desert, with limited camouflage, is likely to invite devastating attacks from the opposing Pakistan Air Force. Prior logistic dumping may not be sufficient and the supplyline (especially an extended one), with limited road communications, would be extremely vulnerable to air attacks. For a successful breakthrough, the Indian army will have to create a 3:1 ratio against the defenders. Although they might be able to create it locally in a particular area for a limited time, they would not be able to sustain it for long, due to the usual limitations in big operations in a desert. Also, a penetrant can take a certain amount of force and no more. It cannot be super-saturated. Similarly, the timely employment of army reserves in the desert would become difficult in the face of stiff resistance from Pakistani air during daytime. Some positioning could be achieved at night but the scale would be extremely inhibited by the inherent difficulties usually encountered at night.

Although the Indian Navy and Air Force are much bigger than the Pakistan Navy and the Pakistan Air Force, the Pakistani services have certain technological edges over their Indian rivals. In the naval and air operations, the influence of technology is much more pronounced than in the land battle.

Pakistan Navy’s submarines and Fleet Air Arm, though fewer, are much more lethal and have the capability of turning the tables on the Indian Navy all along its Western seaboard and even to an extent on its Eastern seaboard. The sole Indian aircraft carrier ‘Viraat’ might be forced to stay out of the main area of operations and would be hard pressed to find a safe hiding place. The remaining Indian surface fleet would be put to great risk if it dared to approach the Pakistani sea lines of communication.

The Pakistan Air Force, on its part, is superb in fighting a defensive aerial battle and is also quite capable of going on to the offensive at the time of its own choosing. It has given a good account of itself in the past and is expected to again spring some nasty surprises for the enemy. It is well trained, quite used to fighting outnumbered and has the requisite technology, weapon systems and electronic gear to sustain a conflict in the South Asian context. It makes a good combined arms team with the other two services, the army and the navy.

Expensive long range ground to ground ballistic missile systems, with conventional warheads, would not be able to give much of a tactical advantage to either side. However, they could be used to terrorize civilian population, especially in the cities. Some could be armed with chemical/biological warheads (with nuclear warheads it would be a different story).

The Pakistani soldier, sailor and airman has the motivation and knows how to defend his land because he loves his country, knows the smell of its soil, the rhythm of its rivers and the beat of its drums. From the airspace over Srinagar, the mountains of Kashmir to the killing fields of Chamb, Chawinda and Shakergarh, down to the deserts of Sindh and all the way into the watery depths of the Arabian Sea, I have seen these men fight. I have felt their heartbeats, seen the fury in their eyes and witnessed the ferocity of their attacks. They give no quarter and ask for none. There would certainly be brave men on the other side as well as along with capable men to lead them. There would surely be immense slaughter and massive destruction of industrial and communication infrastructure. With improvement in artillery ranges, areas many miles deep on either side of the border, would be severely affected, especially in the thickly populated areas of Punjab (the Indians consider the Sikhs to be disposable, gunfodder anyway!). Progress achieved through fifty two years of sweat, toil and hard work would go down the drain in a few weeks.

The Indians must get; themselves out of the 1971 ‘Superiority Complex’ and must realise that a limited conventional war cannot remain limited in area or duration and there would always be ingredients of its spilling over in space and time, to a long drawn out conflict. It must be kept in mind that those who start the war may not always have the luxury of stopping it, when they wish to stop (remember the Iran-Iraq war of eight years). It could even result in a nuclear exchange as the last resort, as there is no guarantee that either side will not use nuclear weapons, if its survival is at stake.

Indian plans to keep the war limited in Kashmir may not succeed due to the fact that the air forces of both countries would be invariably drawn into the conflict and would be at each others throats, with the navies not far behind (one of the reasons the Kargil crisis did not escalate was that Pakistan restrained using its airforce). The cycle of violence cannot be kept limited, as history proves again and again. They must look at the bigger picture, think strategic and not tactical.

The Indians must realize that with so many other ‘Bush Wars’ going on in India, their (neglected) military does not have the requisite motivation (as evident from strikes/protests within the Indian military) to sustain a major campaign and win. If they cannot win, then there is no point in initiating something, which would only result in a stalemate and get them a “Egg on their face”. It is also bad economics because ultimately all wars, apart from the toll in blood and human misery, translate themselves into rupees and dollars, depriving the hundreds of millions of wretched poor of South Asia. It is not only foolish but suicidal as well. The people in both countries look up to statesmanship and intelligent leadership. I hope reason prevails and South Asia’s foundations for the twenty first century are not laid on hate.

About the Author

Malik Ayaz Hussain Tiwana joined the Pakistan Air Force in 1964 and was commissioned as a fighter pilot. He took part in combat fighter operations in Kashmir, Chamb and Shakargarh sectors. Later he was deputed to the Libyan air force as a fighter instructor and saw the 1973 Arab-Israeli war from close quarters in addition to flying sea surveillance mission during the conflict. He is a qualified flying instructor and a graduate of the PAF Staff College and the Joint Services Staff College. He has commanded a fighter squadron, a fighter wing and has held various other Command and Staff appointments. He has also served a tenure as the officer commanding cadets at the Air Force academy at Risalpur, before being posted as the Air and Naval attache in Saudi Arabia, where he covered the 1990-91 Kuwait War. He was commended by the Pakistan government for his excellent work over there. On his return he was seconded to the Pakistan Naval Fleet headquarters from where he retired after 32 years of service in uniform.