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Dear
Mr. Sehgal, Last
year whilst on a short but wonderful visit to Pakistan my family and I
decided to crown the trip with a trip to northern areas and based
ourselves at Bhourbon. And there in the hotel room I found a copy of the
Defence Journal. Since then I have been an avid reader of your internet
additions. It is to your credit that you have managed to create a
wonderful and possibly unique and open forum for discussion of the recent
history of the South Asian Subcontinent and its security, from a Pakistani
perspective. The likes of ZA Khan and AH Amin and so many other eminent
contributors have made this possible by taking the discussion to a higher
level in an area so often full of propaganda and hype. Please
allow me to explain, first, why I have written this e-mail to you. I have
no burning desire to preach to Pakistanis who I am sure are more than
capable and better positioned to analyse their situation than some ex-pats
and foreigners who should know better than to propose simplistic solutions
to complex problems. Most Pakistanis bear with this outrageous intrusion
because they feel that the ex-pat Pakistanis contribute in a small way to
the nations recovery and that their heart is mostly in the right place.
For this reason my aim is not to see this letter in print but to make a
hopefully positive suggestion to you. There are many points of view being
expressed in your publication and yet I find that one important
perspective has been missing. The
animosity between Pakistan and Hindustan has been the hallmark of South
Asia’s recent history and its particularly low ebb at present is clear
to most people. Hindustan is the larger and more powerful neighbour and
has never been particularly well disposed to Pakistan over this period. I
see repeatedly articles in the Defence Journal which allude to the cunning
and deceitful nature of the Hindu, with particular reference to Chanakya.
This may not be kind to a people who’s lives, perceptions and hopes are
not much different to many Pakistanis. We saw lately the saga of a
particular muslim clergy who, carrying a Portuguese passport, had lied to
further his aims. What does that say about the present state of a once
great religion. Worse still, in my view, this way of thinking has caused
Pakistan to steer a totally disastrous route over the short history of
Pakistan culminating in the present position of being belligerent without
the capability of taking the fight further. Those with eyes to see in the
Hindustan tani infrastructure have seen this and are pushing Pakistan to
an inch of total collapse. This is not due to the clever Hindu and more to
do with not so clever Pakistani strategy. The other side is that an
episode like Kargil has shaken Hindustan’s self confidence and a
reaction to their military’s loss of face and what that does to a proud
country’s ego is something that should have been expected. Over
the years Pakistan has seen Hindustan inevitably grow in strength and
discovered that it cannot hope to deal with it from a position of
strength, only as an equal at best. Hindustan has equally realised that
its superiority in numbers does not automatically translate into
capitulation of the smaller neighbour. Pakistan does not have the
strategic depth of Hindustan and its people of necessity put up a tough
fight when confronted with arms. My concern in this thesis is to
concentrate on what holds the differing people of Hindustan together. The
present strength of Hindustan is due to its unity, which is not inherently
there. I propose that this unity comes about due to outside pressures. In
a country whose population is growing at a staggering pace lack of a
unifying force can lead to fragmentationary pressures very quickly. Why
this does not happen in Hindustan is thanks to mainly Pakistan. In
the period of the Raj the differing people of Hindustan united under a
common goal of freedom. Here, there were Pandits, Gujaratis, Sikhs and
Muslims. In the period of the Iranian revolution the common goal was to
overthrow the Shah and there was great cohesion in this struggle. Once
that had been achieved all manner of fault lines developed, and very
quickly. Infighting between the hard line clerics and liberals caused a
potentially prosperous country to become weak and insignificant. Is this
not the fate of Hindustan if the country starts to drift in different
directions. And yet again and again we see that these differing people are
united in a cause which gives them common aim. It has been to
Hindustan’s benefit that Pakistan has for so long not seen fit to
terminate its grievances. Pakistan has provided the glue, the cup of
‘soumme-rus’ the life sustaining fluid to the Hindu gods, the secret
weapon which the Hindus could not produce with or without Chanakya. In the
process Pakistan has bled itself dry, its energy gone and its vision hazy.
It is time, therefore, to take another look at the whole strategy. The
ex-pats perhaps have one perspective which indigenous Pakistanis may not.
We see the Hindustani community as it lives outside Hindustan. Here the
only common experience of the ethnics is that of being a minority. It is
most clear to a patient observer that though the Asians do well for
themselves there is no inherent unity. The divided surface to separate one
Hindu Patel from another Patel because he may not be from the exact same
caste family. One Hindu may not visit another’s temple. Where is the
unity, where are the clever Chanakya dictums? They only come into being
when one is faced with a common struggle. That perhaps is the fundamental
rule in human psychology. There are a large number of Hindustanis in the
US and Europe. Their influence should be quite strong and yet it isn’t,
due to this lack of unity. However, the Hindustani government has seen the
potential and is trying to mobilise this people by using Pakistani
mistakes and strategic blunders. Pakistan
has shown itself to be a resourceful nation. It has built its capabilities
with very little help from outside and without much funds. This should be
of great worry to Hindustan. A peaceful forward looking Pakistan without
the hang-ups of inferiority has the capability of a fast paced economic
development which would enhance its standing in the world and give it the
clout in world affairs which it simply has not had. Pakistan must decide
where it wants to go. There is the pull of the clergy with no forward
vision, the problems of Afghanistan and the issue of Kashmir. The people
of Pakistan have never fully backed religious parties and yet these
parties have such a hold on Pakistan’s internal and external affairs.
Why should that be so? One should perhaps read Eqbal Ahmad’s articles on
use of Islam by weak leaders. Is it not time to become wiser and play the
bigger game with less risk and better gains. Skill is needed to educate
the people so that they can see the alternatives. Wars are won in the
mind. Let Chanakya have his place in history but leaders in Pakistan
should perhaps keep the writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu close to hand
and read them often. One
last point, can Pakistan survive intact without a belligerent Hindustan? A.Ali London,
UK
I
thought you might be interested in the following letter that I have sent
to the editor of Foreign Affairs magazine. [Comments
on “Pakistan’s Never-Ending Story” by Sumit Ganguly (Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2000) ] Ahmad
Faruqui Professor
Ganguly’s assessment of “what ails Pakistan” is vitiated by its
incompleteness. He correctly
excoriates Pakistan’s feudal politicians for having failed to develop
democratic institutions. He
also correctly faults the Pakistani military for expropriating more than
its fair share of the national budget, and advises Pakistan to focus on
the underlying problems of social and economic development.
Several Pakistanis including retired Lieutenant General Talat
Masood and the late economist Mahbub ul Haq have spoken about the need to
reduce defence spending. But
he stops short of getting to the root cause of Pakistan’s problems. This
is India’s bellicose policy towards Pakistan.
Ganguly says that Pakistan is “stuck on Kashmir” and since its
independence, “has sought to wrest Kashmir from India, at considerable
human and material cost.” He
states that “unless Musharraf improves relations with India—and this
means resolving Kashmir—the two countries will remain locked in a
defense-spending race.” He
accuses Pakistan’s ISI of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir but absolves
India’s RAW from conducting terrorism inside Pakistan. Such
a partisan essay does not differ in content or tone from the memoranda
that emanate routinely from South Hall, and will unfortunately have no
impact on key decision makers in Pakistan.
To Pakistanis of all walks of life, India poses a grave threat to
their national identity and survival. Indian
policy towards Pakistan borders on paranoia.
Citing the need to defend itself against Pakistan’s
“cross-border terrorism,” it has announced the highest increase in its
defence budget of 28%. This
increase will be used to pay for the acquisition of nuclear submarines,
aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and supersonic fighter aircraft.
These weapons are unlikely to be of much use against terrorists,
and are designed to establish India’s hegemony in South Asia and beyond.
Ganguly
mentions Pakistan’s nuclear tests but does not state that these were
triggered by India’s tests that were carried out at Pokran near the
Pakistan border. This is the
same spot where India had exploded a ‘peaceful’ nuclear device, dubbed
the Smiling Buddha, in 1974. India
has stated that its nuclear programme is meant to deal with the threat
from China, to deflect criticism, that it is trying to intimidate
Pakistan. One
cannot mention Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil in 1999 and not mention
India’s incursion into the Siachen glacier in 1984.
That was the first violation of the Simla Agreement of 1972 where
the two countries stated their resolve to settle their differences by
peaceful means. India
maintains close to 700,000 troops in Kashmir, which exceeds the strength
of the entire Pakistan army by a couple of hundred thousand.
India
has not followed the two UN Security Council resolutions calling for a
plebiscite to be held in Kashmir. While
agreeing to hold a plebiscite in the early years after partition,
India’s Prime Minister Nehru subsequently changed his position.
In the early sixties, Kashmir was absorbed into the Indian Union,
against Pakistan’s protestations. Bertrand
Russell despaired of the Indian about face on Kashmir, and said that
“the high idealism of the Indian government in international matters
breaks down completely when confronted with the question of Kashmir.” India
has consistently rejected international mediation of the Kashmir conflict,
and even President Clinton has been unable to effect a change in the
Indian position. Neither will
India hold bilateral discussions with Pakistan till such time that
Pakistan has withdrawn its troops from Kashmir. Such a “heads I win,
tails you lose” negotiation strategy is precisely the type of hectoring
that Ganguly says the US should not adopt toward Pakistan. Ganguly
refers to the “bloody divorce of the country’s eastern and western
halves” as symptomatic of Pakistan’s ills, but does not mention that
the divorce was heavily brokered by the Indian army. Field Marshal
Manekshaw, then Chief of the Indian Army, has recently stated that he had
begun preparing for war several months prior to the commencement of
hostilities in December. After
the Indian victory, Mrs.Gandhi, India’s democratically elected Prime
Minister and Nehru’s daughter, stated that India had finally avenged
1000 years of Muslim victories in the subcontinent. In
1975, India sent paratroopers of its elite 1 Para. Bn. into the
independent Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim and forcibly annexed it into the
Indian Union. In her first
few years, she had acquired the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad
through “police action.” If
these are the fruits of democracy then Pakistanis may be forgiven for
embracing military rule. Even
Ganguly notes that General Musharraf “enjoys widespread support from the
military and much of the public.” Unilateral disarmament will not work for Pakistan, just like it did not work for Carthage at the end of the Punic Wars. As the dominant power in the subcontinent, India needs to make the first move towards peace by (1) offering to hold bilateral talks with Pakistan without any preconditions and (2) announcing a moratorium on defence spending. |
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