Living a lie

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI examines the difference in what we pratice and what we preach.

The domestic dimension

At the root of most of our real and imagined problems lies the fact that we have been living a lie since the death of Jinnah, thanks to our ruling elite. That has impacted on our perceptions and problems over the years as one lie after another was generated, both on the domestic and external fronts. The impact of living a lie can be felt across the board now, reflecting an insecure and fear-ridden mindset that is unable to take bold, innovative policy measures.

One of the most damaging lies we have been living, especially since the Zia dictatorship is the selective denial of Jinnah's legacy. In the theocrat's efforts to make Pakistan into an "Islamic" state - from what, one has never really been clearly told - the vision of Pakistan that the founder of the nation had has gradually all but vanished completely.

At a time when the government is trying to restructure the polity, recalling Jinnah's vision in its entirety, and not in distorted selectivity, is critical if we are to rise above the malaise of polarisation and sectarianism that has pervaded our civil society today. Because we have allowed ourselves the luxury of oblivion on Jinnah, those with vested interests are now clamouring to get their notion of Pakistan enforced, and are only too ready to call into question the Muslim identity of anyone who opposes them. In the process, these people have managed to create a divisive and polarised society where the minorities are being pushed more and more into a peripheral existence within the state of Pakistan. And from amongst the Muslim majority, sectarianism has successfully divided the polity with the threat of being branded "unIslamic" constantly hanging above everyone's head.

Yet, Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 is as clear an enunciation of the foundation of Pakistan as one can hope to get. As Jinnah told the new nation:

"You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State."

In other words, politically there was going to be no distinction or discrimination between any citizen because of his/her caste, creed or colour. Politically, all citizens were equal - a point Jinnah elaborated upon in the same speech:

"... you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State."

There was no "grey zone" on this count for Jinnah and there must not be one now for the present leadership. Too much hatred has stacked up because of a denial of resoluteness on this count. When the state creates political laws, including electoral laws, where citizens are discriminated against on the basis of their religion then that is a substantive move away from the Quaid's vision of Pakistan. And the imposition of separate electorates is one such impingement on the rights of the non-Muslims of Pakistan.

So why is the vision of Jinnah so critical even today? Because it is the basis for our nation's existence. The Muslims of India followed Jinnah to independence and the very foundations of the state must not be allowed to be destroyed. It is time we really examined whether Jinnah's Pakistan was a state for the Muslims of India - where they would be free to live and practice their way of life - or whether it was intended to be a theocratic state. When Jinnah himself was asked this point, this is how he commented in a press conference in Delhi, on June 13, 1947:

"Q: Will Pakistan be a secular or a theocratic state?

"Mr Jinnah: You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a theocratic state means.

"A correspondent suggested that a theocratic state meant a state where only people of a particular religion, for example Muslims, could be full citizens and non-Muslims would not be full citizens.

"Mr Jinnah: Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing water on duck's back. (Laughter) For goodness sake, get out of your head the nonsense that is being talked about. What this theocratic state means I do not understand.

"Another correspondent suggested that the questioner meant a state run by Maulanas.

"Mr Jinnah: What about the Government run by Pundits in Hindustan? (laughter) When you talk of democracy, Mr Jinnah went on, I am afraid you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries ago."

So Jinnah acknowledges the underlying supremacy of Islam within the ideal of Pakistan but not in the distorted form of a theocratic state where non-Muslims are discriminated against and sidelined from the mainstream.

In his introduction to Volume II of the First Series of Jinnah Papers, the editor, Z H Zaidi, states that Jinnah clearly felt that the government of the new state of Pakistan would, as Jinnah put it "function with the will and sanction of the entire body of people in Pakistan, irrespective of caste, creed or colour."

According to Zaidi, "Jinnah vehemently disclaimed that the future State of Pakistan would be a 'theocracy'; far from it! He in fact declared that there was no room for theocracy, i.e. rule by religious divines. In his public speeches and statements, Jinnah did not leave a shred of doubt that the new State would not be run by an obscurantist religious leadership."

For Jinnah modern democracy was, according to Zaidi, "in essence a rediscovery of the old democratic tradition of Islam. ..."

One reason why we are able to be selective about Jinnah's legacy is because we are living another critical lie in the form of constant distortions of our history. Whenever governments change, so does the country's recorded history. Worse still, we as a nation have been extremely selective about owning up to our pre-1947 historical and cultural heritage. Being unable to come to term with all the varied influences of our past, we have been unable to come to term with the realities of the Pakistani state and its ruling elite over the decades. Every government seeks to rewrite the history books. And national traumas are glossed over - see what you can find on 1971 and the crisis in East Pakistan. And see whether anyone talks of the impact of the 1965 war in nurturing the seeds of Bengali nationalism?

But that was a major historical turning point. Our ruling elite cannot even tolerate the realities relating to past governments and political leaders - so the history books are constantly rewritten and our children grow up on lies. Lies breed an insecure nation - for confidence comes from being able to face the truth, no matter how unpleasant for in that confrontation we learn our lessons. Which is why it is not surprising to find mistakes continuously repeated by us as a nation.

Today we continue to be burdened by the habitual deception and lies that are the endemic to our ruling elite. There is a lack of courage to concede errors - be they historical or present in context. That is why we are easy prey for our enemies who are able to exaggerate our defeats and undermine our victories. Take the case of Bangladesh. One reason the Indians and other antagonists have continued to harp on the demise of the Two-Nation theory post-1971 is because we as a nation have failed to examine what led to the political crisis, which eventually emboldened India to aggress militarily in East Pakistan. Instead, we have tried to obliterate this momentous turning point in our history as far as we can. Our younger generations know nothing of the national trauma we suffered, so they cannot comprehend the tragedy of the Biharis and the unjust manner in which Pakistan's ruling elite continues to ignore the plight of these dedicated Pakistani nationalists. Worse still, because we refuse to own up to the crisis and have a national catharsis we are not able to assertively refute Indian claims regarding the demise of the Two-Nation theory. Yet, the reality is that the creation of Bangladesh is a reaffirmation of the Two-Nation theory - otherwise East Pakistan would have become a part of Indian Bengal rather than an independent Muslim state. But this point can only be argued once we have the national confidence to accept our shortcomings that allowed for the loss of East Pakistan.

Closer to the present, Kargil again reflects the ruling elite's penchant for living a lie because the truth requires more courage. As a result, India has been able to turn a military disaster into a political and diplomatic victory. And we continue to keep a strange silence on it while elements within Pakistan actually refer to "the Kargil fiasco". Well, Kargil was certainly a political fiasco because the political leadership, lacking the strength to own up to the event, turned a military success into a political and diplomatic disaster. Fearful and unable to shake off the US-centric mindset, the dash to Washington was the last step in undermining the military success. Kargil, in fact, links up with the external dimension of our ruling elite's living a lie syndrome — which has had terrible consequences for this nation in terms of its external policies.

External policy dimension

Pakistan has lost out - and continues to lose out - on innovative opportunities in terms of external policy options because its ruling elite cannot rid itself of living the lie of the continuing need for a US-centric approach to foreign policy. This dependency, both diplomatic and psychological, on the US has been the singular factor in our inability to project a holistic nationalist foreign policy. We flirt with a nationalist approach now and then, but we cannot wean ourselves away from the psychological dependency on US approval of our actions. The costs of this dependency have been tremendous for Pakistan, while the benefits have been limited at best.

Historical summation

Our need for military hardware notwithstanding, moving very early on into the US Cold War alliance system made us a pariah not only within the emerging Non-Aligned Movement but also within important centres of the Muslim World. So while our leadership furthered the myth of Pakistan's close links to the Muslim World, the reality was that we were working against the interests of important Muslim states and this became overt during the Suez crisis when the Pakistan government openly sided with France and Britain and against the nationalist regime of Nasser. The Egyptians never forgave us for this and even as late as the eighties, this scribe could sense the hostility towards Pakistan in Egypt.

Of course, the CENTO and SEATO alliances compelled our ruling elite to further yet another lie - which was that the alliance members would come to our assistance against Indian aggression. Not only was this clearly not the case, the Pakistanis had been informed of this repeatedly in precise terms. Apart from the foreclosure of options and distortions in our priorities that these alliance commitments led to for Pakistan, the lie of protection against India was to have a deep impact when it was exposed during the 1965 war and more fully during and after the 1971 crisis. That the lie lasted as long is surprising given that the US and Britain pumped vast amounts of economic and military assistance into India as a result of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict.

However, even when the lie was exposed, the ruling elite in Pakistan hankered after a close re-alliance with the US because it was convinced that Pakistan had few other options! Hence, when the opportunity offered itself with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ruling elite of the time jumped on the US bandwagon - despite the US sanctions already being put in place against Pakistan's nuclear development. The Afghan crisis once again bolstered the lie that there was a confluence of Pak-US interests in the region. With the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the divergence of US-Pakistan interests was continuously being exposed but our ruling elite continued to live the lie of a convergence of interests so that we tended to push forward an Afghan policy jointly authored by Islamabad and Washington. It is with the withdrawal of US support for the Taliban and Pakistan's continuing support and linkages with them that has finally delinked Pakistan's Afghan policy from the "made-in-Washington" stamp.

The present

On Afghanistan: With a totally indigenous Taliban policy, Pakistan has developed a psyche of fear because we continue to live the lie that without US support we are doomed! Hence our almost hysterical pronouncements denying our having any substantive influence over the Taliban! This is absurd. We should accept that we do have influence with the Taliban but that does not imply we will use it to seek implementation of US objectives. After all, why should we? How would it serve our long-term interests to once again seek implementation of US goals in Afghanistan? The answer to all these questions is in the negative and worse still, if we again dilute our nationalist Afghan policy we will lose our advantage in Afghanistan once the Taliban increase their interaction with the international comity of states - which they will do increasingly. Our present policy - which unfortunately seems to be falling prey to the ruling elite's insecurities in relation to the US - of asking the US to deal directly with the Taliban over Osama is correct: Not because we do not have influence with the Taliban but because we must not use that influence to further a third party's interests.

On Bangladesh: At a time when Pakistan can build subgroupings within SAARC in an effort to expose Indian designs, we have been unable to exploit opportunities in countries like Bangladesh. A major stumbling block is our refusal to accept the political realities that led to the development of Bengali nationalism. It is time we had a national catharsis on 1971 so that we can put the past behind us and take up the new alliance options that prevail with Bangladesh. A beginning needs to be made with the release of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report. The state of Pakistan should have the self-confidence and resilience to face the truth and learn from it - and educate future generations so that they do not fall into the same traps. Of course, if we are able to achieve this, then we can also hope the Bengalis will do likewise. The next step is to accept the Pakistanis stranded for decades in Bangladesh. It should never have been a matter of choice for Pakistani governments since every Pakistani has the right to be in his homeland. Denial of this reality is once again symptomatic of the "living-a-lie" syndrome, which has been so damaging for the nation.

On Kashmir: Because we are fearful of acting proactively on issues where we know the US will disapprove, we continue to live a lie that we are only aiding the Kashmiris politically and diplomatically. We should accept the reality that we are a party to the Kashmir dispute and that we have every legal, moral and political right to aid the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination materially. It is a struggle that has international backing in the form of UN resolutions and since India has been and continues to be adamant in contravening international obligations, then the Kashmiris have had no choice but to use military means to rid themselves of Indian occupation and achieve their right to self-determination. In that struggle Pakistan must lend active support. It is time we faced the world squarely on this score. After all, we are not intervening to overthrow an elected government as the US did against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua; we are party to the Kashmir dispute and are within international and national obligations to assist the Kashmiris in their struggle against Indian occupation any way we are able to.

Also, contrary to what the US and India would have use believe, India is the one in dire straits in Kashmir and it is India that is running out of time and options - hence its reluctant recognition of the APHC. Occupation entanglements against a determined and fighting people undermine even the most professional military's strength and well being - as witnessed by the hasty withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon.

On the USA: The Clinton visit to South Asia should have ended the myth of a special US-Pakistan relationship. But for some reason the psyche of some within our ruling elite makes it difficult for them to accept this point. It is as if without this belief, they will lose their moorings. That is why we are embracing all the Americans rushing to Pakistan - which in itself is strange given that the US is propagating the lie that Pakistan is isolated because it is not supporting a US agenda for this region! Not just that - members of our ruling elite are rushing to Washington to offer all manner of explanations and sops. Worse still, our panic and refusal to accept the ground realities in relation to the US saw us blunder into the farce of a Human Rights Convention aimed solely at a foreign audience but with a damaging fallout internally.

It is time to stop living this dangerous lie of the necessity to have a close link with the US. We do not have to antagonise them unnecessarily, but we must keep a distance from them.

We need to give ourselves space. And we will not come asunder, nor will we be isolated, because the US does not have an intimacy with us. Far from it. US interests demand that they keep their linkages with a nuclear Pakistan - so let the US work on building these linkages keeping Pakistan's interests in mind. We have other options that need to be explored, but unless we can develop a national self-confidence we will never be able to take bold initiatives. For that to happen we need to first stop living lies.