Columnist MB NAQVI discusses the new strategic options available for world powers.

The strategic picture today is dominated by the power and influence of the United States of America. It takes two forms. Primarily, it looks as if it is mainly directed at the prosperity of the American and western world's transitional corporations by working toward the full globalisation of all economies. But on the surface, all careful observers cannot fail to notice that it is the overwhelming US military power that dominates all areas of, and seas around, the Asian landmass. On the ground the American military power is relatively small but is located on strategic sites beginning with Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean going on to Okinawa (Seventh Fleet) and South Korea, while Middle East is covered by the Sixth and Fifth Fleets. Masses of nuclear-tipped ICBMs ensure that no part of the globe is outside the dominance of the US, while the US Navy shows the flag all around the globe. Is there anything more to it?

It would seem that Europe continues to be a safe redoubt of the US military power where it is unlikely to be checkmated in the next 20 years or so. No one seems to be nationalistic and adventurous enough to embark on an anti-American course. In Africa it would be a long time before a new power able to dominate the whole of the continent emerges. Meantime, South Africa remains a major power in that continent but not yet oriented to throwing its weight about or being taken as a strategic world player. Latin America remains the backyard of the US. Insofar as Australia and New Zealand along with the islands thrown haphazardly by a cosmic dispensation in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean are concerned, they do not pose any problem to anyone because Australia, while a significantly strong power, is not oriented to dominate others. It is also content to cultivate Asia's Far East - mainly for trade and economic considerations. It is unlikely to play any particularly strong hand in the next 20 years. It is only in Asia where some movement can be expected. Indeed, Asia alone is where there would be much diplomatic and political action in the next 20 years or more.

But what sort of action in Asia can be expected? Here, there is something to assert and something to refute. The closing years of the 20th century saw one major world political player out of the arena: the Soviet Union. It died a quiet and sudden death at the end of 1980s. What is left is a confused Russia with a still chaotic economy after 10 years. It will take a good decade, on the best possible assumption, before Russia can realise some of its potential. Doubtless, the Russians have all the sinews of power that go to make up a superpower; indeed they are more than sinews. But that depends only if the Russian economy can be reorganised and political life made coherent and stable; it can still emerge as a front rank global power that cannot be taken for granted. Whether it will or not depends ultimately on the outcome of the interplay of domestic forces that will go to determine the direction Russian politics and even more critically its economy takes. So long as the economy remains at sixes and sevens, as it has happened during the last 10 years, the Russian Federation can disintegrate and a multiplicity of new states can emerge. But, as we have noted, if its economy can be reconstructed and politics made coherent in which all the far flung areas of Russia can feel that they can be satisfied being parts of big Mother Russia, we may have a revival of the Russian power. Otherwise, the Russia of today can go the way of Soviet Union. Doubtless the emergence of Vladimir Putin as the new political chief has revived hope in many. For the rest, the world will wait whether Putin's Russia overcomes the challenges to its survival in the political and economic fields.

From the financial and economic points of view, Asia remains dominated by three major world economic powers: the US, Japan and EU. A fourth is struggling to be counted among the great; indeed it has emerged as the fourth: It is China. If the Chinese Four Modernisations Programme goes through and China does not feel compelled to divert resources for undertaking further heavy militarisation, it might emerge as the number one economic and political power in Asia. Like Russia, there are questionmarks about longer-term stability of China in experts’ minds. Why? Because it is still being ruled by the Communist Party and one-party rule is today regarded, almost by definition, as a temporary deviation from the norm. It is only democratic regimes that can attain stability. The challenges to the Chinese leadership are manifold but the central one is: how to reconcile the actual aspirations of its billion plus people with the growth of its wealth that is beginning to foment new and greater inequalities. These constitute a longer-term threat while in the short run the strength of the political leadership and its preservation of the basic framework of the social services created by the Communist planning provide adequate grounds for stability for the immediate future. But concerning the longer-term future, if counted in decades, there is not much certainty.

However, the new moves to be noted are several. Insofar as Japan is concerned, it shows all the signs that it still remains satisfied with making money and remaining loyal to the American leadership again for the immediate future. But there is not much uncertainty about its peace orientation. Japan's political sights are not high - for the present. Most experts think Japan may basically remain a major power centre that chooses not to play a strong political role. As for EU, it too chooses not to make a big political bid for influence and remains content with whatever trade and economic benefits it can make in Asia.

It is only the Russians, the Chinese and the Americans that are making significant political moves. Insofar as the Americans are concerned, they have only to secure Asian areas where political trouble need not be expected: they are what the Americans call Middle East and most of us call West Asia and the Gulf region. These are safe American areas where the American diplomacy is trying to bring about a reconciliation between the Palestinians and the Arabs as a precondition for the general acceptance of Israel in rest of Asia. This can be roughly regarded as the final endorsement by the region for America's global supremacy insofar as West Asia and the Gulf region retain today's social and political orientation. For the rest, America is wary about other areas, chiefly South Asia, Central Asia and the vaster stretches of China and Russia.

Among these Russia's vast domains are perceived as an inviting arena for the future. Either the Russians get their act together or there will be many many new bickering states in the length and breadth of what was the world's largest geographical power. As for China, it remains totally outside the scope of any manipulation by outsiders; the control of the Communist regime is still tight and that is a guarantee that so long as it lasts, there is no scope for outsiders either to fish in its troubled waters or to play the usual great power games. Meantime, China is beginning to flex its muscles and has started playing a strong hand. At the turn of the century, the Chinese design appears to be based on reconciliation and normalisation of ties. It began with Russia where it has tried to befriend the Russian people and rebuild the old 1950s-like strategic partnership. The Sino-Russian axis, the Chinese hope, and the Russians under Putin are responding apparently warmly, is to be the most important current determinant of Asian politics.

China and Russia have increased their trade, made several agreements, reduced their army deployments that were eyeball to eyeball along their long borders in Asia's middle. Then, China tried to assemble a group the aim of which originally was to ensure that American role in Asia is contained and hopefully reduced. That was its chief stated aim. The first attempt aimed at creating an axis of China, Iran, India and Russia. It did not quite succeed largely because the Indians were attracted to other possibilities. China, however, succeeded in forming another group known as Shanghai Five. It comprises China, Russia, Khyrgizistan Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It has gathered momentum; its summits are noteworthy affairs, certainly for Pakistanis. The second aim of the Shanghai Five is what the Sino-Russian partnership is now about: fight against terrorism. Now, terrorism here implies one simple thing: What used to be summed up as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic extremism is now increasingly being referred to as terrorism. But it is directly related to Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Shanghai Five very quickly adopted the aim of containing, and insofar as possible countering the Taliban activities that these powers feel are at their expense. They object to proselytising and promotion of militant Islamic ideas by Taliban that would seek to overthrow the modernist and Marxist-originated governments and replace them with Taliban-like regimes. Whether or not this is the main threat to them and whether or not it is feasible to counter Taliban or whether it is likely to succeed, the governments throughout Central Asia feel to be in danger.

Meanwhile, just about the time that the Shanghai Five were getting together, Pakistan secured the greatest gain of its 53 years old life: victory of Taliban in Afghanistan. That set a cat among the pigeons. Afghanistan was in all the perceptions round the globe a neutral area, a buffer zone between major power systems of successive times. It was first a buffer between the Russian and British Imperialisms and later between the east and west. East and west fought a hot war for almost a decade in 1980s in Afghanistan because the Russians had violated the tacit understanding of staying out. The conceptual incorporation of Afghanistan into the power system of a second-rank power like Pakistan in 1996 has jolted all. The political stripes of the Taliban are yet another factor that has shocked most governments. However, the most shocked are three: India, Iran and Russia while China also has good reasons to feel threatened because Taliban have kept sending preachers, agents and trouble makers into Xinjiang. Indeed the Chinese government have had to register four formal protests with the Pakistan government.

The Russians have of course the grouse against Taliban that they are training Chechen rebels and sending volunteers to Chechnya to fight against them. The Putin government threatened Taliban with aerial bombing of such sanctuaries. Russians are livid against Taliban, so is India because it thinks that the Taliban are casting long shadows over India's military occupation of Kashmir. The most angry, however, was Iran because of two factors: one was the historical interests Iran has in certain western Afghanistan areas bordering on Iran's Khorasan province. Secondly the Taliban's treatment meted out to the Shia minority in Afghanistan, particularly the Hazaras, had shocked the whole world. Iran itself is an Islamic state. But the Taliban treatment of minorities and women has shocked even the Islamic clerics of Iran. Countering terrorism is now the chief aim of Shanghai Five, apart from reducing the role of America, Iran wants to join the Shanghai Five. What this can mean for Pakistanis should not be difficult to appreciate.

Insofar as Sino-Pakistan relations are concerned, there need be no worry. These relations have historically been wholly one sided. The Chinese have helped Pakistan for their own good reasons even when Pakistan has not respected their advice and has acted against their wishes. The Chinese have not taken offence for anything and have continued to provide, whatever, help they could. This is due to their appreciation of the strategic situation. They want a South Asian power that can somehow balance the weight of India. This strategic need of China is not likely to go away. Therefore, Pakistanis need not to be too alarmed over some recent developments in Afghanistan. But for the rest, Chinese are unhappy with Pakistan's continued and more or less unthinking support for Taliban. They also look askance at the Taliban and their works. One reason is Pakistan is not a power that can foot the bill for Afghanistan's reconstruction or its incorporation in its power system. Pakistan is scarcely able to cope with the consequences of its own 'victory'. That means that Pakistanis have to think deep and long over what to do about Afghanistan.

The Americans have treated the Russians rather shabbily. That the west has tried to mollify Russia in words, though not in action. The major world powers say Russia is a great power and have made it a part of G7, calling themselves Group 8. But these are empty words. In action they have expanded NATO threatening Russia, taking in several members of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact that Soviet Union had put together. Eastern Europe was meant to be a buffer. The Russians are also not welcome in NATO. NATO's area of active defensive parameters has reached right up to Russian borders. NATO has eaten up the entire buffer zone in Europe. This does not reflect friendly feelings towards the Russians. Russia needs aid. But the western opinion is now veering around to the view that throwing good money after all their experiences of Russia is a wastage. The Russians are being asked to pull their own bootstraps themselves and rise up if they can. Only minimum IMF aid is being provided to keep it afloat - quite like Pakistan in some respects.

The only change in the American attitude toward Russia came early in the 21st century. The Americans have suddenly woken up to the growing threat of Islamic terrorism based in Afghanistan. Their Gen. Anthony Zinni, chief of the Central Command, was talking of it as a threat to the entire international community, requiring international action. He said precisely this on May 15 last in Tashkent at a workshop of media people. In the process he called central Asian republics the new 'frontline states' and he especially singled out Uzbekistan. Now remember the Russian threat of bombing the Taliban bases where they are supposed to be training Chechen volunteers for going to the Chechnya war. Taliban and Afghanistan are the only subjects where the interests of the Russians and Americans are being projected to coincide. Successive American officials have tried to build bridges with Moscow for a common fight against terrorism this calendar year. In fact the June 4 summit between the US President Bill Clinton and the Russian President Putin had only one positive element: that was the proposal to coordinate their separate fight against terrorism. But the Russian response while not being negative has been less than enthusiastic, insofar as the American schemes are concerned. The Russians, as the Bishkek summit of the Shanghai Five has shown, are far more enthusiastic about the coordinating efforts with China and its other Asian partners.

From the Pakistani viewpoint, the most volatile area remains their own South Asia, mainly Indo-Pakistan cold war over Kashmir. The nuclear status of the two powers has introduced great uncertainties as well as created the stark need for a detente between the two that would regulate their cold war and arms race. An uncontrolled arms race in the nuclear and missile fields is much too destabilising for all the powers concerned as well as for others. The whole world is beginning to impact on the two to begin talks that should, as a minimum, aim at a detente if not anything greater. Pakistan's acquisition of more influence over Afghanistan is yet another aggravating factor in the Indo-Pakistan ties as well as more generally with nearly all others. Pakistan's gain in Afghanistan could in some circumstances have conferred great advantages. But for that Pakistan has to be in a finer fettle than it is. That leave most questions wide open. Meanwhile, India is being patronised by the US and built up as a counterweight to China. That creates a tricky situation: Pakistanis cannot ignore that both Iran and India are aspirants of membership in the Shanghai Five group. Indeed Pakistan too needs to recultivate China as a Pakistani need - rather than responding to Chinese initiatives. The Sino-Pakistan friendship cannot go on being one sided; Pakistanis have to provide some positive input themselves and recognise the concerns of others.