Challenges of the New Strategic Environment

Talk by Gen (Retd) Jehangir Karamat at the Inaugural Seminar of the Near-East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies on 31st October, 2000.

Former COAS Gen (Retd) JEHANGIR KARAMAT talks about challenges faced by South Asia and its impact on the region.

It is a great pleasure and a privilege to be here at the inaugural seminar of the Near-East South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies (NESA). For us in South Asia this is an important event because not only does NESA fill a gap in strategic studies of the region but it also has the potential to become a focal point for interaction. It will, I am sure, lead to the kind of sustained and consistent engagement that can address regional and local security concerns to prevent unpredictable and destabilising events from happening. NESA’s studies and input can help in a better understanding of regional environments so that the evolving bilateral relationships of the US have a regional context and balance, rather than imbalance the region. The US-Israel relationship for example is perceived by that regions’ countries as a destabilising factor and current events are highlighting this perception. NESA is, therefore, sure to have the support of all those who desire peace and stability.

There is no doubt that the strategic environment in the region underwent a dramatic change when, India and Pakistan, carried out reciprocal tests of nuclear weapons in May 1998. I would, however, like to just mention some of the other events that had a significant effect on the region. These events had a deep impact and in many cases emphasised existing fault-lines, hostilities and conflicts. They indirectly contributed to the overall change in the strategic environment. There was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. Then, there were other events — like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed by the War of Resistance or Jehad, with US support, against what was seen as a Marxist assault on Islam, the end of the Cold War and the changes in Europe and Central Asia, the civil war in Afghanistan which continues and the freedom struggle in Kashmir for the right of self-determination that also continues. There were other more local happenings that are also relevant — the ongoing insurgency in Sri Lanka and India’s aborted intervention in it, the Sikh insurgency in India, urban and sectarian violence in Pakistan, the blow-back into Pakistan from Afghanistan and Kashmir, the events leading upto the deployment of forces and a conflict situation in the Siachen Glacier area north of Kashmir and more recently the conflict in the Kargil area and the return of military government in Pakistan after a decade of uninterrupted but weak democracy. I mention these events to underscore the fact that it is a region of hostility, protracted and intractable conflict, confrontation, domestic pressures, internal instabilities and, right now, zero dialogue between India and Pakistan. This is the environment in which nuclear weapons cast their shadow over relationships as India and Pakistan grapple with the realities of an overt nuclear posture and missile capabilities. Their experience will not only decide their destiny but also influence others in the region.

The decisions to test were made by both countries in what they perceived to be their national security interest and they had worked for many years against great odds to become nuclear capable. India sees its security as linked to regional hegemony. Pakistan sees it in terms of survival as a politically independent Islamic state. In this context we might consider the fact that the removal of the stabilising or anchoring effect of the Cold War had introduced an element of fragility and instability in the strategic environment. Therefore, decisions, ostensibly made in the national security interest, have an element of narrow political interest and a pandering to domestic pressure. These are the decisions that led to changes in the strategic environment and more such decisions will determine policies in the new environment. Mature, responsible and institutionalised decision-making will be a great challenge. Many of the events in the region can be analysed from this angle and even post-event rhetoric and policies have been influenced by such considerations. The end of the Cold War was an opportunity for reorienting relationships and the 1998 nuclear tests again presented such a challenge but in both cases exactly the opposite was done and the opportunities were lost. There was a period in the 90’s when talks and restraint created an environment that gave hope and eventually led to the Indian Prime Minister’s controversial visit to Pakistan but that opportunity was also lost. Not enough homework and preparation had preceded the visit. The changed security environment, therefore, requires very responsible, mature and objective decision-making to meet the challenges of establishing a restraint regime for nuclear as well as conventional weapons. Also for the development of strategies that will determine weaponisation, deployment and command and control and above all, future attitudes towards nuclear weapons and non-proliferation measures. Institutionalising interaction and dialogue so that a peace process starts will be another challenge.

The tests have had an impact beyond the South Asian region. India identified China as its primary threat and apparently its test was meant to send a message there. China must have registered the message but its response may not be quite what India hopes it will be. In any case it is unlikely that there will be any changes in China’s immediate policies but it will now see India differently  as it considers its future strategic direction. India, by its action, has indicated that an overt nuclear posture against China is its preferred policy. China on the other hand has so far encouraged a process of improving relations with India. China’s focus is on its economy and it sees its future security and stability in terms of economic prosperity. Pakistan’s response has always been to a threat from India and its security concerns have now been enhanced by Indian policies and actions. India’s plans for a military build up through military hardware from Russia are also causing concern to Pakistan. The challenge inherent in this situation is for India and Pakistan to manage their nuclear deterrent relationship in an environment of proximity and hostility. They have to decide what ‘minimum deterrence’ means especially when India considers it in relation to China and Pakistan looks at India. Perhaps there is now an opportunity for the word ‘reassurance’ to figure in the India-Pakistan relationship and this reassurance has to come from India as the much bigger country. China is already sending such signals to India and has consistently advocated dialogue as the only way to resolve India-Pakistan disputes. The challenge, of course, is to create the kind of environment in which such concepts seem sincere and well meant. At this point in time, when Pakistan is resolving its internal problems, addressing economic issues and has indicated that it will not try to match Indian capabilities but take steps only for its defence and survival, it may be relevant to move from exploitation of each others vulnerabilities towards reassuring each other over future strategies. The urge to extract political mileage out of situations must be tempered by regional concerns. The US can encourage and influence such trends.

There is the point of view that the nuclear tests in South Asia have had a positive effect by bringing security and stability to an insecure and unstable region. Other arguments in favour of this are that asymmetries have been balanced and the chances of coercion through blackmail have been eliminated. Finally, it is said that the chances of war have been eliminated because of both sides having nuclear weapons. It has been suggested that because of this strategic deterrence low intensity conflict and even limited war can be policy options. These are dangerous attitudes. I have already mentioned how national security decision making can be distorted by inadequate informed input and political considerations and pressures. The Kargil episode, though it never had a nuclear dimension and was rooted in the inherently unpredictable Kashmir situation, did indicate that conflict situations can escalate to low level or even limited war with all its implications even when nuclear weapons are there. A reverse which is perceived as threatening to survival can lead to unpredictable escalation. A far greater challenge is to address the internal security situations that exist in the countries of the region and the threats posed by terrorism, drugs and freely available weapons. The leadership in South Asia has acknowledged that economic reforms are most important and that human development programmes need urgent attention if serious psycho-social problems and upheavals are to be avoided. This is a tacit admission that national security rests increasingly on political stability, economic viability and internal harmony. Internal security, therefore, presents a very real challenge and it is in this context that the prolonged struggles in Afghanistan and Kashmir must be seen. These situations must be resolved. We do need to remember that the resurgent demand for self-determination, religious fervour and democracy has come in the wake of the events in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This demand is as strong as the anti-colonial feeling that swept the world after World War II. The challenge is to ensure international involvement to settle these disputes because of the extra regional implications.

Going by the currently available information it seems that both India and Pakistan have so far not taken irrevocable steps towards weaponization and deployment and that both are seriously addressing the challenge of effective command and control measures. The greatest challenge is to make sure that weaponization and deployment is totally avoided and here I am going by the generally accepted definitions of these terms. In the South Asian strategic environment these steps can be highly destabilising and can lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries in proximity of the region. In a weaponised and deployed state crisis, control and management of pressures under tension become extremely difficult. Command and control is, of course, critically important because this will establish ultimate responsibility, prevent accidents and unauthorised use. A recent study has highlighted the enormous cost involved in developing the sort of capabilities that the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine highlights, so a nuclear arms race is the last thing South Asia needs. A realistic restraint regime is a very big challenge in the changed environment. Existing situations cannot be reversed but acceptable limits could be accepted and could in time be extended to other areas.

It would be unwise for any country to think that the changed strategic environment has created strategic stability so the risk of war has reduced and that low intensity conflicts do not pose a danger. I think it is also a fallacy to think that nuclear weapons have resolved insecurities. Such thinking is based on an inadequate understanding of the real impact of nuclear weapons and the change in the environment. It is, therefore, important for the states to understand and agree that, in the changed strategic environment, the use of military force cannot be the basis of a winnable strategy. The focus should shift to dialogue and ultimately to an institutionalised peace process. There is no doubt that the core issue is Kashmir and that both sides have hardened positions on this issue. The only way to break the deadlock, if only to better manage the status quo, is to initiate dialogue without preconditions. The opportunity to reach an agreement on future nuclear trends should not be a hostage to any other unresolved issues. India and China on one side and India and Pakistan on the other can start the process of dialogue to address their respective security concerns. India has a central position and should take the initiative. The military government in Pakistan should not be an excuse for delaying dialogue nor should strategies of exploiting current internal instabilities be considered as options. The military government in Pakistan is committed to a return to democracy and the reforms being introduced have popular support so policies are not likely to change with a change in government.

In the uni-polar world the US has the ability to influence events. Many recent situations have been resolved through various measures and even the use of UN sanctioned force. In the changed and evolving strategic environment the US has a role to play in encouraging the acceptance of the challenges of this environment. US and Pakistan have a long history of co-operation. The developing India-US relationship is also significant. The US can and should orchestrate the efforts of all regional and non-regional actors to accept the challenges. The US needs to take a long view of the changing strategic environment considering not just India’s potential but Pakistan’s role in the region and in the Islamic world. The US can help in resolving internal instabilities, provide help in structuring restraint and control measures and steer the region towards dialogue, reassurance and security. Transitory and evolving situations should not be the basis for long term strategies. In this era of international and economic interaction the strategies which seek to isolate  or punish states can lead to a regional imbalance and even desperate situations. This may suit the forces which control international terrorism, the drugs and weapons trade and extremist elements. For those who have a vision of the future regional balance is most important and this can come only from a resolution of internal conflicts and international interaction.