Anti-Terrorism Web and the China Factor

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA talks about Chinese concern about the Talibaan.

It was a particularly significant exchange. Setting aside diplomatic niceties the four member delegation from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR) had opted to be forthright about their curiosity and concern related to Afghan’s Talibaan government. The general refrain of the delegation was that  it  knows very little about the Talibaan, that most of the Chinese press reports what the western press writes, that the Chinese have very little independent information on the Talibaan which they now must acquire. In addition to meeting with Pakistani officials, members of research institutes, academia and independent writers, this delegation of Chinese scholars will have visited Kabul and Kandahar before end October.

This visit of the CICIR scholars acquired special significance against the backdrop of the angry outburst of a Chinese scholar Lee. Early November a researcher from the Chinese Centre for Strategic Studies was extremely critical of the Talibaan’s role in exporting terrorism. Addressing a seminar at the Centre for Central Asian Studies at Peshawar University he claimed  that the Chinese authorities had evidence to prove the help Xinjiang separatists were getting from the Talibaan. The Chinese scholar blamed the Talibaan for undermining Chinese stability and security and claimed that the Chinese government would support Ahmed Shah Masood if he retakes Kabul. Quite unexpectedly the leader of the delegation himself referred to Lee’s thesis and emphasized that Beijing had no independent evidence to prove that the Talibaan were in fact directly involved in supporting “terrorism”. Mr. Lee’s outburst had prompted many instant and concerned comments in the Pakistani press painting a doomsday scenario in Pak-China relations.

The Chinese scholars represented three different centres of the CICIR; the  Third World Studies, the Ethnic and Religious Studies Centre and the South and Southeast Studies Centers. Interesting Dr. Fang Jinying who has been working on Afghanistan for the last three years produced a paper on Afghanistan focusing on the Talibaan was actually noticed and read by the Chinese President. While acknowledging the problems of terrorism generally in her paper Dr. Jinying had supported the idea of engaging with the Talibaan since they were a major political force. Her participation in the various discussion groups merely reinforced her own findings about the Talibaan government.

For the visiting scholars it was important to realize that within the context of Chinese national security concerns, by not engaging more regularly and systematically in a dialogue with the Talibaan, Beijing is merely denying itself the Talibaan support, to the extent the Talibaan can provide it given the lose Afghan State apparatus. A significant factor that question any assumption about the Talibaan support for Chinese separatists in Xinjiang is the fact that the only territorial link between China and Afghanistan is the narrow Wahkhan corridor which opens up in Ahmad Shah Massoud controlled territory. While entry into Xinjiang of some religious separatists cannot be denied, for Beijing merely mirroring Moscow and Washington’s policy of engineering the Talibaan’s political demise at all costs will not promote Chinese national interest.

Russia, United States, Iran and indeed India are pursuing an anti-Talibaan policy for their own specific security reasons; all except the US believe they are advancing their strategic interests goals by pursuing an anti-Talibaan policy. That such a reactive and militaristic policy may not advance any strategic policy is another matter, the US’s main concern remains issue specific — the Osama Bin Laden factor (OBL). US has chosen to remain engaged with the Talibaan government in the hope of a political breakthrough on the OBL factor. Iran interestingly has adopted a two pronged policy — remaining engaged through trade, diplomatic and political exchanges and yet keeping the diplomatic and military pressure on through its involvement in the anti-Talibaan pro-Massoud military coalition.

Although the problem of sub-state militaristic actors in the region, which do indeed undermine state control, societal peace and regional stability cannot be denied, the government’s within the anti-Talibaan coalition have allocated primary responsibility for all this to the Talibaan. Facts including availability of no independent evidence of the Talibaan ‘exporting’ Islamic revolution, the problem of extremism predating the advent of the Talibaan, the post-1991 five-year civil war in Tajikistan between the government and the Islamic  opposition, the politically oppressive policies of key government’s within the region, the long history of drug  problem, are all ignored to justify their anti-Talibaan policy.

At the diplomatic and the military level the attempt by most countries in the region including the US, to tighten the noose around the Talibaan’s neck continues. Mostly in the name of anti-terrorism, narco-terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism. The anti-Talibaan web grows ominously. With the first deputy foreign minister of Russia in Delhi, the first session of the Indo-Russian Working Group on Afghanistan is also underway. Indian analysts have maintained that “the revival of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership according to Indian analysts has centered around containing fundamentalist Islamic forces from Afghanistan.”

Similarly during his November 18 Moscow meeting with his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev the Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed steps needed to create an anti-terrorist Centre for the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the same day the Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff met with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing. Such is the significance of the terrorism issue that concluding his week-long visit the general declared that “our most important task is to fight international terrorism by developing methods of early warning working out effective actions and destroying terrorists.”

Washington’s efforts following unsuccessful negotiations with the Talibaan and attack on the US ship Cole, have accelerated. Mid-October the US Under Secretary Thomas Pickering and Russian First Deputy Minister Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Tribnukov attended the US-Russian Anti-Terrorist Group meet in Moscow. During their  meeting US and Russian officials decided to intensify sanctions against the Talibaan government because of Talibaan’s support for international terrorism and drug trafficking. According to Pickering close collaboration over the terrorism issue stems from the fact that US and Russia share a “deep sense of common understanding of the threat” posed by the Talibaan.

According to the Washington File dated October 18 and posted on US State Department web-site  Pickering said that the “US accuses the Talibaan of funding terrorists training camps where tens of thousands of people have been prepared for operations in Central Asia and beyond.” In September a US General Tommy Franks,  during his Uzbekistan visit, promised an increase in military aid because of fear that the Afghan fighting will “destabilize the whole of Central Asia. “

Late September the head of the American taskforce on counter-terrorism, Michael Sheehan and his Indian counterpart emphasized the connection between the Talibaan movement in Afghanistan and the opium trade. Sheehan argued that drug money was financing international terrorism. Under deepening Indo-US cooperation American specialists will train Indian police on the latest techniques in crime detection, counter-terrorism and narcotics policing.

Although at a less active level the Chinese too remain engaged in the anti-terrorism efforts. On November 13 General Valery Manilov, First Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff met with General Xu  Guangkai, the Chinese Deputy Minister of Defence. Russian news agency reported their agreement to begin practical cooperation as soon as possible to eliminate terrorism and separatism. The content of the ‘practical cooperation’ was not defined.

Beijing naturally considers religious and ethnic armed groups as forces capable of threatening China’s integrity. Early this year the Chinese Defence Minister let the Pakistani officials know that they would “smash” the armed infiltrator groups.  However, retaining a historical perspective on the problems like armed violence,  ethnic and religious extremism and separatism and drug trafficking proliferating Central Asia and the neighbouring regions the best option will be of constructively engaging the Talibaan while remaining alert of militaristic threats to China’s security.

The Chinese have deployed wisdom in the pursuit of their strategic objectives, in the economic, military and political fields. Hopefully, they will do the same in formulating a policy towards the Afghan government while remaining mindful of them, their own legitimate interests in Central Asia, of the  Indo-Russia factor and of the Indo-US game of containing China.