The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

GEO-POLITICAL AFFAIRS
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
	Contributing Editor Vice Adm (Retd) IQBAL F QUADIR writes about the CTBT issue
On the surface the stated purpose of CTBT is merely to stop underground testing of nuclear weapons and to create an international regime to ensure its verification. There is also, already, an agreement amongst the self-proclaimed five nuclear powers stopping all nuclear weapons testing in the air and on the surface. In this manner it is hoped that in the future no country would be able to test explode any nuclear device without fear of a general world sanctions. This, too, would ensure stoppage of any further proliferation of weapons of this type. An impression has also been created that all this effort together with others like control on dissemination of sensitive or dual purpose technologies, or stopping further production of fissile material of weapons grade, all would lead towards creating a stable peaceful world that would permit nuclear disarmament in the future. If that was the case then it is a most laudable proposition. It is also stated that the treaty bans (verifiable) nuclear explosions only and nothing more and as such would have no effect on Pakistan and India's nuclear capabilities. Further that despite all the Treaties and Controls already agreed to or envisaged, Pakistan would be able to maintain permanently its nuclear deterrence capability against India. Therefore, all is well and there is nothing to worry about. But is that so? Let us take the case of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons first. In Pakistan, most of those who favoured signing of CTBT immediately, had earlier in May 1998 claimed that with the state of nuclear weapons' development in the country a physical explosion of a device was not necessary to ensure it would work and provide the expected results. This meant that any country, whether it has signed NPT / CTBT etc. or not, could still surreptitiously develop a credible nuclear weapons' capability and make the system as highly sophisticated as the state of that country's scientific and technological development would support. No one would know because a physical explosion is not necessary. That being the case, then in fact, CTBT does not contribute anything towards the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. Why then all this huge effort, expense and fuss by three of 'the five self- proclaimed' Nuclear Weapon States to promote NPT / CTBT etc.? If the treaty was designed to be the first real step towards elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, then, nothing could be better than it. However, three things do create doubts. The desire to continue with the 'rights and privileges' of the existing exclusive nuclear weapons club of five. The right to continue with simulated weapons testing and cold trials, which because of the sophistication available in that field virtually amounts to real testing. A capability that perhaps only the five plus two (Japan and Germany) possess and elements of which are most likely being passed on to India right now under various economic, scientific and technological cooperation agreements in return for certain considerations. The permission granted to 'the Five' to exchange information in nuclear weapons' field amongst themselves, while denying the same facility to others e.g. even between India and Israel or North Korea. In reality, if the past were any guide, it means exchange of information between NATO nuclear weapon states only. In the future, there could be droppings for Russia too, just to keep her amused till the unbearable weight of nuclear super-structure under the fresh Russian nuclear doctrine brings itself or the whole house down. That is if the West, for reasons of its own, does not subsidize that country economically and financially, and thereby allow it to divert indigenous resources in greater quantities into nuclear weapons field. Further, despite all the advantages that the existing and proposed treaties and agreements provide USA, the decision at the Capitol Hill not to ratify CTBT should make our thinkers, planners and decision makers alike to ask themselves; 'Why the hesitancy?' What worries the high and mighty, should not the same be atleast of some concern to new comers in the field. India is doing just that. Pakistan must give CTBT a deeper look as to its effect on Pakistan when combined with other treaties and controls, many still at the discussion stage. We must also appreciate that most of the nuclear technology is dual purpose and if Pakistan does not safeguard its interests now it could find itself denied newer and some of the older technologies even for peaceful / economic purposes like textile mills and chemical industries etc. Without these newer technologies Pakistan's industries would soon become outdated and uneconomical, and reduce the country to the level of mere raw material exports. The only way this situation could be avoided is by having the status of a Nuclear Weapon State. Failing that Pakistan must insist that no non-nuclear state would be allowed to acquire /retain / possess dual-purpose nuclear technology before Pakistan signs / ratifies CTBT or any other proposed treaties and controls. When one looks at the combined effect of CTBT and FMCR, let us assume that Pakistan and India stop further enrichment of fissile material but there would be a great difference between the two. Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear material would practically freeze except for a little amount that will come out of KANUPP and the CHASHMA Plant. India, on the contrary with its already vast and increasing nuclear power programme would have huge stocks being pumped out regularly. Thus creating an increasing imbalance between the two countries. Not only that but due to the life cycle of nuclear materials, after a certain period Pakistan's stock would decline rapidly and the disparity between the two countries' stocks would rise sharply. How would then Pakistan retain a credible nuclear deterrence against India? What would happen when Pakistan's existing stock of enriched material runs out its life cycle and the country has not processed any new material because of FMCR? Where would then be our defensive shield? Furthermore, considering the open hostility Moscow is maintaining towards Pakistan and seeing how cruelly and wantonly it has treated its weak neighbours in the last thirty years, should Pakistanis not think of what it might have to face if Russia does not reconcile itself to allowing the CAS States and Afghanistan freedom in their international relations? We must not lose sight of the future and the hope that the country would progressively be better off politically and economically. Given the right leadership Pakistanis, with the Blessings of God, are capable of doing wonders. In which case, this country might become a pole of attraction for these countries lying between Pakistan and Russia. Here, we must not forget that in its last five thousand years of history Pakistan has remained a part of Central Asia or of the Central Asian culture for more than four thousand five hundred years. The Pathans only extended their influence into the plains of Hindusthan and the Mughals completed the Central Asian conquest of what is present India and gave it a political entity which then survived over four hundred years till 1947. Therefore, with the passage of time there are great chances of Pakistan, Afghanistan and CAS getting culturally and economically closer to each other. Should we not perceive, hope and work for such an eventuality? And when Insha Allah that happens what would the reaction of Russia? Should we not think and plan for that? Those in a hurry to sign CTBT before Pakistan is 'granted' the status of Nuclear Weapon State in the hope that later, if India obtains better terms and conditions, Pakistan need not ratify the treaty in the manner of the US Legislators I ask,' If today, under the pressure or compulsion of economic difficulties, or with the idea of gaining some undefined temporary economic-cum-military benefits and a moral victory over India, whatever that means in the present day jungle world, we are prepared to sign CTBT; what is there to ensure that under similar or worse circumstances later, we would not succumb to similar pressures, compulsions or temptations of further undefined gains?' For those who have decided to live for today only and do not care to think of a tomorrow with self-respect and honour, and for those who do not aspire for the higher, and prepared to make sacrifices for it, I recommend a little patience and a rethink. But, please, let hurry not create a greater worry later, particularly for our children in the manner our elders have left for us. If in the case of India the world can wait for elections and induction of a new government to and give it time to build up a consensus in the country, surely the same considerations cannot be denied to Pakistan.