CTBT Should Pakistan take the plunge?

Columnist SherjeeL Rizwan questions Pakistan’s position on signing the CTBT.

Whether Pakistan should sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or not has once again become the burning issue, both with the government and the public. Although Pakistan is undergoing pressures to sign the CTBT but is just not a treaty that should be signed for purely political reasons. The treaty has serious implications for Pakistan’s nuclear autonomy as it directly affects Pakistan nuclear capability and its relevance to the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence.

CTBT is in fact a measure which aims to marginalise new nuclear states from the Calculus of International nuclear diplomacy by confining their nuclear reach to sub-regional parameters through limiting them to their first generation of rather simple nuclear devices. Further it must be realised that the treaty is part of a more comprehensive initiative involving the FMCT which itself seeks to eventually bring about a comprehensive moratorium on the production of fissile material, placing production facilities under the supervision of the clearly American inspired and driven IAEA. This comprehensive measure is aimed at limiting and rolling back the nuclear capability of certain states, prime amongst them Pakistan.

The main argument in favour of Pakistan signing the CTBT is economic reason i.e. “If Pakistan sign it, it can draw economic assistance and investment from abroad”. Secondly, that by signing the treaty, our economic situation would improve. The fact is that signing the CTBT will not translate into any concrete economic benefits. As far our need to further reschedule loans, as asserted by the Finance Minister, that will be possible even without signing the CTBT. International lending agencies cannot afford defaults. Russia is a prime example. They will bail Pakistan out. Furthermore, our economic situation is not entirely linked to our nuclear programme. Rather it has its roots in factors like corruption, mismanagement of resources and failure to have persistent economic policies over a period of time. We were near a state of economic chaos before we tested; and if we want to improve our economic situation we have to see our internal problems face to face, rather than hide behind illusions.

Those in favour of signing the CTBT refer to the withdrawal clause of the treaty. According to them, using this clause Pakistan can withdraw from the treaty by giving a notice of six months if and when its supreme national interests are threatened. It won’t be easy for Pakistan to withdraw, once it signs the treaty, in any given conditions. The criticism and condemnation will be much greater and the world cannot and will not understand if our supreme national interest is threatened and they will be in a position not to allow us to withdraw. Another view is that we sign it and then later on delay the ratification but even this will not do any good, because as a signatory we will be bound by Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on Treaties not to undertake any action that violates the “purpose or intent” of the treaty ... irrespective of whether the CTBT ever comes into force or not.

Another argument is that Pakistan can still have its nuclear devices without having to conduct further tests. This is not true because like every other weapon, nuclear weapon has a limited life. They cease to be effective after some years. We have to check the effectiveness of our nuclear devices from time to time. This cannot be done without actual test explosions because no technology, however, sophisticated it may be, can substitute actual testing, there are certain variables which cannot be checked without actual text. According to Dr. James Schlesinger, former secretary of defense, director of the CIA and Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission:

“In the absence of testing, confidence in the reliability of the stockpile will inevitably decline ....”

Former secretary of defense Casper Weinberger says:

“... The only assurance that you could have that [the devices] will work is to test them, and the only way to test them is the most effective way to test them” .

According to Admiral Henry Chills, former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Forces Command:-

“... without testing I know of no other engineering unit of comparable complexity that anyone would consider safe and reliable in a modern world....”

Even if we consider the computer simulated test option to achieve certain results, we need to have top grade, latest, high speed computers, which we do not possess, nor is there a likelihood of them being made available to Pakistan. The entire premise of signing the treaty is based on the argument that Pakistan has minimum credible nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India and we can easily forgo our option to test further and improve our weapon designs without testing. This is debatable specially in a strategic environment in which India has continued to increase the level of escalation and stakes for its neighbours. The pronouncement of the Indian nuclear doctrine aims at the operationalization of nuclear weapons from employment to possible deployment, to establish minimum credible deterrence vis-a-vis China. This has negative connotation for Pakistan’s nuclear capability and its deterrent against India. India’s elaboration of its nuclear policies in the year following the tests is based on a trial of aircraft, mobile land based missiles, sea based assets, plus command, control and intelligence systems. This means a shift from peace time deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time. The nuclear forces would be designed to survive a surprise attack, a first strike and repetitive attrition attempts while retaining according to the Indians, adequate retaliatory capabilities .

In view of the stated aim, the Indians drive to include sea launched ballistic missiles (Sagarika), further divided into two kinds, surface ship launched version of Prithvi ballistic missile (operational 2001) and submarine launched cruise missile with a reported range of about 330 km (operational 2010) only reestablishes on effective and reliable second strike capability for India, while becoming a serious cause of concern for Pakistan. In this regard even more significant is the assessment that design for the long awaited Advance Technology Vessel (ATV), the name for an Indian nuclear submarine programme, is complete and construction can begin soon. The expected submarine is to have a displacement of 9,400 tons at a maximum submerged speed of 24 knots. This platform along with the on board nuclear cruise missile will complete India’s nuclear trial and make Pakistan’s southern flank and the survivability of its nuclear arsenal subject to serious limitation. India already has a clear conventional superiority and a second strike nuclear capability vis-a-vis Pakistan. The long draw conflict with India over the issue of Kashmir and India’s repeated divergences from agreements, in addition to her purchases like ABM-S-300 system from Russia, satellite technology transfer by the Americans and Mirage 2000 from France may force Pakistan to redefine the credibility of her need either further testing or more sophisticated technology to up grade our arsena. Viewing the Indian nuclear development can it be said that we already have credible nuclear deterrence with India? What we have at present is existential deterrence, that is deterrence exist because nuclear weapons exist. This is hardly what is required to have an impregnable defence against our adversary. With the growing possibility of an ABM capability in India and the technological impetus which India is likely to get, it would be unwarranted on Pakistan’s part to restrict the option of maintaining deterrence through replicating the existing weapon design indefinitely without realizing its cost-benefit implications and the ability to penetrate through Indian defences in future. Secondly, we say that flight time would depend upon the missile technology which is not to be affected by CTBT. The fact of the matter is that there is no point to have sophisticated delivery systems when we do not have the cores to match them.

Pakistan has yet to formulate its own minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine. The concept of minimum deterrence revolves around denying the enemy victory by insuring one’s own ability to inflict absolutely unsustainable losses upon him, even if one sustain a preemptive strike launched by him. Having this, capacity, creates an inherently, stable situation between nuclear adversaries since engaging the enemy’s counter targets will invariably results in one’s own annihilation. Essential to this model is the ability of the nuclear forces of each to survive a first strike while retaining operational C4CI and the ability to launch a massive counter strike. Attaining this level of preparedness necessitates survivability and variety of weapons and delivery system. It is hard to conceive of advances being made in these areas without testing. The theory of minimum deterrence only holds in scenarios in which escalation to the level of counter-value target is imminent. Since the Cost of Counter-value target engagement is the annihilation of both adversaries, there is cause to suggest that a state will sustain a counter-force tactical nuclear strike, and respond in kind if it possesses the capacity, without escalating to the level of engaging counter-value targets. Hence, the case is made for extending the nuclear struggle for supremacy to the domain of tactical weaponry. Achieving parity, or supremacy in the tactical field is a process intensive on research, development and testing. As with nuclear weaponry, generally, there are particular types of weapons in the tactical areas each with differing destructive properties upon detonation, a particular variety emits an enhanced electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which is a pulse of energy radiating from a nuclear explosion having the effect of rendering useless virtually all known electronic hardware within a defined radius from ground Zero, including communication, control and optics - related hardware. By enhancing the intensity of the EMP during a nuclear explosion the weapons becomes a more effective tool against C4C1.

The above mentioned developments require extensive research to develop and to create effective protection against, a process to which underground testing is essential.

CONCLUSION

An operational CTBT will create serious obstacle to Pakistan’s nuclear preparedness. Therefore, Pakistan must chart its own course of action regarding the CTBT in light of its vital strategic interest.

Given the fact of acknowledgement of India’s status by the international community as a defects nuclear power and that it will not be denied the right to sub-critical tests, computer simulation and fission research. India has little to lose and much to gain from signing the CTBT. So we should not link our signing with India’s signing the CTBT.

In our supreme national interest, it is necessary that we should at this point of time not sign the CTBT, under any pretext. It needs to be evaluated whether more tests are required for further enhancing of the nuclear weapons capability. If these are needed, then there would be technical reasons driven by compulsions of national security for not signing the treaty as yet. The decision that presents itself clearly is not to sign, for the CTBT can lead to the eventual degradation of our nuclear capability, as it aims to curtail any kind of qualitative improvement in the nuclear capability.

Clearly, an operational CTBT and the international environment it would create, will form a serious obstacle to Pakistan’s tactical and strategic nuclear preparedness. Strategists and the military must make a comprehensive examination of the emerging strategic reality facing us. It is clear that they will find in the CTBT a stumbling block which can bring down the effectiveness and preparedness of our nuclear deterrent.

NOTE:

This article is an extract from a research paper which was presented at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad for academic purposes.

The author would like to thank his beloved teacher Mr. Umer Khan, research at ISS, Islamabad and his senior Ms. Maria Sultan, Research Associate at ISS Islamabad. Their work was the main source of this paper.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sherjeel Rizwan Zeb has done his Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies. He has written Research Papers on: Khalistan Movement: Causes and Impact; Post Cold War American policies and strategies towards South Asia; CTBT: Prospects for Pakistan; Iranian Revolution: A unique case in History; A proposed Nuclear Strategy for Pakistan. He has also written a book about Brig. Tariq Mahmood and History of SSG in Pakistan.