Kashmir
The Autonomy Resolution

Renowned Indian columnist KULDIP NAYAR writes his point of view about the “autonomy issue”, which is generally believed in Pakistan to be another Indian ploy to divert international public opinion.

“AUTONOMY is what you promised us,” says Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Farooq Abdullah. “Azadi does not literally mean independence... Autonomy may not be a solution, but it can at least be a starting point for a debate,” says Mir Waiz Umer Farooq, a leader of the Hurriyat Conference. “The autonomy resolution, if implemented, may take the wind out of our sails,” says a Pakistan leader. The three points of view, heard at Srinagar and Lahore in the last few days, cover practically the debate in favour of autonomy. But first a word to explainautonomy. After partitioning India into two countries, the British advised the 550-odd princely States to join either India or Pakistan. One such State was Jammu and Kashmir.

Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India, but the ruler, in ‘the instrument of accession,’ indicated that he was giving up control over only three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications. The State held its own constituent assembly in November 1952 to ratify the accession and New Delhi’s hold over the three subjects. This is what is generally referred to as the pre-1953 status.

India after receiving the instrument of accession on October 26, 1947, conferred the special status on Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370 in the constitution. The power of parliament to make laws for the State was restricted to defence, foreign affairs and communications.

The State, if it wanted, could extend any law operating in the rest of India. But the assembly had to indicate so by passing that law. In other words, Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed autonomy, self-governance, in all central and concurrent subjects listed in the constitution except the three.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who succeeded Sheikh Abdullah, when the latter was detained, ‘worked’ with the centre on the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, to extend its rule beyond the three subjects. Many provisions of the Indian constitution and laws were extended to the State, a couple of them by the then governor, Jagmohan, after the dissolution of the state assembly.

The furore over the resolution is unreal because the state is with in its right to reiterate that its accession to India was confined to the three subjects. Whatever was done during the Bakshi regime or later was ‘wrong.’ The Centre’s reaction that the clockcannot be turned back is considered by the Farooq government a one-sided statement with no legal backing. If New Delhi wants control over other subjects, the State’s plea is that the Centre has to hold talks with it and reach an agreement. An influential segment of opinion says that if the pre-1953 status is reviewed for Jammu and Kashmir, it would evoke similar demands from other States. The argument is fallacious. It is J and K which joined the Union, not the other way round.

No doubt, most of the princely States gave defence, foreign affairs and communications to the centre to begin with. But then they themselves agreed to merge with the Union. J and K did not. Nor did the Union amend Article 370 to indicate that the State’s special status had been changed. So much so, the BJP set aside its demand for abrogation of the Article to head the government at the Centre.

Where the autonomy report can be faulted is that it does not take into account the Accord reached between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi in February 1975. It should have formed the bed rock of the relationship because the Sheikh has sanctified it. He took over thereins in 1975 itself. He was the one who agreed to span the distance between 1952 and 1975. The committee on autonomy should have begun its journey from the 1975 milestone.

The 1975 accord authorises parliament to make laws to prevent “activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian national flag. The Indian national anthem and the constitution.” Why should the Farooq government feel shy about it? Apparently, there were differences over the interpretation of the 1975 accord. In a letter to Indira Gandhi, the Sheikh had said: “As you are aware, it is my view that constitutional relationship between the Centre and the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be what it was in 1953. Nevertheless, (are mine) I am happy to say that the agreed conclusions (the 1975 accord) provide a good basis for my cooperation at the political level and for Centre-State relationship.

”The Sheikh went on to say: “The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is not a matter at issue. It has been my firm believe that the future of Jammu and Kashmir lies with India because of the common ideals that we share.” Farooq Abdullah has used more emphatic words than these. But by ignoring his father’s accord, he has created doubts about his political strategy. Did he want this only as a plank for the assembly election next year?

It is a pity that the RSS has succeeded in its endeavour. The BJP members in the cabinet buckled under the RSS command to reject the autonomy resolution without delay. The worst part of the report is the regionalisation of J and K on communal lines. This recommendation tallies with views expressed by the RSS and some of the Hurriyat leaders. Indeed, the straight rejection of the report has disappointed the people in the valley generally. I heard them expressing their unhappiness. Farooq Abdullah has yet another reason to be unhappy. The Centre is holding secret talks with the Hurriyat leaders. The reported offer to them is to head the State government. Is it the solution? New Delhi has not learnt a simple thing: those who live in glass houses should not change their clothes with the lights on, as Bernard Shaw put it.