Nuclear weapons and deterrent

Columnist MB NAQVI discusses the deterrence potential of nuclear powers.

In a confused and general sort of way most people believe that possession of nuclear weapons, being the kind of mass destruction weapons they are, deter aggressive intent on the part of others. There are two elements here. One is the idea of deterrence and the other is whether the special nature of the weapons does make the difference. Insofar as the idea of overwhelming strength, per se, deters another state with which the former may be in adversarial relation, there is a clear lesson of history that is uncontestable: Possession of strong military strength has never prevented wars where other reasons or causes for it existed. Possessors of somewhat smaller strength adopted various stratagems, such as alliances with other smaller powers, selecting their own time and place, together with the elements of surprise or adoption of other strategies enabled the perceived or actually weaker power to often prevail or at any rate such a power(s) had a go (at war). But does the possession of nuclear weapons deter, even if it is perceived to be fewer in number or perhaps of smaller or weaker strength or otherwise inferior in design or yield or some other kind of inferiority such as unreliable delivery mechanism, fewer or more underdeveloped missiles. That is the question to be answered.

It is an arcane field of inquiry. Most thoughts are dominated by the NATO's and Warsaw Pact's doctrines. A whole lot of mythology has been built up along with the concept. Statesmen have waxed eloquent on the theme that possession of nuclear weapons by both the Soviet Union (and its satellite powers) and the western alignment kept peace for 45 years despite the intense global cold war. Most governments, and certainly of India and Pakistan, appear to believe this. Since the fact that no war broke out between the Soviet system and the western alignment, a certain amount of plausibility or arguability attaches to this idea of the deterring quality of nuclear weapons. It cannot be controverted with reference to any other fact. What seems to give added plausibility is the fact that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used for war like purposes? But would that hold in the case of India and Pakistan?

Insofar as east-west cold war not having led to a war between the two superpowers, two tangentially relevant considerations apply. The two powers freely engaged in proxy wars for straight cold war reasons. Secondly there is the consideration that there was no historical traditions of hatred or nationalistic dispute over any territory or people between the people included in the Soviet power system and most of the main members of western alliance. There were no issues in which the primordial passions of the people on both sides could be involved. So if they did not directly come to blows, there was no strong historically determined motivating factor. The only power against which nuclear weapons have been used, viz. Japan, it can be said that there was a measure of passion involved: after the Japanese had launched a surprise devastating aerial attack on the American Navy in Pearl Harbour. Upto a point, it can be said that the Americans were so angry that once they had the weapons they used it against the Japanese. One says this without too much conviction. The Americans motive could well be what has been often given: the Americans wanted to be sure whether the weapons actually produced the kind of devastation that was foreseen. It may also have been intended as the opening shot as the foreseeable cold war to come. In other words the real target in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were those powers that were to adopt views and courses of action that the main allied powers did not approve - a statement of intent to dominate the world completely. Thus the possession of nuclear weapons is all about ideas of domination and browbeating others, reliance being placed on the evil nature of the weapons which no responsible politician, democratic or not, would actually use. At any rate this debate cannot be concluded with any strong and definite statement.

The pure idea of deterrence - that overwhelming strength deters - is nonsense. We have just noted that the case for possession of nuclear weapons, overwhelming or not in the case of Pakistan, is to be determined. The specific question is: would the minimal nuclear deterrent, such as Pakistan's smaller economic potential may be able to produce, deter India from aggression against it, with its much larger and deadlier still nuclear deterrent, it in the context of a strong and proactive Kashmir policy by both protagonists. In terms of logic there is in fact a conundrum: if fewer, smaller or otherwise inferior nuclear weapons of Pakistan can deter India from an aggression against it that may otherwise be the logical response to Pakistan's policies, why would the larger and even more deadlier deterrent of India not deter Pakistan? In terms of actual realities of the situation, the Indian government's official policy is that both sides nuclear weapons deter. But what does that deterrence mean? Looked at more closely, Indian War Minister George Fernandes has said: nuclear weapons deter only nuclear weapons: neither India nor Pakistan can make a nuclear strike against the other for fear of a riposte in kind. That leaves ample scope for what the Indian government has called 'limited war'.

So where it the deterrence sought from Pakistan's nuclear deterrent? It is necessary for us to be sure about the connotation of the concept of 'limited war'. It is certainly going to be a war but in what sense would it be limited? Logically it can only be limited in two senses. Either it will remain confined to a certain geographical area or territory - in this case meaning thereby Jammu and Kashmir state - or it can mean limited in the sense of the kind of weapon systems being used: That can mean war limited in the sense of not using mass destruction weapons while conventional armaments of all kinds might freely be used. The Indians have not been forthcoming about what exactly do they mean by their expression: 'limited war'. This ambiguity would work for them and they would certainly like Pakistanis to keep guessing. For their part Pakistanis will have to assume that 'limited' covers both connotation. At any rate, a war that India might want it to remain limited to the territory of say Azad Kashmir cannot realistically speaking remain limited to that territory. Both sides will strike where the other might seem vulnerable no matter where. The idea of 'limited' in terms of an area is non se quiter? By that token, while eschewing (at least by India) a nuclear strike, all other conventional capability will be used to the full. In other words, it will be an all out war.

Where then is the utility of having acquired a nuclear deterrent? Pakistanis started their nuclear programme in the early 1970s with the specific aim of acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent. What precisely was in the mind of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when he started the programme? The commonest rationale for Pakistan's nuclear weapons is: since India has a large resource base, it can always outspend Pakistan and acquire a larger military machine in terms of conventional weapons. Pakistan, as a matter of fact, has continued to slip in its desired ratio of power it wanted to maintain with India. At one time it was thought that 1:3 ratio was sufficient guarantee for its security. (Here security simply meant military defence; the two terms were coterminous for most people in the early years). But as the Indian military build up after 1962 went ahead, Pakistan could not maintain a 1:3 ratio, though in terms of the land forces it did maintain a rough and ready equation with Indian army that ranged somewhere between 1:2 and 1:3. Pakistan has kept falling behind in terms of the air and naval power. In terms of air, the ratio today may be somewhere 1:6 or even less. In the naval sphere the position is even worse. But this is pure numbers that do not necessarily reflect actual state of military preparedness or firepower. India not only surpasses in terms of number but has a qualitative edge.

This could be foreseen in the gloomy days of early 1970s. It was somehow thought that possession of nuclear weapons would make up the deficiency. But the how of it apparently was not thought through. How precisely would the nuclear weapons remove the deficiency? The explanations that have been heard go something like this: Should India make an aggression again, at some stage, the Pakistanis would be able to turn round and threaten the Indians with a nuclear strike. Even if it would only be able to drop a single nuclear weapon on Indian territory with even a primitive delivery mechanism, no Indian government would knowingly allow any part of its territory to be devasted with nuclear weapons. Thus, India would remain deterred and not make the aggression at all. Obviously, India was originally thought to be a non-nuclear power and apparently it was assumed that its conventional superiority being decisive would remain a non-nuclear weapons power. As it happens, however, India detonated a nuclear weapon in May 1974 in Pokhran, telling the world that India now possesses nuclear weapons capability. Pakistani doctrine did not seem to take cognisance of Indian nuclear demonstration.

It is a moot point whether the Indians detonated the nuclear weapon in 1974 for the benefit of the Chinese who had already demonstrated their nuclear weapons capability way back in 1964, so soon after 1962 war. Indians probably had the technological capability of fabricating nuclear weapons all along. And if China was any consideration, if it had waited 10 years to demonstrate its capability it could have waited another 10 years more without any obvious detriment to Indian defence or security because the Chinese were not in any meaningful sense a threat to India. It is an intriguing idea to regard the 1974 Indian detonation as having been intended for the benefit of Pakistanis about whose nuclear ambitions or activities they might have received reports. But there is no way of being sure on the present level of evidence.

However, the position now is that both countries after May 1998 are countries with nuclear weapons capability. Obviously India possess an integrated technological base with greater resources of raw material or components from which to fabricate the nuclear weapons. Anyway Pakistan apparently has enough of them to its own satisfaction. The question now is whether the nuclear weapons do remove the deficiency or disadvantage that a smaller economic and military potential creates in conventional armaments? How does one prove or disprove the proposition that it successfully removes the deficiency in Pakistan's (conventional) military defence. The use of the term military defence is precise while the concept of security is much wider and less precise. The only possible approach is to project possible scenarios of war and to see where do the nuclear weapons come in.

The usual scenario is that conventional war breaks out either as an escalation from the virtually nonstop Kashmir incidents or India retaliates with an invasion of Azad Kashmir for Pakistan's proactive Kashmir policy. There is no way such a war can remain confined to Azad Kashmir, as we have seen. The terrain of Azad Kashmir would not permit India to gain many significant military objectives and it would also look for ways of striking at the mainsprings of Pakistani strength. Whether by Pakistani action or accidentally or by Indian design but war is sure to spread. Eventually the Indian superiority in the quantity and quality of armaments will begin to show. At some stage or other the Pakistani leadership would either let the enemy know that it intends to use the nuclear weapons or it would make a pre-emptive nuclear strike first without warning. What happens thereafter is not clear.

Scenario 2 does not seem to exist insofar as Pakistani planners have discussed. The recent experience is more ambiguous. A semi-war situation obtained in the spring and summer of 1999 in which Pakistan had captured vacant Kargil posts on the Indian side of the LoC in Kashmir. The Indians tried very hard to get them vacated. A great deal of military escalation was in the works after India ordered the use of navy. At which point either Pakistan Prime Minister requested to be received by the US President Bill Clinton or the latter invited him to Washington. The July 4 agreement resulted. This agreement is based on the terms dictated by India, perhaps item by item. Pakistan vacated all the posts within stipulated seven days plus one day that was specially requested by Pakistan and granted by Indian government. In reaching this denouement Pakistan's possession of nuclear deterrent did not help it one little bit. It had to accept all the terms that the Indians dictated. Why?, because there was no other option to an all out war. The Indians were spoiling for a war and their initial action of putting the Indian Navy on red alert after mobilising it in the Arabian Sea not too far from Pakistan sent a clear signal of its intent. As far as India was talking of blockading Karachi, it would have been a proper unlimited conventional war because Pakistanis would have been compelled to break the blockade and the rest would have followed. In the event Pakistan chose not to go the length of an all out war for which there were a variety of good reasons.

The point is that nuclear weapons were wholly irrelevant to the entire proceedings. Weren't nuclear weapons in anyone's mind? They were on both sides. But they did not affect the course of events at all. What was the use of the deterrent?