Syria after Assad

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA gives a first hand account of SYRIA after the demise of long-serving strongman HAFEZ AL ASSAD.

Damascus: Damascus wore an air of stability and of sobriety. To observe the forty day mourning period following President Hafez al Assad’s  death, official buildings remain draped in black flags. The deification  of the man who completely controlled Syrian affairs for over thirty  years continues through the state-controlled television. Professionally  prepared documentaries, with very moving background music, reinforcing  Assad’s image as the ‘benevolent father’ of the Syrian people, the  ‘great Arab leader’, a nation-builder and a statesman, are shown  throughout the day. Cars and buses plying the streets display Assad and  Bashar posters. Interestingly many Assad posters show him praying. The  attempt is to permanently engrave Assad’s glorified memory onto the  Syrian heart and mind.

Although Assad ruled Syria with an iron fist which included the crushing  of over 10,000 supporters of the Ikhwan-I Muslameen party, he was a man  hiding no personal skeletons. He openly accumulated power for himself  and his clique to build a strong Syrian state but was not given to  accumulating personal wealth. He, therefore, had no personal skeletons of  the kind that for example the once revered Rumanian President Nicholae  Ceausescu left behind. When Ceausescu the self-declared “most loved son  of the people” and his wife were executed by a firing squad in December  1989, their personal riches worth millions of dollars were discovered by  the financially hard-up Rumanian people. Similarly after the  unceremonious exit of other despots like the Shah of Iran and Ferdinand  Marcos of the Philippines much ill-gotten wealth was uncovered. 

Assad by contrast was a man of spartan ways all his ruling years Assad  lived in a modest apartment. The Peoples’ palace was only used for  official functions. The attempt at deification therefore will have an  impact, however limited, on the Syrian population. Alongside this  91deification’, in Damascus the business of the state is in full  swing. Syria’s national managers are deftly tackling matters of  succession and of policy. The cabinet, the Baath Party’s high command  and the Party Congress have been meeting regularly. State-run media has  been used to reassure the public that Syria’s future is in safe hands.  In a widely publicized speech Bashar made on June  at the concluding  session of the Baath Party’s Congress he attempted to inspire the  public by maintaining that “Our great Party that has been a strong  fortress of liberation will remain firm and invulnerable, the pillar of  any stability and the virtual element of any change or achievement. The  Party will also remain faithful to the values of the first Baathist  leader Hafez al-Assad.” Whatever his claims Syria’s young Bashar  recognizes the necessity to move beyond the stifling and stagnating  political and economic policies of the Baath party. The responsibility  to guide, even if collectively, socio-economic and political ‘opening  up’ within Syria poses a formidable challenge for Assad’s political  successor. 

Meanwhile, in Damascus, life for the public has returned to normal. After  their impromptu outpouring of grief at Assad’s death, they are back to  work in the mornings and to recreation in the evenings. In the pleasant June evenings of Damascus they pepper the many parks and play-grounds,  the old Arab souks, the vista point of the al-Mezzeh hills surrounding  Damascus and the centuries old Ommayad mosque. 

Among the public there are no signs of worry and of concern. Little has  changed in their daily routine. Within what has largely been a police  state, the average Syrian senses stability. At least within the  immediate context. The population mix of 74% Sunnis, 9% Alawites, 12%  Christian and Druze and 2% Shias in a 15 million Syrian population,  has at least for now been disallowed any free political power play.  Authoritarian Baathist rule has contained the divisiveness. 

Only some minor changes in the power structure have taken place since  Assad’s death some minor changes have taken place. Mostly the focus has  been to strengthen the alawite and the military and political old guard  hold over the power apparatus. End June the Regional Command Congress  met in Damascus after 15 years. Significantly the Party bye-laws call  for it to meet on a yearly basis. The Congress made three important  decisions: it formally handed down the powerful position of the  Party’s Regional Secretary to Hafiz Al-Assad’s son Lt. General  Bashar al-Assad; it re-elected 21 members to Syria’s most powerful  political bod, the Party Regional Leadership (RL) and elected the  90-member Party Central Committee. Bashar’s own brother and the son of  the defence minister have also been brought into the Central Committee. 

Each of these decisions have a significance within the context of Syrian  power politics. The June 10 nomination of Bashar as President of Syria  by the Ba’ath party, his promotion to the rank of a Lt. General in the  army and election as the Ba’ath Party’s Secretary have all been  consensual decisions of the old guard of the Ba’ath party. They know  that peacefully and rapidly filling the political vacuum created by the  departure of the man who ruthlessly and devotedly ruled Syria was  essential for ensuring stability. For now Bashar has their support. On  July 11 he will, therefore, be elected as Syria’s President through a  “popular vote.” As it must be in what is essentially a one-party rule  in Syria. 

It is no surprise that in the arena of power politics there was more  continuity than change that has followed Assad’s death. The strong man  of Syria Hafez al-Assad himself had begun preparations for his own  departure; hence the peaceful transition of power to his son Lt. General  Bashar al-Assad after his death. While the power-shift from father to  son was engineered by Bashar’s father, it is the more complex yet  necessary socio-economic and socio-political shift in the Syria that  Bashar and his team will have to engineer.

Significantly the interplay of the external with the internal realities  had prompted Assad himself to very gradually initiate even this  political and economic opening up; although a completely controlled  opening up. He began with the removal of some of his key men. Top level  men like the Prime Minister Mahmud Ali Zhobi and the chief of army staff  Hikmat Shahabi was removed on corruption charges. In March 2000 Assad  reshuffled the cabinet to enable Bashar to tighten his hold over power.  Bashar brought in some of his own men. Others like Mustapha Talas, a  school friend of Assad and Minister of Defence and Vice President and  Abdul Qader Qaddura, an Assad loyalist, with a strong base in the army  and the assembly was retained as the Speaker. Ali Aslan was appointed  Chief of Staff in the Army. In the ruling group there is now a mix of  the old with the new. Farooq Al-Shara the Foreign Minister may be  appointed as the Vice President. Khaddam the Vice-President and member  of the Executive Regional Committee.

Within Syria’s power structure the 21-member Central Command of the  Syrian Ba’ath Party is very powerful. For 17 years the old membership  remained unchanged. The members of the Central Command are elected by the 135-member Central Congress. The members of this Congress come from  Syria’s 127 districts; each sends five members to the Congress. 

Bashar’s grooming as his father’s successor began eversince his brother  Bassel’s death in 1994. In 1998 Bashar personally gave final clearance for  the nomination of 250 members of a new Syrian parliament for a four  year period was nominated. Members of the Baath Party and seven other  officially cleared political parties including the National Democratic  Front, the Communist Party filed in their nominations for the  parliament. Bashar cleared many young professionals for a four year  parliament membership. Bashar’s apprenticeship in conducting complex  state affairs began with him being given charge of the Lebanon affairs.  The old guard figure Vice President Abdul Haleem Khaddam, the former  foreign minister responsible for Lebanon was side-tracked. However,  Khaddam a Baathist and a Sunni, with twenty years in politics, is known  to have a political base of his own. 

Assad also went for a major reshuffle in the Syria’s 250,000 men strong  army. The former reportedly around 100 commanders known to be Shahabi  loyalists were removed from the army. 

Assad’s authority where it came to his son inheriting the leadership  mantle was reportedly challenged. There were indications of resistance,  within the Party, to Bashar’s election as the party’s Secretary-General.  For the last one year the meeting of the party Congress, in which Bashar  was reportedly to be elected, kept getting postponed. According to  unconfirmed reports a couple of hundred arrests of intellectuals and  journalists too accompanied the postponement. 

Clearly reshuffling and changes within the Central Command including  removal of some key men may create new and autonomous power blocks. As  expected Assad’s brother Rafat has claimed Presidency. Raffa, who has  posed a consistent, however, weak political challenge to Hafez al Assad,  served in the Syrian army from 1973 to 1984 was also the  Vice-President. His support within the army is not known, however, he has  some hardline Alawite supporters. Assad had always effectively stymied  Raffat’s bid for power. 

Raffat remained in exile until 1996 when, on his mother’s insistence  Assad allowed Raffat to return to Syria. Always an obedient son Syria’s  strong-man patched up with his brother on his mother’s instructions.  Kept away from politics Raffat was only allowed entry into the  commercial world. Assad’s brother set up a shipping company and was  involved in the import and export business. In July 1999, after the  reported attempt by Raffat to stir political trouble for Assad in a  mosque gathering and subsequently within the army, he was forced to  leave Syria. Raffat left for France. To ensure complete destruction of  his business assets in October Assad ordered Syrian military tanks to  shell his brother’s jetty, the adjacent buildings and godowns. Raffat  who is widely seen as a ruthless and determined man, has business  interests in France and operates a London-based Arab News Network television channel. Through his television channel Raffat beams in  anti-Assad programmes and lays claim to the Syrian presidency. 

Bashar al Assad’s fathers legacy will be his principle asset as he takes  over as President for a seven year period. Whatever the political  excesses committed by Assad he has been widely acknowledged as the man  who brought stability and security to the Syrian state living under the  constant Israeli threat. The reality of the Israeli threat remains  constant and hence continuity under Bashar, of Syria’s security policy.  Meanwhile, in the economic and the political arena a controlled opening  up, initiated under Assad’s rule, will no doubt be carried forward.  This Bashar and his team may do maybe at a faster speed compared to  Assad. However, the caution and care applied by Assad while ‘opening up’  the economic and political system to ‘new’ elements, Bashar will not  abandon. He has two models of perestroika to choose from; the controlled  and home-grown Chinese model versus the chaotic, philosophical and  largely externally influenced Gorbachev-authored Soviet model. Clearly  Bashar will avoid the Gorbachev approach, as any society in transition  must. 

On the external front Assad’s ability to withstand external pressure and  pursue for Syria a policy of dignity and of honour was unmatched by any  other Arab leader. Despite domestic economic pressures, the military  threats and the diplomatic and media wars waged against Syria by the  pro-Israeli governments and media Assad remained committed to his vision  of peace with Israel based on principles and on balance of power basis ;  a vision that squarely contradicts Israel’s vision of peace based on  Israel’s military hegemony. Struggling to establish a militarily,  socially and economically secure Syria, Assad, almost the lone leader  in the region had defied Israel’s security calculations which were based  on the military and political insecurity and dependence of its Arab  neighbours. 

On the foreign policy front Bashar will, therefore, generally build upon  his father’s admirable legacy. The three key pillars of Syrian policy  its policy of no compromise with Israel on the Golan Heights and on the  Palestinian issues; a policy of no dependence on Washington and finally  a policy of developing special relationships with countries in the  region — Lebanon and Iran being the two principle ones. For Pakistan too,  Assad’s cabinet ministers maintained that he had issued special  instructions to “ensure cooperation in which ever field possible.”  Interestingly Assad’s political astuteness and his untiring commitment  to a larger Arab unity prevented him from marking Arab enemies. When  King Hussain of Jordan passed away in 1998 Assad surprised the world  community by actually arriving at Hussein’s funeral; a man he openly  criticized for dividing the Arab world on the Israeli issue. Similarly  his policy differences with Saddam of Iraq did not translate into active  hate. Hence Saddam sent a plane-load of state mourners led by the Iraqi  Vice President, to attend Assad’s funeral. 

Under Assad Syria and Iran cultivated a special relationship. While the  uncompromising Israel policy of Tehran and Damascus appear to be a  bonding factor, it was the Iran-Iraq war of the late eighties and the  Gulf war of the early nineties that brought the two countries closer.  Iraq’s Saddam Hussain, who emerged as a common security threat for  the two, drove the two closer strategically. 

According to unconfirmed reports Hafez al Assad was deeply influenced by  the great Iranian thinker Ali Shariati who visited Syria. 

Within the domestic context Assad managed a performance paradox. The  good with the bad. The stability which came from control; the peace that  followed a highly authoritarian state, the institutionalized  decision-making apparatus that flowed from a one-party rule. Assad  accumulated power but he wielded it within an institutionalized  framework. He brought in loyalists in the decision-making fray but they  were encouraged to provide candid input. 

Bashar will follow, perhaps most vigorously, his father’s policy of  ‘economic perestroika.’ Greater involvement of the private sector and of  foreign investors for greater economic prosperity will be sought. Since  the last four years economic opening up in Syria began under Assad. Under the Foreign Investment Law 10, foreign companies have been  involved in infrastructure projects. Foreign companies like Shell and  Siemens are getting involved in infrastructure projects. Financed  through Japanese tied-loans and an international consortium Mitsubishi  is setting up power plants in Aleppo and in Zara. Beginning with the  current year, foreign investment is being sought to set up  pharmaceutical and textile assembly plants. Private sector ownership is  restricted to retail outlets and to the cottage industry. Industry is  state-owned and the socialist economy has functioned with only one  state-owned bank until very recently. Reportedly a couple of foreign  banks may soon begin their operations. 

For now oil and agriculture are the main cash providers for the Syrian  economy. Annual oil revenue amounts to around $1.8 billion. The  continued military threat from Israel requires Syria to divert major  resources towards military security. While the Syrian state has been a  major job provider, a sizeable Syrian population is also employed in  the Gulf region from where they send home remittances. Saudi financial  help too has been received by Syria. To improve its own economic base  Bashar’s government will pursue an active policy of reviving its under  performing industry and of setting up IT-based industry.

Linked to the economic revival will be the necessity to more social and  political freedoms. And there appears to be a realisation of this fact  within the Baath Party. An intellectual of the Baathist Party rather  candidly made the point during a discussion. He said, “the Baath Party  has many challenges ahead. The entire party will have an understanding  of the realities and the requirements of the present, if this happens  then Baath Party will survive; it needs revolution and substantive  modernisation inside or else it will perish.” 

Explaining how this change would be possible within the existing Party  parameters he said, “the fundamental principles of the Party will  hold what will happen is that new approaches can be developed, vision  can be modernized, meaning an openness to the world. This will mean  improving the performance of the administration, of the information  system, economy etc.

“Having witnessed the party from the inside since 1967 when he joined it,  this Syrian explained the need for greater freedom. He said, “there will  be a change in the old theoretical approach to socialism there must be  a way for each person to achieve equality and justice, more respect for  freedom of speech, individual opinions and democratic practices.” 

In the coming months for Bashar a key challenge will be how he explains  and projects Syria to both the Syrians and the outside world. Unless a  proactive approach is not adopted Syria will be defined by the media  that views Syria through Israeli eyes. Given the political  authoritarianism of Syria, it would be easy to sell the Israeli or the  anti-Bashar, the Raffat view of Syria which within and outside Syria.  Significantly the communication revolution in Syria is honing in  gradually. In Damascus the satellites are in peering from every roof  top, public telephones are more noticeable in street corners. Public now  stops to use them.

Free flow of information will inevitably be allowed.  Public access to internet maybe months not years away. 

After all the information revolution, along with its advantages, has  also proved to be one of the most destabilising factors in politics world  over. It has virtually nullified the numbers’ advantage in that aspect of  politics which is played media-driven. In its ability to super-impose a  state’s folly upon its many accomplishments, easy and selective  discrediting of governments has a simple task for a globalized and  western-dominated media. 

The information, therefore, revolution superimposes the ‘bad and the ugly’  on what maybe good and useful. Syria had the ugly, the massacre at  Hamma. Yet its order, its peace and its facilities for the people under  Baathist rule served millions of Syrians. Nevertheless the ‘bad and  ugly’ of the past becomes the ammunition of present day detractors.  This is universally in the nature of power play. The good it promises is  not always apparent —it’s the good of the order — Aristotle said man  can be the architect of order. Those were simpler times. Now the chaos in  the name of freedom, freedom of often the few is lionized within the  framework of democracy. Bashar, like his other contemporaries guiding  societies towards an inevitable openness, will face a difficult time. 

Perhaps on this score Bashar and his team will do well to heed the  advise of a visiting scholar. Speaking on the state-controlled Syrian  television he said, “Information plays a fundamentally important role  today especially in the West where opinion is influenced through the  media; western governments for elections depend on public opinion “regret that in shaping the western opinion the Arab voice is absent. We  should deplore this and a huge effort should be made to explain Syrian  views to the world.”