There are certain comments that I wish to humbly give on May 2000 issue of DJ.

 Dr S.M Rahman’s article was a fine effort. The fact, however, remains that the gap between theory and action or deeds and words is always there. Truth as I believe Machiavelli or Clausewitz said is but a weak motive for action with men. A large part of Pakistan’s political problems were created by ex-civil servants brought in the cabinet, first by Mr Jinnah and then by his successors. Mr Jinnah knew how to kick them as proved by his open snub to Ghulam Mohammad Kakkezai (Refers-Page-74-Memoirs of Gul Hassan Khan - Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993). His successors did not and the bureaucrat who had spent a life sycophancy with the Britisher became the ruler! The army under Ayub played a major part in acting as the vanguard of USA’s proxy war to destabilise democracy in Pakistan during the period 1954-58. The USA which talks a great deal about dialogue with democratic governments today, in 1954 was more interested in talking with only the Pakistani army C-in-C! Who can forget Ayub’s remarks to US Assistant Secretary of State Byroade,  “Our Army can be your army if you want us” (Page-108- India and the United States-Estranged Democracies-Dennis Kux- National Defense University Press-Washington D.C -June 1993). Democracy was destabilised in five years through intrigues carried out by the Ghulam-Mirza-Ayub trio from 1953 to 1958. Just like Nawaz was intriguing to divide and politicise the army from 1997 to 1999!  In 1955 this trio became a duo once Ghulam was dropped and thus it was a two-soldier team that finally usurped power in 1958. Rigging was perfected in 1965 elections and the exercise went on till 1969 when Ayub was finally booted out, as a result of a popular agitation led by student leaders like Tariq Ali and Raja Anwar. There is positive evidence in a large number of books and accounts of direct participants of that time about Yahya’s lack of sincerity in transfer of power and, in playing Bhutto against Mujeeb.

Bhutto himself was the creation of the army Mandarins (Mirza/Ayub) and while confronting Mujeeb in January-March 1971 was as a matter of fact fighting Yahya and his inner circle’s proxy war against Mujeeb. Bhutto at least till December 1971 was pursuing Yahya’s line and was perceived as the general’s man by Mujeeb and the Awami League (Refers-The Nation that lost its Soul- Shaukat Hayat-Jang Publishers-Lahore 1995). Zia who came in power in 1977 to hold fair elections over stayed by eleven years till finally eliminated through a mysterious although at least theoretically classic low intensity covert operation. Pakistan was kept away from normal civilised methods of governance for 11 years simply because Zia and his junta were unable to arrive at a viable and safe exit strategy! Zia was finally removed not by a judicial or political compromise but by chemicalwarfare! Nawaz Sharif who is a much-maligned man today was the test tube baby of the Zia-Jillani-Hamid Gul-Beg team of political gynaecologist-cum-artificial fertility experts! Thus the present military government is now dealing with a creature created by the military Mandarins after five years of effort from 1985 to 1990! All the accompanying corruption that the NAB is professedly trying to deal with has its origins in the Zia era! The two biggest scams of that era i.e pilfering of billions of dollars of US aid and the co-operative bank scam have been put into cold storage!

Two politicians that as per the army Mandarins inflicted the greatest harm on Pakistan’s political system were discovered and groomed by Ayub and Zia or his larger inner circle respectively! The LEFO political mine which first proved its amphibious worth by sinking Mansoor ul Haq’s ship and its land operations anti-tank worth by disabling General Jehangir Karamat till it was finally destroyed by the resolute artillery man duo of Generals Mahmood and Musharraf was as a matter of fact conceived and fabricated in the COAS secretariat, Governor House Lahore and ISI Directorate in the period 1978-90. The army, which now claims to be cleaning the mess as a matter of fact, is thus dealing with its own creations.  Dr Rahman’s hopes for devolution of power are utopian! Ideology or good intentions have  played  a limited role in our history . Ayub’s take over had a deeper connection with his fears of not getting another extension than any tangible concrete political facts! Zia’s actions from 1977-88 had no connection with Islam but with perpetuating his personal power. Why should the present set up devolve power! Does this mean that the present military rule will continue! The forces that shape history, natural calamities, accidents, deliberate accidents, war, economic pressure etc are far more complicated to handle than a prime minister turned business man. Noble intentions or mere induction of whiz kids in cabinets without any great man at the helm of affairs or a great idea to execute does not lead to any great results! A glance at our fifty-year-old history proves that mediocrity has been institutionalised in our higher leaders!

M/s Humera Niazi has written a very fine article. The writer has treated the subject dispassionately and rationally without sentimentality.

Book Review-General Niazi’s Book

The book review on General Niazi’s book  was a very fine effort. There are some observations which I wish to share with the readers. Firstly the writers quoting another author saying that creation of Bangladesh was the end of the two nation theory. We in Pakistan have twisted “Two Nation Theory” very subjectively . We have forgotten that Mr Jinnah the founder of Pakistan favoured creation of an Independent Bengal in 1946. H.V Hodson perfectly reliable authority states that Mr Jinnah said that he would be delighted if Bengal stayed united and independent and added,  “What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta? They had much better remained united and independent: I am sure they would be on friendly terms with Pakistan”. (Refers-Page-246- The Great Divide- H.V Hodson- Oxford University Karachi-1985). Bengal did not become independent because of Bengali Hindu fears about being in a Muslim majority independent Bengal. Thus the connection with “Two Nation Theory” was not the reason why Bengal was divided in 1947. Mr Jinnah saw in 1946 i.e the inadvisability of having Bengal in Pakistan without Calcutta. Something that the Pakistani policy makers failed to grasp till 1971! It is to Jinnah’s credit that he brought Bengalis in the army by raising the first two battalions of the East Bengal regiment. A process, which was stopped by Ayub from 1950 to 1966, as a result of which Pakistan Army instead of becoming a broad based national army like the post 1947 Indian Army, remained, a Punjabi dominated army. A factor which contributed a great deal to the separation of East Pakistan. The Two Nation Theory was created due to certain reasons which at that time were valid albeit relatively. It did not exist in 711 AD or in 1857 but was enunciated in the period 1860-1940. In 1971 it was no longer valid at least for the Bengali Muslims and they rejected it.

My second contention pertains to the author’s quoting a Pakistani General stating that “Never before had a Muslim army surrendered before a Hindu army or the assertion that the Pakistan Army was a bearer of traditions of the early Muslim conquerors of India! This assertion is absolutely false ! The problem is that we have to get out of this “Martial Races Syndrome”. The vast bulk of Pakistan army consists of men with Hindu or Buddhist ancestry! As a matter of fact the Hindu Rajputs of the north of Chenab area from where the vast bulk of Pakistan army is recruited were far more difficult to govern before they were converted to Islam! The only positive connection that these races had with the Muslim Turks was the fact that one of their members killed Sultan Ghauri! Even the Pathans, the second largest group of Pakistani soldiers, had little connection with Turkish invasions of India! Babar did not like the Pathans and the Pathans generally remained in conflict with the Muslim governments in Delhi! Many Muslim forts surrendered to the Hindu Marathas during the Maratha war in the south. The Marathas captured Delhi long before 1971 in mid -18th century and held it with uneven gaps till 1803 once the British captured it. As a matter of fact the problem is that most of our worthy generals have not read military history of the sub-continent. The Pakistan Army is not the descendant of the Turk armies that invaded India! Of course with the exceptions of some genuinely Mughal villages like Lehr Sultanpur etc! The Pakistan Army is a chip from the block of the old mercenary British army with its origins in the “Mutiny Loyalty of Punjabi Muslim Pathan and Sikh soldiers” who attacked Delhi for the first time in September 1857 and in phenomenal staunchness of Punjabi soldiers while facing the Muslim Turks in WW One! The Punjabis once totalled as Muslim Hindu and Sikh, as an ethnic group became the largest single group and the vast bulk of the British Indian Army in the period 1883-1911. In 1883 there were about 34.09 % or 120 Punjabi companies  (25 Punjabi Muslims, 18 Punjabi Dogra Hindus and 77 Punjabi Sikhs) and 15 Pathan companies out of the total 352 infantry companies of the Regular Bengal Army. By 1911 the Indian Army was a more than 50 % Punjabi army although never a Muslim majority army. In 1929 thanks to Pathan and Ranghar defiance of the British in WW One the Punjabi percentage (divided into roughly one third Muslim Sikh and Hindu) of the Indian Army rose to 54.36% if the Gurkhas were included and to 61.8 % if Gurkhas were excluded. The Pathan share at this time stood at 4.02 % out of which all were not ethnic or linguistic Pathans. (Refers- Map on page-96 - Report of Indian Statutory Commission-Volume One- Calcutta - Government of India - Publication Branch - 1930). The low caste Hindu Marathas militarily defeated the Mughals long before 1971 and their hold on India was finally successfully challenged not by any Punjabi or Pathan Muslim army but by the Bengal and Madras armies of the English East India Companies at Laswari and Assaye respectively in 1803! Punjab later dubbed as a martial province with a Muslim majority was firmly under Sikh domination despite the fact that the Sikhs were a 8 or 9 % minority! During Sikh rule mosques were often used as military magazines, including the famous Badshahi mosque and some times plastered with cow dung (Pages -347 to 360— “Lahore -Past and Present” - M.Baqir, Punjabi Adabi Academy, Lahore—1984)as happened with the Golden Mosque of Kashmiri Bazaar Lahore ! So much for the martial traditions, just 122 years ago, of the largely Punjabi Muslim army that surrendered in East Pakistan! The problem ironically was the fact that the same West Pakistanis, who despised Bengalis as non-Martial race in March 1971, at least were not as martial in 1849, as they became in 1914, because of British recruitment policies and situational reasons!  The problem is that we have forgotten that all territory west of Aligarh district (including Aligarh), including Delhi Agra Punjab and Frontier was under Hindu Maratha or non-Muslim Sikh rule till 1803 or as late as 1849! There were no martial races in Muslim majority Punjab, at least to rule Punjab till 1849! So much for the martial traditions of Muslims of Indo-Pak! It was all situational, there being no martial races! But somehow in Pakistan by 1950s myth became mixed with reality and myth finally gained the upper hand ! The winter of our discontent finally came in the killing fields  of Bengal in December 1971!

General Niazi, the much maligned man, was the tip of the iceberg only!  But we realise this only if he is assessed in the light of the other factors. He was a product of the Ayubian system when officers with ranker background or those who lacked independent judgements were preferred for higher ranks! The class conscious British who were extremely snobbish in selection of regular officers for the British Army very cleverly kept a 50% quota for Indian Army rankers (24 on internal merit and 6 on nomination) in each intake  ( 30 out of 60 cadets) of the Indian Military Academy Dera Dun. The ulterior motive was to ensure that relatively more pliable , politically inert, and orders oriented material entered the Indian officer corps. In India the ranker breed did not do as well as Pakistan because their first Indian C-in-C Cariappa was from the 1919 commissioned Indian course. On theother hand in Pakistan the civilian leadership in its zeal to have a non-Punjabi C-in-C at a time when the Punjabi-Hindustani conflict was at its peak selected Ayub who was a 1927 commissioned officer. This led to the exit of many Sandhurst/Daly College commissioned Muslim officers who were senior to Ayub. The leftover of Sandhurst commissioned officers were eliminated by Ayub through forced retirement or by promotion of Musa to C-in-C’s appointment in 1958. Thus the Pakistan Army lost the services of many more experienced officers simply because they were sidelined through political supersession or were retired. The gap between the two Indo Pak armies in quality of experience may be gauged from the fact that the first Indian C-in-C was eight years senior to Ayub in service and the course mate of  Musa, the second Muslim C-in-C of the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C-in-C eleven years after Musa! This may have worked positively for the Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with an independent outlook! Musa on the other hand as Gul Hassan’s memoirs revealed lacked independent judgement dynamism or talent! The Pakistan army during the period 1951-71 became a highly orders oriented machine! Smart on the drill square, tactically sound but strategically barren and lacking in operational vision! One whose first Pakistani  C-in-C was more interested in political intrigue and industrial ventures than in the basics of higher military organisation or operational strategy!

Modern warfare on the other hand demanded mission-oriented approach, which was sadly lacking in both the Indo Pak armies! This was thanks to the British inherited orders oriented approach which in words of General Mellenthin of the Wehrmacht, reduced British officers to the status of clerks and mouthpieces of their commanders! The British with all the resources of the British Empire and thanks to US aid in both world wars managed to survive despite phenomenal military incompetence. Thus Alanbrooke the British Chief lamented during WW Two once he said “It is lamentable, how poor we are in army and corps commanders; we ought to remove several , but heaven knows where we shall find anything much better...the flower of our manhood was wiped out some twenty years ago and it is just some of those that we lost then that we require now” (Refers-Page-239- The Turn of the Tide-Arthur Bryant -Collins Saint James Place-London-April 1957). But this incompetence was no longer affordable in the resource starved Pakistan Army of 1971! The Indian problem was less serious since many of their drawbacks were overcome by the fact that they were numerically superior, and possessed larger material resources. This was applicable relatively less in 1965 and convincingly more in 1971! Secondly the Indians had lesser number of ranker officers in their higher ranks and had benefited from the experience of a larger number of service chiefs with more experience in terms of length of service as well as war record than Pakistan Army, whose first chief was famous for tactical timidity in Burma, while the second chief was a non entity, whose only quality was humility, albeit, commensurate with his actual potential  (!)  and political reliability!

Some readers may find the approach biased. Nevertheless it is based on lessons of military history. Leadership is a situational process. The finest leadership seen in an institutionalised form was developed in the German Army. The German officer corps was dominated by two classes of men. One, scions from aristocratic families of Prussia or the impoverished nobility weak in land holding but bearers of a long tradition in officer rank. Men with the title/prefix Von. Second were men of learning who made their way upwards in the officer corps through sheer merit and on total intellectual grounds. Like Moltke Gneisenau  and Scharnhorst (of humble origins but educated under a noble’s patronage who saw great talent in him). Take Moltke the Elder, the writer of a large number of military history works and a profound thinker. He cannot be compared with Niazi Tikka or Musa, all of whom entered the army on the ranker quota and the last were not famous for any qualities of higher military leadership apart from eminence in conducting ruthless counter insurgency operations in Baluchistan or East Pakistan!  Men who had not written even a single article or composition on any military subject, with any trace of depth of intellect!  When I was commissioned in the army in March 1983 we had two officers in 11 Cavalry who specialised in narrating anecdotes of General Tikka Khan’s utterances of Solomon’s wisdom on various occasions while he was the chief! Take Ayub Khan.  Guilty of tactical timidity in Burma! No comparison with Thimaya the only Indian to command an infantry brigade in actual action in WW Two or Rajendarsinhji the first Indian to get a DSO! Those who did have the talent of higher command or grasp of strategy like Yaqub were sidelined! Those who did have a record of accomplished generalship as divisional commanders like Abrar or Sarfaraz or brigade commanders like Qayyum Sher were not promoted!

The reviewer’s observation about gallantry awards may be compared with Tajammul’s observation about the round about manner in which gallantry awards were awarded in 1965, e.g Aziz Bhatti’s case who as per Tajammul died on the home bank of BRB (by fluke) but was awarded a Nishan e Haidar on the basis of the citation (which was rewritten three times) written by his Commanding Officer Colonel Ibrahim Qureshi (a man the readers may or may not know of considerable literary merit). (Refers-Page-74-The Story of My Struggle- Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-Jang Publishers- Lahore -1991) . In any case Hilal I Jurrat was awarded even to Niazi again and to General Rahim (accused of fleeing in a unsoldierly manner later), Ansari, Sharif (God knows why) during the period when the army was engaged in minor operations against the so-called  Mukti Bahini insurgents from March to December 1971 (Page -126-Ibid). Tajammul a Punjabi Muslim from Chakwal forthrightly admitted that these above-mentioned awards were given to these gentlemen for killing their own countrymen! (Ibid).

The problem of the Pakistan Army was not lack of talent but of operating in an environment, which I have always referred to in a self-coined phrase as “ conspiracy against originality and boldness”, something which I at least witnessed in my 13 years service from 1981 to 1994. Why this conspiracy against talent?  We enter the political realm once again! The German Kaisers had nothing to fear from a Moltke or Blucher but military or civilian usurpers of Pakistan had a lot to fear from a more talented general! Thus the necessity for (another self-coined phrase)  “Goof Selection Syndrome”, a process initiated by Liaquat the first prime minister under able advice of Iskandar Mirza and perfected by Ayub and Bhutto. “Select a man from an ethnic or sectarian minority or at least a politically docile man or one who is mediocre or at least perceived/assessed as such”.  Thus in the Ayubian era officers with ranker background, were not preferred on merit, but on the basis of lack of talent and thus lack of ambition in being politically docile, or being from ethnic and sectarian minorities as was the case with Musa and Yahya. The German Army which we were discussing as late as 1930’s the German army was a “Von” dominated army. As a matter of fact most of the German generals who opposed Hitler’s rule and many of his unsound strategic decisions were men like Fritsch Manstein etc, all of them with an aristocratic background. In India unfortunately the British with an ulterior motive had encouraged men from the ranks to be officers with the thinking that these would be more reliable. There never was any 50 % quota for rankers in Sandhurst! Why the British were so generous with the despised Indians! Even the Punjabi dominated army which was so much criticised by the British press for atrocities in East Pakistan was a British creation whose origins dated back to the period 1883-1911!

The army did have potential Moltke’s Mansteins and some Grey Wolf’s but the vast bulk of these, perhaps with the exception of men like Eftikhar Khan were sidelined! Even Eftikhar, thanks to his unorthodox personal life, was a sidelined man, once the war broke out, and it was Pakistan Army’s good luck that this great leader of men, our finest commander commanded the 23 Division! I remember a session with General Attiq ur Rahman whenI presented him with a book that I had written on Clausewitz’s military thoughts .The book was dedicated to Eftikhar Khan. Attiq was horror struck and remembered Eftikhar as a horrible man , as Attiq saw him in the light of Attiq’s strict standards of morality as Eftikhar’s Directing Staff in Staff College Quetta. I dismissed General Attique’s objections since I viewed Eftikhar as all the officers and men of my unit 11 Cavalry saw him in Chamb in 1971. Moving towards the sound of guns, racing ahead of the leading tank ! Goading cursing and prodding with his stick irresolute lower commanders ahead ! Our problem has been failure to identify and groom talent! A natural result in a country where the Prime Minister or the President wants to have the most pathetic man in the highest ranks, just because he feels safer with them!

There were some charismatic and resolute men in East Pakistan at brigade level like Tajammul or Saadullah but Tajammul was described as a nut to this scribe by his brigade major! Nut because he wished to fight till the bitter end and was abandoned by most officers of his headquarter while doing so !  But these men  Tajammul, Saadullah etc were the exception rather than the rule! An officer who served in 16 Division Headquarters and stayed as a prisoner stated in a conversation in 1983 that the choice in December 1971 was between getting massacred by the Bengalis or safety of an Indian camp and many, specially those involved in atrocities against non combatants/civilians were positively relieved on hearing the announcement of surrender. On the other hand surrender was a traumatic experience for many upright officers like some who I saw even as late as 1985 as brigadiers were bitter about the terrible psychological experience of the whole affair. There were fighting soldiers who had no part in any atrocities against non-combatants!  Many fine souls like Ijaz Mustafa, Sultan Mahmood and many more died in the fighting, but today they are not remembered since they had no one to write a good citation or no patron in the higher headquarters to send their names ahead.

The Eastern Command on the other hand required a mission-oriented commander with independent judgement! Niazi’s intellectual level as stated by Gul and many others was not beyond that of a company commander! The GOCs that he had were equally illustrious! On the other hand the strategic situation in 1971 required a Moltke or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! Thus the basic reasons for surrender do not lie in Niazi’s personality alone, but in other factors! The surrender in 1971 was the combined result of absence of a Von Lettow Vorbeck (German commander in East Africa in WW One) in East Pakistan and an absence of a Moltke the Elder or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! The surrender had two angles, one strategic, which was in the realm of the Pakistani GHQ and the other operational i.e the realm of the Eastern Command. I will quote an Indian to prove that East Pakistan could have been saved despite all the horrible things done by another ranker Tikka, had the Pakistani GHQ acted with a greater sense of timing! General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that “ the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us “ (Refers-Page-28-The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War 1971- Lt Gen P. Candeth -Allied Publishers-Madras-1984).

The fact that Niazi became a three star general proves that incompetent men can reach relatively high ranks in an army. Who can say that Niazi was different from the bulk of other generals of the Pakistan Army in 1971! An army in which between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age.  (Refers- Page-258 & 259- Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973). An army in which in the words of a major general who served in the same period, anyone “in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service” or one in which “Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for”! (Ibid). An army where “gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators”! (Refers-Ibid). An army in which security of commission and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary dismissal thanks to laws amended from early 1950s were so lacking that “some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an armed force officer”. (Refers-Ibid).

As a matter of fact Clausewitz recognised mediocrity in higher ranks. As per Gul obsequiousness  helped Niazi in his rise. Then being from Ayub’s unit also played a part in his promotion to higher ranks. As far as gallantry is concerned Niazi did win an MC in WW Two and an HJ in 1965! But then, the resolution required at higher level, as Clausewitz the great philosopher of war says, is far different from that required at a lower level, thus “higher the rank the more necessary it is that boldness be accompanied by a reflective mind”, compare this with General Niazi. “Much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics”; judge Yahya in the light of this statement and the situation is easier to comprehend! Yahya’s war record, successful escape from a Prisoner camp, or combat action as a company officer or company commander or command of a division, was no guarantee that Yahya possessed the strategic vision or talent to function successfully as Pakistan’s Supreme War Lord in a conflict with an enemy with a marked numerical superiority! He simply did not have the “strength of will or the strategic insight to execute a sound military strategy “ in a situation which required a man with a Moltke the Elder’s calibre! It was not a question of valour or  more being more martial but a conflict of David and an over cautious Goliath (as Candeth’s statement proves) in which the David lost or lost too badly; not because of weak muscles or fists but because of lack of resolution and strategic talent at the operational as well as strategic level!

Lastly the military conduct of war in East Pakistan. The failure to withdraw to the Dacca bowl, the failure to foresee the pattern of Indian operations in case of war! Niazi alone cannot be blamed for it! In foreseeing this the GHQ, Niazi’s staff, all five of his GOCs and above all Yahya’s strategic failure in exercising the offensive strategy to remedy the operational crisis resulting from an Indian attack on East Pakistan were the ultimate reason for surrender. The only two areas where Niazi and his team of staff officers and divisional commanders, can be blamed is not for fighting longer than they did, and setting an example in resolution and heroism and for not being mission oriented and in blindly following orders to defend every inch of territory against his better judgement, if there is a grain of truth in what he asserts, was his better judgement in that particular situation at that point in time! But surrender even then was a foregone conclusion! In the past when armies fought till the end, even when it was militarily pointless, was not due to their being more martial, but simply because of sheer desperation, since at that time prisoners were not taken, all found alive were liquidated! This was no longer the case in civilised warfare! The only exceptions to this rule being the Japanese! Surrender took place, not because Pakistan army was less martial but because it was without air cover blockaded and encircled and surrender was the only option as many other armies had done in Singapore, France, Poland etc. In any case Hara Kiri or fighting till death was not a part of the historical traditions of the areas from which the bulk of Pakistan Army was recruited! Had that been the case the Punjab and an 8 % Sikh minority could not have ruled Frontier! An admirer addressed Moltke the Elder after his military triumphs against Austria and France as a great military commander. Moltke said that he was not a great military commander since he had never carried out a withdrawal operation. The operational problem in East Pakistan involved withdrawal to the Dacca bowl and was not as simple as it seemed. The fact thus remains that even the operational problems in East Pakistan were too complicated for Niazi and his staff officers and even for the Military Operations Directorate of the Pakistani GHQ! Gul the Pakistani CGS being a man in words of Sultan Khan who firmly believed in the power of bayonet to settle all issues! Now coming down to actual on ground odds. Manekshaw admitted that “The Pakistanis (in East Pakistan) fought well... and that they could not have fought any better and ...their defeat keeping in view the overwhelming Indian superiority was a foregone conclusion.  Surrender was a natural result of higher military incompetence and political bankruptcy. Niazi the product of the Ayubian system was relatively as good or as bad as most of the general officers of that era. Ironically since no other three star general was tried in 1971 like Niazi, Niazi stands out as a scapegoat!

To conclude there were many intangible factors that counted. It takes me 32 years back as a school going lad to Quetta where my father was a grade two operations staff officer with the 16 Division (which was airlifted from Quetta to East Pakistan in 1971) from 1969 till October 1971! How the school children mostly army officers sons, or even common West Pakistani soldiers referred contemptuously to Bengalis as one West Pakistani (Punjabi or Pathan) is equal to ten Bengalis! A perception based on the myth of the Martial Races Theory as I discovered much later!  What about the immense psychological the burden of having carried out a genocide on the Muslim population of Bengal from March to October 1971. An officer, one Major Bhatt,  brother of another officer who became a three star general, who was there in that gory period, and admitted that atrocities were carried out by both sides on a lavish scale, once told me that there was ferocity in the Bengalis as if they had a 50 year old debt to repay ! True that all officers were not guilty of atrocities, nor were all the divisions, brigades or units! But there were Hodsons and Calleys and the actions of these men weighed heavily on the whole army! These are the intangible factors that many of us now discount. But these were there! Somehow everyone in 1971 had been under estimating the Bengalis! A race, which led India at least as far as the Bengali Hindus, was concerned in defiance of imperialism!  The indomitable man who threw a bomb on the British viceroy at Delhi in 1913 was not from the so-called martial races but a thoroughbred Bengali! Clausewitzian solution to Pakistan’s strategic dilemma vis-a-vis India

Long ago Clausewitz gave a strategic solution to Pakistan’s military dilemma vis-a-vis India when he said, “Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the present moment, is always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect not to us but to our adversary”. In this case the future had better prospects for India and Pakistan’s only hope was an all out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the following words; “Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that  with each  year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages - it will rather increase the disparity of forces - but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account.”

The problem is that the men at the helm of affairs did not read Clausewitz in the period 1947-1971! Even debauchery was not the problem for there was no greater womanizer and drinker than Mustafa Kemal; often  contracting Syphilis and Gonorrhea in the course of satisfying his heavy appetite, and yet at the same time he was such a great military commander that his exploits were acknowledged even by his opponents, the British, in their official history of the WW One! Our problem in 1971 and to date was not debauchery but lack of resolution and strategic talent at the higher level! The present generation of our senior officers has not been tested in any war since none of them commanded anything beyond a company in any war! Only the audit of war will prove their actual worth. We must remember that  fighting the Indians  is not as simple as removing  Feroz Khan Noon, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif’s government . Or even as simple as dealing with other pillars of state! Even Kargil about which there has been so much sabre rattling was a junior leader’s triumph! It is hard to believe that we were so close to a strategic triumph and our noble leaders gave up the triumph! If that was so then Mr Nawaz Sharif should not have been allowed to land after negotiating the Blair House sell off! The actions of 12th October although necessary were late by some four months!

A.H. Amin

Pavocavalry@hotmail.com

Dear Mr. Sehgal and Staff,

I just wanted to let you know that I stumbled upon your magazine web site the other day and since then I have been reading (and copying) several of the military history articles dealing with both modern day Pakistan and the former Raj.

I wanted to congratulate you on presenting strong, reasoned arguments and points of view. It is also refreshing to see that numerous sources are used to support any argument put forth.

While I definitely try to stay out of the “current” argument between Pakistan and India, I have come away with the impression that there is deep and reasoned thought (be it right or wrong) on the Pakistani side and that is always refreshing to see and read. I have also noticed the lack of bias in your reports on the Raj period; again it is nice to see straight-forward and balanced reporting.

Your balanced coverage is to be congratulated. I tried to look for a comparable Indian site and the best I could find was the:

http://www.itihaas.com/index.html

I did not spend much time in the current History section, but I did read several biased and unsubstantiated accounts in the Modern History section dealing with the period of the Raj.

Again, please keep up the good work. I have posted information about “Defence Journal” to my newsgroup and I will soon put a link to your URL on my website.

Sincerely,

Andrew Preziosi

The legacy of Kashmir

Sir,

The legacy of Vietnam is making news in the press and electronic media. The great American nation has served rightful defeat at the hands of the guerilla fighters of Vietnam. History records and rightly so, guerrilla fighters know no frontiers, they can fight in the hills, they can fight in the mountains, they can fight in the forest, they can fight in the torrents of flood, they can fight in the rivers, they can fight anywhere and everywhere. Their armour is grit, determination and will to sacrifice. Natural resources are neutral of which the guerrilla fighters make full use of, which an organised army is incapable of doing because of its tradition and training. Every guerrilla is a commander in himself and can take and does take decisions in hours of need, which an American trained army is incapable of doing because of its lifestyle and traditions.

General Hague is on record to say that 40% of the American Army is drug addict, what can be expected of such force. Fighting is a tough job, specially in the hills and terrain’s during the 2nd World War while Field Marshal Rommel use to spend 72 hours in a tank, the American Commander-in-Chief was provided an Air-conditioned Camp. Field Marshal Auckenleck on assuming command in the Libyan Desert had issued an order of the day that no officer and men under his command will live in concrete built house, but he will spend his nights in a tent. This is the spirit and tough conditioning required for a fighting force and not air-conditioned houses.

Now the times have changed Americans are more interested in their own welfare rather than in extending the tentacles of their President through IMF & World Bank to subjugate the third world and give shape to one world or a global village with the President of the United States on top.

In the United Nations the Americans met much more than their match and this is the legacy which haunts them even now. Americans are very good at bombing from the air and throwing out missiles and that too on Baghdad only. Their land forces are loath to land in an enemy territory as an occupation force. This may be one of the reasons that UN is not able to implement the resolutions passed by it on Kashmir where fighting is going on. The plebiscite could not be administered because the UN could not disengage the fighting elements in Kashmir. Of course the United Nations are effective when it comes to peaceful bombing.

The world conscience has to wake-up before Kashmir leaves a legacy behind for India and its new adopted friend the Americans. Watch out, the great Americans, instead of blackmailing Pakistan with the allegations of supporting terrorism in Kashmir which every independent naked eye can see that India is perpetrating terrorism against the innocent Kashmiris for the last fifty years implement the UN resolutions on Kashmir.