Reality Check On Afghanistan

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA discusses the real AFGHANISTAN and its problems vis-a-vis the outside world.

While publicly they are all against continued fighting, yet again there must be an air of expectation in various capitals. Entrenched behind their internet-loaded computers Afghanistan specialists must closely monitor the ground situation. Their government’s concerns remain unchanged: Will Afghanistan’s fortunes change? Will the Tehran and Moscow supported Ahmad Shah Massoud succeed in a roll-back of the Islamabad supported Talibaan?

Every year the melting of snow heralds resumption of fighting between the Talibaan and Ahmad Shah Massoud’s forces. This time around it promises to be no different. Massoud is an experienced military. Most governments would rejoice at the political demise of the Talibaan.

Today’s dominant discourse, official and unofficial, is premised on the simplistic view that all terrorism that moves westwards is born, nurtured and exported by the Talibaan. The latest US State Department report also states that Afghanistan poses a “major terrorist threat.” This simplistic, if convenient terrorism-related view of the Talibaan overlooks three facts: that the world is sowing which Pakistan and US together authored and in differing ways benefited from in the post-Soviet invasion period; that the explosive combine of religion, resistance and unconventional warfare that was painstakingly nurtured by the ISI and CIA has proliferated across the politically turbulent Central Asian and Caucasus zones; the Talibaan government is far too.

Yet reports like the April 27 one published in a Pristina-based publication Tanjug on April 27 only further consolidate stereotypes. The report entitled “International terrorist Osama bin Laden in Kosovo and Metohija” maintains that “the notorious international terrorist of Saudi origin Osama bin Laden, wanted by the U.S. State Department for a reward of five million dollars, has found new sanctuary in the Balkans, in the hotbed of European terrorism - Kosovo and Metohija, after many years of hiding in Afghanistan.” Osama the report claims has “arrived in the province in the company of his close associate Abou-Hassan, who is responsible for the murder of three British tourists in December 1998.” It adds that “the Islamic fanatic arrived in the southern Serbian province from Albania.Until recently, bin Laden was training a group of almost 500 mujaheddin from Arab countries around the Albanian towns of Podgrade and Korce for terrorist actions in Kosovo and Metohija.” Further cultivating and whipping the “fear” against the so-called “Islamic terrorists” the paper claims that “This group of mujaheddin represents only one-fourth of  the planned number of extremists whose task is to set off a new wave of violence in southern Serbia .”

This report about Osama arriving in Kosovo may read like horror-tale or fairy-tale , depending on what and who you support and oppose. Clearly freedom of the press and circulation of information is indispensable to the evolution of responsible and thinking societies. Yet more critical is the evidence that must back media reports. Otherwise responsible reports is reduced to story-telling. On issues where an international consensus is sought by the more resourceful and therefore influential governments or interest groups, the ordinary public is informed more by stories than by responsible reporting. Examples abound: that the Kashmir struggle is one promoted through Islamic terrorist groups, that the Talibaan are promoting terrorism etc. While story-reading we must constantly ask ourselves which group or government will benefit from this. For example Osama in Kosovo sounds like creating a perfect alibi to demonize the KLA or the group that the report indicates Osama will support. In many capitals the Osama card or the Islamic terrorism card have been used to promote their own illegal, anti-people and unjust policies.

On the Talibaan front there have been other serious issues. Their archaic and anti-Islamic policies towards women have rightly and roundly been criticized. It is ofcourse another matter that tribal practices, the absence of the formally educated Afghans and the Madrassa teachings the Talibaan were exposed to are largely responsible for this attitude. Sign of change are visible. Much less in Kabul and more in the other towns like Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif etc.

Anyway for a number of reasons the West generally and most governments specifically fear and resent the Talibaan. Prolonged rule, rather simplistically they believe will encourage other countries in the region to emulate the Talibaan example. Talibaan example cannot be emulated. None can. Late twentieth century history establishes that each society, therefore each context, evolves its own change recipe. The only uniformity lies in the action-reaction mode. Injustice, insecurity, exclusion and suppression will always throw up strong anti-status quo forces.

Most countries have preferred to deal with the Talibaan’s predecessor government. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s and Ahmad Shah Massoud’ controlled Kabul until September 1996. Tehran and Moscow, supported the Rabbani-Massoud government financially, militarily and diplomatically.

Encouraged Rabbani-Massoud violated the Pakistan-brokered Islamabad Accord of 1993. The Accord had legitimized their time-bound hold over Kabul. The only tool for peaceful transfer of power was rubbished. As perhaps should have been predictable in the post-Soviet game of brazen power play. A frustrated Pakistan greatly facilitated the birth of the Talibaan. To a lesser degree they, along with Saudi Arabia and the United States have helped them militarily and economically.

The Saudi and the Talibaan connection broke off after the fateful September 1997 meeting between Mulla Umar and the Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki-al Faisal in Kandahar. Umar refused to surrender his guest Osama Bin Ladin to the Saudis. Similarly Washington’s official policy of “constructive engagement” with the Talibaan changed into one of active hostility. Again Osama and the Talibaan’s policies towards women became the primary factors. Only Pakistan’s support remained intact. However, there is the unpublicized resentment against Pakistan for not sufficiently helping the Afghans on various fronts. Also there is the fact that the Talibaan have not been able to roll-back Massoud’s forces in any decisive manner. In the presence of significant military support from Pakistan it may have been different for the Talibaan.

Within the comity of nations the Talibaan virtually stand alone. Perhaps the Talibaan government comes closest to being actually isolated. Unlike other Washington-hounded states like Cuba, Iraq, Sudan, and until recently North Korea and Libya who have a number of other supporter states, Talibaan have none. Yet they fight on. Above all hold on to power.

Those who may hope to witness a quick end to the Talibaan government will be disappointed. It is a phenomenon that may enjoy less support of many starving, jobless and frustrated Afghans, yet there is no better alternative. They unite to throw out the Kabul regime. Yet any successful movement towards Kabul exposes their potential for callous and bloody in-fighting. A painfully destroyed Kabul is a tribute to the madness of these groups. Also those Afghans planning revolutions and evolutions for Afghanistan sitting on foreign soil can only have limited impact on the internal situation. Only what is rooted and is born largely from within, has chances of blossoming.

However, with increasing discontent against the Talibaan’s inability to deliver employment, education, health facilities etc in towns like Kabul, there may be more opportunities for Talibaan’s opponents to destabilise the situation. Sabotage activities have been on the increase.

However, with all their difficulties the Talibaan will neither concede military nor political victory to the opponents. Whatever pressures the international community may apply. Economic, political isolation through sanctions has been tried. Interestingly many countries of Western Europe and of the region including China, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhistan are engaged in trade and in exchanges in different sectors.

The Talibaan derive some comfort from these developments. Material and political comfort. The UN agencies too detect the nuances of a very gradually changing Talibaan approach towards social development issues.

They continue to work with the Talibaan. Although with a miniscule amount of resources compared to the reconstruction task at hand. They see the human deprivation and suffering first hand.

The Talibaan are off for the Jeddah talks but breakthrough is possible only if Mulla Umar is expected as the head of the government. Power sharing government departments will then follow, the Talibaan leadership has always maintained. “We will fight the war to end the war” was the standard line that Talibaan leaders share with visitors in Kabul. War will no doubt go on. The irony is that Kabul’s rag-a tag army, in its guerilla warfare techniques is no comparison to Massoud’s masterly techniques. Many among the Talibaan hope that more Massoud commanders will defect and join them.

Only then can the Talibaan drive Massoud outside his Panjsheer base. Or if the Pakistan government decides to provide significant military support.

The war will go on. Anti-Talibaan governments world over hope that the Tehran-initiated rapprochement among different Afghan commanders will bring the Talibaan to their knees. That is unlikely to happen. All UN peace initiatives, including the current one led by Vendrell too will draw a blank. For the Afghan people and for the peace in the region it would be wise for the international community to launch a massive rehabilitation programme for Afghanistan. This would encourage the more contemporary and aware men within the Talibaan to call for further moderation in Talibaan policies on social issues including education, employment for women, the beard issue etc. This would lead to the return of the educated Afghans who still in big numbers continue to migrate to distant shores. Such an approach will facilitate the birth of a more contemporary mode of governance in Afghanistan. Political patch-ups can follow later.