Re-examining Kargil

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI looks at this epoch-making event of 1999.

The Kargil conflict cannot be understood in isolation since it has its roots in the post-Simla developments along the Line of Control that was agreed to as the ceasefire line after the 1971 Pakistan-India war. Nor can one analyse Kargil without examining the fear malaise that afflicts governments in Pakistan every time they sense US disapproval of their actions. The inability to develop the confidence to own up to unpopular (in the international context) policies is one major reason why the Indian myths surrounding Kargil have gained so much acceptability even within an ill-informed public in Pakistan. And this brings us to the third important aspect of Kargil: The inability of the state to take its people into confidence on crucial policy matters.

Why did Kargil happen at all? A major factor was the manner in which the Indians had destroyed the LoC on the ground through incursions - conducted with impunity and at least a passive international approval - into the Pakistani side. This was accompanied by an increasing Indian harassment in the form of shelling along the main supply route of the Neelum Valley up to the Pakistani side of the LoC - making it almost impossible to use the Neelum Valley road leading up to Khel. For instance, in November 1972 Indian forces broke the LoC in Chorbatla and occupied a 10 sq km area across the Line. This was followed by a more adventurous move north of NJ 9842 - again into the Pakistani side of the LoC — in 1984 when about 4,000 Indian troops occupied a portion of the Siachin area (2512 kms). Here, the Pakistani government of dictator Zia - for its own purposes - chose to ignore this major military move by India and left the Pakistani nation to pay the price of this Indian aggression. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that India would move again to destroy what was left of the LoC - and it did, in autumn 1988 when its forces moved south-west of NJ 9842 in the Qamar Sector. This time round the Pakistan army did respond but India managed to retain 10 posts within Pakistani territory (34 kms).

Therefore, it should not surprise anyone to discover that the Pakistanis might have been planning something so as to counter the continuing interdiction by Indian forces along the Neelum Valley supply route - especially since the Indians had all but destroyed the post-1971 LoC. Here the Drass-Kargil-Batalik area was the natural choice because it is the only area - about 150 kms of the LoC - where Pakistan has the advantage of height, so that its side of the peaks dominate Indian positions. More critical, these peaks command a full view of the Srinagar-Drass-Kargil highway, which is the lifeline of supplies to Indian troops in Siachin. Of course, the height of these peaks - rising from 15,000 to 20,000 feet - also makes it difficult to occupy them. So any operation contemplating such a move has to be very well-planned - especially in terms of supplies and communication lines. Whether it was the Pakistani military’s suspicion that India was planning a Siachin-like adventure in this region, or whether it was simply an already-planned Pakistani move reaching fruition, the fact is that the military aspect of the Kargil action was simply brilliant. Taking the Indians by surprise - the major factor for success - the Pakistan military used forces already deployed in the area to occupy the heights along the LoC. Between March-April 1999, it appears, the inaccessible areas on the LoC were manned and prepared by the Pakistan army - with the forces and logistics all conducted in total deception to maintain the crucial element of surprise. That is why the commander of India’s 15th Corps declared on May 19th that there was “no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side, and no battle indicators of war, or even limited skirmishes.” The move itself was simply an offensive-defence, which did not constitute crossing over to the Indian side of the LoC - but simply along the LoC itself which deprived India of the advantage of doing something similar. More critically, this move meant that Pakistan could now interdict Indian supplies to Siachin and this is why the Indians could not afford to let this action go unchecked since it would mean the end of India’s military occupation of Siachin.

To further complicate things for the Indians, the Kashmiri freedom fighters - it became clear after the events began to unfold - had also begun to regroup out of the urban areas of IHK and alter their guerrilla strategy. With India increasing the number of its armed personnel in IHK, the fighters apparently chose to focus on more direct military targets through the classic hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. To this end, the narrowness of the Srinagar-Leh highway at the Zojila Pass presented an ideal target since Indian military convoys had to move very slowly. As the Indians suffered increasing casualties, they retaliated and the fighters moved to the hills above the Zojila-Kargil highway. This provided the Indians with the pretext to attack the Pakistan army to dislodge them from the peaks along the LoC - since the Indian supply route to Siachin was now under threat. The Mujahideen were forgotten as the Indian military moved massive forces and began a full-scale limited war action against Pakistan army positions. Details of the military exchanges vary depending on which version one hears - but some points emerge clearly:

One, that India was deadlocked militarily and, therefore, chose to go international - very successfully - in order to seek international pressure to get Pakistan to withdraw from the heights along the LoC.

Two, that India was able to turn a military defeat into a diplomatic victory.

Three, that Pakistan was unable to translate a tremendous military success into a politico-diplomatic victory.

Four, that Kargil has forced India’s hand on Kashmir and combined with the nuclearisation of the region, the Kashmir issue has attracted international attention.

Five, that Kargil signalled the advent of limited war into the Pakistan-India conflictual equation.

From a Pakistani perspective, the most critical question that needs examination is what went wrong in that the military success failed to be reflected at the politico-diplomatic level? Before one examines this issue, there are certain myths that need to be clarified. Myth No 1: Ms Bhutto’s claims that the Kargil plan was presented to her while she was in power but she rejected it.

This scribe could find no proof for this claim and most sources in the know categorically refuted Ms Bhutto’s claim. It seems this is one of the many examples of Ms Bhutto’s desperate efforts to gain cheap popularity in the West at Pakistan’s expense.

Myth No 2: That Pakistan was beginning to lose peak after peak, which compelled Sharif to go to Washington.

In trying to assess the reality of this claim, according to most military sources the Pakistani-Mujahideen positions were steadfast in most of the five areas involved - with only two points of loss of ground. About half in one area and one-third in another.

According to knowledgeable sources, the Pakistan army was determined to hold on till August and then expected the government to move towards some mutual disengagement linking Kargil to Siachin and moving on towards a dialogue on Kashmir.

Myth No 3: That the Sharif government was kept in the dark till the very last and it was purely a military decision to embark upon the Kargil action.

This is the most damaging myth being propagated since Sharif’s controversial flight to Washington, D.C. The fact of the matter is that the Sharif government was in on the whole plan right from the start. In November 1998, the government was given a presentation on this issue by the ISI’s Ziauddin himself. After the presentation, Sharif gave his approval.

Unfortunately, right from the start no attempt was made to work out the diplomatic and propaganda aspects of this policy in advance. Even when the action commenced, the government’s initial reaction was one of fear which led to denial. As a result, unlike India, which began a media offensive to counter its military failings, Pakistan seemed lost on the issue - which allowed India to fill the vacuum. It was not till July that the Pakistani electronic media began to project the Pakistani side of the story. The US-centric mind-set of the policy makers caused them to panic when they felt Western disapproval of the action. Instead of putting forward Pakistan’s case - which was strong - they chose to deny all knowledge and put it all on the military’s shoulders.

Apparently, the back-door diplomatic channel from the Indian side initially - under another Mr Misra, not Birjesh, brought the message that if Pakistan called off the Kargil move, Kashmir would be resolved in 9 months. When Pakistan refused this time period, the Indians agreed to 6 months - this apparently happened about the time Sharif visited China. It appears that at this point the US rang the alarm bells because it saw success for Pakistan and sidelining of the Americans - and so it played a major role in sabotaging this effort.

The pro-US lobby within the Pakistan government panicked Sharif into undertaking a meaningless flight to Washington - leaving everything on the ground in a state of confusion. It is a fact that within the Sharif government, there was a group that Sharif isolated because he knew they would not support his compromise on Kargil in Washington. Mushahid Hussain was in that group and was clueless about the Washington dash, sitting in Ayubia with his family!

In fact, throughout the Kargil operation, the Sharif government seemed split on the issue and unable to undertake rapid diplomatic and political responses. Even when the Indian government through the cover of its lobbyists in the US brought out the highly offensive “Rough Army” ad, the Sharif government dithered over the response. For those of us who saw some of this dithering up close, it was incomprehensible why the government kept rejecting one ad suggestion after another - sometimes on the grounds that the suggestion was “too strong/extreme”. It was equally clear that the decision to withhold a response was coming from the very top of the political leadership.

Worse still, Washington and the subsequent forced disengagement not only provided a lifeline to the Indian army, it caused heavy loss of life for the Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry. That it led to the inevitable frustration within the Armed Forces was understandable since the military success of Kargil was totally undermined by the Sharif government’s confused and panicked approach from beginning to end. And, to top it all, there was a deliberate policy to deny the public the truth. In keeping with the legacy of previous governments, the Sharif government continued the tradition of not trusting the nation and thereby not taking it into confidence. That is why the Indian lobby has so successfully cultivated its myths on Kargil within Pakistani domestic opinion.

Regardless of all this, Indian military weaknesses were exposed most acutely during Kargil as were its propaganda-diplomatic skills. The media blitzkrieg also helped India realise its propaganda objectives. But the reality of the Kashmiri struggle could not be countered and as the military struggle has gone from strength to strength, India is having to deal with the realities of the situation on the ground as well as seeking new propaganda themes to undermine this struggle of the Kashmiri people.

One dangerous theme that is being propagated is that the struggle is being waged by “jehadis” from Pakistan. This is the major theme post-Kargil and what is amazing is that no one asks about the survival of the struggle for over a decade in IHK. How come it took Kargil to make the Indians refer to the “jehadi” feature of this freedom struggle?

One reason why India has sold this line to the West is because it has found a sympathetic target audience. But another reason is that Pakistan has once again failed to counter this theme with conviction and a proactive policy. It seems our political decision-makers - be they military or civilian - get a strange case of dithers and fear when it comes to presenting a confident but “unpopular-in-the-West” stance that owns up to realities and counters falsehoods emanating from India with conviction.

Kargil showed the best and the worst of the Pakistani state and nation - what we are able to achieve with heroic valour on the ground, our leadership cannot sustain with equal conviction at the policy projection level. Till we can forge a unity between our actions and our projection of them, we will always let success down.