Air Force to Aerospace Force

Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) AYAZ AHMED KHAN writes about India’s future airpower plans.

On October 6, 2000 the Indian Air Force was renamed “The Indian Aerospace Force.” This change of title three days after the signing of the Indo-Russo strategic partnership and the military and technical accords during President Putin’s visit to India signifies enhanced role for the IAF including use of space for offensive operations.

Indian Air Force is the major beneficiary of the Indo-Russian strategic accords signed on October 3 at Delhi. Fifty SU-30 K fighters are already on order from Russia. And the transfer of technology for the licenced production of 140 Sukhoi SU-30 MKI multirole fighters (total 190) will give the IAF a qualitative jump over the Chinese Air Force and numerical and qualitative edge over the Pakistan Air Force. In another five years all the 190 Su 30K’s and MK-1’s which are powerful force multipliers are expected to become operational with the IASF. Russia will also update 110 out of the 200 Mig-21 Bis fighters. With the strength of 1,200 combat aircraft by the year 2005-6 the IASF will aim to gain air superiority at the outset in an air war.

Moscow will also supply undisclosed number of Mi-52 attack gunship helicopters and will help India to put on track the stalled light combat aircraft (LCA) programme. Russia will provide advanced atomic technology support, nuclear reactors, expanded nuclear technology cooperation and help complete Russian nuclear power project at Koodankulam in Tamil Naadu. Russian support for India’s missile and nuclear programme is well known, though the strategic accords do not mention this clearly.

Eighty percent of IAF hardware i.e. aircraft and weapons are of Russian origin. The new title i.e. Indian Aerospace Force suggests collusion between India and Russia to use space satellites and other orbiting space hardware for offensive purposes. Specialists and military and space experts in China and Pakistan must carry out studies in this regard. Evaluation of the capabilities of the adversary aerospace force is important because air power and space power will directly impact on the outcome of war. Analysis of Indian aero-space power could best be done by the correct knowledge of combat aircraft, attack helicopters, recce and electronic warfare aircraft, AEW-Elint, transport aircraft, missile and air defence assets and space satellites likely to be used offensively. Besides IAF’s manpower especially flying personnel, pilot deficiencies, and aircraft accidents i.e. flight safety record will help evaluate its operational capabilities.

IAF has 989 combat aircraft in forty squadrons (including 154 fighter trainers). It has 280 helicopters, 181 transport aircraft, 62 electronic warfare aircraft, and 22 ELINT i.e. AEW spy aircraft. These are operated by 2,847 pilots and maintained by 130,000 personnel including civilians. Defence Minister George Fernandes told the Indian Parliament that the IAF is short of 500 pilots and that its flight safety record is abysmal.

With 415 attack aircraft i.e. 63 Mig 21 M/MF, 63 M-23 BN, 189 Mig-27 ML, and one hundred Jaguars-IS and IM in twenty strike squadrons the IAF could launch 830 strike sorties per day against selected targets. This strong offensive punch must be met with effective strategy. Another twenty squadrons comprise four hundred and twenty air superiority fighters in India’s air armoury. These include eighteen SU-30K multirole fighter bombers (32 are under procurement), 35 Mirage 2000 H (ten more are on order), 69 Mig-29 B/S, 30 Mig-23MF, two hundred Mig-21 Bis, and 21 Mig-21 FL. Elements viz Su 30 K’s and Mirages of this air defence force could be effectively used in the strike role as was seen during the Kargil battles; where the Mirage-2000-H did well against undefended and exposed mountain top bunkers. In five years time the IASF Combat aircraft strength will be 1,200 fighter bombers.

With its one hundred and eighty one transport aircraft the IAF has a strategic lift capability for para-dropping and support of a para division plus deep inside. The IAF has employed this strategic transport capability in Ladakh for Siachin and Kargil operations, and as far as Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. The landing of a division plus on Baluchistan coast or in the rear could be quite unsettling. The two hundred and ninety IAF helicopters including 60 attack helicopters with Mi-52’s in the pipeline are to provide tactical support to the Indian Army’s land offensives and to stop Pak armour thrusts.

The Indian Air Force has a credible reconnaissance and electronic warfare capability. Eight Mig-25 RU, 16 Canberra’s, 22 Mig 21-R and MEW and 16 Mig 23 BN fighters are fitted with special visual and electronic cameras and sensing devices to spy on Pakistani air space, radars, missiles, nuclear installations and command and communication centres. Besides a noticeable airborne early warning i.e. AEW and ELINT i.e. electronic intelligence capability is in place with twenty specially designed aircraft. Four Boeing 707’s and two Boeing 737’s are being used as Command Posts and Elint’s. Two Russian IL 76 MD are being used in the ELINT role. In addition five HAL 748 and two HAL 748’s are engaged in ELINT activities along India-China and India-Pak borders. Two IL-76 Bariev AWACs borrowed from Russia in April for deep spying into Pakistan were returned for deficient performance. Indian Air Force neverth-less is ready to fight an electronically supported air war against Pakistan and China.

But will this IAF capability have a paralysing effect on the performance of the PAF? There are many visible weaknesses in the Indian Air Force for the discerning eye. Since 37 years Russian Mig fighters have crashed in large numbers causing widespread unrest in the IAF. Mig 21, 23 and 27’s assembled / manufactured by HAL divisions at Nasik, Sonabeda and elsewhere have crashed at the rate of 25 to thirty aircraft per year. This means loss of five hundred Mig fighters and death of equal number of fighter pilots during the last two decades. In an article titled. “Attrition in the IAF and PAF” published in Vol 2 (4) January-February issue 2000 of Bharat Rakshak Monitor writer Rupak Chattopadhvay writes that, “The Indian press has called into question the IAF’s ability to adequately carry out tasks assigned to it in the light of the recent spate of accidents. Experts both in India and abroad have gone so far as to claim that the rate at which the IAF was flying itself into the ground, Pakistan would simply have to wait for the IAF to crash its entire fleet before attaining air superiority”. Though he concludes that IAF’s safety record is not as bleak as Defence Minister George Fernandes believes, and in fact attempts to prove that it is better than that of the PAF, the fact is that the operational flying record of the IAF is so bleak and abysmal that the force could suffer collapse of morale right at the outset if it suffers high casualties as it did in the 1965 war with Pakistan. During the Kargil war Mig 21 and 27’s performed poorly and Mirage 2000 had to be brought in. The glaring weakness of the Indian Air Force is that eighty percent of its fighter aircraft of Russian design are old, fatigued and accident prone. They have been falling out of the sky like dead ducks. Three hundred and forty eight Mig 21 fighters of 1960 vintage are still being flown at great risk to the lives of young Indian fighter pilots. The Mig-21 is called the “flying coffin” and the “dinosaur”. Almost every IAF Chief of the Air Staff announced the retirement of IAF’s Mig-21 fleet, but tight fisted Indian rulers have disallowed this. They remain mute while young fighter pilots die everyday for no fault of theirs.

Equally vulnerable to accidents and air crashes are Mig-23 and Mig-27’s of 1970-80 vintage and relatively new Mig-29’s of 1980 vintage. Phase out of Mig 23 has been on the cards since long. About twenty Jaguars and five Mirage 2000 H fighters have also crashed. The reason for the high aircraft accidents is poor quality flying training especially fighter training. The dangerous jump during fighter training from slow Kiran basic trainer to the supersonic Mig-21 fighter trainer is one aspect of it. The poor quality of instructor pilots, poor instruction, poor selection and low motivation and morale are contributing factors. The Indian fighter pilots have done well when there is no air opposition e.g. in the December 1971 air war over East Pakistan or the Kargil war. But in the face of air opposition e.g. the seventeen day September 1965 war the IAF crumbled too quickly. On 7th September 1965 the IAF suffered a major debacle and defeat at the hands of the Pakistan Air Force. The lack of sympathy for the fighter pilots when they die in accidents caused by engine failures, fires and explosions in the air is the main cause of widespread frustration in the Indian Air Force. This is evidenced by the unsympathetic statements of IAF senior commanders including Air Chief Marshal Amal Yashwant Tipnis the Chief of the Air Staff, who blames the dead or surviving pilots and not the non-air worthy IAF Mig fighters and poor aircraft maintenance. Air Chief Marshal Tipnis talking to Indian journalists on August 25 said that, “The Mig-21 is a fine aircraft. Accidents in the Indian Air Force are mostly because of human error, and not because the Mig-21 is not airworthy. Mig 21’s will continue to be in operation for at least another decade. There is no reason to phase them out because they are as air worthy as they should be.” This cruel statement is a joke with the Indian fighter pilot, who is being considered as gun fodder. The four hundred fifty seven Mig-21’s (348) and Mig-23’s (109) comprise over fifty percent of the IAF combat strength. These are real dinosaurs who will kill 250 to 300 Indian fighters during the next ten years. Flight safety is the barometer of the efficiency of an air force. With its abysmal flight safety record during peacetime the expected performance of the IAF in war cannot be high.

The truth is that it is not easy to ground or scrap 450 fighter aircraft without replacements by the LCA. But the LCA is a pipe dream, unlikely to materialize. So the IAF commanders and politicians are forced to use Indian fighter pilots as gun fodder rather than ground the flying coffins viz Mig-21 and Mig-23 aircraft.

But Russia, France and other countries are providing potent weapons to India especially to the IAF, and this is destroying the much needed strategic military balance in the region. Pakistan and China must not remain complacent, and need to develop strategic partnership and a strategic doctrine for defence and for peace in the region.

The changed title of the IAF i.e. Indian Air and Space Force implies a distinct effort by the Indian Air Staff for the fourth dimension i.e. use of space for aggression. The air staff is part of the nuclear weapons command and control setup. Prithvi II Squadrons have already been formed. The 250 Km Prithvi II SSM will be used to knock out PAF airfields, radars, missile air defence and command and communication installations.

The IASF has also made a bid to acquire nuclear tipped Agni II IRBM’s for use against strategic targets in Pakistan and China. Its spy satellites and space aggression plans and programmes are shrouded in secrecy, though Air Chief Marshal gave several broad hints in his address on Air Force Day celebrated on October 6, 2000. Pakistan and China would need anti-missile missile like the US Patriot or the Israeli Arrow to destroy incoming Indian Prithvi and Agni missiles. It will take some time for the IASF to acquire space warfare capability. High priority must be given by the Pakistani scientific community to nip in the bud Indian plans to impose aggression from the space.