Possibility of a Nuclear War

Cdr (Retd) Muhammad Azam Khan writes about the dangers of a catastrophe.

India’s increasing problem in Kashmir and the Kargil flare-up has led many analysts to believe that a Nuclear War in South Asia remains a distinct possibility. The ever widening gap in the conventional force levels of India and Pakistan, phenomenal increase in Indian Defence budget and, off late, failure of talks between Mujahideen and Indian Government are cited as other reasons for such a nightmarish possibility and following holocaust. The factors that determine credibility of a nuclear weapon possessor, inter-alia, include the demonstrated capability, an effective command and control system, delivery means and above all the “will” of the possessor to use the same should a situation so necessitate. It was this last factor that persistently averted a nuclear exchange during the cold war even at the height of Cuban missile crisis. In a war between two nuclear adversaries, conventional forces always act as the first line of defence failing which the other option can be exercised. While it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the nuclear threshold of an opponent, it can only encourage the other side if one possessor displays any “lack of resolve” or “determination” on his part in the use of weapon. The conventional force ratio between India and Pakistan has always been to the latter’s disadvantage. This, off course, our adversary has frequently justified given her long contiguous borders with hostile neighbours, the large airspace that needs to be defended as well as the vast coastline with a huge infrastructure of ports handling around US Dollar 80 billion worth of trade annually. The latest increase in Indian defence outlay has, however, come in the wake of Kargil for which our planners should squarely take the blame. Analysis of the post-Kargil crisis has hardly left any doubt that in the absence of a clear and well-defined “strategic thought process” a brilliant tactical manoeuvre was wasted. In its aftermath the Indian defence planners have not only sought a sizeable increase in their defence spending but have gone in for some feverish purchases of military hardware including state of the art surveillance and mountain warfare equipment. Our withdrawal from the peaks and dash to Washington not only eroded the image of our “nuclear resolve” but also emboldened the enemy to take a tougher line of action against us. It needs to be appreciated that terrain friction along our borders has increased significantly over the years, which, today, may impede either side to make any meaningful gains on land in the event of outbreak of hostilities. Consequently, the focus of main battle may shift from land to sea where both sides have some highly valuable strategic assets dispersed along their respective coast. Not only that, the sea lines of communication are strategically too important, both nationally as well as militarily, for either side to be ignored. While it is essential for Pakistan to maintain a minimal conventional force ratio with its eastern neighbour, the same may not be possible in the foreseeable future given our precarious economic condition coupled with massive debt burden and unstable political environment in the country. Alternatively, however, while cutting down on the bloated and wasteful defence expenditure, efforts can be mobilized to strengthen our strategic nuclear weapons capability using indigenous resources (as is being done by many regional countries including China and Iran). This shall not only save some valuable foreign exchange but will certainly have profound psychological and deterrent effect on the enemy. An ex-US ambassador to India narrates in his accounts the Indian psyche by saying “they (Indians) would kick if you lick and they would lick if you kick”. Despite having a predominantly fundamentalist majority the BJP government has not shown any cognizable hard-line approach to issues beyond May 1998 nuclear detonation. Militant organizations like RSS and followers of Advani who continue to pursue a separate agenda are not likely to have any telling effect on the Indian leadership which already finds itself in a predicament maintaining the much needed secular image.

As a post-cold war reality the Indians have assumed the role of “big brother” in the region with the tacit backing of Americans who see in them a real ally that can effectively “rein in” the growing might of China. The world at large is quite well aware and need not be reminded incessantly of the catastrophic consequences of the weapons of mass destruction as is being done by many analysts on our side of the divide. What, however, needs to be drilled into Indian minds today, unmistakably and in subtle manner, is our “determined resolve” to use these weapons as much as the horrific price Indians will have to share should we go down. Notwithstanding the pressure from the west, Indian internal dynamics or her socio-political problems (Kashmir included), how then can we ensure that the “will” of the enemy to wage a war is broken or in other words he is kept at bay and does not undertake even minor misadventure lest it may result in conflagration of the conflict? Only by displaying our resolute determination to use the nukes, if so needed, whilst ensuring:

• Formulation of a clear, well deliberated and an all-encompassing nuclear doctrine.

• Developing/enhancing strategic nuclear weapons capability.

• Ensuring an effective command and control system.

• Developing delivery means.

• Carefully weighing and developing our options of a nuclear second-strike capability (which our adversary inherently enjoys given the strategic depth available to them).

• Last but not the least, declaring emphatically; in unequivocal and unambiguous terms our decisive commitment to use these weapons as a national security imperative.

Note: Edited version of the above article appeared in the daily DAWN of 15 Sept 2000 under the caption “Security Imperatives”.