From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA writes about the new developments in relations between Pakistan and Russia.

A skilled communicator, he readily fielded all the questions. Adeptly extricated himself from the difficult ones. Gave measured responses to others. While cautioning that “deeds must follow words” to measure real progress, his upbeat tone conveyed his optimism on the future of Pak-Russian relations.

By all accounts, the Presidential envoy, whose Pakistan visit Russian Vladmir Putin himself announced to the Pakistani Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf during the millennium summit, is a fairly influential and powerful man within the Presidential team. A Presidential spokesman specially on Chechnya, Yasterzhembskiya is an important and powerful policy advisor on Central Asian and Afghan affairs. He has easy access to Putin who trusts his judgement on regional affairs. Formerly an ambassador to an East European country, Yasterzhembskiya has hands-on experience in dealing with troubled spots. He carried for Musharraf Putin’s letter expressing hope and apprehensions on the bilateral and the regional fronts.

Never short of words, on Afghanistan, the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy Sergei Yasterzhembskiya put up a confident if untenable, defence. His response about Moscow’s help to the Afghan opposition was the expected refrain. “I have first time heard Shah Massoud being referred to as the opposition. Rabbani occupies the Afghan seat at the UN and entire international community recognizes him as Afghanistan’s President. Similarly when asked to comment on the Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s September 26 statement that “some forces are trying to exaggerate the Talibaan threat” comment Yasterzhembskiyaa cleverly denied having any knowledge of such a statement.

Much of what he communicated on Pakistan and Islam was positive. Even if tactically driven. “Terrorism has no religion,” “traditional Islam and enlightened Islam has no tolerance for violence”, “we have a better understanding of Pakistan’s position on Chechnya”, “Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism,” “we have a common understanding on causes of terrorism,” “Putin has been invited to Pakistan and so one President’s trip would be good “-all these statements conveyed Yasterzhembskiya’s positive posturing on Pak-Russian relations. Evidently prompted by both the pre-visit brief he would have got from his Moscow boss but the response that he got from the senior Pakistanis including the country’s Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdus Sattar and Minister of Interior Moinuddin Haider. Hence Yasterzhembskiya’s statements on Pak-Russian relations during the press conference clearly conveyed that Moscow ‘meant business’ where it came to improving Pak-Russian ties.

Even in an exclusive thirty minute one-on-one discussion with the writer the Presidential envoy conveyed his President’s firm commitment to improving Pak-Russian relations. In the candid encounter he also raised Russian concerns about regional security and how improved Pak-Russian relations could contribute to enhanced regional stability and security. On bilateral ties three specific areas of cooperation were identified. In the economic arena there was an indication of Russia wanting to jointly undertake a “major project. “ On the assurance that a definite development may take place on “the project very shortly” not much more was indicated either by the envoy or by the Pakistani officials. During his meetings with the Chief Executive and the foreign minister Pakistan’s keenness to revive and enhance economic ties was strongly conveyed. The fact that principally your trading partners will have a tangible stake in your security and survival, is finally gaining ground among Pakistan’s cash-starved and security-searching national managers.

The second area of cooperation was of defence. Initially related to defence purchases. Reportedly Yasterzhembskiya himself raised the issue of Russian MI-17 helicopters. Last time the Pak-Russian discussions on the purchase fell through since the bilateral relations took a dip.

The third area of cooperation was curtailment of terrorist activities. This area perhaps occupied most of the discussion. Russians are fighting its own people in what Moscow maintains is a war and many globally maintain is inhuman state oppression. Similarly in Afghanistan the continued and expanding military and political hold of the Talibaan is making Moscow’s anti-Talibaan appear almost childish. That being as it may in Russian eyes, the memory of its borders being attacked, major political turmoil in the Caucus region and Moscow’s keenness to retain control over the former Soviet states of Central Asia, all justify Moscow’s frustration over the developments taking place inside Afghanistan and in Chechnya.

In a significant departure from Moscow’s policy of blaming Pakistan for so-called “terrorism” in the region the presidential envoy clearly appreciated Pakistan’s own policies and practices from what was taking place within the region. In fact Yasterzhembskiya also conceded that Moscow has no evidence of any Pakistani national fighting in Chechnya. He identified other Muslim countries whose private citizens he maintained were fighting in Chechnya. Not unexpectedly the issue of military training camps.

For example on Chechnya there were no complaints, some gratitude and help sought. In his meeting with the Chief Executive Yasterzhembskiya conveyed Moscow’s gratitude for Pakistan’s prompt response to Moscow’s sensitivities on the Zselimkhan Yandarbiyev. In February this year Yandarbiyev, the former Chechen President, a Russian passport holder, had visited Pakistan with valid travel documents. However, when Moscow complained to Islamabad of his ‘political activities’ the Pakistani government requested that Yanderbiyev depart. And he did. Islamabad recognized that sympathy for the Chechens among many Pakistanis, like among many westerners and Muslims, could not be legislated away. It, however, chose to give precedence to its commitment to international law and to Pakistan’s relations with Russia in ensuring Yanderbiyev’s departure. Even if not publicly, Moscow has been compelled to acknowledge the folly of the ‘Pakistan-bashing’ propaganda theme that it has been pursuing for the last few years. Especially since the 1996 ouster of Moscow and Tehran-supported Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud from Kabul and the take-over by Pakistan supported Talibaan, senior Russian officials and the Russian press has repeatedly launched verbal attacks on Pakistan for supporting and promoting so-called terrorism. This bilateral and internationally-orchestrated anti-Pakistan sabre-rattling within the UN Security Council and the Six-Plus-Two Group on Afghanistan, did not pay off. Moscow’s internationally acknowledged problem within Chechnya is intact.

In Afghanistan the Talibaan’s military gains are matched only by the political demise and now the military defeats, of the Afghan opposition. For Moscow Ahmad Shah Massoud’s string of military defeats are a major setback to its Afghan policy. Much like the 1998 Talibaan capture of Mazar-i-Sharif was a major setback for Tehran’s policy. Meanwhile, Moscow’s diplomatic and media pressure has failed to unnerve Islamabad whose Afghan policy since the mid-nineties has successfully factored in the socio-political ground realities inside Afghanistan, the regional power play and subsequently its own national interest. The policy may have created an ‘image’ problem for Pakistan but in concrete and practical terms it has held Pakistan in good stead; on ground where it really matters.

From Afghanistan’s current ground realities finally it appears that there are lessons that Moscow may have imbibed. Principally that Pakistan has to be engaged and that within the immediate context the Talibaan cannot be overlooked. The Russian envoy’s refreshingly forthright envoy’s plans and suggestions for improving Pak-Russian relations and for improving regional security were marked by realism. Despite his rehearsed condemnation of the current Afghan government he was not closing the door on negotiations. “Never say never,” he promptly quoted the title of a James Bond movie when the possibility of an Afghan and Russian government dialogue was raised.

When Yasterzhembskiya’s attention was drawn to the moderating effect that induction in government has on any brand of political group, he maintained no such ‘moderation ‘was visible in the Talibaan. There were signs of Moscow’s dogged commitment to Talibaan’s political extinction being replaced with criticism of what the Talibaan were not doing to engage the neighbouring countries. Talibaan’s military victories had been registered in Moscow. Massoud’s “temporary” retreat was being acknowledged. He will ‘withdraw’ to fight another year, is perhaps Moscow’s thinking.

Reliable conclusions from Sergei’s trip can be drawn from more than mere statements coming from both Moscow and Islamabad and from Yasterzhembskiya.

Events that preceded the visit provide a realistic perspective on the visit. Four September events are especially noteworthy; one the Director-General ISI’s September visit to Moscow, two what Putin said to Musharraf in their three minute exchange in New York, the detailed meeting between the Russian and Pakistani foreign ministers Sattar-Musharraf and finally Putin’s remarks when receiving the credentials of the newly appointed Pakistani ambassador. “We are looking forward to improved relations with Pakistan,” Putin is reported to have told Iftikhar Murshid.

Earlier in New York Putin personally walked up to Musharraf, shook hands and recalled Mahmud’s very useful trip to Moscow. He personally informed Musharraf of his envoy’s visit and acknowledged the difficulties Musharraf faced in implementing his reform programme and praised him for the steps he was taking. By all accounts Putin is personally keen to see vastly improved Pak-Russian relations. A fact forcefully conveyed by his envoy. The Musharraf government no doubt can take credit for initiating this opening up. The early September visit by the ISI chief can rightly be termed as the trigger to what appears to be a promising start to the unfreezing of Pak-Russian relations.

Perhaps in the string of the Afghan government’s late August military victories around the strategic town of Taloqaan, Pakistan detected a window of opportunity. With Moscow’s ally Massoud forced into military roll-back, within the current context the demonstration of the Talibaan’s staying power, the Talibaan’s repeated assurance of non-interference in the internal affairs of any neighbour and their offer of dialogue, Russians could be persuaded to opt for constructive engagement with Pakistan and with Afghanistan. Given its geographical proximity, sociological and economic linkages and the presence of around 1.2 million Afghan refugees inside Pakistan, prolonged economic deprivation of the war-hit Afghans inside Afghanistan will naturally be destabilizing for Pakistan. The compulsion, therefore, for Pakistan to actively advocate international community and more importantly the regional countries’ constructive engagement with the Afghan government. Hence the Mahmud visit.

Also other regional and international developments including deepening military Indo-Russian military ties and Washington’s increasingly pro-India position on issues like international terrorism and Kashmir, would have contributed to what appears to be the beginning of a thaw in Pak-Russian relations. Interestingly compared to Pak-US diplomatic engagement in which Washington opts for the Indian bidding approach on issues like Kashmir and international terrorism, Moscow has demonstrated more prudence. For now it has kept the bilateral dialogue sharply focused on bilateral issues. Without prejudice to its own positions on Pak-India problems, it has opted to work on improving bilateral economic, diplomatic and defence cooperation.

Moscow responded to this Pakistani initiative because both governments believe they can profit from this opening up. Moscow believes improved relations with a Pakistan where the State is reasserting itself can help Moscow in dealing with the Chechnya problem. Moscow claims, although simplistically and opportunistically, that at the heart of its Chechnya problem is the nexus between the ‘rebellious’ Chechans and the so-called militant, extremist and supranational Islamic brigade.

There are also broader trends at the global and regional level explain the significance that Pakistan and Russia are attaching to improving bilateral ties.

After twenty years of perpetual disabling of the state in the region, through revolutions, interventions and resistance movements, it is time to reassert the authority of the state. Another, though less pronounced is the need to inject rationality, discipline and tolerance in the minds of those who have been fodder for power wielders within and outside of the state context. The greater the delay in re-framing the human challenges for what has hitherto been treated as sheer fodder mass, the greater danger that the madness of our regions’ immediate past, will devour and destruct much around us.

Yasterzhembskiya’s trip has been a critical step towards improving Pak-Russian ties. The Russians are also interpreting the trip as a “successful” and as a necessary step forward. How far will this trip translate into will depend on two factors. Expectation management on both sides. On the economic and defence front this may not pose a challenge. On security issues it may. While ensuring rule of law within its own territory, specifically through effective border controls, Islamabad can only facilitate Moscow in understanding and engaging with the complex and self-created challenges it confronts. Pakistan merely expects Moscow to be realistic and honest about the real threats this region faces — that of repressive and intolerant governments which set off an entire chain of often violent political reaction within and outside the region.

Two the way the two countries deal with their internal issues; improved Pak-Russian ties are no substitute for Moscow’s intelligent handling of its Chechnya and Caucus problem. Today BBC headlines focus on the cracking down of the free press in Moscow, a virtual inevitability given Moscow’s current Chechnya policy. Can Putin, the hard-nosed and action-oriented man of KGB descent bring forth the vision and the realism that Moscow requires to move beyond its current internal problems; which it has unsuccessfully tried to externalize. Pak-Russian relations will only prosper if dedicated to both genuine security concerns and to advancing the greater good of the people in the region. If dedicated by Moscow or Islamabad to advancing narrowly defined state security concerns, the relationship will remain a troubled one.