Pakistan Army Being Villainised for What?

Columnist M. ZAFAR takes exception to the media onslaught against the Pakistan Army.

A few weeks before independence an idea came to be feverishly discussed in the army messes in New Delhi. Some officers overwhelmed by the bonds of camaraderie thought that Army of British India could be kept undivided as a single entity and entrusted with the defence of both India and Pakistan. One particularly precipitate person put the idea to the Quaid-e-Azam at a social gathering. Quaid-e-Azam gave the officer a cold stare and asked him about his current duties. The officer enumerated some Movement and Quartering related functions. ‘Keep doing that’ advised the Father and moved on. The interlocutor had obviously no idea of the ingredients of national sovereignty and the Quaid no time to open up a primer.

A state exists on territories made secure by its armed forces. It is sovereign because it has an instrument of force that can be used to impose its will. The extent to which the exercise of will is possible is limited by the strength of her armed forces which in turn is the sum total of a state’s physical, economic and moral resources. Armed power is applied only when other forms of persuasion fail. And when armed forces fail, the state ceases to exist.

September is a good month to talk about Pakistan Army. The nation pays homage to her defenders. It is altogether proper that it should do so. It is also not unreasonable to do a bit of critical introspection especially when the institution as a body is under massive indictment on account of acts of commission and omission allegedly committed by it leadership during the crisis of 1971.

Our independence came through the process of a negotiated division of the territories of British India into two states, India and Pakistan. The departing colonial power transferred sovereignty to two political parties; Indian National Congress in the case of India and All India Muslim League for Pakistan. While India inherited all state institutions required for exercise of sovereignty, Pakistan had none. It neither had the personnel nor the locale. Muslim bureaucrats who voluntarily opted for service in Pakistan formed the staff and dilapidated army barracks in Karachi provided the address for the executive branch of the Government of Pakistan. Building of Sindh Assembly was appropriated for housing the Constituent Assembly. Federal Court was housed in Lahore High Court premises. The new state had no central bank till May 1948. Headquarters Northern Command at Rawalpindi was converted into General Headquarters Pakistan.

It was the absence of central institutions that prompted Cassandras to predict early demise of the new country. For Pakistanis defence of the realm logically became the first priority. Costs were borne happily and with a certain amount of pride. The performance and conduct of soldiery justified every penny.

Those who lived through the era of mass migration gratefully remember the Baluch Regiment of Pakistan Army. To the harassed, bruised, often bereaved millions of refugees trekking their way to the Promised Land, soldiers of Baluch Regiment were angels from heaven who provided security and succour. Kashmir erupted two months after independence. Just about the time when Mujahideen were about to capture the state capital, Indian Army moved in and fanned out to re-establish the boundaries of Maharaja’s State. In the meanwhile freedom fighters had successfully established their independent regime in liberated areas and acceded to Pakistan. If Indian army were not checked the flank and rear of Pakistan would forever be under threat. Not only that, the ensuing communal backlash would unleash a holocaust in the valley that would send at least 3 million refugees into Pakistan. With only a handful of battalions, Pakistan Army was able to stem the tide and in fact forced India to sue for peace through the United Nations.

Then in 1950 floods came to the Punjab. Civil Agencies responsible for rescue and relief were utterly inadequate. Army was called out to help. Soon the whole province was singing praises of the Jawans. Earlier Pakistan Army had set upon a programme of reorganisation. This re-organisation was in effect demobilisation and fighting units were made to function with reduced manpower. Indians calculated that an under strength under equipped Army could be easily overcome and chapter of an independent Pakistan closed forever.  They reacted rather aggressively to a routine relief of an infantry brigade in Azad Kashmir and concentrated the whole of Indian Army on Pakistan borders. Pakistan army deployed with such rapidity and finesse that the Indians were forced to think again. That the officers of the Pakistan Army referred to this very close call, as only a ‘Flap’ is reflective of their elan and confidence to meet the adversary head on and defeat his designs. Was that the finest hour of Pakistan Army? They had actually won without fighting which according to masters of warfare is the best thing that can happen to an army.

There are many other things that happened to the army in that fateful year. A Pakistani took over as the Commander-in-Chief. The same year some of the more ambitious service officers planned a coup and were caught. The Commander-in-Chief acquired the power to remove an officer from service on administrative grounds without recourse to court martial. It was also the year that officers lost the right to appeal to the sovereign against the orders of service superiors. The political governments in full control of their senses fortified the office of the head of the army. In the name of superficial unity and discipline the army lost its verve and style. Increasingly higher ranks came to be crowded with people of average merit but plenty of acceptability.

In 1953 another event of breathtaking importance took place in the history of Pakistan. Some political leaders planned to destabilise the central government and let a religio-political agitation take root in Lahore. The agitators demanded followers of Ahmediya sect to be declared a minority. How could a government legislate on such a matter especially when the founder of the country had declared in the Constituent Assembly ‘You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the state’.

But the agitation did wreck havoc in Lahore and looked as if it had become uncontrollable. Uncontrollable? Hardly. Iskandar Mirza the then Defence Secretary came out of cabinet meeting that was discussing the Lahore situation and asked the Garrison Commander on phone that how long will it take to bring the situation under control? ‘Fifteen minutes’ said General Azam Khan. ‘Then go ahead’ said Mirza and signed off. Azam Khan declared Martial Law and situation was brought under control immediately. That the Army stayed on to rule over Lahore for many months is another issue. Martial Law authorities enjoyed getting the streets cleaned up, sweetmeat shops gauzed, price lists displayed and having an odd recalcitrant whipped but the rank and file showed exemplary discipline.

Higher commanders at the General Headquarters considered Lahore experience as a tester and saved the lessons in the General Staff memory. Major conclusion was that the public would welcome military intervention whenever the inefficiency and rapacity of politicians could be exposed. They confirmed the lesson and tested the waters further in East Pakistan through a contrived anti smuggling operation called Operation ‘Close Door’. General Ayub Khan had by then decided to take over but marked time to let the fruit ripen so that it could fall in the lap without effort. Army’s stance during the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and packing off the governments of Mohammed Ali Bogra twice would seem to be part of the grand plan. Dynamics of political economic and administrative fragility did make a contribution.

While the army had become stronger and better organised, other institutions had lost their will to improve and exert. Politicians specialised in changing loyalties. Police reduced itself to the position of a handmaiden of rulers. Courts showed remarkable intellectual flexibility in order to oblige the wielders of power. Those charged with management of state enterprises ate up the assets.

On 7th October 1958 leaders of the Army persuaded Iskandar Mirza to play his part. The public had been so well prepared through propaganda of intelligence agencies that not a soul stirred in defence of democracy. Thanks to the American military aid Pakistan army was by then an entirely new outfit. It was a better organised, equipped, trained and hence a sharper instrument. Martial Law duties were carried with efficiency and without friction. Other than some key personnel who ran the provinces from Provincial Assembly buildings bulk of the army was back in the barracks in a matter of weeks. Army reverted to its professional training. A certain amount of professionalism became visible in the rank and file of the Army. Some memorable exercises were held to test tactical and strategic concepts, operational plans and systems of command and logistics.

It was during this era that the feudal-military-bureaucratic plutocracy took root. It aimed to perpetuate itself in power through maintenance of status quo. Opportunities thrown in by a burgeoning economy were fully encashed and wealth was concentrated in a small circle through systems of preferential treatment, quotas and licenses. This process effectively choked movement within the society and created stagnation and frustration, which eventually led to the downfall of Ayub Khan. His faux pas in Kashmir operations ‘Gibraltar’ and ‘Grand Slam’) was another factor that precipitated matters. There is evidence to suggest that these operations were thrust upon an unsuspecting Ayub by less than transparent actions of a particularly ambitious political leader aided by an odd service officer who more for a burning desire to make a professional point than any other consideration became entangled. The war came and delivered expected results, a stalemate.

The war of ’65 was mostly if not totally fought at company level. The limitations of higher commanders were mercilessly exposed. But in the post war period, the military leadership insisted on added emphasis on sub unit level training instead of putting the weaknesses in higher direction of war right. In fact discussion of the war was forbidden in service circles. Why? Because that would invariably bring quality of high command under focus and have a political fall out on the President who was ultimately responsible for having imposed the less than the best leaders on a brave army. This institutional reluctance to have a look in the mirror deprived the army of an immense opportunity to learn. A tradition of condoning the actions of ranking officers howsoever incompetent was set.

Martial law of 1969 was not half as welcome or for that matter, effective as that of 1958. Senior officers were learning politics while others were running kangaroo courts to punish bad characters, smugglers and the like. The professional elements were disgusted. Professionalism was on the back seat. A test of sort came in 1970 when a tidal wave hit the shores of East Pakistan. The army failed to acquit itself in the manner expected and this became a big issue in the elections that ensued a few months later.

Soon the novices at politics and careless at military duty created havoc. A full-fledged insurgency broke out in the eastern wing due to inept handling at political level. India sensing a chance of a thousand years intervened in support of the rebels and invaded East Pakistan. On 16th December 1971 the defenders surrendered and walked into Prisoners of War cages. Quaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan ceased to exist.

Dissolution of Pakistan was result of accumulated political failures but to this day the responsibility for it is laid at the doorstep of the Army. It is so because the Commander of the troops in East Pakistan performed the defining act. When Commander-in-Chief Army assumed ultimate political power he did that in exercise of his personal judgement and will. The institution did not authorise him to act on its behalf in any particular manner. Decision to abrogate the constitution, dissolution of one unit, imposition of legal Framework Order, holding of general election and then nullifying its results and so forth were decision of the sovereign in which the Army as an institution had no part. Army Commander turned President failed to sell his political plan if indeed he had any and sealed the fate of the country. Thereafter, the role of the army was limited to damage control and do its best to carry out the orders of those set above it by law.

The then Governor of East Pakistan Admiral Ahsan and the Commander Eastern Command General Yaqub Khan both advised the President in no uncertain terms. Both resigned within days of each other. Departure of General Yaqub did show existence of a contrary opinion in the Army.

Therefore, reasons for subsequent happenings must be found elsewhere and not in the institution. The army of 1972-77 was a troubled listless body. Made insecure by summary removals and whimsical promotions, insulted by vitriolic propaganda, humiliated by POWs debriefing, degraded by making generals perform like junior aides de camp, impoverished by rapid reduction in purchasing power of rupee and corrupted by allotments and undeserved placements, the army underwent a cultural and moral change. Shorn of its pride and flourish, the institution was left with little. Unfortunately the army played into the hands of political masters and did not insist on open inquiries or courts martial of the leaders of the army who were being accused of everything from cowardice to corruption. Pakistan’s soldiery had a reputation won over centuries of fighting all over the world to protect. No one ever accused it of such unsoldierly characteristics. Courts Martial would clear the names of individuals and restore the esteem of the organisation. It would in fact highlight the extremely unfavourable strategic environments in which the troops were asked to perform. This was also essential if the body was to be rid of the virus that was eating into its entrails and had diminished its vivacity and originality.

Some elements revolted in disgust but in accordance with the spirit of the times were let down by their own cast. Insurgency in Balochistan put on added strain but the thread broke when troops were asked to open fire in Lahore. Three Brigade Commanders refused to act in aid of civil power because they found that killing of fellow citizens so that a regime of questionable legitimacy could remain in power was not correct. The soul of the institution had spoken. Obviously the regime did not respond to the message and in the event lost its power and much more.

Zia-ul-Haq’s coup was a relief from a ruler gone berserk. Except a few officers who considered Martial Law duty as an opportunity for pecuniary benefits and professional advancement, the army did not approve of prolonged Martial Law regime. General Zia was aware of this fact and made entry to higher ranks, from where challenge could be mounted, extremely restricted. As a further precaution he divided the officer corps into three distinct classes-majors and below, colonels and brigadiers and major generals and above. Each class had its interests to guard. The soul of the service despised it but the officer corps bore it in the hope of correction at some stage. Zia’s response to such hopes was to further corrupt the corps. Promotions, plots, placements for offsprings were all available for support and silence. Zia is reported to have promoted the General in whose tour of duty Pakistan lost Siachin. Zia did not find anyone responsible for Ojhri.

Although Zia-ul-Haq has been dead for over twelve years but damage he did to the institution in pursuit of his personal political goals still persists. The politicians who succeeded him in power emulated his style and succeeded only in corrupting the cadres but failed to achieve any permanence for their regimes.

The army had to carry out the correction of 12th October to set the limits and save the institution from further degradation in furtherance of a political agenda. Detached observers cannot fail to notice a pattern in the performance of the Army. Whenever the Army has been used in furtherance of political aims of rulers quite different from national objectives, its performance has been poor. Should that surprise anybody? May one also assert here that a major cause for the defeat of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan that has remained unstated so far, was that the inner soul of the Army found operations against citizens of own country as repulsive. Of course violence once unleashed had its own dynamics but this was the spirit that spoke up through the action of brigadiers in Lahore seven years later.

Hamood ur Rahman Report is an incomplete and not an entirely magisterial document. It tends to ramble and would have us believe that defeat of the entire nation was due to some unproven in court and certainly exaggerated tendencies in the character, of a few senior officers. Some judgement. The publication of the report in a foreign country is a God sent opportunity for the army to come out clean. No Commander can allow any indictment of his command made publicly to go unchallenged. Pakistan Army is an Army of brave and honourable men. It has nothing to hide. The High Command should proceed systematically and hold its own inquiries and subsequent trials and put the blame where it is due. The aim can hardly be to punish the guilty-they are all dead and gone but this exercise will do a lot of good to the soul of the symbol of national sovereignty.