Army’s role in politics

Columnist MB NAQVI discusses the army’s role in politics.

Minister for Information and Advisor for National Affairs to the Chief Executive, Javed Jabbar, has propounded an old and famous doctrine. He says that the army should be recognised as a political force and therefore it should be made a partner in governance —- indeed what used to be called a constitutional role for the army. It is a dangerous one and needs to be analysed. It raises fundamental issues of how a nation should organise itself and how should it conduct its politics.

Why does one say it is dangerous? The assertion being made here is that this would, in the first instance, destroy the national character and acceptance of the army as a common asset of the nation. In the next phase it will divide the army because the politics is sure to flow back into the army. It is inevitable that its leading members, Generals and even Brigadiers, would begin to disagree on all sorts of political questions. Political differences within a professional army is a prescription for its destruction, not to mention the chances of its acceptance as a non-political national institution. The differences among the Generals can degenerate from logical argument into arguments of force, as some may be tempted to push their arguments with the force at their command.

There is no doubt a great deal of history behind the idea of a constitutional role for the army. While the generals have taken over the government(s) at the drop of a hat, all of them have over the decades believed and protested that it is bad for the army. Frequent takeovers, in any case, make the country more unstable than it is; it wrecks the reputation of Pakistanis as being civilised and a mature people. People feel diminished. It is true that sections of the press have always kicked up bogus controversies to underline the need for army’s takeover —- each time it did. But most of these reporters and writers, chiefly in the Urdu press, have clear linkages with the various agencies. Their utterances are their master’s voice. The fact of the matter must be recognised that all military dictators in this country have, to their last days, remained politically on the defensive. None of them could ever acquire any legitimacy, let alone a secure one, though some of them have ruled for over a decade.

It is not fanciful to say that the army’s presence and active role in the political field will divide it. Indeed this has happened before —and more than once. Anyone with political insight has had to watch with horror one military ruler being followed by another military dictator.

The fact that the self-promoted Field Marshal had to transfer power to his army C-in-C did not bespeak his choice: he felt compelled to murder his own constitution and the system based on it because he was left with no option; people were in virtual revolt in both wings while the army was refusing to prop him up. It was a veritable coup by Gen. Yahya Khan against Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Similarly Yahya Khan did not go without being forced to; it was other Generals, viz. Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan, who overthrew him, though they did not themselves takeover. They chose the civilians in the special circumstances of 1971. Similarly Gen. Ziaul Haq, having overstayed his welcome, had to go while real power stayed with the next Army Chief. Not one person in the government service, uniformed or un-uniformed, was punished for negligence or other act of omission and commission in the aircrash that killed so many Generals. Why no one was even suspended, much less prosecuted or tried? These facts throw a lurid light on the event.

Two circumstances are important. Pakistan army is not a national army in the technical sense of the word. It is a professional army in which a man joins it to earn a livelihood and he adopts soldiery as a trade. It has other features that give it an ethnic face. About 75 per cent of it comprise people from Punjab, and even in Punjab it is a question of four districts only. While Army’s good 20 per cent share goes to the Pukhtoons —- mainly of two Frontier districts. Its record is patchy. All wars that Pakistan has fought, except the first, were ordered by Generals. Not one of them could be won. And one was a humiliating defeat. The greatest discredit for the dismemberment of Pakistan has necessarily to go to Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Former’s responsibility was more substantive and profound. As for the latter his bungling of the political situation could scarcely be equalled by any other dictator. Ziaul Haq has bequeathed a most controversial legacy: proliferation of narcotics, Klashnikovs and other small arms, nuclearisation and a perpetually at war Afghanistan. The country’s politics was divided both horizontally and vertically several ways more or less consciously by him and trails of sectarian strife and provincial bitterness survive.

Ziaul Haq first propagated that which is now being propounded by Javed Jabbar. As a stratagem to perpetuate his own rule, he agreed to lift Martial Law provided the country gave the army a political, or as he put it constitutional, role. The National Assembly, such as it was, had to accept the proposition. Zia had offered it an either or choice: National Assembly should constitutionally create a National Security Council (NSC) in which, with himself as the President, the Generals would be in a majority and its powers would include not merely overseeing how is the government functioning but also to takeover if the Generals judge that the civilians are making a mess. If the NSC is not acceptable, they should write in additional powers —- wholly contrary to what a President in a parliamentary democracy is associated with —- of life and death over the entire elected paraphernalia in his discretion plus his ability to oversee, interfere, reverse Cabinet or other governmental decisions. The National Assembly finally chose the latter course and thus Pakistanis had the blessings of Eighth Amendment.

What the Eighth Amendment has done so far is before all of us. The President has dismissed five governments and five prime ministers together with all the provincial governments and Assemblies leaving only the Senate behind. Zia’s dismissal of Junejo can be understood more easily because Zia was also the Army Chief and was himself the chief locus of power. How could Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari dismiss elected prime ministers who had received millions of votes? Those Presidents were political lightweights in comparison with PMs, in terms of influence and real popular support. The explanation is simple: behind the President stood the Army Chief and the President had merely executed the wishes of the Generals. Otherwise Pakistan politics would be wholly unintelligible.

Let us view the problem of giving the army a permanent constitutional role —- this is what Mr. Jabbar is proposing by his partnership idea —- against this background. The democracy that might be introduced two and a quarter year hence would have to deal with the Generals wholly tend to do what their predecessors had done: manipulate civilian affairs as their fancy dictates. Would that be democracy, any democracy whatever —- one is not talking of theoretically perfect democracy? Would it produce a credible government? It would make prime ministers mere job seekers, surviving during the pleasure of the Army Chief, who other things being equal, would either keep the presidency himself or put a dummy on it so as to backseat drive the government as Gen. Aslam Beg did. This is what the partnership would mean in the nitty gritty of actual politics. Do we want that? But there are other facets of the problem.

The political situation today comprises a number of curses: the national life is chaotic; sectarian feelings and religious intolerance are running riot in Punjab and parts of NWFP; relationship among provinces, as admitted by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, betrays much mistrust among them and regional nationalisms, with clear undertones of secessionism, are flourishing; lawlessness and, let us face it, bad governance is rampant with widespread fears that the primary state structures are beginning to collapse; the government and the economy as a whole are bankrupt and Pakistan is running the risk of being declared a defaulter or rogue state; it is badly isolated internationally on the question of recognising and supporting Taliban in Afghanistan; relationship with the US and India has been in a turmoil with an ever present threat of a war, possibly a nuclear one; and finally there is the threat that the rightwing religious parties might make a bid for power. Should the latter possibility materialise, the unity of the army is likely to be threatened because the chicks raised by Gen. Zia have by now come home to roost.

The background suggests that a partnership between the army and the politicians may become a catalyst for igniting a fire that may not be easy to extinguish. Politics is best kept out of the army. If not, mind-boggling possibilities open up.  For one thing, there is the question of what kind of partnership is JJ talking about and what can it be in real life? Only those two methods that Ziaul Haq presented before the National Assembly in 1985: either an NSC with power to takeover the government for specified periods by the army or through the enhanced powers of the President —- to dismiss the government with whatever discrimination and discretion the rich experience of the period 1986 to 1999 may dictate. Let us suppose the former method has been adopted. There will be four or five top generals on it, always pushing for takeover after every rumour of corruption in a contract. Now let us further suppose that the supply of persons like Nawaz Sharif has not dried up in the higher echelons. What kinds of goings on can be imagined? Who can fail to see the likelihood of divided counsels within the military component of the NSC? Will the kind of NSC we are liable to have will the moral fibre of Pakistan be strengthened or weakened? Can that deliver ‘real’ democracy? Is that what Gen. Musharraf mean by real democracy?

Now look at the other version: the revival in some form of Eighth Amendment. What did those extra powers of the President do for the governance? It made PMs mere job seekers, surviving during the pleasure of the Army Chief. It gave an irresponsible President who drew his real clout from an extra constitutional source. It gave unmeasured power to Army Chiefs without responsibility. No wonder some generals began to intrigue with PM Nawaz Sharif —- necessarily against their Army Chief —- for which some were sacked and some will pay in some other way. That does not augur too well for ‘real’ democracy to be. Mr. JJ should think some more before downloading his thoughts, half-baked, on the press.

It is about time to ask to which of the country’s pressing problems will be facilitated into resolution through an army-politician partnership—- necessarily unequal, as the general will constantly be overseeing the working of the government from the top. As it happens Pakistan is being humiliated at every step for not having a normal democratic government. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee is unwilling to extend the common civility of a handshake opportunity in New York suggested by the Americans, let alone start serious negotiations with Pakistan authorities. Even US President Bill Clinton was not ready to ring up Musharraf after the Pehalgam massacre, not to forget the kind of protocol and methodology he adopted way back in March.

Let us suppose that the country’s politicians oblige as a result of CE’s lobbying with them for a constitutional cover to his reforms, indemnity for his Oct. 12 and subsequent actions and the partnership business in lieu of major civilian politicians joining his government. No one need be amazed at this quid pro quo: why would the power brokers controlling the national Assembly votes give something without taking something of value in return. Suppose, there is no uncertainty left and the NA has delivered what was desired by the military government including a government that can at a stretch be called a national government, though it will be a throwback to 1954’s government of all talents. How will facilitate, with clear intimations of where does the true locus of power in Pakistan, the resolutions of major problems that admit of no delay.

There is the all important question of a deal with the IMF, IFI (international financial institutions) and Paris Club for more cash, ODA and rescheduling of debt servicing for a reasonable period. Insofar as IMF and IFIs were gravely disappointed with both Benazir Bhutto’s and Nawaz Sharif’s crews, it might indeed be helpful. This is perhaps the only case, though few in Washington might admit.

There is the bleeding wound of Kashmir that can occasion a war —including a nuclear exchange. War is what no one in Pakistan wants. How are we going to move forward in the quest for a political settlement? There is no new Kashmir policy. What still hold the field is the one that Gen. Beg started in 1990 behind the shield of unweaponised nuclear capability. That it is out of date since May ‘98 is a reproach to two governments: Nawaz Sharif’s and General Musharaf’s. How do we negotiate with an India that refuses to shake hands with a Pakistani general? The desired partnership between the civil and military leaders, even if it is soon signed, sealed and delivered, is unlikely to be at helpful in the pursuit of an amicable Kashmir problem. Indeed, it might even adversely impact on our interlocutors.

The issues between the US —- and much of the west —- and Pakistan are many and quite divisive. They want us to ensure a drastic cut in the Kashmir insurgency’s intensity; reduction in the tension along the LoC is desired; Pakistan is also required to respect the sanctity of LoC; it must exorcise the spectre of a takeover by religious extremist parties; it must give an early timeframe of return to simple (civilian) democracy; Islamabad should sign CTBT and show that it is ready to take the non-proliferation road; and Pakistan and India must return to the negotiating table, if necessary mostly on Indian terms, for not only the Kashmir solution but also for a detente on the nuclear questions. Somewhere in between major issues the Americans also mention the need to better respect human rights.

There is a fairly long list of questions between the US and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan. They do not like the Taliban, of course. They want Pakistan to lean on Taliban to accommodate the Northern Alliance; Taliban should help stop the endemic war there; there should be a government of national reconciliation in Afghanistan; and the Taliban should change their style, should become more moderate and tolerant pronto and should treat women, minorities and foreigners better. Since the US is closely cooperating with Russia and the latter has threatened to bomb Afghan bases where Islamic zealots are trained, who carry Islamic terrorism to central Asia, Russia and China. The same complaint is made by the Shanghai Five, grouping China, Russia, Kryghystan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. It is a volatile situation. Iran and China too are unhappy about our domestic as well as Afghanistan policies. Will the civilian and the military partnership improve any matter?