The Charge of the Light Brigade (?)

Publisher and Managing Editor IKRAM SEHGAL  wrote this article for THE NATION which the DJ is re-producing with thanks.

If any fighting entity in the world can be equated pro-rata to the six hundred (actually 673) who rode into the valley of death at Balaclava during the Crimean War, it is the Pakistan Army. The five British cavalry regiments 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, 17th Lancers, 11th and 8th Hussars that went into the cauldron in the famous charge on 25 October 1854 to take the Russian guns on the heights could not hold a candle to the blind obedience of the rank and file of the Pakistan Army to their Chief.  This is one Army that does not question orders, all the more reason that Ziauddin Butt’s failure to register his individual authority on Oct 12 as COAS-designate for a few hours stands out in stark contrast to Pervez Musharraf’s success in sustaining his on the same day, and that also while airborne mostly in international airspace. All our coups have not only been bloodless but attempts by the lower hierarchy have always failed, miserably.  Four times since 1947 the Chiefs of the Army have gone on to become the Chief Executives of the country without being voted to power, albeit with different nomenclatures, the others have had some sort of a say in the destinies of the infrequent democratic governments at least to start with.  In the last decade Gen Aslam Beg packed off Ms Benazir in 1990 at the behest of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, late Gen Asif Nawaz set up Mian Nawaz Sharif for eventual dismissal in late 1992, Gen Waheed Kakar sent both the PM and the President Mian Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq home in mid-1993,  Gen Jahangir Karamat tacitly supported both Leghari’s sacking of Benazir for a second time in 1996 and then Leghari’s self-destruction of his own Presidency.  Any murmur of dissent from the rank and file? That is why Jahangir Karamat’s “resignation” in 1998 is still felt by the Army as a major let down. The next time Mian Nawaz Sharif tried it, it was one time too many and his luck ran out, they were ready.

Before the Chief Executive announced the Local Government Plan 2000 on Pakistan’s 53rd Independence Day, it was extensively and openly debated in the country. Surprisingly for a dictatorial regime, ego did not stand in the way of changes.  And more surprising, many of the more pragmatic suggestions were accepted. Barring a significant segment of PML(N), politicians have outrightly rejected the Plan without even considering on merit  the most comprehensive attempt at giving power to the people at the grassroots level. Given that 40% of Pakistan’s districts are virtually tribal territory, a better way for more effective coordination would have been to have either more Provinces or conversely having Divisional Governments. However, the city district government concept gives hope that a re-structuring of the Districts will probably take place on the basis of population, especially in Balochistan, Upper Sindh and West Punjab, e.g. Balochistan’s six divisions can easily become six districts for a workable district government with homogeneity. The way the present Divisions were (mostly) carved out by bureaucracy is not a feasible proposition for good governance anywhere in Pakistan.

For some excellent features in the plan the military regime deserves kudos, viz among others (1) run-off elections (2) voting age reduced to 18 years (3) the senior-most bureaucrat in the district set-up to be under the District Nazim (4) reserved seats for women, minorities, workers and peasants (5) running mate concept for all major posts i.e. Nazim and Naib Nazim (6) direct linkage between administration and representation e.g. Naib Union Nazims to represent in the Tehsil Council, Union Nazims at the District (Zila), (7) district police chief under the Zila Nazim (8) Citizen’s community boards and (9) financial autonomy at Zila level, etc. etc.  However, the plan comes crashing down inasfar as indirect elections for the principal posts at the Tehsil and Zila level is concerned and the question of separate electorates for minorities.  Any indirect election is open to manipulation, moreover it becomes susceptible to the rumour-machine spreading widespread suspicion, however incorrect, about a possible electoral college down the road for Prime Minister and President on the pattern of Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracy.  Indirect elections undercuts the credibility of the grassroots democracy that Pervez Musharraf keeps on  promising us, it smacks of the “sham” democracy he is so much against. Whatever the cost of the elections we have to bear it for the sake of good governance in the country, the cost being far lesser in comparison to the burden of corruption that indirect elections adds to the cost of any form of governance.  In getting elected indirectly, other than the fact that he or she may not be suitable as a leader, the candidate, ends up with IOUs to individuals and/or special interest groups, a “debt”  that they eventually come around to collect at the cost of the “great silent majority”.  To talk in the same breath about the brilliant concept of a “run-off election” at the Union level with indirect elections for primary posts is incongruous. One does not agree with a separate electorate for the minorities, we must reserve seats for them but outside of a joint electorate they will remain alien to the national mainstream.

Even though the plan envisages non-party polls, those not elected in the Local Bodies set-up may not be eligible for any further elections, be it Provincial Assembles, National Assembly, Senate, etc. Political parties failing to take part in the Local Bodies elections they may find themselves out in the cold, almost permanently. The individual must display his electorate strength at the grassroots level before having any further aspirations. All executive posts must be directly contested within the Councils, Assemblies, etc, posts such as Speakers, etc may be the prerogative of that particular unit to elect.  The President, the PM and the Chief Ministers (CMs) must be directly elected. On the basis of linkages between executive authority and representation in the Councils, Assemblies, and the running mate concept, as recommended in my article “Democracy and Good Governance” dated July 15, 2000 (THE NATION), the government  has formulated a variation that the Naib Union Nazim would represent the Union on the Tehsil Council and the Union Nazim could be on the Zila Council. For the Provincial Assemblies, the National Assembly and the Senate only the Members of the Tehsil and Zila Councils should be eligible to contest.  Or conversely have the Nazim Tehsil as a Member of the Provincial Assembly and the Zila Nazim as a Member of the National Assembly. After all there should be some linkage at the grassroots level for the potential elected representatives at that level. The 105 districts of the country average about 100 Union Councils each with about 25 Union Councils in every Tehsil. There is a total of 7,930 Union Councils in Punjab, 1,437 in Sindh, 1,212 in NWFP, 367 in Balochistan, 26 in the Federal Capital and 403 in FATA, a total of 10,835, making for 10,835 Nazims Union Council and 10,835 Naib Nazims Union Council. As many as 21,670 councillors will have dual membership of Union Councils and Tehsil Councils. The Nazim and Naib Union Nazims will form the electoral college for the Zilas and Tehsils respectively. At 21 seats per Union Council there will be 227,535 Union Council members. Around 15,000 Union Council members will be women (@ 33% reserved seats).  

The District Coordination Officer (DCO) should not have control over all the functionaries at the Zila level.  Zila Council members who have been elected by the people should be appointed by the Council to head various executive posts. Let the functionaries report to them in their individual capacities, providing the bureaucratic back-up functions as necessary for good governance.  Let the District Coordination Officer act as the Advisor to the Nazim and/or his Principal/Cabinet Secretary, ensuring that the rules and regulations are not being violated, especially in budgetary matters pertaining to allocations and expenditures.  Power has been given to the people with one hand and taken back through the DCO with the other. This must be rectified before implementation. The local government plan may not be perfect but it is far better to have some form of local governance functioning at the grassroots level than not at all.

The Chief Executive has openly invited suggestions, this is quite a  departure from the normal military mind-set that thrives on Tennyson’s refrain in his famous poem about the 600 or so who took part in the Charge of the Light Brigade, “though they knew someone had blundered, someone had made a mistake, ours is not to reason why, ours is but to do and die”. Less than 200 made it back, Romantic perhaps, brave certainly and the very model of discipline, but was it pragmatic?