From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA does a comprehensive analysis of the latest moves on Kashmir.

Islamabad’s concurrence to the Hizbul Mujahideen’s July 24 unilateral ceasefire declaration did fit well into Islamabad’s almost decade-long method of dealing with the Kashmir issue. Since the 1989 Uprising Islamabad’s Kashmir policy has combined support to armed struggle with Pak-India bilateral dialogue on Kashmir. In the early nineties and subsequently since 1997 onwards Islamabad participated in the foreign secretary level dialogue with India. Although  Washington’s advocacy for Pak-India dialogue has influenced Pakistani policy-makers,  Islamabad has always invoked the dialogue option because Pakistan’s own home-spun policy of ‘no compromise on Kashmir and no armed confrontation’ with India over Kashmir  did require entering into a dialogue with India over Kashmir.

Few in Pakistan’s establishment believe that the Kashmir issue can be resolved through force alone. The consensus view in Pakistan and among the Kashmiri leadership is that, like in all other freedom movements, armed struggle must be a key component of the Kashmiri freedom struggle. This position has been vindicated by the fact that there is a direct correlation between the increased casualty of the Indian security forces and Delhi’s grudging acknowledgement of the Kashmir. Never mind how Delhi frames it but it cannot deny the problem exists. The fall-out of the Kashmiri armed struggle and to some extent Washington’s urging have together brought India to the negotiating table to discuss the Kashmir issue with Pakistan.

Clearly Pak-India bilateral diplomacy, trilateral diplomacy involving a third party or multilateral diplomacy involving the UN, have done little to untie the bloody and painful Kashmir knot. While the UN and the international community have been keen on ‘containing’ the problem  the Indians have viewed bilateral dialogue as a means for deflecting international pressure on Kashmir. However, the political and psychological pressure generated on the Indian government through the armed struggle and a diplomatic peace offensive launched by Pakistan has forced India to make symbolic gestures for tackling the  Kashmir issue. For example, however temporary, it was on June 23 1997 that the Indians during the Pak-India Foreign Secretary level talks first agreed to the formation of a Joint Working Group on Kashmir. Similarly following the February 1999 Nawaz-Vajpayee Lahore summit the issue of Kashmir was being discussed in great detail through the much under-reported back channel diplomacy. Pakistan’s Kargil operation did not further strengthen Islamabad’s negotiating hand at the back-channel negotiations. Instead, international pressure combined with personalized and haphazard decision-making blew the back-channel negotiations  involving both the Prime Ministers. For the first time ever the substance of the Kashmir issue, the issue of the future of the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh was actually being discussed during these back-channelnegotiations. Pakistan’s top military command was also briefed on the exchanges that took place during these negotiations. Clearly there was no ‘guaranteed success’  formula attached to the back-channel negotiations. Only that the Indians, away from the masses and the media glare, were willing to engage on the core problem.

Whatever policy initiatives taken by Islamabad on Kashmir there have been two factors common to each one of them. One, that these initiatives were not pursued at the cost of the Kashmiri armed struggle. Islamabad has never had illusions about Delhi’s operational policy on the Kashmir issue and therefore the question of compromising the centre-piece of the freedom movement, the armed struggle, never arose.  The second commonality has been Washington’s direct or indirect role in prompting these initiatives.

The July 24 initiative on Kashmir, advocated by Pakistan and taken by the Hizbul Mujahideen also shared these common traits. In calling for a temporary ceasefire, and that too by one group, the Kashmiri armed struggle faced no danger of losing the psychological ascendancy it has established over the half a million Indian forces. According to western and Indian media reports the post-Kargil track record of the Kashmiri freedom fighters has been an impressive one with high Indian security forces casualties, constant targeting of symbols of Indian state power in Indian Occupied Kashmir, the beginning of suicide missions and the swelling up of the Mujahideen ranks with Kashmiri youth. The over arching and the more significant factor for the armed struggle is that it enjoys the support of the people in the Valley. The classic cycle of resistance and repression continues unabated.

The second factor common to this initiative, like all others is that Washington was the ‘guiding angel’. It had sought reciprocity from Pakistan and the Kashmiri Mujahideen ever since the release by Delhi of the illegally-held APHC leaders. Islamabad, along with the Mujahideen, thought long and hard on the reciprocity issue. All did not agree but a key group did. The Hizb leader Abdul Majid Dar made a unilateral and unconditional 3-month ceasefire declaration on June 24 to “facilitate dialogue”.

Addressing foreign and Indian journalists in the outskirts of Srinagar Dar said “We want to show the world we are not hardliners and we are flexible in search for a solution.” Sounding more like a diplomat the Hizb leader explained why his group had opted for a unilateral ceasefire. “There is a global craving worldwide that peace and normality should return to the subcontinent which is passing through difficult times”, he explained. What must have been music to Indian, western and also Pakistani years he said his decision was “in consonance with the statements by the Hurriyat leaders and popular feelings. “Dar urged the Indian government to

reciprocate with immediacy and sincerity. The 3-month ceasefire was extendable in case Delhi “expressed its willingness to enter into a meaningful dialogue.” Dar left nothing unsaid. Reflecting all the concerns of the Indian state and of many other capitals he emphasized that if Delhi gave them a “cold shoulder New Delhi has no right to call us terrorists and we deserve a right to withdraw our offer.”

The unilateral ceasefire naturally evoked a mixed response from by other Kashmiri and Pakistani-Kashmiri  groups involved in the armed struggle. After all it was not a unanimously approved decision. It could not have been. The dynamics of inter-group power relations militates against such dramatic moves being consensus-based. An attempt to seek consensus follows dramatic moves, as the Hizbe Mujahideen is now doing with. The response of these groups is being influenced  by different reservations. Some were convinced  that Delhi would never respond positively, that it will only be willing to dialogue on the issue within the context of the Indian Constitution, that Delhi may use the dialogue cover to crush the armed struggle, that while showing willingness to negotiate  Delhi may attempt to sow dissension among the various Kashmiri groups.

From Islamabad’s perspective India’s track record on a Kashmir-specific dialogue  inspires no confidence. Delhi’s general tenor and tone on Kashmir which has been backed by its backing-off from the June 24, 1997 commitment of setting up a Joint Working Group on Kashmir has bred more skeptics than optimists in Pakistan on what  can be achieved through a Pak-India dialogue. Delhi, too, has its skeptics. The problem of Kashmir, according to the overt consensus in the establishment and the think-tanks is Pakistan’s support for the militants, lack of economic development and political freedom in Indian Held Kashmir. At the most some Indians, including former Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Duby,  believe that additional autonomy within the Indian Constitution is the “azadi” the Kashmiris are seeking.  Also many critics of Pakistan argue that for Delhi the Pak-India back-channel diplomacy combined with the Kargil episode was, as Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee  conveyed to his Pakistani counter-part,  amounted to “Nawaz Sharif stabbing Vajpayee in the back.”  That is a strongly held Indian interpretation of events, whatever Islamabad’s justifications may have been.

Whatever the reservations on all sides, the unilateral ceasefire initiative was worth taking. Jointly Pakistan and the Hizbul Mujahideen, supported by the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC), have forced an opening for beginning a process for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. This initiative on its own guarantees no success; in fact the odds are in favour of the initiative becoming victim to myriad of unforeseen developments which are almost inevitable in a multi-party conflict situation.  The many parties in the conflict include the many Kashmiri parties, the five different Indian security forces based in Indian-Held Kashmir, the pundits, the BJP supporters, Delhi’s puppet Chief Minister Abdullah, the Indian and Pakistani governments and the various political parties of the two countries.

If the armed struggle against Indian state-terrorism in Indian Held Kashmir is resulting in  massive human casualties, any attempt at initiating a substantive dialogue on Kashmir will inherently messy and crisis-ridden. In fact, any initial initiative, leave aside the actual beginning of a substantive dialogue, promises to unleash such colossal chaos that could devour a starting initiative. Unlike other simpler problem situations in which breakthrough initiative taken  by either party need to be grabbed, the perpetually volatile situation in Kashmir warrants overt initiatives be prefaced by some iron-clad understanding by all principal parties to keep their horns locked in the pursuit of a principled and peaceful resolution of Kashmir. That has apparently not been the case. Accusations from Delhi have come Pakistan’s way. Is it the beginning of the end? Has the Hizbul Mujahideen and Pakistan supported ceasefire been devoured by Delhi’s old mind-sets and old ways? Obituaries of the ceasefire initiative have already begun rolling out. Especially in Pakistan.

The ceasefire was accompanied by the expected human casualties. Within a week of the ceasefire an accentuated spate of killings left  over 85 dead in the Srinagar and Jammu districts. The dead included Indian security forces personnel, Kashmiri freedom fighters, Kashmiri Muslims and  Hindu pilgrims. There has been a pattern to such events. Such indiscriminate killings inside the Valley have always coincided with either Indo-Pak foreign secretary level or even more senior level talks or with the arrival of American delegations keen to ‘get Pakistan-India talking.’ The most recent massacre accompanied the American President’s visit to India. Over 30 Sikhs were massacred in a Jammu district under strange circumstances. According to security forces forty militants had arrived in the village which was under curfew and had begun firing. Only recently a report produced by a three member group including a retired Indian judge and an army officer concluded that there was no concrete evidence that the militants were behind the Chattising pora massacre.

Against this backdrop it would be rather simplistic to conclude that the freedom fighters were behind the very tragic killing of innocent civilians. In fact the India media reports especially on the killing of over 30 Hindu pilgrims in Pahalgam points to other perpetrators of violence. Conflicting eye witness accounts of the Pahalgam shoot-out which left over 30 including Hindu pilgrims and Muslim civilians dead, blame the “militants” and the Indian security forces for the tragic incident. Some newspapers like the Asian Age of August 2 quoted “official sources” who said that “at about 7 p.m. two to three militants emerged from the woods near  the Plaza and Heaven hotels along the River Lidder and targeted a security  forces’ camp nearby with rifle fire and grenades. The security forces returned fire, killing two militants.”

The newspaper reporter Yusuf Jameel, a highly respected and reliable Kashmiri  journalist and a stringer for various western news agencies, further adds that “official sources independent reports from Pahalgam said the security forces panicked on being attacked by the militants. They opened indiscriminate firing in retaliation, resulting in heavy casualties among civilians.”

However, Jameel wrote in his report that “a police official had given a different version of the incident. He said that a group of militants in a Maruti 800 attacked the security forces deployed near a railway holiday home along the Lidder river at 6.50 p.m. and that the security forces retaliated “effectively but in a restrained manner.” However, the deputy IG of Jammu police made a contrary claim regarding those the “militants” had targeted. According to the Asian Age report he claimed  that  the “gunmen formed a fidayeen group “who wanted to kill innocent pilgrims.”

In addition the contradiction between the police officials statement and the “independent” eye witness accounts  there is another factor that raises the question about the real killers. One is the pattern that has been almost consistently been followed by almost all militant groups to attack only those linked to the Indian state apparatus or those who have become collaborators with the India, the occupying state.

Compelled to make a statement after the massacre of around 80 civilians Vajpayee  opted for the obvious target. Addressing the parliament the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee  “It is clear that ... after the Hizbul Mujahideen’s ceasefire call and moves for peace talks, either groups which enjoy Pakistan’s protection or militant groups that take instructions from Pakistan have decided to end the peace and attack and kill  innocent people,” he said. “The path we are following in Jammu and Kashmir is one of peace and we will not leave it. “He declared that a message should go from this house that we will not let the peace attempts be derailed and will  not be cowed down by terrorism.” Responding to the Indian accusation Pakistan and other groups of freedom fighters have denied any involvement. Meanwhile, Hizbul Mujahideen have indicated to continue their peace attempts despite the latest killings.

Vajpayee’s statement was  significant on two counts. First, that it is the first direct attack he has made on Pakistan since the July 24 ceasefire and, two, he has remained committed to a dialogue with Hizbul Mujahideen. Delhi has yet to completely formulate its reaction to what has genuinely been a surprise for the Indian establishment. Delhi has ordered suspension of operations against the HUM by its security forces in the Valley. On July 31 talks began between the Indian security forces and the Hizb to work out the modalities for a ceasefire. The condition of holding talks within the framework of the Constitution has not been directly articulated. However, in his July 28 Star Television interview the NSC Advisor Brajesh Mishra has indicated that “surely any representative of the government of India cannot be acting outside the Constitution”. Indian Home Ministry officials have already established contact with one of the Srinagar-based nominees Fazal Haq Qureshi to check his availability.

While these steps have been taken to initiate engagement with the Hizb. Delhi has still to formulate a holistic policy towards what is inherently a changing situation. A statement in the Lok Sabha by the government on the developments in Kashmir has also been postponed.

Delhi has to still grapple with the complex issue of Pakistan’s involvement in the talks — direct or indirect. Top level negotiations involving Vajpayee, his cabinet members and Farooq Abdullah are underway to formulate a line of action.

Most Indian commentators welcomed Hizb’s unilateral ceasefire and Delhi’s decision to invite them for unconditional dialogue. Positives flowed in editorials of most newspapers . These included Times of India “Peace Attack”, The Hindu “A good beginning” and the  Asian Age, “To Give Peace A Chance.” Beyond these positives most editorial and expert comments have advocated that Delhi take this opportunity to win over Hizb to its side, to create divisions between the various Kashmiri groups and also to work towards creating a divide between Pakistan and the Kashmiri groups. In its July 31editorial the Hindustan Times spelt out what it believed should be Delhi’s dialogue objectives “One: it would help broad-base the dialogue process so that a wider consensus can be eventually evolved. Two: it should gradually assist in isolating groups that choose to continue using the gun as an instrument of their discourse.”

The Indian establishment,  based on the information from their various intelligence agencies,  argued that multiple developments in IHK prompted the Hizbul Mujahideen to take this step in case they would become politically marginalized. The developments include the release of the APHC prisoners, opening of dialogue with Delhi, Farooq Abdullah’s autonomy package, Farooq Mir Waiz’s trip to Iran and to Central Asia. The Indian  interpretation was also shared in some sections of the State Department.

However, all this is premised on selective perception of what has prompted the Hizb to announce the ceasefire. The explanations range from their disenchantment with Pakistan, a serious divide between the various Kashmiri groups fighting in the Valley and also within APHC, high casualty rates of the freedom fighters, dwindling public support and consequently thinning out of the Mujahideen ranks.

Also  this Indian interpretation cannot logically flow from the realities that all direct and indirect parties involved in the Kashmir issue have acknowledged. One that  virtually all the freedom fighters have been supported by Pakistan, two that the Hizbul Mujahideen and the APHC have asked for inclusion of Pakistan in any negotiations. On July 27 Abdul Ghani Bhatt of APHC has said that the Kashmiris should talk simultaneously to the Pakistanis.

The Hizb, meanwhile, kept up the pressure on Delhi. It continued to press Delhi to begin tripartite negotiations and to avoid delaying tactics. Eversince the ceasefire there was  little doubt that any prolonged delays by Delhi would see the Hizb returning to the battlefield with great ease.

Hizb had little to lose by returning to the field but much more to lose if it remained  away from it for an extended period marked by no concrete steps taken by Delhi. In fact Hizb had already threatened to end the truce if trilateral negotiations do not begin. Meanwhile, it lobbied with other Kashmiri groups to support its temporary ceasefire position.  APHC had already supported the Hizb move. Others like Lashkaray-Tayyaba, however, saw no wisdom in negotiating with India give its track record.

With all these developments taking place on Kashmir Islamabad opted for silence. It  welcomed Hizbe Mujahideen’s decision and asked India to respond to Hizbe’s demand that a tripartite dialogue on Kashmir be held. Islamabad believed that publicizing its role in the ceasefire may complicate matters on home-ground. Officials believed that where “it matters” there Islamabad’s role in the ceasefire is well known. Pakistan chose to publicly remain aloof from the situation. Islamabad was mindful that a rejectionist Indian stance may force Hizbul Mujahideen to re-establish the dominance of the armed struggle. And sooner rather than later.

The break-down of the ceasefire

The expected then happened. Having failed to break away from its conventional mindset on Kashmir, Delhi did not produce the statesmanship required to seize the opportunity presented by the largest Kashmiri freedom fighters group the Hizbul Mujahideen(HUM)’s unilaterally declared ceasefire on July 24.  Instead by treading on its usual rejectionist path Delhi demonstrated that it sought to deal with the Kashmir issue completely within the context of the Indian Union deploying, whatever, methods it must to crush what is essentially an indigenous uprising. One that is  assisted rightfully by the Pakistanis who are a legitimate party to the Kashmir conflict. Delhi naturally but unwisely believes that it has the military, economic and the political capacity to crush the movement without incurring any major loss. Only to look ‘reasonable’ to the international community and to make some gains at the tactical level Delhi showed an initial inclination to engage with the Hizbul Mujahideen. Delhi would have liked to drag the negotiations at the front end, without conceding any ground to the Hizb. Hizb, however, having thought about the ceasefire for months, was prepared for the Indian time-gaining devices. The August 8 deadline was consequently put into place. And finally on realizing that the Indians were neither willing to bring Pakistan into a trilateral dialogue arrangement, nor were they willing to unambiguously put aside the Indian Constitution condition, the Hizb Supreme Commander invoked the August 8 deadline.

An Opportunity Lost

India has blown up an opportunity for peace. Spoilt by the international community’s indulgence and confident about the international sympathy its anti-Pakistan terrorism linked propaganda can earn it Delhi is not genuinely concerned that it has frittered away the opportunity for dialogue. It appears that increased losses on the ground may finally force Delhi to review its stance on Kashmir.

Delhi’s initial response to the ceasefire announcement were not prompted by wisdom. Instead by tactics flowing from an unchanged strategy on Kashmir. At the heart of this strategy remain two objectives. One, malign Pakistan to ensure that it is ‘dealt out’ from any dialogue on Kashmir and, two, to ‘neutralize’ the armed struggle. Both objectives have been consistently pursued by India ever-since the 1989 uprising in Indian Held Kashmir.  Delhi obviously gave a self-serving and wholly incorrect interpretation to the Hizb ceasefire. It read into it Hizb’s disillusionment with Pakistan and with other freedom fighters’ groups. Hence, without conceding any ground it wanted to keep Hizb engaged in ‘dialogue’ which would alienate Hizb from the rest of the Kashmiri freedom fighters.

Unfortunately a near consensus existed within the Indian establishment, political press and opinion-making circles to essentially extract some quick gains for India’s existing Kashmir policy — of continuing its occupation of Indian-Held Kashmir. Together they fabricated news items claiming that there was lack of unity between the Hizb group based in Islamabad and the one based in Srinagar, that the Srinagar group wanted the extension in the August 8 deadline, that the Indian government was committed to a dialogue with the Hizb “at all costs”, that the relations between the Indian Security Forces and the Hizb had improved to such a degree that the two had played a “friendly” cricket match in Handwara, that  the  European Union had blamed Pakistan for the Pahalgam killings (August 4 The Indian Express), that in his conversation with the Indian Prime Minister the American President blamed Pakistan for the killings and said he would “talk to Pakistan” about it. Much myth-making was resorted to, as is often done by those in desperate denials.

Islamabad, meanwhile, exercised exemplary restraint during the entire period. Essentially after welcoming the ceasefire and announcing that it respects the independent decision taken by the Hizb Islamabad chose to take a back seat . It urged India to heed to the Hizb demand that Islamabad be included in the talks on Kashmir. Following the Pahalgam killings the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf and the foreign office regretted the killings. However, after India chose to accuse Pakistan for the killings in its tit-for-tat response Islamabad accused India of the killings. The Pakistan government called for the setting up of an international inquiry commission to investigate the  killings.

This restraint notwithstanding, Delhi continued to accuse Pakistan for the Pahalgam killings. None other than the Indian Prime Minister himself made the rather amusing statement that Pakistan is behind it because they had not condemned the Pahalgam killings.  On August 4 the Times of India reported that “The Prime Minister, who led an all-party parliamentary delegation to Pahalgam where 22 pilgrims were gunned down on Tuesday night, said there was no scope left for talks with Pakistan after these mass killings. The silence of the Pakistani ruler on the killings was all the more intriguing. “I don’t see any possibility of talks with Pakistan,’’ he said.  Vajpayee said Musharraf should openly condemn the killings in Pahalgam and elsewhere. On the one hand, Musharraf wanted talks “with me’’ and on the other, mindless killings were being encouraged in Kashmir, Vajpayee said and alleged that Musharraf’s silence was enough proof of Pakistan’s direct involvement in the killings.”

On August 5 Vajpayee maintained that “Islamabad’s aim is not confined to the separation of Jammu and Kashmir from India. Indeed it is a sinister aim that targets India’s unity and integrity,’’ he declared as he rejected Pakistan’s description of the ongoing proxy war as “jehad’’. Vajpayee was speaking at the day-long Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security and was bitterly attacking Pakistan for supporting “cross-border terrorism.” (August 6 Indian Express-Pak) Interesting a few hours later speaking at the centenary celebrations of a BJP pandit Vajpayee claimed that  “efforts for improving mutual relations have failed as Pakistan is afraid that if it makes friendship with India, it (Pakistan) may lose its very existence.” To support his contention Vajpayee cited a paragraph from Mishra’s autobiography where he had said “Pakistan came into existence out of separatist tendencies generated by political ambition and a fear psychosis” and that “If we become friends how can we live separately.” (Aug 6-The Hindu)

Finally after the Hizb leadership announced the end of the ceasefire the first reaction from the Indian government targeted Pakistan.  According to the statement, Delhi  “had noticed that the announcement for the cancellation of the ceasefire came from Islamabad.” Delhi also commented on how the ceasefire “fits the Pakistani design of encouraging cross-border terrorism.”

In not taking the opportunity offered through the Hizb ceasefire Delhi has demonstrated its rejection of genuine and meaningful dialogue on Kashmir. Clearly without Pakistan’s participation and without removing the condition that dialogue on Kashmir can only take place within the framework of the Indian constitution, Delhi cannot expect to even begin to address the Kashmir problem. For the sake of principled peace, genuine stability and peoples’ development in South Asia and above all for its own security Delhi has to re-think its Kashmir policy. An occupier state cannot sustain its occupation endlessly. Hence, the need to reject its rejectionist policy on Kashmir.

Meanwhile, Hizb returns to the battlefield, with increased credibility. It lost nothing but gained both stature and acceptance after having demonstrated its political maturity through its unilateral ceasefire. Significantly it is now  a Delhi-certified indigenous freedom fighters movement. Also during its two week long ceasefire on the ground Hizb has ‘burnt no boats’. Instead of reacting negatively to the criticisms of other groups who were opposed to the ceasefire decision, Hizb had kept the dialogue going with other Kashmiri groups. The Hizb leadership had urged them to show patience and understanding. And they did.  Now as Hizb picks up its guns again it will be welcomed back into the fold of the Kashmiri freedom fighters. With perhaps increased political clout.

Islamabad’s position on Delhi and the Kashmir issue stands vindicated. All along Islamabad has argued with its western friends that resorting to dialogue with Delhi has not worked since Delhi is not sincere in dealing with the Kashmir issue through a bilateral or a trilateral dialogue. Committed to a status quo on Kashmir Delhi’s primary objective is to knock out Islamabad from the Kashmir equation. ‘Unhindered’ by Islamabad, Delhi believes it can crush the Kashmiris into subservience. Fortunately the Islamabad factor, legitimized by UN Security Council resolutions and by historical facts, cannot be ‘knocked out.’ While inviting India to a principled  dialogue on Kashmir issue Pakistan will not abandon the Kashmiri freedom fighters inside Indian Held Kashmir.