21st Century Intelligence:
Dimensions of Leadership

Lt Cdr David M. Keithly, USNR  from Joint Military Intelligence College looks at future intelligence parameters.

The Brave, New World

With both the Cold War and the Soviet Union now history, the United States enjoys a much wider range of policy options, but at the same time, the U.S. military faces a plethora of new missions. “Defusing and resolving international conflicts” for instance, are principal objectives specified by Presidential Decision Directive 25, Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), which also addresses itself to issues of civil strife and humanitarian crises within individual states1. Agonizing policy dilemmas stem from ethnically charged conflict in unstable parts of the world. Such conflict derives from a host of historical determinants, including cultural and religious enmities, colonialism’s legacies, and control of resources.

The new strategic era has precipitated an attendant sea-change in the utility of the instruments of U.S. power. Accordingly, the intelligence community should be reviewing intelligence fundamentals with an eye to determining how intelligence organizations can best serve military purposes. Much intelligence is defence intelligence, and an increasingly fragmented, multipolar world will, in all likelihood, place yet more military demands upon the intelligence community. Some observers suggest that how U.S. intelligence reacts to the current transformation could in large part determine how U.S. power fares in this new era. Many counsel that a substantial reorganization of the intelligence community will be necessary. Few seem to harbour doubts that more attention must be accorded to the intelligence support geared to various current military missions.

The purpose of this article is two-fold: to identify prominent change agents in the intelligence sphere, and to provide a sense of direction for intelligence leadership. Less transparent security challenges, along with a significantly more volatile security environment, necessitate a reassessment of intelligence needs and contingencies. Abroad, the United States could increasingly confront what Rudyard Kipling aptly referred to as “savage wars of peace”.

The U.S. defence establishment uses the terms “operations other than war” (OOTW), along with the newer version, “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), to depict many of the new mission profiles of military forces. Although the expressions are fairly recent, many of the associated missions sets are not. The field is broad, extending across a range of operational environments from traditional peace-keeping operations to low-intensity conflict. In past years, the United Nations appeared to be fairly comfortable with traditional peace-keeping doctrine, which emphasized impartiality, restrictive rules of engagement, low force levels and use of force only in self-defence2. Peace-keeping was largely a U.N. bailiwick. But no longer.

The term “low-intensity conflict” came into vogue some fifteen years ago to describe conflicts of a lesser order3. Lacking precise definition then and now, the term has gained wide currency and is used in portraying most small conflicts, including on occasion garden-variety terrorism. Indeed, definitional ambiguity has become more pronounced with recent transformations. More meaningful distinctions need to be made about the various types of operations in which forces will be engaged; accompanying missions recognized; ensuing challenges more clearly identified. The substantive dimensions of such conflict often derive from counter-revolutionary strategy and causes4.

Revolution and counter-revolution, though, differ considerably from hostage situations and terrorist acts. Clashes borne of revolution tend to differ substantially from other forms of conflict, conceptually and organizationally. Of the thirty-plus conflicts raging around the world at the time of this writing, few, if any, fit the “traditional” war paradigm. None entails outright aggression against a nation-state, few comprise transgression of internationally recognized borders. Civilian casualties, representing the lion’s share of those inflicted, amount to over 80 percent of those suffered in conflicts since 19915. Front lines are virtually non-existent in such wars; moreover, as the wars of the former Yugoslavia demonstrate, non-combatants are often primary targets. However, much credibility observers might accord Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, many agree about the likelihood of lesser-order, localized conflicts assuming far wider political ramifications6. Commanders on the ground or offshore are on the political/military firing line, and will be required in growing measure to make rapid, on-the-spot decisions.

The response to most sorts of modern conflict must take the form of different command structures; different training and operational planning; different targets; above all, different intelligence7. Several of what were deemed “non-traditional missions” in the 1980s have moved to the forefront of military operations, with insufficient attention having been afforded such things as tactics, command structures, intelligence organization and operational planning. Some of yesterday’s collateral duties have become today’s primary ones, and many operations have assumed new aspects. Intelligence leadership should recognize such changes; intelligence structures must reflect the transformation of circumstances and missions.

In the last years, U.S. forces have found themselves involved in peace-keeping, peace-enforcing, peace-making, even nation-building operations, with distinctions sometimes becoming blurred, and situations oscillating from relatively peaceful lulls to periods of brief, intense combat. Low-intensity conflict, generally speaking, entails a full range of violent actions, from basic subversion to a fairly extensive use of armed force. In all conceivable missions, from peace-keeping operations to low-intensity conflict, suitable intelligence instruments are critical. Many of these conflicts involve protracted struggles of beliefs. Most are localized, yet can have far-reaching security implications, especially if events take a turn for the worse, or when large-scale escalation occurs.

Many conflicts stem from the inability of central governments to control civil turmoil; some a determined effort on the authorities’ part to arouse and capitalize on ethnic strife. A new international phenomenon, that of  “failing nations,” characterized primarily by governments that cannot meet the basic criteria for the effective assertion of national sovereignty, presents fresh quandaries8. In response to the entangling potential of internal wars, the United States will have to amend its international agenda somewhat9. One should operate on the assumption, for instance, that the social fabric of yet more nations will be rent asunder, with national failure the dire consequence. Prospects for failure continue to suggest themselves, and in some cases, appropriate and timely action might prevent the worst from happening. Intelligence is crucial not only in identifying states that are candidates for failure, but in order to assess specific conditions associated with such failure, and to estimate the rapidity of potential decline.

Intelligence Quandaries

The dilemma for 21st century intelligence is thus both organizational and doctrinal. Henry S. Rowen describes the organizational aspect as the lack of responsiveness on the part of U.S. information systems to users in the field10. Information systems still tend to respond sluggishly to local crises and brush-fire conflicts—precisely those contingencies the United States increasingly confronts. Such systems function far better serving national leaders and dealing with broader, strategic topics. Intelligence focus and performance still reflect Cold-War legacies, when intelligence efforts were directed chiefly toward the Soviet Union. More intelligence preparation must be made for various regional conflicts and outbreaks of violence. For example, intelligence must assist in explaining how operations can be conducted quickly in a variety of areas, and, above all, what one should expect upon arrival11.

The doctrinal aspect closely corresponds to a more central political/military problem. The crucial and fundamental difference between low and high-intensity warfare is to be found not so much in the degree of violence, but in the intrinsic political context defining the campaign. Instrumental to waging low-intensity warfare are an accurate assessment of local conditions, and the abiding focus upon the political dimensions of the conflict. Both presuppose effective intelligence. Moreover, the doctrinal aspect coincides with the organizational one on a key point. The intelligence community, as might be said more broadly of the military community, is to a considerable extent still structured for large-scale war, to the detriment of low-intensity campaigning. Potential great-power conflict, which loomed large in the decades prior to 1990, still considerably shapes defence intelligence doctrine.

For decades, U.S. conventional forces were designed much less for smaller wars against secondary powers in deserts or jungles, than for high-intensity conflict in Europe. Warfighting doctrine and intelligence operations conformed to such high-intensity campaigning. Doctrinal innovation and remodelling have seldom kept pace in the last years with sweeping political change. At this time, the United States should develop appropriate “small and little wars” doctrine for coping with an array of 21st century contingencies, and intelligence operations must be conceived to deal with significantly changed strategic circumstances12.

A result of superpower weapons superiority, quantitative as well as qualitative, Michael Handel observed a decade ago, was a dangerous overestimation on the part of the superpowers of their own strength, compounded by an underestimation of potential enemy strength13. Even during the Cold War, straightforward quantitative calculations that ignored other factors were misleading, at times even erroneous. Assessment quandaries are greater now. Furthermore, the potential vulnerability of smaller states often induces them to

develop creative doctrine and unconventional tactics in order better to do battle with larger states. Lack of orthodoxy is likely to be a 21st century warfighting maxim, as new actors, guerrillas, narco-terrorists, ethnic splinter groups, and crime syndicates spar with national military forces and each other. The incidence of state-sponsored terrorism, suggests Walter Laqueur, following this logic, will persist in an inverse relationship to the risk and expense of conventional war. One can reasonably expect 21st-century terrorism to be a surrogate for the great conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries14. If the United States is to respond effectively, it must do so with equally creative doctrine, innovative intelligence, and unconventional tactics, including, for instance, pseudo-operations. These latter are operations employing a counterinsurgent wholly mirroring insurgent forces15. The chief purpose is to infiltrate civilian communities to acquire critical background information.

In addressing key issues, observers and policymakers have at their disposal several utilizable historical tools: chief among these is the fairly close precedent of the British military in the nineteenth century. Britain began that century engaged for the most part in high-intensity conflict, fighting pitched battles on the land and sea. That many in the British military establishment were preparing throughout the century to refight the great clashes of the Napoleonic Wars is hardly surprising. And yet, nothing of the sort happened. Britain campaigned in India, fought Afghan guerrillas, Zulu impis, Sudanese Mahdists and South African Boers. During that century, national diversity was poignant and fervid;  interwoven beliefs and ideologies as ponderous as present ones; ethnic rivalry similarly intense16. Seemingly intractable difficulties in peripheral areas rankled doctrine, strategy and military self-image.

Between 1860 and 1908, hardly a year passed without seeing British troops engaged in fighting on one or more of  four continents17. Virtually all of these conflicts would be characterized as low-intensity or unconventional in today’s parlance. British forces were frequently involved in several small military enterprises simultaneously, the most taxing combination coming around the turn of the century, when Britain fought a war in southern Africa, while simultaneously conducting operations in China, Somaliland and India. The British Army and Navy  engaged in operations far afield of their primary missions, which in the latter case was to provide for security in the English Channel and the home waters, and in the former, to field an expeditionary force to intervene at points of British choosing on the Continent. British forces in the main fared well in the low-intensity conflict of the nineteenth century, but, arguably, the experiences affected preparedness for the high-intensity conflict that shattered Europe’s peace in August 191418. British military leaders, accustomed to fighting insurgents and guerrillas in areas peripheral to Europe, found themselves ill-prepared for the combat of World War I19. Therein may lie an important message on the eve of the 21st century. Peacetime engagement must not be permitted to divert attention unduly from major strategic threats. Nineteenth-century Britain, suitably attentive to mission profiles and force structures, employed its military forces proficiently on the whole. In the longer term, however,  it may have sacrificed the capability to wage high-intensity conflict, as the appalling slaughter of 1914-18 illustrated.

The two great conflagrations of the twentieth century started with European squabbles, and were settled by the great clashes of forces on Europe’s plains. The subsequent conflict, the Cold War, ended in a series of non-violent climaxes in Europe. These conflicts represented the century’s chief hallmarks. But the conflicts U.S. forces will face in the foreseeable future are likely to resemble far more closely those of the nineteenth century rather than those of the twentieth, the prominent ones at least. The nature of potential conflict should be described to respective audiences in an appropriate manner, and doctrinal discourses should be mission- and task-oriented. What is most needed in current and evolving doctrine is a continuing assessment of roles and missions.

For the foreseeable future, the United States will face few, if any, powers equal in weapons or technology. This is not to suggest, though, that it will not face very real military and political threats. Nor should the intelligence community be inclined to write off any parts of the world as inconsequential20. Planning and operations continue to reflect the lingering predisposition in the U.S. military to regard low-intensity conflict, however implicitly, as merely a smaller version of large-scale or “real” warfare, and consequently to diminish its inherent political nature21.             Weapons, doctrine, and training still manifest an approach whose tenets coalesce around the pivotal components of attrition: large amounts of firepower, total destruction of the enemy and overwhelming force22. Properly meshing the political aspects of warfare with new technology represents one of the key strategic challenges of the 21st century for the United States. The impending military/technological revolution many observers foresee marks a transformation necessitating not only a reordering of  U.S. defence posture, but an examination of policy assumptions as well. Doctrine must be geared to technological change, but it must also be developed and revised to conform to a recast environment. Service personnel require education in this new environment; training scenarios must suitably reflect it. An appreciation of the political dimensions of  warfare represents, in this sense, the flip side of the coin of military/technological revolution.

A recurring commitment to the employment of  overwhelming force and complete destruction of the enemy fosters a political/military disconnect that is on many points incongruous to the 21st century. Military commanders are too frequently inclined to plan for the waging of large-scale war, content to bequeath the construction of the post-war order to civilian officials. In counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict, allotting primacy to combat or logistical dimensions over intelligence is to invite defeat. By the same token, a predisposition to view politics as somehow terminating once the iron dice roll is a recipe for tragedy. Refurbished “small wars” doctrine should clarify that military commanders must contribute through their actions to peace and to the building of the post-war order.

Intelligence Requirements

Where does this bring us? Some observers argue that a principal upshot of the brave, new world from the intelligence standpoint is that heavy dependence on technical intelligence will be in the main detrimental, especially if such reliance is without far-reaching analytical reorganization. Human intelligence (HUMINT), the argument goes, furnishes the most reliable information about intentions. A different perspective was provided some years ago by Stansfield Turner:

As a general proposition, that is simply not true. Electronic intercepts may be even more useful in discerning intentions. For instance, if a foreign official writes about plans in a             message and the United States intercepts it, or if he discusses it and we record it with a listening device, those verbatim intercepts are more likely to be more reliable than second-hand reports from an agent. Not only do agents have biases and human fallibilities, there is always the risk that an agent is, after all, working for someone else23.

Echoing this theme, Jeffrey Richelson identified a number of glaring intelligence failures in the HUMINT field during the Cold War24. In particular, he cites the examples of Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany), where human intelligence networks were extensively penetrated.

In truth, applied science is a two-edged sword. Employing technology to one’s best advantage represents the pinnacle of skill. Imagery satellites “see” a good deal, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts large amounts of communications without requiring the considerable period of time associated with the development of human intelligence sources. Whether more HUMINT or SIGINT is needed is largely beside the point in the current context, though. Rather, the intelligence community must address fundamental questions about the 21st century. What effect will the nature of modern warfare have upon intelligence? What are the most likely contingencies? What will be the longer-term impact?

Moreover, strategic intelligence has to a considerable extent become tactical intelligence and vice versa25. Such blending is in part a technological phenomenon. Satellite imagery for tracking major military assets such as missiles and large air bases can be used in many cases for battlefield purposes as well. Changes also reflect certain political phenomena. Given the salience of the political dimension of many modern military operations, policymakers will demand updates of local occurrences. In some cases, tactical decisions will have profound effects at the strategic level. Modern communications systems enable large amounts of intelligence to be “down-channelled” to the tactical or operational level26. At the same time, much information at this level can be provided to higher levels, quite useful in situations where local occurrences can have such far-reaching implications. The flow of essential information, up-channel and down-channel, can and must increase. Principal information channels will be complemented by “sub-channels,” which form part of the architecture of future information warfare. Examples of “sub-channels” include  sensor-to-shooter, political guidelines, and rules-of-engagement27.

In situations where occurrences at the tactical level have strategic implications, intelligence assumes a far weightier role. The channelling and flow of intelligence—up or down—subsequently grows in import. By channelling information in the proper direction, intelligence will serve the needs of the operational-level commander. At the same time, information must be channelled upward for strategic analysis, with an eye to determining the broader implications of actions taken at the operational or tactical level. Competing analytical staffs with at least a modicum of independence will promote more “consumer-oriented” intelligence that uses assets more creatively. Intelligence must increasingly be analyzed at several different levels, by independent, competing staffs. 

Why analytical competition? Intellectual debates are altogether appropriate in the intelligence community; the questioning of conventional thinking doubtless beneficial. Outside analysts, for example, openly challenged CIA estimates of Soviet potential and capabilities on several occasions. Best known are probably the “A Team-B Team” analysis of the Soviet military establishment in the 1970s28, and, later, the fairly widespread challenge to CIA studies of the Soviet economy in the 1980s29. This latter intellectual dispute prompted some observers to suggest that greater competitive analysis, both classified and unclassified, might have revealed the hollowness of the Soviet system, and subsequently rendered the collapse of that system and those of its satellites less of a surprise.

But wouldn’t more competition in analysis further stretch already overtaxed intelligence resources? Not necessarily. Analysis accounts for only a fraction of the intelligence budget as it is. In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, a competition proponent with extensive experience in the CIA pointed out that analytical competition would be covered by a mere “rounding” in the overall defence budget30. Analysts, for their part, enable intelligence collection departments to exploit their hardware assets more effectively.

Recent operations, particularly Desert Shield/Desert Storm, have demonstrated the need for more and better intelligence. In 1991, Norman H. Schwarzkopf explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee: “The Intelligence Community should be asked to come up with a system that will, in fact, be capable of delivering a real-time product to a theatre commander when he requests it31.” Schwarzkopf is alluding to qualitative improvement in the “down-channelling” mode. Quantitatively, U.S. intelligence assets will  be heavily burdened in future operations, as evidenced by the very high percentage of  U.S. resources utilized during the Gulf War. According to James FitzSimonds, the intelligence requirements of that conflict were in fact modest in comparison to future specifications32. Hence, any revolution in military affairs probably must go hand-in-hand with a technological revolution in intelligence.

In the course of things, intelligence will be called upon to tender a realistic assessment of capabilities, friendly and enemy. Future conflict calls for more time-sensitive intelligence, organized to better serve commanders involved in local crises and low-intensity conflict, as well as intelligence that is more politically sensitive. Intelligence officers must apprise commanders of the political contours and nuances of local conflict; they must gauge local conditions, and must encourage friendly forces to focus on many of the political dimensions of the conflict. In low-intensity conflict, for instance, guerrillas depend on the goodwill and support of the people on whose territory conflict takes place. Defeat of the forces themselves is not always the primary objective; often, transformation of the political situation is most critical. For this reason, the leading analyst of nineteenth-century British warfare, C. E. Callwell, observed that the moral effect in low-intensity conflict is often more important than actual material successes33. Victory against guerrillas usually necessitates either a significant alteration of political circumstances, whereby the guerrillas cease enjoying widespread popular support, or by the realization on the guerrillas’ part that their purposes are no longer best served by the conflict’s continuation. Intelligence is critical across the spectrum, from assessing moral effects, to determining how the political situation might be transformed, to gauging what might induce guerrillas to cease fighting and negotiate.

Guerrillas do not stand and fight pitched battles. They must be fought on their own turf as a rule; in many instances, the United States must reconcile itself to waging “war against vapours,” as T. E. Lawrence aptly described it34. Guerrillas tend to move at will, in any direction, and endeavour to achieve their objectives through psychological and political means. Intelligence must determine what these objectives are, and how they will be pursued. The key in many cases to defeating such enemies is to undermine their legitimacy. Effective counter-insurgency strategy presupposes, though, that the source of  legitimacy is known and understood. Only then can the means to combat it be delineated.

Opportunities and Challenges

With this vision of future warfare as a backdrop, we can take the next analytical step, one  Stephen Blank tenders in his appraisal of critical preparations for coming wars. The acid test, he argues, of any political/military vision is to be found in a state’s ability to restructure its policy process and its defence establishment to accord with that vision35. Intelligence is part of both the process and the establishment. Salient themes of current U.S. National Military Strategy, flexibility, selectivity and power projection, represent a significant reconfiguration, one affording  greater pertinence to changed circumstances36. Strategy must prescribe a span of operational response capabilities, ranging from basic peacekeeping to intense small-unit combat. Strategic reconfiguration has crucial implications for intelligence, and new strategic accents might warrant a restructuring of  intelligence organizations.

The extraordinary variation of  the conditions of low-intensity conflict renders inquiry ponderous, and contingency planning intricate. To stand much chance of successfully waging low-intensity war, the broader causes of conflict must be carefully considered: ethnic, religious, social, political and economic. A long-serving veteran of low-intensity campaigns, retired British General Sir Frank Kitson, remarked: “if you have 80 insurgencies you will have 80 different solutions in defeating those insurgencies37.” Ad-hoc operating procedures are virtually indispensable in dealing with low-intensity conflicts so diverse in nature. The intelligence arm is instrumental to developing proper approaches and methods. Specifically, intelligence should:

• indicate the political and moral dimensions of particular conflicts;

• assist in determining how military means might best be marshalled for political ends;

• analyze the attributes of particular conflicts, something critical in light of the diversity of the conflict environment.

The character of contemporary missions raises vexed questions intelligence can aid in answering38. What are to be the criteria for success? How are we to judge the success, or lack thereof, of ongoing operations? When is it time to reassess the situation? To cut losses?

The intelligence function gains prominence in another key area of modern conflict. The scope of intelligence should extend beyond warfighting, and assume a role in deterrence, a facet of modern strategy receiving too little analytical attention at present. The essence of deterrence, Thomas Schelling observed, is the desire to economize coercive resources and forestall hostility. Deterrence entails manipulating behaviour by threatening harm. Expressed somewhat more prosaically, deterrence involves more discernible pain than gain. Since at least the end of the Second World War, U.S. national security policy strove to thwart aggression through implied or explicit threats. But many of the key assumptions about deterrence are outmoded, and were made in an era when superpower conflict with nuclear weapons was conceivable, if not likely. The potential pain under such circumstances was relatively easy to discern, and superpower national interest coincided on at least one salient point, namely, survival in the face of a preponderant nuclear threat. But no such concurrence exists among lesser countries and non-state actors. Long-smouldering animosities, diversity of conflict, and the asperity of the clash of interests between belligerents avert agreement on rules-of-the-road. Past strategies and paradigms of deterrence no longer have the same applicability. Clearly, new concepts are needed.

In any deterrence strategy, the most fundamental part of the equation must be determined: the pain. That said, the notion of threatening to use force to prevent prior use is often ill-conceived in insurgencies. Insurgents and terrorists usually embrace violence for political reasons, above all, to call attention to their cause. Threatened action is effective only if, first, it is regarded by the enemy as potential punishment, and, second, it is credible. What, though, is credible, and what punishes? Credibility and punishment are highly situation-dependent in this context, and intelligence must ascertain enemy perceptions.

Because large-scale nuclear war represented the paramount threat to the national security of the United States, Steven Metz argues, policymakers were not sufficiently compelled to develop deterrence strategies for low-intensity conflict or for conflict short of war39. Herein lies a prominent security paradox of the post-cold war order: the United States is largely unable to deter those conflicts in which it is most likely to be involved. Intelligence must determine the motivating factors of  potential and existing enemies, with an eye to enhancing deterrence.

The substantial convergence of strategic and operational intelligence becomes apparent here as well. Local intelligence collection and analysis must be done largely on a case-by-case basis—tactical and operational intelligence—to be “up-channelled” to shape deterrence strategies. Given the dearth of reliable data in many instances, and the sheer complexity of many situations, strategists will sometimes have to rely upon rough estimates and extrapolations from the intelligence community, which, in turn, makes the case yet again for competing analysis. A task of the intelligence community will be to determine what measures have the greatest repercussions upon decision making within terrorist and insurgent organizations40. One must not assume that such divergent organizations have much in common, or that their decision-makers are motivated in the same manner or to the same degree ours are. In a dialogue of the deaf, Metz points out, the deterrence equation simply fails to function41. In the realm of deterrence, strategic intelligence becomes in large part operational intelligence also. The latter must determine the nature of potential enemy organizations, the motivations of the leaders and the specific attributes of associated power structures. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations specifies that “the operational art translates theatre strategy and design into operational design which links and integrates the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won, achieve the strategic aim.” This axiom has sweeping ramifications for military intelligence.

Potential Deficiencies

As its point of departure, a sober assessment of future intelligence requirements might evaluate the chief weaknesses identified in several studies of U.S. intelligence during the Gulf War42. Technological sophistication notwithstanding, glaring shortfalls reflecting a partial disconnect between weapons capability and intelligence performance suggested themselves. The 1993 Congressional study of campaign intelligence support characterized intelligence dissemination as “very poor,” especially from the Air Force perspective, while intelligence analysis was depicted as being of “mixed” efficacy.

Such evaluations portend significant problems. Dissemination difficulties wreak havoc in an environment where “down-channelling” to local commanders and forces is crucial. The inability reliably to disseminate intelligence, particularly imagery, was identified as a “major intelligence failure” in the Gulf War. Lack of interoperable hardware represented a source of difficulties. The apparent unwillingness of component headquarters freely to distribute available intelligence to subordinate units was another. Displaying material in an understandable, digestible form is instrumental to cogent intelligence analysis. Considerable improvement will be needed with respect to presenting information and data in a more usable form to commanders, both “up-channel” and “down-channel.” The effect of sheer volume will be profound. And much more attention must be accorded certain political aspects of conflict in light of the evolving nature of 21st century warfare, where victory is likely in the main to be a function of political astuteness. Intelligence architecture couples information to the decisionmaking function. The paramount goal of intelligence is optimization of strategic advantage.

NOTES

1Strategic Assessment 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), p.127.

2John O. B. Sewall, “Peacekeeping Implications for the U.S. Military: Supporting the United Nations,” Dennis J. Quinn, ed., Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1994), p. 39.

3An excellent short discussion of low-intensity conflict is Sam C. Sarkesian, “Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines,” Air University Review, Vol. 36,  No. 2 (January-February 1985), pp. 4-23.

4Harry G. Summers, Military Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (March 1985), pp. 43-45.

5 John G. Mason, “Failing nations: what U.S. response?” Great Decisions 1996 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1996), pp. 52-53.

6In addition to Huntington’s 1993 article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), see his “New Contingencies, Old Roles,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 38-43.

7Sam C. Sarkesian, “The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict: The Formative Period,” Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis (London: Brassey’s, 1989), pp. 21-22.

8Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 3-20.

9See Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 3-20.

10Henry S. Rowen, “Reforming Intelligence: A Market Approach,” Roy Godson, Ernest R. May and Gary Schmitt, eds., U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 1995), p. 233.

11Charles Jefferson, “Regional Hotspots,” unpublished paper presented at the 1996 Joint Operations Symposium, p. 2.

12See William W. Mendel and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. “Planning For A New Threat Environment,” Landpower Essay Series, No. 96-6 (July 1996).

13Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 494-95.

14Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), p. 34.

15Paul Melshen, “Taking On Low-Intensity Conflicts,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1987, p. 50.

16See the article in The Economist, “Defence in the 21st Century: Meet your unbrave new world,” September 5, 1992, pp. 3-12.

17Eric William Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army (London: Constable and Company, 1950), p. 272.

18See Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), especially chapters 14 and 16.

19See Paul Melshen, “Pseudo Operations: The Use by British and American Armed Forces of Deception in Counter-Insurgencies 1945-1973,” Dr. Phil. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1996.

20Jefferson, “Regional Hotspots,” p. 2.

21Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy and History, Collected Essays, Vol. 2 (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), pp. 196-97.

22See Andrew F. Krepinevich, The United States Army and Vietnam: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Army Concept of War (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Centre, 1984), pp.7-9.

23Stansfield Turner, “Intelligence for a New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, No. Vol. (Fall 1991), p. 154.

24Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 470.

25See Ernest R. May, “Intelligence: Backing Into the Future,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 63-72.

26Michael L. Warsocki, “Operational Intelligence Within Operational Art,” Military Review Vol. 75, No. 2 (March-April 1995, pp. 44-45.

27Martin C. Libicki, What is Information Warfare? (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 99-100.

28See Robert C. Reich, “Re-examining the Team A- Team B Exercise,” Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1989), pp. 387-403.

29See Bruce D. Berkowitz and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The CIA Vindicated,” The National Interest, No. 41 (Fall 1995), pp. 36-47.

30May, “Intelligence: Backing Into the Future,” p. 69.

31Quoted in Richelson, U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 474.

32James R FitzSimonds, “Intelligence and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Godson et. al. U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads, p. 269.

33Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars Their Principles and Practice (East Ardsley, England: EP Publishing, 1976), p. 42.

34Bevin Alexander, The Future of Warfare (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995) pp. 120-21.

35Stephen J. Blank, “Preparing for the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Strategic Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 21-22.

36See The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

37Quoted from an interview with Paul Melshen, January 1986.

38For example, Lucia Mouat, “Can the UN Be the World’s Cop?” Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 1993, pp. 9-12; William H. Lewis, “Peacekeeping: Whither U.S. Policy,” Quinn, ed., Peace Support Operations, pp. 113-19.

39Steven Metz, “Deterring Conflict Short of War,” Strategic Review, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 44-51.

40Carnes Lord, “American Strategic Culture in Small Wars,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1992), pp. 205-208.

41Metz, “Deterring Conflict,” pp. 48-49.

42See for example, “Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm,” Report of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, 103rd Congress, August 16, 1993.