Progressive Restraints of Nuclear Weapons

Contributing Editor Vice Admiral (Retd) IQBAL F QUADIR develops probable checks and balances.

The following are extracts from the talk given by the Honourable William F Burns Major General US Army (Retd) to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs and the Pakistan Institute of Maritime Affairs at Karachi on 24th and 26th February, 2001 respectively.

The Honourable William F Burns served as the 9th Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (88-89) under President Reagan and as US Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement (92-93) under President Bush (Snr.). He is presently chairing a US National Academy of Science’s study on a “comprehensive nuclear weapons reduction regime,” a follow-on to the NAS 1997 study titled “The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy.” This committee recommended amongst others, a further reduction in active weapons inventories, and to engage China, France and the United Kingdom on these issues. After the nuclear detonations by India followed by Pakistan, the necessity of engaging Pakistan and India arose at almost the same time as the committee began to consider the possibility of US and Russian nuclear weapons reductions to the level of or even below that of 1,000 between the two of them. The primary purpose of General Burns’ visit to Pakistan was to obtain views how best Pakistan and India could be associated with the study and later the programme itself.

Major General (R) Burns served for twenty-five years as a field artillery officer in nuclear weapons delivery units. He was the Joint Chief of Staff’s representative to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva, 1981-86. The General, later served as military advisor to the Secretary of State and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political - Military Affairs. In the US Army, he also served as Deputy Commandant of the US Army War College, he is its current Distinguished Fellow, and is the President Emeritus of the Army War College Foundation.

As the 21st Century begins, arguments about the pros and cons of nuclear weapons continue. Nuclear weapons have become the ultimate symbol of national power and have imposed stability — presumably preventing general war. The concept of nuclear deterrence (to deny a state the ability to take an action through fear of failure or punishment) has become the key ingredient in the relationship between the two pre-eminent nuclear powers, the United States and the Russian Federation. However, nuclear weapons are not without their drawbacks. Since their inception, there has been a universal concern that the spread of nuclear weapons to many states would undermine deterrence and increase the chances of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate use. Nations have also been concerned that the high cost of development of a nuclear weapons arsenal deprives a developing state of necessary economic tools for growth.

But, nuclear weapons cannot be “uninvented” and they will remain a part of the political and strategic landscape of the world for the indefinite future. The real question, then, is how their existence can be managed and controlled to the advantage of the world community and the disadvantage of none. A future nuclear weapons control regime could lead to eventual prohibition of use similar to other weapons of mass destruction, but the total elimination of nuclear weapons is unlikely. Therefore, the world must learn to live with them for the foreseeable future.

In this present and future nuclear age, there exist a number of tools to maintain stability and prevent indiscriminate proliferation, inadvertent or accidental use, and a very high assurance that a general or regional war will not break out. Arms control measures, pioneered by the United States and Russia, are now available to provide assurances that nations are maintaining nuclear arsenals in a responsible manner and that the purposes of such arsenals are for deterrence only. The question of regional deterrence is important and should be explored to determine if it is as satisfying for stability as the global deterrence now imposed by the two nuclear superpowers. However, increased stability must also depend upon economic growth and the settlement of outstanding regional disputes, difficult as that may be.

In 1997, the Committee for International Security and Arms Control, a standing committee of the US National Academy of Sciences, published the report of a study entitled “The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy.” This study argued that the nuclear weapons held in readiness by the US and Russia were too many for the post-Cold War period and recommended a “regime of progressive restraints” that would lead to markedly lower numbers. Lower numbers, it is argued, would reduce the dangers of inadvertent and accidental use, reduce costs, eliminate the less stable and older weapons, and make verification of the terms of an agreement easier. The study, therefore, recommended that START III be agreed and implemented immediately at a level of about 1,500 deployed nuclear weapons on each side. This should be followed by a “START IV” that would reduce nuclear weaponry to perhaps 1,500 followed by a third step to 1,000 — but these 1,000 would include all nuclear weapons both deployed and non deployed together with weapons-usable fissile material.

The Committee believed and asserted that any step below 1,000 total nuclear warheads would require the participation and concurrence of nuclear powers other than the US and Russia — or at least the two powers must take them into account. The Committee also concluded that a level of a few hundred warheads, given effective verification of compliance, and the inclusion of other nuclear states in some manner would provide nuclear deterrence and enhanced international stability.

In order to examine the technology necessary to achieve a level of 1,000 total warheads or below, the Committee embarked on a new study (due in 2002) as a follow-on to the 1997 report. It will not only design a monitoring system using available technology to assure effective verification but it will also examine the implications of the inclusion of third countries in a future nuclear arms control regime. For that reason, CISAC has consulted with a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental authorities from Russia, China, India and NATO. My visit at this time is to open broad consultations with governmental and non-governmental agencies in Pakistan to insure that the views of Pakistan are represented in our deliberations.

We take no Committee position on the current policy of Pakistan with regard to nuclear arms. We deplore the fact that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has continued — although at a much slower rate than predicted ten or twenty years ago. We acknowledge the responsibility of both Russia and the United States for permitting nuclear proliferation to continue and believe that adoption of our recommendations — in the earlier study as well as the study we are now undertaking — will go far to involve the US in the solution to this global problem. I am personally hopeful that the new US Administration will take a fresh look at US policy toward Pakistan.