Weapons and Tactics

Chapter 6

Columnist Brig (Retd) ZA KHAN gives an overview of the changing concepts over the years.

INDIA
(1526 to 1757)

1. Babur’s Invasion of India (1526 AD)

At the beginning of the 16th century, the Lodis ruled the territories east of the Indus to Agra. At this time Babur, descendant of Tamerlane and Changez Khan, lost his kingdom of Fergana and moved to Kabul in Afghanistan from where he raided the areas west of the Indus four times. In 1524, the Governor of the Punjab asked Babur for help against his brother, Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, who ruled northern India from Agra. Babur’s fifth expedition to India started on 17 November 1526, he crossed the Indus at Haro; a census of the army was taken while the river being crossed, the army numbered 12,000.

Babur’s army was organised in six divisions with its day and night guards; the army was organised as a right wing, a centre and a left wing. The right and the left wings were commanded by the great ‘Begs’, the centre had the household ‘Begs’. The right wing command was the prestigious command in the army, the next in importance was the left wing command; both wing commanders had two or three subordinates.

The army moved with a vanguard, right, left, and centre followed, when it stopped for the night it retained its formation each person according to his place in battle and each prepared to take his post. At night, men on foot were posted all round the camp, commanders, including Babur, checked the guards at night at intervals and men not found at their posts had their nose slit and were led around the army.

Babur reached Panipat in the first week of April in 1526 and held a council of war where it was decided to give battle at Panipat to Ibrahim Lodi’s advancing army; a census of the army revealed that it now numbered about 25,000.

Babur planned for the forthcoming battle, he used Panipat village to rest his right flank, to protect his front he collected 700 carts and tied them together with raw hide in the ‘Ottoman fashion’, the tactic the nomads had used against the Romans. In the protective line of carts Babur sited his guns, he was amongst the first military commanders in Asia to appreciate the value of field artillery. Between every two guns, five or six mantlets (protective screens) were fixed behind which match lock men stood and fired their matchlocks; after every 200 yards a sally gap for 100 to 200 horsemen was left; the left flank was refused and protected by a ditch and a stockade made with branches of trees; on 12 April 1526 Babur was ready.

Ibrahim Lodi with 100,000 men and 1000 elephants arrived at Panipat and faced Babur’s army for eight days; the pay of some of his men was in arrears, there was discontentment in the army and they did not sally out of the camp.

Babur sent his cavalry to ride out to Ibrahim Lodi’s camp to rain arrows and cut off the head of anyone caught outside the camp. On the night 19/20 April Babur sent a raiding force of 5000 to Lodi’s camp but the raid was badly conducted. The next morning, at dawn, Ibrahim Lodi advanced in battle array, Babur took up his battle position, his son Humayun on the right, his left was commanded by Mohammad Sultan Mirza, he had a right centre, a left centre, a van, a right and left reserve; Babur also had a right and left flanking parties whose task was that when the enemy came near his front they were to turn both his flanks and attack from the rear.

When Ibrahim Lodi’s army came in sight it seemed to incline to Babur’s right and he reinforced his right with his right reserve. Ibrahim advanced swiftly but observing Babur’s protected front he halted and then could not make his men resume the advance. Babur ordered his centre to engage the enemy, his cannon to fire and his turning parties to wheel from the right and left and attack the rear, the turning parties surrounded the enemy who made some attempts to breakout but eventually fell back on their centre, caught between Babur’s line of carts and his wheeling parties; by the afternoon Ibrahim Lodi was defeated with an estimated 16,000 killed including Ibrahim Lodi. Babur distributed huge money awards and gave treasures to his son Humayun, the ‘Begs’ in command got smaller awards, the whole army including tradesmen, received money and gifts.

2. The Moghal Mansabdari System

The Moghals ruled India from 1526 AD, when Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi at the Battle of Panipat, till 1707 AD when the Emperor Aurangzeb died and thereafter nominally till the Indian Mutiny in 1857 AD.

When Babur invaded India to establish his kingdom his army consisted of tribes and clans that followed him from Kabul, some joined him later, after the Battle of Panipat, he awarded the leaders of these tribes and clans in accordance to their performance in the battle and many of them who had joined Babur for the booty, chose to return to their homes.

Babur and Humayun ruled over territory that was not too far flung, after the tribes and the clans that had joined Babur for booty returned after the Battle of Panipat, their place was taken by foreign adventurers, Uzbeks, Persians, Arabs, Turks etc who thronged to the court with contingents of troops. Since the Moghals were foreigners there were no hereditary nobles related to the rulers or ancient families to depend upon, the court consisted of adventurers from different nations, the ruler raised them to dignity or degraded them; up to the early rule of Akbar the Moghal armies consisted of contingents commanded by these adventurers.

Akbar, Babur’s grandson, who ruled from 1556 to 1605, organised the ‘mansabdari’ system in the 19th year of his rule. The system classified the functionaries of the kingdom as fighters, ‘ashab-u’s-saif’, (masters of the sword); clerks ‘ashab-u’l-qalam’ (masters of the pen); theologians, ‘ashab-u’l-amamah’. The ‘mansab’ denoted a rank of office, it had its obligations, precedence and grade of pay; it was for life but it was not hereditary, heirs could not demand continuity of office.

The status of the ‘ashab-u’s-saif (military) and ashab-u’l-qalam’ (clerical and administrative), was denoted by military rank, originally 66 grades but later only 33 grades existed. Every official of the empire above the rank of a sepoy or a servant held an army rank, the lowest was the commander of twenty; the highest the commander of seven thousand. Mansabs were ranked as of 7,000, 6,000, 5,000, intervals of 500 between 5,000 and 1,000, intervals of 100 between 1,000 and 200, intervals of 50 between 200 and 100, finally intervals of 20 between 100 and 20.

Mansabs were of three classes, 7,000 to 3,000 - ‘Amir-i-Azam’ the greater nobles; 2,500 to 500 - ‘Amir’, noble; 400 to 20 - ‘Mansabdar’ office holder. Commanders of higher ranks were of three classes according to the proportion of horsemen, first class if the whole command was of ‘horse’, second class if the ‘horse’ element was more than half and third class if less than half.

Compensation per annum started at rupees 350,000 with intervals of 50,000 between mansabs of 7,000 and 5,000; rupees 250,000 with intervals of 25,000 between mansabs of 5,000 and 1,000; the mansab of 20 received 1,000.

Compensation was either ‘naqdi’ meaning cash compensation or by the revenue of a ‘jagir’, an area of land which was not given to the ‘mansabdar’ but he could use the revenue from the land for his expenses and compensation. The ‘mansab’ could be increased or decreased on the wishes of the ruler and reports of performance and two lists were maintained, ‘Hazir-i-rikah’ present at court and ‘Ta-inat’ on duty elsewhere.

For a military mansab an application could be made for a mansab with troops or without troops. Those applying for a mansab with troops brought their retainers, mounted and equipped at their expense, these were known as ‘silladars’ and their men were known as ‘bagirs’. (The system continued under the British till 1914.) When a silladar brought his men, they were paraded for inspection, their descriptive rolls were prepared and the horses were branded; these mansabdars were paid for the maintenance of horses and the salaries of the men. Men considered fit to command but lacking resources were given money to purchase horses and received the salaries of the men only. Men who could not be mansabdars but too good to be employed as soldiers were given the higher rank of a ‘ahadi’.

Military mansabdars were required to maintain troops according to the mansab including beasts of burden, elephants, camels, mules, carts etc, they maintained horses for their troopers and a prescribed number in their own stables.

 Military command was at the will of the emperor, Akbar held that anyone could be a military commander and often appointed commanders who had no military knowledge or experience.

Mansabdars were given control over an area of land, a ‘jagir’ whose revenue was to be used for maintaining troops; if not given a ‘jagir’ they were paid in cash through a complicated accounting system, with deductions for various things including ‘the rising of the moon’; it was a normal practice to pay for only eight or ten months in the year. The mansabdars were allowed to keep five percent of the income of the ‘jagir’ or five per cent of the salaries received. The accounting system was complex, mansabdars usually borrowed money for expenses and when they died their private property was seized against any outstanding balances.

With a corrupt system of accounting and inspection very few mansabdars kept their units up to strength. When a mansabdar was ordered to take part in an expedition, he was required to parade his unit outside the palace and the emperor inspected it from a window in the palace.

Cavalry made up the bulk of the Moghal army, they enjoyed the prestige of warriors. Individual troopers took great care to keep themselves fit, they exercised, engaged each other in mock fights, practised horsemanship, they were personally brave and trained themselves for person to person combat, but were unwilling to endanger their mounts because their salary depended on these; there was no training for units to act collectively.

Infantry was despised as drudges, they were considered little more than watchmen to guard the baggage, labourers, porters etc. The infantry consisted of matchlock men and archers, in the ratio of one matchlock man to four archers because of the greater rate of fire of the archers since both weapons had about the same effective range; there was no infantry training, no discipline and very little reliance was placed on them.

The ‘Mir Atish’, the ‘master gunner’, was responsible for the manufacture, supply of ordnance and was the artillery commander. Gunners were called ‘golandaz’ (the bringer of round shot, a term also used by the British till 1857), they were paid directly from the treasury and were the most reliable part of the army. The efficiency of the Moghal artillery was poor, the rate of fire was very low and the pieces were difficult to move. Europeans as artillery men were prized and were paid as much as ten times the amount paid to locals.

The recruitment of men was by ‘classes’; it was specified that an officer from Iran could not recruit more than one third Moghals, the rest had to be Syeds or Sheikhs, Afghans could not be more than one sixth or Rajputs more than one seventh of a force. This system of recruitment by ‘classes’ was adopted by the British.

The Moghal army consisted of bands of horsemen, each band linked by some personal loyalty to its leader but without any loyalty to the emperor or any national or religious loyalty. These soldiers of fortune depended on their commanders, their pay was always kept in arrears to prevent desertion.

There was a theoretical pattern to which the army conformed in battle; this consisted of three divisions, the centre, right and left wing, each of these had an advance guard, a screen of skirmishers and there was a rear guard to the whole force. Once a formation was adopted there was very little capability for manoeuvre and there was no system of communicating between the parts.

 Open country was necessary for successful action by a Moghal army because it was mostly cavalry. The opposing armies deployed guns on a line protected by earthwork and tied together with chains or ropes to prevent cavalry riding through as Babur had done at Panipat. Battle started with artillery fire, the heavy guns fired one round every three hours while the others about four rounds per hour. When it was considered that the artillery had sufficiently demoralised the enemy, successive charges were delivered from one wing then the other; the cavalry first fired their matchlocks and arrows then closed with the sword, spear and the mace, fighting was series of skirmishes ending in individual combat. The cavalry was not trained to act collectively on command, once dispersed it could not be formed again but since cavalry was the bulk of the army, the object of the Moghal commander was to engage the enemy on an open plain where he could deliver a massed charge of mail clad warriors. Up to the time of Aurangzeb, the Moghals fielded much larger armies than their opponents and usually managed to defeat their enemy, either on the battlefield or after a siege.

During battle the overall commander or the king had to prominently show his presence on the battlefield, usually riding an elephant, the battle objective was usually the elephant of the opposing commander and around it raged the fiercest battle; the decisive event of a battle was the death or disappearance of the leader, if he was known to have been killed or could not be seen the troops dispersed and sought their own safety. Aurangzeb when fighting his brothers for succession, in two battles, the rival to the throne was induced by treacherous advice to dismount and their armies automatically dispersed; this was because the remuneration of the army was from individual princes. The British used this custom to their advantage by knocking off the commanders with a four pounders and causing the dispersion of the opponents, eventually the princes and commanders learnt to ride horses instead of elephants and not to prominently show themselves.

The Emperor usually did not personally command the army unless it was a very large force in an important campaign; when the army moved out to war with the emperor in command, the whole apparatus of government moved with it. Aurangzeb’s army on the move included camels bearing treasure, one hundred loaded with gold, two hundred with silver; the emperor’s hunting establishment, with hawks and cheetahs; official records, on eighty camels, thirty elephants and twenty carts, these could never be parted from the emperor; a hundred camels carried water and kitchen utensils; fifty milch-cows, a hundred cooks, each a specialist in a dish; fifty camels and a hundred carts carried the emperor’s and his ladies wardrobe; thirty elephants carried the women’s jewellery and presents for successful commanders.

The mass of the cavalry, the main strength of the army, led, then the way was levelled for the emperor and his women; a rear guard largely of infantry brought up the tail. When the army halted the emperor’s camp was about a mile long, a square enclosure was roped off and surrounded by a ditch, heavy artillery defended the approaches, the emperor’s tent was in the centre, divided into four courts with the entrance facing the direction of the next day’s march.

The army transport consisted of elephants, camels, pack horses, bullocks, bullock carts and porters. Every man provided for himself by buying for his needs, on a daily basis from ‘banyas’ who erected their shops in the camps. Supplies of grain were brought to the camp by ‘banjarahs’ on bullocks which moved at two miles an hour, they formed a square in the evening with bags of grain. The ‘banjarahs’ were not attacked by either side and the grain taken was paid for. Fodder was taken from the country side and foragers looted the villages in the path of the army.

 The armies of the Moghal times consisted of bands without military training and discipline; there was no loyalty owed to the ruler or the state; band leaders could be bought; half hearted support during battle, treachery and desertion were therefore negotiable. The two opposing armies would camp on the battlefield and for several days negotiations would be conducted to entice commanders to change sides before the battle, to refuse to act at a critical moment or to desert with their commands during a battle. This mercenary soldiering, in its worst form, was successfully exploited by the British when they fought the princes who had seized bits and pieces of the Moghal empire.

Insulated by the mountains and the seas, the Moghals developed a military system which, though locally successful, did not improve on the weapons, organisation and tactics, it failed miserably when it clashed with the European military system of the period.

The French were the first to train Indian infantry on the European pattern in 1674, in 1693 36 Frenchmen with 400 Indians defended Pondicherry against 19 ships and 1,500 Dutch infantry. In 1746, M. Paradis with 230 French infantry and 700 sepoys attacked 10,000 strongly posted Indians at San Thoma and routed them. These actions proved that small numbers of properly trained and led Indian troops could defeat large numbers of men who were not disciplined and had no military training. The Europeans, introducing European military methods and techniques and imposing military discipline, created excellent mercenary troops that defeated their own countrymen for the benefit of foreigners.

The Battle of Plassey (1757) is an example of the defects in the military systems that emerged after the disintegration of the Moghal empire.

In Bengal there was friction between Nawab Ali Vardi Khan, the nominal ‘subahdar’ of the Moghals, and the English, over the English fortification of Calcutta. Ali Vardi died in 1756 and was succeeded by Siraj-ud-daulah who on getting an evasive reply from the English about the fortifications marched on Calcutta, seized the city, garrisoned with a weak garrison and returned to his capital, Murshidabad.

 The English sent an expedition under Robert Clive by sea who recaptured Calcutta, strengthened the fortifications of the city and raised an infantry battalion, the 1st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, known as the ‘Lal Paltan’ from which originated the Bengal Army of the East India Company.

Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah again marched on Calcutta with 18,000 cavalry, 12,000 infantry, 40 guns and 50 elephants. Clive had 650 English infantry, 800 sepoys, 600 sailors and 100 gunners manning 6 guns. Clive marched against Siraj-ud-daulah’s army deployed on the Maratha ditch on the outskirts of Calcutta; in a thick mist an indecisive action took place in which the Nawab lost 1,300 killed against the English loss of 57 killed. Siraj-ud-daulah paralysed by the surprise attack by the English concluded a treaty restoring the privileges of the English and paying compensation.

 The following six months were spent in complicated negotiations between Siraj-ud-daulah, the English and the French while Robert Clive intrigued with Mir Jaffer and the Nawab’s other commanders to betray the Nawab; Mir Jaffar had the command of 10,000 troops of the Nawab. With the assurance that Mir Jaffer would betray the Nawab, Clive advanced against the Nawab’s capital.

 At Plassey, Robert Clive, with 613 European infantry men, ten field guns manned by 171 men, 91 topasses (Indian Christians with Portuguese names) and 2,100 sepoys faced Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah’s army of 70,000. The Nawab could only rely on about 8,000 men, large number of the others were on ‘strike’ because they had not been paid and out of his commanders he had the loyalty of only three generals out of nine.

Clive’s army crossed the Bhagirathi river near Plassey and keeping the river on its left moved north, Siraj-ud-daulah confronted Clive with his best troops and most trustworthy generals, Mir Mardan and Bahadur Ali Khan. Having blocked the English advance, Sira-ud-daulah surrounded the English with troops commanded by Rai Durlabh on the right, Yar Lutaf Khan in the centre and Mir Jaffer on the left, the generals who had conspired to betray him. Mir Mardan and Bahadur Ali Khan’s troops and sixty French artillery men fought the English, the rest of the army stood and watched. Early in the day Mir Mardan was fatally wounded, his place was taken by Mohanlal, later Bahadur Ali Khan was also killed, both these commands became in-effective, at noon it rained heavily and the gunpowder of the Nawab’s artillery got soaked putting his guns out of action.

With the English stopped frontally and hemmed by the Nawab’s troops against the river, the Nawab called Mir Jaffer, who came heavily guarded, and when ordered to attack he haughtily refused to act and sent a message to Clive. The Nawab then consulted Rai Durlabh, another conspirator who advised the Nawab to withdraw behind his entrenchment. When the withdrawal started the English followed it up, Mir Jaffer, on the extreme left of the Nawab’s army moved away to the left opening a gap through which the English attacked; the Nawab, on the advice of his treacherous generals left the battlefield and lost the battle. Plassey illustrates the military weaknesses of the successors of the Moghals, it was the battle which opened the way for the conquest of India by the English.

Chapter 7
THE NATION AT WAR

1. Conscription

In the era preceding the French revolution wars were limited in duration and the size of armies due to the cost of maintaining standing armies, heavy casualties at close musket range, frequency of sieges and the necessity of establishing supply depots along the line of march.

The French Revolution, in the last quarter of the 18th Century, was caused by the collapse of the French economy which necessitated an increase in taxes from which the nobility and the clergy were exempted, the burden fell on the middle class who demanded economic and social justice and a voice in the direction of national affairs which resulted in a revolution which ended the monarchy, forced the emigration of the nobility and the officer class and caused chaos in the country. Prussia, Austria and Russia considered the chaos in France a good opportunity for territorial expansion at the French expense under the guise of the restoration of the monarchy.

 The ruling body of the French Revolution, the National Convention, faced with external threats and lacking the means of meeting them, on August 23, 1793, passed a law which made war unlimited. The law stated:

“From this moment until that in which our enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for service in the armies. The young men shall fight; the married men forge weapons and transport supplies; the women shall make tents and clothes and will serve in the hospitals; the children will make up old linen into lint, the old men will have themselves carried in to the public squares to rouse the courage of the fighting men, to preach the unity of the Republic and hatred against the kings.”

 “The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public square into munition factories, the earthen floors and cellars shall be treated with lye to extract salt petre.”

 “All the firearms of suitable calibre shall be turned over to the troops; the interior shall be policed with shot guns and with cold steel.”

 “All saddle horses will be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons.”

 In February 1793, France had an army of 228,000 by December of that year it had increased to 628,000 and in September 1794 it became 1,026,000 with 732,000 men on the battlefields.

 Conscription improved the quality of man power because men from all classes of society were conscripted. The conscripts received very little training, they were not trained to volley fire but instead acted individually.

 Initially there was an acute shortage of officers because thousands of cavalry and infantry officers, connected with the nobility had migrated, but due to a magnificent corps of long service non-commissioned officers were promoted from them and performed well; the famous officers of the Napoleon’s era, Bertheir, Besseieres, Davout, Friant, Jourdan, Kellerman, Leclerc, Lannes, Macdonald, Messina, Soult and many others were either in command or in the ranks.

 Conscription changed the basis of warfare, soldiers became cheap, battles were no longer avoided for the fear of casualties because replacements were readily available.

 The administrative and logistic system also changed, tents and their carrying vehicles disappeared, transport was reduced, bakeries and bread columns were done away with by requisitioning of rations which often meant the plundering of the country side.

 Before the revolution no particular attention had been paid to manufacturing weapons and equipment for the army. Cut off from the rest of Europe, particularly Sweden from where steel was imported, the French learnt to make steel. Brass bells were melted and cast into cannons, swords were made from cutlery, 248 forges were set up in the open spaces in Paris to make muskets and 1000 muskets were made and delivered daily.

 The man behind all this activity, Carnot, giving an account to the Assembly said “France was formerly dependent on her enemies for the primary necessities relative to her defence, now, not only made in her midst are sufficient guns to arm all the republicans, but she would soon be in a position to sell them to strangers, she would become the greatest magazine”. Carnot further stated that every great nation had made experiments, the Greeks conquered with the Phalanx, the Romans with the Legion. The French experiment was with conscription and the mobilisation of the national resources for the defence of the country.

2. The Evolution of the Division and the Corps

In Europe by the eighteenth century roads and canals had been built and in many places parallel roads became available connecting the main cities thereby reducing the travelling time considerably. Map making was now based on triangulation rather than imagination and maps of Europe became available. The population had generally increased and most regions could supply armies decreasing reliance of armies on magazines and supply convoys, thus giving armies mobility.

Marshal Saxe, the great soldier of fortune of the 18th Century, in about 1732 advocated an increase in mobility and manoeuvrability through an organisation in ‘legions’, self-contained and homogeneous fighting formations composed of all arms, he proposed a legion of 3580, divided into four regiments of 880, each regiment of four ‘centuries’ of 220 infantry and a half ‘century’ of cavalry for reconnaissance, each infantry century was to have a light field gun on two wheels.

The ‘legion’, self-contained homogenous organisation, now called a ‘division’ was adopted in 1759; the original division was from 6000 to 8000 strong and had its own cavalry and artillery; the infantry in the division was organised in demi-brigades or regiments of about 2500 men in three battalions, each with nine companies.

The French National Assembly, by an order in 1794, grouped divisions to form corps, each composed of all arms and a staff, each corps a little army by itself. The corps became the largest tactical organisation; the French armies now consisted of several corps, with inter-changeable roles, they could form the advance guard, flanking force, or the main battle force; this gave flexibility of manoeuvre.

An army instead of moving as a concentrated force moved as separate corps spread over distances up to thirty miles from each other to make the best use of roads and supplies. The handling of an army now required the skill of keeping the separated corps under control within mutual supporting distances to avoid defeat in detail and concentrating them at the decisive moment and place.

With these environmental changes and the changes in the method of movement of armies the operational area of an army became very large, continuous flow of information had to come from areas extending to about seventy miles, written orders had to be transmitted over long distances, movement of troops, supply columns and rearward movement had to be controlled; this required the genius of Napoleon.

Napoleon’s Imperial Headquarters consisted of the ‘Maison’, the General Staff and an Administrative Headquarter. The Maison (House or personal staff) had Napoleon’s personal staff, it consisted of a ‘Cabinet’, Adjutants Generaux and Officers d’Ordonnance.

The Cabinet consisted of the Secretariat, the Topographical Bureau and the Statistical Bureau. The Secretariat consisted of secretaries, librarians and archivists; the Topographical Bureau was responsible for setting up the headquarter with a situation map by plotting information about the enemy supplied by the Statistical Bureau and of own forces supplied by the General Staff. The Statistical Bureau reported directly to Napoleon and obtained strategic intelligence.

The General Staff working under Marshal Berthier’s direction functioned to handle the emperor’s military correspondence, to prepare detailed orders from Napoleon’s instructions, to instruct commanders whose tactical situation did not warrant the emperor’s attention, to provide Napoleon’s ‘Cabinet’ with the army’s own situation and to supervise the numerous functions which have to be carried out to keep an army operational and military government functioning in occupied territory.

The system made available to Napoleon the vast amount of information that was required to control the widely dispersed forces. States of regiments; details of records of all military territorial regions including commanders, staff, units, bridging, police, garrisons and military institutions; records of the general staff; detailed report on all forward and rearward movement; records of all the officers in the army. These records were updated daily from reports received from corps at the end of each day’s operations, the reports were based on a standard format which included corps movement during the day, location, strength change, state of arms, equipment, supplies, uniforms etc, information from prisoner interrogation. These daily reports were properly arranged and presented by the chief of staff to Napoleon at midnight. A summary had to be submitted every five days and a grand summary every fifteen days.

The Administrative Headquarters under General Daru, consisting of civilian administrative and economic staff, controlled the entire zone of communication, in 1813 this consisted of the greater part Europe. This headquarter carried out all the tasks necessary to support the armies, it levied contributions, made requisitions, established magazines and hospitals, evacuated the wounded and the prisoners and made industry etc function.

The corps and the divisions had their own staff, the corps staff varied from sixteen to twenty four officers, the divisions were standardised with eleven officers. The corps headquarters staff included an inspector general of artillery and engineers with their own staff; a senior staff officer to look after supplies; two staff officers to look after operations representing the Administrative Headquarters; officers to control bread supply, meat and foraging; a surgeon general and a director of mail services. The divisional staff was a smaller similar establishment.

To train officers for the army, Napolean created ‘Ecole Speciale Militaire’ but there was no specialised training for staff officers, they were selected by commanders from captains with two years service and retained after a probationary period. The staff belonged to the commander and went with him when he was transferred.

The corps was a self-contained organisation of two or more divisions with its own artillery and cavalry, it was fast moving, it advanced behind a reconnaissance screen of light cavalry followed by swarms of skirmishers of light infantry sharp shooters who penetrated the enemy’s weak points.

The division was of 6,000 to 9,000 men in five or six infantry regiments, cavalry and artillery, this made it highly mobile.

The cavalry was designated as light and heavy. The light cavalry squadrons, of about 160 men, were divisional and corps troops, they were employed for deep reconnaissance and protective screening in the advance and in the pursuit after a victorious engagement. The light cavalry consisted of ‘Chasseurs’ and ‘Hussars’; the Hussars wore the showiest uniform in the army; both were armed with a curved slashing sabre and a musket without a bayonet.

The heavy cavalry formed the cavalry divisions, it consisted of ‘Cuirassiers’ and ‘Dragoons’. The Cuirassiers, with bullet proof breast and back plates, were armed with a sword, later on a lance, they also carried a musket, or a carbine or a pistol, their battle drill was excellent; the cavalry divisions were kept in reserve to deliver decisive charges. The ‘Dragoons’, originally mounted infantry, now formed part of the cavalry division with the role of pursuit of the enemy.

In the infantry, for skirmishing, ‘light infantry’ battalions were formed at the scale of one battalion for every three battalions; the light infantry used cover while skirmishing and aimed fire instead of volley firing; each infantry battalion added a grenadier company with higher rates of pay. The basic infantry weapon was the flintlock smooth bore musket with a socket bayonet, it had a rate of fire of two rounds a minute and a range of 150 yards. Napoleon also added ‘pioneer’ detachments in infantry battalions with four men with axes, two with spades and two with picks.

Napolean’s infantry looked ragged and seemed indisciplined, the infantryman marched with a 58 pound pack, 65 for the Guards, he carried 60 rounds for his musket, a week’s rations, spare trousers, two shirts and two pairs of boots. The basic ration was one pound of bread, quarter pound of meat, two ounces of dried vegetables and one ounce of brandy.

The French artillery, reorganised by General Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval, inspector general of artillery in 1776, was the best in Europe. Gribeauval had increased the mobility of artillery by reducing the weight of the guns without sacrificing the range or the shell power. Field artillery was restricted to 4-pounder regimental guns, divisional artillery to 8 and 12 pounder guns and 6 inch howitzers; for sieges and fortresses there were 12 and 16 pounder guns, 8 inch howitzers and 10 inch mortars; Gribeauval also introduced limber boxes and standard gun carriages with interchangeable parts; the standardisation introduced industry to standardised weapons and equipment. Guns were muzzle loading and had to be relaid after firing because there was no recoil system, the characteristics of the guns were as follows:

In 1791 the French introduced horse artillery on the Prussian pattern with all gunners mounted. These changes in the artillery increased the number of horses and wagons which lengthened marching columns and, therefore, required light protective troops.

In this period engineers consisted of officers only; pontoon bridging personnel, sappers, miners and artificers belonged to the artillery, in 1794 Napoleon transferred these to form the Corps of Engineers.

Napoleon formed crack regiments, notably the Imperial Guard. The Guards, elite of the elite, had to be over 1.71 metres (5’ 6”) in height, must have fought in three campaigns or been wounded twice or distinguished themselves by outstanding action and had to be able to read and write, to be eligible to serve in the Imperial Guards. Guardsmen were respectfully addressed by officers as “monsieur’, their pay was higher, they received better rations, had better barracks, had the privilege of escorting the Emperor and the honour of going into battle at the decisive moment as a dependable reserve.

Napolean broke away from the tradition of advancing in dressed lines to battalion columns which made approach through broken country easier and presented a front of about 50 yards, from the column the formation could be quickly changed to line for ‘fire action’. Tactics had not changed since the battle of Leuthen, while attacking the defences were first disorganised by skirmishers and concentrated artillery, fire then the assault followed in dense lines of infantry.

In Napolean’s army there was no corporal punishment as in other armies of the period, men were motivated by system of awards and decorations.

The Ulm Campaign and the Battle of Austerlitz (1805):

The Ulm campaign and the Battle of Austerlitz illustrates the movement of an army by corps and the tactics of the age. Wars of the French revolution started in 1792 and were fought by coalitions of European powers; on 9 August 1805 the Third Coalition of Austria, Russia, England, Sweden and Denmark was formed to overthrow the domination of Europe by France.

The French army, in 1805 was concentrated along the English Channel coast for the invasion of England. The coalition, with Austrian leadership, knowing that Napoleon could either fight the Austrians in the Po Valley in Italy or in the Danube Valley, planned to deploy an army of 95,000 in the Po Valley in Italy, under the Archduke Charles, their best commander, where they had been defeated by Napoleon in 1796 and 1797 and to advance into Bavaria to the Iller River with 65,000 men commanded by Mack and take up a defensive position till the 100,000 Russians joined them in October.

Napoleon learning about the formation of the coalition and about its intentions decided to offer Hanover to the Prussians to keep them out of the coalition and informed them that he had sent an ultimatum to the Austrians to return to their cantonments or he would enter Bavaria with more than 100,000 troops. He placed Massena in command in Italy and gave instructions for the Grand Army to move against the Austrians.

The French Grand Army was composed as follows:

The movement of the Grand Army started on 23 August, Murat, the cavalry corps commander, the Chief Engineer and another general were sent on a route reconnaissance and the five cavalry divisions were dispatched on parallel routes to secure the crossings over the Rhine from Neuf Brisach to Strasbourg. The Chief of Staff, Berthier, maintained a card index showing the location of all the formations and units.

On 26 August, movement instructions were issued to the army; I and II Corps were to join the Bavarian allies of the French at Wuzberg, I Corps was to start on 2 September from Hanover and reach Gottingen on the 9th, II Corps from Bruges and reach Mainz on the 15th; III, IV, V and VI Corps were to start moving on 27 August, they were to reach the Rhine crossings on a front of 80 miles, between Strasbourg and Mannheim, on 26 September. VII Corps, located at Brest, had to march the longest distance to Freiburg to block the exits from the Black Forest.

The supply of the army was a major problem, each man started with four days bread ration and requisitions were made on the country side; Berthier’s orders laid down the quantities of provisions each regiment was to draw from each individual place on the way. Provisions were to be distributed every two or three days, local authorities were informed about the coming movement and asked to cooperate. 500,000 biscuit rations were to be prepared at Strasbourg, 200,000 at Mainz, 1,000,000 by the Elector of Bavaria, all within 25 days. Marmont’s II Corps, passing through friendly country, was ordered to “live off what the country can supply”; Bernadotte’s I Corps, carried seven days supply of biscuits to avoid burdening neutral Hesse-Kassel, while passing through; on the whole the men fared well.

Horses suffered badly from bad roads, untrained riders and because there was shortage of horses. By the time the Rhine was reached the horses of the cavalry corps were starving because fodder could not be bought.

The army’s transport was 4,650 wagons, out of which the artillery had 2,650, leaving 2000 to support 116,000 men, excluding I and II Corps, this was sufficient for eleven days at 3 pounds per man per day.

Across the Rhine, corps were kept well apart to live off the land and forage. The normal method of subsisting was to quarter them on the inhabitants with their horses. Rations for men were fixed at 1 1/2 pounds of bread, a half pound of meat, one ounce of rice per day, wood for cooking was to be supplied by the hosts. Supplies were commandeered by corps and divisional commissionaries who informed the local authorities of the number of men and horses to be fed and where the provisions were to be provided. Receipts specifying quantities appropriated were given for later redemption by the French treasury.

Gradually requisitioning became a fine art, for example Soult, commanding IV Corps, forced Heilbron and its surroundings, population of about 15,000, to surrender 85,000 bread rations, 24,000 pounds of salt, 3,600 bushels of hay, 6,000 sacks of oats, 5,000 pints of wine, 800 bushels of straw and 100 four-horse wagons.

After crossing the Rhine, the lines of communications were established by directing that all traffic to and from the army to pass through the town of Spires where a general was made responsible for the pipeline leading to the army. Every fifteen to eighteen miles a relay station was set up, the lines of communications were policed by auxiliary troops and ‘gendarmes’. Through these relay stations passed supply convoys, reservists, the sick, wounded and prisoners. The ‘lines of communications’ desperately lacked wagons and horses, the corps, as they passed through an area commandeered the wagons and horses  and Napoleon had to issue orders for the surrender of surplus wagons and horses.

As the army approached the Danube, with the enemy nearby, the centrally organised requisitioning system was replaced by the divisional commissionaires, regiments and units fending for themselves; the cavalry racing ahead and occupying villages left nothing for the following infantry. It was said that Napoleon’s army could only live if kept moving fast but this was not true, though it took some time to establish and organise a supply system.

As the army advanced, the communications back to France were also organised, the section, Strasbourg to Augsburg, was divided into seventeen sections, each section with 60 four-horse wagons shuttling in each section, moving between 60 and 120 tons of supplies of clothing and ammunition per day.

The 2,500 wagons allocated to the artillery, carried two thirds of the infantry ammunition; a division of about 8,000 men carried 146-300 rounds per gun and 97,000 rounds of infantry ammunition while each infantry man carried 60 to 80 rounds. After the surrender by Mack at Ulm an artillery depot was established at Heilbron through which there was daily flow of 75,000 to 100,000 rounds of ammunition. This is regarded as first example of a continuous re-supply of ammunition.

On 10 September the Austrians invaded Bavaria, the Bavarians withdrew to Wuzburg and made contact with the French I Corps. A cavalry screen reported the Austrians approaching Ulm and digging in, on this report Napoleon ordered V and VI Corps, moving towards Ulm to march to Stuttgart, Ludweisburg, Heidenheim and Gundelfingen to locate the flank of the Austrians. I, II, III and IV Corps were ordered to cross the Danube between Ingolstadt and Donauworth and to advance to Munich and Augsburg to cut the Austrian line of communications and to prevent the Russians joining the Austrians.

On 17 September, Napoleon ordered the crossing of the Rhine on 25 September, the six corps in the north crossed the Rhine and cavalry screens spread across Germany on a front of 70 miles to locate the enemy; the Austrians were located along the Iller River and at Ulm.

After crossing the Rhine the Danube was crossed, the Bavarians, I and II Corps were at Wurzburg, I Corps advanced through Ansbach, Weisenburg, crossed at Ingolstadt and continued to Munich; II Corps moving through Rothenburg crossed with III Corps at Neuburg; IV Corps crossed at Donauworth and continued to Augsburg; V and VI Corps crossed downstream of Ulm. These crossings placed Napoleon firmly astride the Austrian lines of communications virtually winning the campaign before the fighting began.

An Austrian corps watching the Danube bridges, upstream of the Ulm, was driven by Murat’s cavalry and II and III Corps towards Munich where I Corps took up the pursuit and entered Munich on 12 October. The ring around the Austrians at Ulm rapidly tightened, II Corps moved to Augsburg and then to the ridge overlooking Ulm; IV Corps was sent to cut off the remaining communication of Ulm with the south; V and VI Corps advanced on both banks of the Danube to complete the encirclement of Ulm; I and III Corps were placed in reserve to stop the Russians. On 12 October, Napoleon ordered Murat to clear Ulm with his and two other corps, due to faulty deployment, an Austrian corps escaped, on 19 October Napoleon bombarded Ulm, 33,000 men with 60 guns surrendered.

After the surrender of Ulm, 20,000 Austrian and 30,000 Russians on the Inn River blocked the route to Vienna, the Austrian capital; a second Russian army started moving to join the blocking troops and the Austrian army in Italy started moving to Vienna.

On 27 October the French cavalry crossed the Inn River against light opposition, III, IV, V Corps followed, on the right I Corps entered Salzburg on the 30 October. On 6 November, Napoleon created VIII Corps to protect his left flank on the left bank of the Danube; the right flank was protected by II and IV Corps at Innsbruck; the rear was protected by VII Corps.

On 9 November, the Russians, judging that they could not prevent the fall of Vienna, retreated into Moravia. Napoleon entered Vienna on 13 November, he ordered the pursuit of the enemy by cavalry and IV and V Corps, sent I Corps to Budwels to watch an Austrian Corps and VIII Corps was ordered to garrison Vienna.

On November 19, the Russian commander Kutusov and Austrian commander Buxhowden united their armies. The pursuing French cavalry contacted the Russian rearguard at Hollabrun and pursued them to Austerlitz where contact was made with Austrian cavalry on 20th November.

Napoleon’s position was critical, the bulk of his army was scattered, he was faced by 82,000 Russians and Austrians led by their kings; by the middle of December the Austro-Russians strength would double with the arrival of the troops from Italy and another 180,000 Prussians were expected to join. The Russian Czar Alexander, short of supplies, decided to attack Napoleon before he could collect the rest of his army.

On 26 November, Napoleon issued instructions to his army on how to deal with the Russian tactics of attacking in dense formations and depending on the bayonet by developing the maximum infantry firepower and retaining cohesion to sustain Russian assaults.

Napoleon now began concentrating for battle, I Corps was relieved by the Bavarians in Bohemia, III Corps moved from Pressburg, by 30th November 65,000 French troops faced 52,000 Russians and 30,000 Austrians. On 1 December the French were deployed on a six mile front between Brun and Austerlitz, facing east on the right bank of the Goldbach stream. The French left was held by V and I Corps protected by a knoll called Santon; Murat’s cavalry, a grenadier division, and the Imperial Guard were in reserve in the centre; the right was thinly held by IV Corps deployed on a front of three miles; the right flank was protected by frozen lakes; III Corps was held in reserve 4 miles in the rear of the right flank. Napoleon’s command post was located on high ground in the centre from where he could see across the Goldbach up to the important plateau of Pratzen.

The Austro-Russian plan, based on the belief that the French were about to retreat to Vienna, was to contain the French left, outflank the right and cut the French communications with Vienna, Napoleon predicted before the battle that the Austro-Russians would attempt to outflank his right; at night on 1 December he rode along the front and observed the pattern of the Austro-Russian camp fires to confirm this.

Before dawn on 2 December, six Austro-Russian columns advanced, two columns attacked V and I Corps while the main attack was launched south of the Pratzen plateau with three columns which drove the French back but Napoleon counter attacked with III Corps and re-established the Goldbach line.

At 7.30 A.M. when the morning mist cleared, Napoleon observed that the Pratzen plateau was unoccupied and ordered two divisions of IV Corps to occupy it. The divisions which occupied the Pratzen plateau flanked the enemy attacking the French centre, they attacked the Austro-Russians driving them back in disorder, the Czar and the Austro-Russian commander-in-chief who were following their attacking force, lost control.

As soon as Pratzen was occupied, Napoleon attacked with his left and his reserve and routed the Austro-Russian right; on the French right the Austro-Russians were caught between on Pratzen and III Corps, the Russians tried to escape over the frozen lakes but the French broke the ice with artillery fire.

At the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon lured the Austro-Russians into a false position, cut their forces into two and annihilated its left wing, with 65,000 men Napoleon defeated 82,000 Austro-Russians, for a loss of 6,800 he inflicted 12,200 casualties, captured 15,000 prisoners and 180 guns. The Ulm campaign is a masterpiece in movement and of all his battles, Austerlitz was the one that Napoleon was most proud of.