Missile Defence systems: US-China relations

Columnist Zafar Nawaz Jaspal examines the effect of the proposed missile defence system on US relations with China.

President George W. Bush and his closest advisers (most of whom happen to be remnants of the cold war days) are on the move to assert their military superiority in the world. They are strong proponents of Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) systems. The BMD is a part of an overall integrated defensive and offensive capability that functions to enhance the US offensive capability by weakening that of its adversaries. The BMD will provide US a decisive first strike capability, that is, in a confrontation the US will launch a preemptive strike at its opponents’ weapons of mass destruction arsenals and then use the BMD system to minimize the damage from a retaliatory strike.  This testified that the primary strategic objective of the Bush’s administration is to prevent and counter the rise of any great power, which can stand to US, in any part of the world.                                                 

The Americans have established congenial relations with the Europeans, during the last decade. The three former Warsaw pact members — Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others aspire to be part of it. US perceive both allies and potential strategic peer in Asia. US have been strengthening its bilateral military alliances with its prior Asian allies (Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan) and forging a new strategic partnership with India, in order to contain the future enemy in Asia. The Americans have increased their level of engagement with India in the recent years. The Bush administration has further intensified its engagement with India, particularly in the military field. On July 18, 2001 General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) said in Delhi, ‘the US hopes to establish a strong military-to-military relationship with India, which is a major power with global influence’1. Consequently, the US Asian policy will effect and undermine some Asian State’s security and jeopardize US-China relations. 

Since the cold war ended, American scholars and strategists have debated whether China will pose a security threat to the US homeland, its global and regional interests in East Asia/Far East in next few decades. For many American strategic analysts Chinese military of the twenty-first century is replacing the Soviet military of pre-Gorbachev years and Japanese economy of the 1970s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership2. However, in present international scenario, Washington considers and vocally termed rogue states as a threat to its interests. The Americans perceive that it would be difficult to deter these states from attacking the US by the prevalent nuclear deterrence strategy. But this threat perception is debatable. In real terms, these states do not pose any military threat to the Americans homeland. For instance, North Korea one of the most advanced in missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology, among the rogue states, is not capable of making multiple launches of missiles. On August 31, 1998, North Korea tested a Taepodong-1 missile, which is believed to be a Nodong with a Scud-like second stage and a small third stage kick-motor. The Taepodong-1 flew only1320 km3. This proves that in order to develop a long-range ballistic missile, the North Koreans would have to make remarkable progress in propulsion, guidance, airframe, warhead and re-entry vehicle technology. There is no evidence that North Korea has mastered these technologies. At the same time one cannot ignore the fact that North Korea is eager to open normal trade relations with the West, seems to be willing to suspend its long range missiles programme for real material gain.

Secondly, North Korea, Iraq and Iran are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967. And all their nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirdly, there is a reason to doubt that they would ever use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US, due to the overwhelming US retaliatory capability. The historical record shows that in the past states have been deterred from using such weapons, when the US threatens to retaliate. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War, despite his threats to do so, by the US decision that such an attack would meet with a devastating US response4. It seems that it is supposed that rogue states, might be insane, they would be willing to commit national suicide by launching the nuclear capable missile against US.

The ‘rogue states’ threat has been exaggerated out of proportion and made a good excuse to develop the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system with its national and regional variation, which would be employed for the containment of other major powers. Interestingly, some scholars opine that the likeliest nuclear attack against the United States would come not from a nuclear missile launched by a rogue state but from a warhead in the belly of a ship or the back of a truck delivered by a group with no return address. Furthermore, the greatest nuclear danger to the US today and in the near future is likely an accidental launch of missile armed with nuclear warhead from Russia. The current US policy of maintaining large numbers of highly accurate nuclear weapons, that can be launched promptly to attack Russia’s nuclear forces, stands in the way of reducing this risk. The Russians have made clear that if the US abrogate Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, they would no longer be bound by other strategic arms reduction treaties.  They would feel free to start putting more multiple warheads on missiles to counter a US missile shield.       

President Bush’s some key officials consider China the predominant threat to American interests. Colin Powell, the State Secretary has rejected the Clinton administration’s posture ‘China as a strategic partner’5. The Clinton administration viewed China as a strategic partner, and emphasized expanded trade rather than disagreement over Taiwan. Ironically, the structure of the NMD system designed for the Clinton Administration was East Asia-oriented, especially in its first deployment phase, C1. In the C1 phase, the only new missile tracking radar deployed on Shemya, an outpost well located to watch missiles from East Asia, including Russian Siberia, Korea, and China. The only NMD launch site in the C1 and C2 phases would be in Central Alaska, which is much closer to East Asia than to the Middle East or the European part of Russia. On January 17, 2001 in his confirmation hearing, Colin Powell stated ‘China is a competitor and a potential regional rival’6. On May 1, 2001 in his speech on missile defences, President Bush spoke of reaching out to both Russia and China. While he was elaborating his desire to build a constructive new relationship with Russia, he ruled out no such prospects with China. Washington reinforced this message when the high-level emissaries were sent to consult with Asian leaders on American missile defence plans conspicuously omitted Beijing from their itinerary. A lower-level delegation visited Beijing7. In late January 2001, the US Air Force staged its first ever space war game. The possibility of war in space turned from pure scientific fiction to realistic planning by the Space War Centre at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The simulation was based on a scenario with growing tension between the US and China in 2017. The exercise perceived that in 2017 US would be, involved in a conflict with a large near-space peer nation ‘Red’, which threatens to attack ‘Brown’, a small neighbouring country. The good guys ‘Blue’ come to the rescue, launching reusable space planes and deploying missile defences, anti-satellite lasers, and tiny attack satellites known as micro-satellites. Several participants admitted that Red force was modelled on China8. The concept of space war exercise is a part of the US East Asian war fighting strategy.

The basic elements of the Americans East Asian strategy are deterring attack on allies and friends; maintaining East Asian bases for global power projection; and preventing spirals of tension among regional actors whose relations are plagued by both historical legacies of mistrust and contemporary sovereignty disputes9. According to Thomas J. Christen assessment, ‘...with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretence of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power or technology’. He added, ‘I firmly agreed with those who are sceptical about China’s prospects in significantly closing the gap with the US’10. The following table assists the readers to make an objective analysis about the US-China competing potential.

Source: The Military Balance: 2000-2001, The International National Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp16, 25, 26, 29, 30, 179, 194, 195, 196.

China had bluntly criticized US BMD plans than Russian and European. On January 18, 2001, Zhu Bangzao, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that any development of TMD or NMD would undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region as well as in the Taiwan Strait11. China is severely opposing US BMD programme because:

• NMD will undermine the credibility and effectiveness of China’s small strategic nuclear deterrent capability of 25 single warhead Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Even the first phase of the proposed NMD, which is expected to be operationalised within a few years, will make China’s missile capability ineffective;

• Transfer of TMD to Taiwan will provide a sense of security to anti-China forces in Taiwan, which is not in the interest of China;

• The Japan and US are working on the joint project for the development of TMD. The Chinese consider that this will encourage Japan to shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy. The change in Japanese military strategy will shift the military balance in North East Asia against Beijing;

• India would receive assistance from the US in its missile defence systems project. In fact, US BMD policy reveals that the US will not only transfer TMD but also co-operate in the research and development of anti-missile defence capabilities with allies. It would undermine the strategic balance of power between India and China.

China has great concern because a regional version of the system could neutralize its missile potential against Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province that must return to its mainland or rule. Therefore, it has made clear that it does not accept the rogue state rationale and sees itself as the focus of the US BMD systems. China’s interpretation that the BMD is directed against it, seems legitimate, due to the Americans provocative actions like arming Taiwan with Patriot missile capability. Chinese draw links between offensive and defensive missile systems. They have argued that Taiwan could use technologies acquired for a missile defence to develop offensive systems. On June 20, 2001 the Taiwanese army test- fired US Patriot missile. The Patriot was fired as the China was conducting massive war games in the region, including the mock invasion of a Taiwanese island. China expresses its strong opposition and dissatisfaction. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Quiyue said, ‘The assistance by the United States in having a test of the Patriot missile violates its commitments’.  She added the test also violated the China’s sovereignty and undermined the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region12. Moreover, human rights interventions, a higher profile for the Tibetan cause and above all Bush administration’s perception that China is an emerging threat to the US security13.

China has announced that its opposition to BMD would not change. It is expected that China can respond by developing new quantities and qualities of missiles and warheads capable of compensation for the reduction in their deterrent capabilities that would be brought about by a defensive shield. China is thus likely to invest in a more robust nuclear triad. Within the triad, as China’s strategic long-range strike programmes come to fruition, single warhead liquid-fuel missiles will be replaced with longer-range, multiple warhead, solid-fuel systems. The US BMD could also force changes in China’s deployment posture. China currently lacks the technical capability to maintain its nuclear force on a high-alert status. Warheads are stored separately from their missile launchers. Because Chinese ICBMs are liquid-fuel, they require lengthy launch preparations. China’s current nuclear modernisation plans will bring it within striking distance of deploying a credible and survivable deterrent. However, BMD could prove to be the decisive factor that might persuade Chinese leaders to transform a small strategic deterrent into a full nuclear war-fighting capability14. But China’s engagement in an arms race with the US would be disastrous for its economy. Perhaps that is part of the American calculation.

Conclusion

Though the Bush administration has yet to articulate a fully formed China policy, there are indications that it may be inclined to see China primarily as an emerging military threat in Asia. Therefore, the nature and the future of Sino-US relations once again became debatable.  The Bush Administration has weakened the limited consensus of the two governments on building a constructive strategic partnership. One can consider that their future relationships would be competitive or even confrontational, following the pattern of traditional relations among great powers in the past. The differences between the US and China in international and regional strategic issues, such as Iraq, Kosovo, the US-Japan strategic alliance, the US and Taiwan military co-operation US-India military relations and missile defence systems prove that China would be a peer competitor. When the two countries differ in so many strategic issues, it is imperative for the Americans to adopt a containment policy against China. China’s warming relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian States and Pakistan leaves US to cultivate its strategic partnership with India, besides its East Asian and Far Eastern allies to contain China, regionally.

END NOTES

1. ‘US-India ties, Dawn (July 19, 2001) p16. See also ‘Rocca hints at lifting of sanctions’ The Times of India (July 24 2001). http://www.timesofindia.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=1388952703

2. Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001) p6.

3. In the 1990s, North Korea tested and then deployed a 1000-km range missile, Nodong, based on a scaled-up Scud engine. Joseph Cirincione, ‘The Ballistic Missile Threat’, in Joseph Cirincione, Steve Fetter, George Lewis, Jack Mendelson, John Steinbruner, White Paper on National Missile Defens (Washington DC: The Lawyers Alliance for World Security, April 2001)     p. 17.

4. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. US Senator, ‘Opposing the National Missile Defence Act’  (March 16, 1999) http://www.senate.govt/-biden.

5. John Isaacs, ‘Bush 11 or Reagan 111?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/ June 2001)p. 31. 

6. Ibid.

7. ‘China Viewed Narrowly’, The New York Times (June 10, 2001). http://www.nytimes.com

8. ‘Self- fulfilling prophecy?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/ June 2001)pp.10-11. 

9. Thomas J. Christensen. opcit. p. 7.

10. Ibid. To many American analysts China seems devoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan’s diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment of any third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf, including both US and Japan.   

11. www.spacer.com/news/bmdo.01c.html

12. Annie Huang, ‘ARMY FIRES A TEST OF PATRIOT MISSILES’, The Associated Press (Taipei: June 21, 2001). See ‘CHINA SLAMS U.S. OVER TAIWAN’S PATRIOT MISSILE TEST’, Agence France Presse, (Beijing: June 21,2001).

13. The United States cannot ignore the possibility. See ‘China Viewed Narrowly’, The New York Times (June 10, 2001).

14. Gaurav Kampani, ‘How a US National Missile Defense will Affect South Asia’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Reports (May 2000).

                     Bombers                             300

                     Strategic submarines             18