Time For Reflection  

Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy

Columnist HAMID HUSSAIN reflects on our policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

The events of last few months have made profound changes on the world map in terms of relations between different countries. The war in Afghanistan has resulted in a dramatic change in the security environment of Pakistan.  This changed environment requires serious thinking to plan for the future.  Even in normal circumstances, every country periodically evaluates its policies concerning its neighbours.  In case of a crisis, it is imperative to critically analyze the country’s policies so that one can plan for a better future policy, which serves the country best.  The purpose of this exercise should not be to portray one’s favourites as heroes and opponents as villains.  The purpose should be correcting one’s course in new circumstances for the benefit of the nation and avoiding repetition of mistakes and blunders.  An astute observer of Afghan affairs warned in 1998 that, ‘For Pakistan to hope to remain immune from the consequences of the events it has set in motion would be a wishful thinking in the extreme’.1

It is now the right time to have a serious indepth analysis of Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, especially that of the last 25 years.  Although, Pakistan has been involved in Afghanistan’s internal affairs for long time, to desist it from fomenting trouble among Pakistani Pushtuns.  The extensive involvement started with Soviet invasion in 1979.  The initial aims of internationalization of the issue to decrease pressure on Pakistan, no overt involvement and maximum efforts to get a negotiated settlement were consistent with Pakistan’s interests and made sense.  Very quickly, the policy was to change dramatically under the influence of the United States aim of making Afghanistan Viet Nam of Soviet Union.  Overtime, the major component of Pakistan’s policy zeroed in on military support of resistance fighters to bleed the Russian bear white.  This was to take precedence over political, social and economic aspects of the conflict and the broader effects on Afghan and Pakistani societies were totally neglected.  There was also a significant ambivalence about long-term policy towards Afghanistan. There were several reasons for this approach.  First of all, the country being under the military rule, all policy decisions were made by a small group of senior army officers. This assured that only military aspect of the conflict would take precedence. There was very little of any civilian input.  Even in the military, the operation was run solely by ISI with not even the army’s normal chain of command being involved in the details of the operations, which were to have wide ranging effects both domestically and internationally.  Former COAS, General Aslam Beg states that, ‘Support for Afghan Jehad, was spearheaded by the CIA, which carried out the largest covert operation, undertaken most overtly since World War II.  Pakistan Army had nothing to do with the operations, and the gun running’.2 A former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf described his cell in these words, ‘This department controls the allocation of arms and ammunition; their distribution to Mujahideen leaders and commanders; the training of Mujahideen in Pakistan; the allocation of funds from the US and Saudi Arabian governments; and the strategic planning of operations inside Afghanistan’.3 The result was that an intelligence organization with the primary role of intelligence gathering was transformed into a complex, highly centralized and personalized cartel planning, organizing and executing its plans with no significant interaction with any other department of the state.  General Zia when heading his meetings with Afghan resistance leaders and ISI came secretly even without his Military Secretary and ADC.4 This surely helped to maintain tight control over operations inside Afghanistan and limited leakage of intelligence but over long term it had many negative effects even on military operations.  At the operational level, the negative impact was on individual officers.  The group of officers involved with covert operations was viewed with suspicion and frequent large scale purges rather than normal procedure of transfer had a negative impact on the morale and efficiency of the officers.  In case of a crisis, it made very difficult for any organized response at governmental level as only a handful of people were involved.  It made adjustment to a changed situation very slow and difficult.  It will take a major crisis to occur before any serious re-consideration of policy was attempted.  In such a situation, most of the decisions then become reactionary, only responding to events and no original thinking or planning.  An example of such problems is the decision in 1994, to send a convoy of trucks led by Major Jehangir with several ISI men after cutting a deal with warlords through Southern Afghanistan without any authorization from Rabbani government.  Pakistani ambassador in Kabul, Amir Usman had no clue about the venture.5 The result of such highly personalized nature of operation is the fact that when the person involved is gone there is no continuity of the policy as the newcomer has first to learn the trade and then implement his own policy which may be drastically different from the predecessor.  There is no detailed written record of previous interactions and no input from the departing individual or group.  Sudden death of Zia in a plane crash, quick change of four civilian governments amid crisis and not so smooth removals of many ISI chiefs resulted in major impact on Pakistan’s Afghan policy. There was no organized, coherent effort on the policy issues taking into account military, diplomatic, social  and economic aspects of the conflict.  In addition, it had a negative impact on the parties with whom Pakistan was dealing at different times.  One group was favoured which caused resentment in the ignored one and at other times the favourite was unceremoniously dumped when a new proxy was able to deliver some benefit.  Prior to 1988, the former king, Zahir Shah was considered a hopeless client.  In 1989, during Benazir government, ADC to Prime Minister, Squadron Leader Iqbal went to Rome to open dialogue with the king’s associates.  When Benazir government was dismissed this parley ended to be re-opened again in 1993-94 when Zahir Shah’s son-in-law, General Abdul Wali came to Islamabad.  This was then again abruptly discontinued due to pressure from some other quarters of policy making.6 This channel was revived recently after the gathering of the storm.  Similar is the story about Pakistan’s relationship with the Uzbek warlord, General Abdul Rashid Dostum.  Such haphazard course, causes significant ambiguity in the mind of the other party and it is unwilling to commit itself to a consistent course, as there is no surety or continuity of the policy.  The opposite party surely will also try to keep all channels open. 

Most of the officers involved in Afghanistan had a very limited knowledge about the country, its history and relationship between various ethnic groups.  Most of them had, and even with the benefit of hindsight, some have even now a very simplistic rather naive view about the whole scenario.  A former Chief of the Afghan Cell of ISI is of the view that, ‘Had he (General Akhtar Abdur Rahman) remained in ISI I feel certain that the Afghan war would have been won within months of the Soviet’s retreat’.7 General (r) K.M. Arif is of the view that all the problems of Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal are due to the wavering support of that country by Pakistan after Zia’s death.8 One former ISI Chief now admits the folly of Pakistan by stating that, ‘The desire to forge a Pakistani solution — quite evidently for narrow political motives — resulted in confusion, resentment and further polarization within the Afghans’.9 For successful operations, many Pushtun officers, JCOs and NCOs were actively involved in Afghanistan which gave a certain Pushtun bias toward policies and neglect of other ethnicities. Many successful Afghans resistance leaders especially Non-Pushtuns resented this manipulation by ISI.  Ahmad Shah Masud in Panjsher, Ismael Khan in Heart, Ghor, Farah and Nimroz and Alauddin in

Mazar-e-Sharif achieved militarily without compromising their independence.10 The non-Pushtuns were alienated as they saw the preferential treatment of  Pushtun forces of Afghanistan by Pakistan with great suspicion and felt it as a threat to their future role.  This contributed greatly to the ethnic and sub-ethnic fragmentation of Afghanistan making the task of Pakistan very difficult to bring any compromise when the Soviets left the country.  Military officer by nature abhors politics and may achieve the military objectives but guerrilla wars are won politically not militarily.  It is very hard for the army officer to fully comprehend the broader effects of military operations in unconventional wars.  ISI right from the beginning was very suspicious about any efforts for a broader base of the resistance groups for the fear of losing control. Even at the heels of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, ISI was of the view that the interim government issue will split the shaky alliance of resistance groups.11 Their concern was genuine but they were not willing to see the inevitable and face the reality.  Even after a clear military victory, some form of government has to be formed in Kabul and regardless how difficult the task, it needed to be done. 

After Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan hoping a quick military victory, abandoned all diplomatic activity and embarked on an ambitious outright military victory plan.12 It was after the failure of conventional attacks by resistance fighters attempts in Jalalabad and Khost organized by ISI that COAS took control.  According to General K.M. Arif, ‘after these failures of ISI, for the first time, COAS, General Aslam Beg emerged as coordinator of Afghan policy meeting Afghan leaders and directing and advising ISI on operations’.13    After Soviet withdrawal, and later drying up of aid pipeline made Pakistan’s job very frustrating and difficult due to the incessant civil war.  Benazir government hated Hikmatyar due to his close association with Zia and Jamaat-e-Islami. In addition, his failure to deliver to Pakistan, Pakistan started to look for other potential Pushtun proxies in Afghanistan.14 Benazir Bhutto’s Interior Minister, Major General (r) Naseerullah Babar became active in Afghan affairs heavily and was closely involved with Taliban while the gulf between Rabbani government and Pakistan widened and Pakistan called openly his rule ‘illegitimate’.  After the Taliban take over of most of the country, Pakistan had a sigh of relief on the pause of fratricidal war in its backyard.  This proved to be very short-lived. 

After the September 11 attacks in United States, Pakistan decided to join US in the operation against Osama and Taliban.  Pakistan now allowed many anti-Taliban leaders and groups who have been banned earlier to open offices.  Even intelligence officers admit the folly of such approach of putting all eggs in one basket.  A Pakistani intelligence officer pointed to this mistake, ‘the previous ISI bosses thought it a sin to have contact with anti-Taliban Afghans.  In the business of secret intelligence operations you can never close any window, but in the past the ISI rebuffed every attempt by anti-Taliban elements to open dialogues with it’.15 Abdul Haq, Hamid Karzai, Haji Zaman and representatives of former King Zahir Shah were encouraged to work on both sides of border on Pushtun tribal chiefs and commanders to encourage their defection from Taliban.  Generous amounts of money were distributed to achieve the aims.  These Chiefs who have played these games for centuries, were very careful and didn’t launch any rebellion until they were completely convinced about the routing of Taliban after devastating air strikes.16 Now an uneasy calm in most part of the Afghanistan prevail with many uncertainties. 

The last twenty years of Pakistan’s policy can be summed as the policy of ‘cross-border ethnic clientalism’, with the objective to have a client regime in Kabul to get ‘broader regional political, economic and strategic gains’.17 This policy was pursued without taking into consideration the fact that when a government supports a proxy in a country ravaged by civil war, it has to assure the survival of the proxy against its rivals which simply means more direct involvement, thus starting a vicious cycle.  In addition, time and again, the refusal of many leaders of Afghanistan, the latest one being Taliban to enter into patron-client relationship with Pakistan has resulted in frustration among the Pakistani policy makers.  The single most important factor, which has contributed to the ad hoc nature of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, is the failure on part of the policy makers to comprehend the profound changes, which has occurred in Afghanistan during guerilla war which has affected social, cultural, political and economic life of Afghans.18 The local forces inside Afghanistan, be they Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, tribal Pushtuns or puritan Sunni groups have asserted themselves over last twenty five years while the state institutions around them have crumbled.  This makes any organized effort very difficult due to the absence of any acceptable central authority. 

Pakistan, first needs to clarify what are its objectives regarding Afghanistan.  These objectives have to be realistic and achievable.  Pakistan, has to understand the enormous change, which has occurred since 1980 in international and domestic arena.  It also has to adjust to its own changed status.  There is no longer any cold war, no unlimited economic and material sources from foreign countries.  In fact many countries including Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan are genuinely concerned about the fall out from Afghanistan and any Pakistani policy will have to take into consideration this element.   Pakistan itself has a host of political, social and economic problems, which need urgent attention, and the impact of any ambitious foreign policy objectives on domestic canvas should be seriously considered.  In Afghanistan itself, the return of former players and presence of United States and Britain has made things more complex.  The tribal, clan, sectarian and ethnic fault lines have come to the surface and any future policy decisions have to be taken very carefully and after a lot of thinking.  In the present situation the Wisdom of Solomon, patience of Job and mercy of Jesus is needed to overcome tremendous obstacles in Afghanistan.  There will be setbacks and obstacles, which need to be handled tactfully to prevent it spiraling into an uncontrolled free fall.  Barnett Rubin’s plea in 1995 that, ‘If the international community does not find a way to rebuild Afghanistan, a floodtide of weapons, cash, and contraband will escape that state’s porous boundaries and make the world less secure for all’19 stands true at the end of 2001.  

Time has come that our policies should be institutionalized.  Instead of relying on the wisdom of a cliche, role of academics, diplomats, politicians and intelligentsia should be seriously sought in the formulation and later execution of the policy.  A man used to travel on horseback when forced to walk he felt angry, bitter and frustrated as walking is more tiring, incomfortable and takes a long time to reach the destination.  It is time that we start walking rather than keep lamenting about the strength and qualities of our long gone horse. 

Notes:

1Davis, Anthony.  How The Taliban became a Military Force in Maley, William (Ed.)  Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban  (Lahore:         Vanguard Books, 1998), p. 71) 

2Beg, Aslam Mirza, General (r). Kargil Withdrawal and Rogue Army Image.  Defence Journal, September 1999)

3Yousaf, Mohammad, Brigadier (r).  Silent Soldier (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993 (10th Edition), p. 17)

4Yousaf, Mohammad, Brigadier (r) and Adkins, Mark, Major.  The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story  (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993 (Second Edition), p.136)

5Matinuddin, Kamal, Lt. General (r).  The Taliban Phenomenon (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 64-65)

6Major General (r) Naseerullah Khan Babar’s letter to the editor.  The News (Online Edition), October 06, 2001)

7Yousaf, Mohammad, Brigadier (r).  Silent Soldier,  p. 19)

8Arif, M. Khalid, General (r).   Working With Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988  (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.413)

9Durrani, Asad, Lt. General (r). Politics and National Security.  Defence Journal, October 1998)

10Christensen, Asger.  When Muslim Identity has Different Meanings in Huldt, Bo and Jansson, Erland (Ed.) The Tragedy of Afghanistan (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 15-16)

11Khan, M. Riaz.  Untying the Afghan Knot:  Negotiating Soviet Withdrwal  (Durham and London:  Duke University Press, 1991), p. 200

12Weinbaum G. Marvin.  Pakistan and the Resolution of the Afghan Conflict in Kennedy H. Charles (Ed.) Pakistan: 1992  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 111 )

13Arif, M. Khalid, General (r). Working With Zia,  p. 320)

14Ahmed, Rashid. Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 26)

15The News, (Online Edition), November 14, 2001)

16Frontier Post, (Online Edition) November 18, 2001)

17Saikal, Amin.  The Rabbani Government 1992-1996 in Maley, William (Ed.)  Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, p. 37-38) 

18Grevemeyer, Jan-Heeren.  Modernization From Below:  The Afghan resistance between the fight for liberation and social emancipation in The Tragedy of Afghanistan,  p. 123)

19Rubin, R. Barnett.  The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system  (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 280)