The Mighty Microbe & Biological Warfare

OPINION

The Mighty Microbe & Biological Warfare

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI discusses biological warfare.

Biological warfare and the military threat from the use of biological weapons is real and immediate. Of late, this threat has magnified and such weapons may well be included in the list of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The recent threat of Anthrax has created much furore worldwide. This short presentation provides a backgrounder to biological weapons.

In a nutshell biological weapons are mass casualty weapons which are based on bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi and toxins. As compared to nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, biological weapons are unique in their diversity.

Dozens of different biological agents can be used to make a biological weapon — which each agent producing markedly different disease. “Concern about the biological threat has increased tremendously in the past decade. Recent revelations of the enormous size and scope of illicit biological weapons programme maintained by the USSR and Russia through at least the early 1990s, and discovery of the existence and extent of Iraq’s biological weapons programme, have demonstrated that the military biological threat is real and immediate.”

Dr Ken Alibek, Ex-Deputy Chief of Biopreprat (Russian Germ Warfare Labs) and a scientist at Hadron Inc. while writing in the British Defence Review Autumn 2001 says “... While there have been few terrorist attacks using biological weapons, terrorist groups are exhibiting increasing interest in non-conventional weapons. In addition, advances in biotechnology means that biological weapons are becoming progressively less expensive and easier to produce. Although the most sophisticated and effective versions of biological weapons require considerable equipment and scientific expertise likely to be possessed by a nation or a state- sponsored terrorist group, there is considerable concern that primitive biological weapons can be produced in a small area by someone with minimal equipment and limited training. The general consensus has been that a terrorist biological attack is not a matter of ‘if’ but a matter of ‘when’.”

Biological weapons could be deployed in the following three ways:

* Contamination of food and water supplies, which are ingested by the victims.

* Release of infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas which then bite the victim.

* Creation of an aerosol cloud, which is then inhaled by the victim.

Of the above, water contamination is the least effective method for dissemination especially in those countries which have effective water treatment systems. Besides the use of chlorine and the dilution of the agent in enormous amount of water would limit the effectiveness of such a method.

Food contamination would most likely be used in a terrorist rather than a military attack, since it is difficult to contaminate enough food to elicit a military advantage. “The agents that can be disseminated by food or water contamination are limited to those for which the intestinal tract can serve as an altrium of infection.”

Then again release of infected vectors is not particularly efficient method for military purposes, but could be used for terrorist purposes to produce disruption and panic.

For either military or terrorist purposes, creation of an aerosol cloud, usually accompanied by an explosion or spraying is by far the most efficient and effective mode for deploying biological weapons. “Aerosol is the only method that can effectively be used against large target areas.” So from the military point of view defence against this type of attack is more important.

Aerosol biological weapons in the military scenario may be deployed to provide a devastating effect over large areas. As an example, in the late 1980s, Soviet military planning dictated that one medium range bomber equipped with two 2xTon spray tanks would effectively cover 1000-4000 square kilometers, causing very extensive casualties across the entire area.

Assuming that the bomber’s target is a major metropolitan area, a successful attack with such a weapon could result in casualties in the region of upwards of one million, besides tremendous disruption and panic. Even a smaller scale attack will be equally horrendous. Some of the more important credentials of a biological weapon attack are listed below:

* A biological weapon attack may go undetected for some time until victims begin to fall ill; which complicates diagnosis,treatment and containment efforts.

* Once the attack has been detected, more time is likely to elapse before the causative agent can be conclusively identi- fied which again delays contain ment efforts.

* It is generally difficult to determine the total contaminated area and thus the size of exposure. Hence the process of decontamination is impeded.

* It is not possible to vaccinate the target population as no vaccine may be available — and where it is, these agents do not present a significant public health problem(at least initially.)

* The few vaccines that do exist for use against biological threat agents will be of very little use once the attack has taken place, since they reach full effectiveness days to weeks after inoculations and their stocks are generally limited.

* Treatment options are limited or non-existent for the majority of biological threat agents.

* The public and the military health services are not equipped in general — whether in terms of personnel, equipment or pharmaceuticals to accommodation widespread epidemic.

* A biological attack will incite panic and result in influx of patients many of whom are not ill or were not even exposed to already overburdened health care facilities.

From the above it appears that the net result of a biological attack whether against the military or the civilians will signify a large number of diseased and dead, a panicked populace, and overwhelmed health care system and complete disruption of economic and military activity.

By and large the medical defence against biological weapons can be divided into three categories as follows:

* Pre-exposure prophylaxis by protective means administered before a biological attack, and preemptive use of certain drugs.

* Post-exposure prophylaxis protective means administered after an attack has taken place but before the victim develops symptoms.

* Treatment by etiologic, pathogentic and symptomatic therapy administered after the patient has developed symptoms.

The total range of the biological agents is not really known but the Soviet offensive-cum-strategic programme clearly included the following anti-personnel agents:

* Bacillus anthracis.

* Francisella tularensis.

* Brucella.

* Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis.

* Q Fever.

* Botulinum Toxin.

* Staphyloccal Enterotoxin B.

While attending the Fifth International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents —Stockholm Sweden June 11-16, 1995 it came out in broad terms that biological weapons have more strategical benefit as compared to nuclear and chemical weapons. Chemical weapons may have an entirely tactical employment at the very best. All the same, the chemical and biological weapons are much cheaper to make.

Some of the active protective measures against a bio attack have been enumerated above. Some important passive measures for protection against this weapon attack are:

* Intrusive arms control measures thereby increasing the probability that a forbidden programme will be detected. Increased diplomatic pressure to encourage all States to accede to the CB (Chemical Biological) arms control treaties.

* Broad export monitoring and controls thereby impeding the ease with which States may acquire the materials and equipment needed for the programme.

* “Determined national and international response thereby causing States to recognize that a breach of the Chemical or Biological Convention will result in costly intervention which may range from political, diplomatic or economic sanctions through to armed intervention.

The above passive measures were termed as a web of deterrence by Dr Graham S Pearson CB — DG Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment Porton Down, Salisbury, Wilts SP4 OJQ England in his keynote address at Stockholm-Sweden seminar referred to above. He said “... this approach may have also influenced the thinking of other states on the CBW problem... The overall aim of the web of deterrence is to cause states contemplating the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, to judge that the political penalties are such and the military benefits are insufficient to risk becoming an international pariah.”

All the same it is ironical that there are 20 states assessed as having or seeking to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

A word or two about the delivery systems for the chemical and biological weapons. Dr Pearson clarifies “... The second concern that I wish to emphasise about biological warfare is that the term weaponisation is misleading and is best avoided when discussing BW. For effective use of a biological agent, the ability is needed to disseminate the BW agent into the atmosphere in the right particle size. As BW agents are so much more potent than chemical warfare agents, the quantity that is required to be effective against a military target is less and requires very much less in the way of delivery systems. BW may only require one or a few delivery systems whereas to achieve a sufficient concentration of chemical agent will require tens or hundreds of multiple rocket launchers, bombs or artillery shells.”

He continues in the same vein, “... BW agents, therefore, do not require loading into rockets, missiles or bombs although these can be so loaded if required. We need to always remember that effective dissemination can be achieved through relatively simple spray system. A simple paint sprayer can produce particles of right size very effectively....”

Relevant data and fact sheets on Biological Weapons Convention are appended in the presentation.

The Pacts and Conventions as these are, they are as good as these are perceived and no better, and some countries may flout these flagrantly. All the same there will be continuing need for chemical and biological defence because of the relative ease with which offensive capabilities can be concealed (Iraq is a case in point) or a rapid breakout and mobilization plan activated. Intelligence capabilities and resources will never be adequate to ensure detection of all cheats even if all states had acceded to and ratified the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. It is important to remember that the intelligence will be as good as the available information and no better. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

FACT SHEET

PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

STATE (COUNTRY)

Afghanistan Chile Greece

Albania China, People’s Granada

Argentina Republic of Guatemala

Armenia Colombia Guinea-Bissau

Australia Congo Guyana(s)

Austria(1) Costa Rica Haiti(s)

Bahamas Cote d’lvoire(s) Honduras

Bahrain(1) Croatia Hungary

Bangladesh Cuba Iceland

Barbados Cyprus India

Belarus Czech Republic Indonesia

Belgium Denmark Iran

Belize Dominica(2) Iraq

Benin Dominican Republic Ireland

Bhutan Ecuador Italy

Bolivia Egypt(s) Jamaica

Bosnia Herzegovina El Salvador Japan

Botswana Equatorial Guinea Jordan

Brazil Estonia Kenya

Brunei Darussalam(2) Ethiopia Korea, Democratic

Bulgaria Fiji People’s Republic of

Burkina Faso Finland Korea, Republic of

Burundi(s) France Kuwait

Cambodia (Kampuchea) Gabon(s) Laos

Canada Gambia, The Latvia

Cape Verde Georgia Lebanon

Central African Germany Lesotho

Republic(s) Ghana Liberia(s)

Libya Paraguay Sri Lanka

Liechtenstein Peru Suriname

Luxembourg Philippines Swaziland

Madagascar(s) Poland Sweden

Malawi(s) Portugal Switzerland

Malaysia(1) Qatar Syria(s)

Maldives Romania Taiwan

Mali(s) Russia Tanzania(s)

Malta Rwanda Thailand

Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis Togo

Mexico St. Lucia Tonga

Mongolia San Marino Tunisia

Morocco(s) Sao Tome and Principe Turkey

Myanmar (Burma)(s) Saudi Arabia Turkmenistan

Nepal(s) Senegal Uganda

Netherlands(3) Serbia-Montenegro Ukraine

New Zealand (Formerly Yugoslavia) United Arab

Nicaragua Seychelles Emirates(S)(5)

Niger Sierra Leone United Kingdom(6)

Nigeria Singapore United States

Norway Slovak Republic Uruguay

Oman Slovenia Uzbekistan

Pakistan Solomon Islands(2) Vanuatu

Panama Somalia(S) Venezuela

Papua New Guinea South Africa Vietnam

Spain Yemen

Zaire

Zimbabwe

________________________

(s)Signatory

(1)With reservation

(2)Based on general declarations concerning Treaty obligations applicable prior to independence.

(3)Applicable to Netherlands, Antilles and Aruba.

(4) Instruments of Ratification/Adherence to the Treaty have been deposited in the name of the Republic of China. Effective

January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole government of China.

(5) The United Arab Emirates which did not ratify the Convention is listed as one country.

(6) Extended to territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Also extended to New Hebrides; continued application to Vanuatu not determined.

US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(202) 647-8677 OR (1-800-581-ACDA); http; www.acda.gov

FACT SHEET

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

REVIEW CONFERENCE 1996

The recent threat of Anthrax has created much furore worldwide. This short presentation provides a backgrounder to biological weapons.

Biological weapons could be deployed in the following three ways:

* Contamination of food and water supplies, which are tested by the victims.

* Release of infected vectors, such as mosquitoes or fleas which then bite the victim.

* Creation of an aerosol cloud, which is then inhaled by the victim.

Then again release of infected vectors is not particularly efficient method for military purposes, but could be used for terrorist purposes to produce disruption and panic.

* A biological weapon attack may go undetected for some time until victims begin to fall ill; which complicates diagnosis, treatment and containment efforts.

* Once the attack has been detected, more thme is likely to elapse before the causative agent can be conclusively identified which again delays containment efforts.

* It is generally difficult to determine the total contaminated area and thus the size of exposure. Hence the process of decontamination is impeded.

* It is not possible to vaccinate the target population as no vaccine may be available — and where it is, these agents do not present a significant public health problem (at least initially.)

* the few vaccines that do exist for use against biological threat agents will be of very little use once the attack has taken place, since they reach full effective ness days to weeks after inoculations and their stocks are generally limited.

* Treatment options are limited or non-existent for the majority of biological threat agents.

* The public and the military health services are not equipped in general — whether in terms of personnel, equipment or phar maceuticals to accommodate a widespread epidemic.

* A biological attack will incite panic and result in influx of patients — many of whom are not ill or were not even exposed to already over- burdened health care facilities.

By and large the medical defence against biological weapons can be divided into three categories as follows:

* Pre-exposure prophylaxis by protective means administere before a biological attack, and preemptive use of certain drugs.

* Post-exposure prophylaxis protective means administered after an attack has taken place but before the victim develops symptoms.

* Treatment by etiologic,pathogentic and symptomatic therapy administered after the patient has developed symp toms

The total range of the biolofical agents is not really known but the Soviet offensive-cum-strategic programme clearly included the following anti-personnel agents:

* Bacillus anthracis.

* Francisella tularensis.

* Brucella.

* Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis.

* Q Fever.

* Botulintm Toxin.

* Staphyloccal Enterotoxin B.

Some of the active protective measures against a bio attack have been enumerated above. Some important passive measures for protection against this weapon attack are:

* Broad export monitoring and controls thereby impeding the ease with which States may acquire the materials and equipment needed for the programme.

All the same it is ironical that there are 20 states assessed as having or seeking to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

Relevant data and fact sheets on Biological Weapons Convention are appended in the presentation.

The Biological Weapons Convention requires Parties not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes,” as well as weapons and means of delivery. The United States unilaterally renounced biological and toxin weapons in 1969.

The Biological Weapons Convention was opened for signature in April 1972 and the United States submitted its instruments of ratification in March 1975. The United States, along with the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, are the three depository governments for the Convention. There are currently some 139 States/ Parties with an additional 18 countries who have signed but notratified the Convention.

There have been three Review Conferences to the BWC, each taking place in Geneva. The First Review Conference was held in 1980. At the Second Review Conference in 1986, the Parties agreed on a set of confidence building measures (CBMs), including the following: exchanging data on research laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological activities; sharing information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases or similar occurrences caused by toxins which deviate from the normal; encouraging publication of results of biological defence research in scientific journals generally available to the public; and promoting scientific contact, including joint research projects directly related to the Convention. The United States has implemented these CBMs and routinely submits data to the United Nations, according to procedures of the Final Declaration of the 1986 Review Conference.

At the Third Review Conference in 1991 States/Parties were determined to strengthen the CBMs and to enhance confidence in the implementation of the Convention. In addition, to strengthening the existing CBMs, States/Parties added two additional CBMs: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes; and Declaration of vaccine production facilities. Unfortunately, participation by States/Parties in submitting data has been somewhat disappointing with some 70 countries having submitted at least one declaration since inception. In a further effort to strengthen the effectiveness and improve implementation of the Convention, States/Parties mandated the convening of an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. That Ad Hoc Group (also known as VEREX) held four sessions in Geneva between March 1992 and September 1993. As provided in the mandate, a Special Conference to discuss the VEREX Final Report and to consider further actions was convened in September 1994. The Conference agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States/Parties, to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention in a legally binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) held three meetings in 1995, a procedural meeting and two substantive meetings in 1996, each of two weeks duration. The work of the AHG is divided into four Friends of the Chair, consistent with the categories established by the Special Conference. They are: Definitions and Objective Criteria; Confidence Building Measures (CBMs); Measures to Promote Compliance; and Article X (technology transfer). An Ad Hoc Group Progress Report will be submitted to the Fourth Review Conference scheduled to convene in Geneva, November 25-December 6, 1996.

A Note on Anthrax

Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Anthrax most commonly occurs in wild and domestic lower vertebrates (cattle, sheep, goats, camels, antelopes, and other herbivores), but it can also occur in humans when they are exposed to infected animals or tissue from infected animals.

Because anthrax is considered to be a potential agent for use in biological warfare, the Department of Defence (DoD) has begun mandatory vaccination of all active duty military personnel who might be involved in conflict.

Anthrax is most common in agricultural regions where it occurs in animals. These include South and Central America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. When anthrax affects humans, it is usually due to an occupational exposure to infected animals or their products. Workers who are exposed to dead animals and animal products from other countries where anthrax is more common may become infected with B anthracis (industrial anthrax). Anthrax in wild livestock has occurred in the United States.

Anthrax infection can occur in three forms: cutaneous (skin), inhalation, and gastrointestinal. B anthracis spores can live in the soil for many years, and humans can become infected with anthrax by handling products from infected animals or by inhaling anthrax spores from contaminated animal products. Anthrax can also be spread by eating undercooked meat from infected animals. It is rare to find infected animals in the United States.

Symptoms of disease vary depending on how the disease was contracted, but symptoms usually occur within 7 days.

Most (about 95%) anthrax infections occur when the bacteria enters a cut or abrasion on the skin, such as when handling contaminated wool, hides, leather or hair products (especially goat hair) of infected animals. Skin infection begins as a raised itchy bump that resembles an insect bite but within 1-2 days develops into a vesicle and then a painless ulcer, usually 1-3 cm in diameter, with a characteristic black necrotic (dying) area in the centre. Lymph glands in the adjacent area may swell. About 20% of untreated cases of cutaneous anthrax will result in death. Deaths are rare with appropriate antimicrobial therapy.

Initial symptoms may resemble a common cold. After several days, the symptoms may progress to severe breathing problems and shock. Inhalation anthrax is usually fatal.

The intestinal disease form of an anthrax may follow the consumption of contaminated meat and is characterized by an acute inflammation of the intestinal tract. Initial signs of nausea, loss of appetite, vomiting, fever are followed by abdominal pain vomiting of blood, and severe diarrhea. Intestinal anthrax results in death in 25% to 60% of cases. Anthrax can be found globally. It is more common in developing countries or countries without veterinary public health programmes. Certain regions of the world (South and Central America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East) report more anthrax in animals than others.

Direct person-to-person spread of anthrax is extremely unlikely to occur. Communicability is not a concern in managing or visiting with patients with inhalational anthrax.

In countries where anthrax is common and vaccination levels of animal herds are low, humans should avoid contact with livestock and animal products and avoid eating meat that has not been properly slaughtered and cooked. Also an anthrax vaccine has been licenced for use in humans. The vaccine is reported to be 93% effective in protecting against anthrax. The anthrax vaccine is manufactured and distributed by BioPort, Corporation. Lansing, Michigan. The vaccine is a cell-free filtrate vaccine, which means it contains no dead or live bacteria in the preparation. The final product contains no more than 2.4 mg of aluminum hydroxide as adjuvant. Anthrax vaccines intended for animals should not be used in humans.