Would India attack Pakistan

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN analyses whether our neighbour will take advantage of the present crisis.

Would the Indians attack us across the Line of Control (LoC)? This is the most frequently asked question these days. My assessment is that they will not. However, they will threaten to do so by indulging in sabre rattling and then fervently hope the world would plead with them to show restraint, for the sake of humanity, and in the end they would graciously oblige. They would then hope, and if necessary demand and rant that the world pull their chestnut out of fire by applying all kinds of pressure to bear on Pakistan to stop it from what the Indians term as cross border terrorism.

Study of 1948 and 1965 Indo-Pakistan wars make one thing abundantly clear. India reacted militarily across the international border/LoC if ever it felt threatened by Pakistan’s attempt to change the status quo in Kashmir through military means. However, since the nuclearization of both the nations, there has been a definite change in the Indian military strategy. The Kargil episode clearly demonstrated the Indian mindset and their options and dilemma in dealing with any perceived Pakistani aggression in Kashmir.

When the vacant Kargil posts were occupied by the freedom fighters, Indian army’s first reaction was to initially deny and then play down the incident. They assumed that they would be able to throw back the aggressors fairly easily. That did not happen. The terrain was such that despite having the entire might of Indian Army along with their Air Force at their disposal, Indians were making heavy weather and suffering very high casualty in their offensive against the freedom fighters on the Kargil heights. They examined the option of opening a new front similar to the strategy they had exercised in 1965 but they realized that 1999 was very different from 1965. With such heavy commitment of Indian forces in Kashmir on anti-insurgency duties, Indian Army was in a state of unbalance and no meaningful offensive could be launched against Pakistan. Even more critical was the fact that with both sides having nuclear weapons, open hostility across the international border meant flirting with the issue of a nuclear holocaust in the region. The gains did not justify the risk.

Situation in Kargil in the meanwhile was becoming desperate. If Indians were unable to have the heights vacated before the onset of winters, their entire position in Siachen was getting compromised.  Something had to be done to salvage the situation.

Indian strategists then came up with this brilliant plan. They threatened very forcefully of declaring all out war against Pakistan unless Kargil was vacated and they hoped the world would notice that such a situation could lead to a nuclear conflagration. The world would then react to prevent and diffuse the situation. They were also well aware that if they could convince the world that Pakistan was the aggressor and they were the aggrieved party, the entire world pressure would focus on Pakistan. They executed their plan to perfection. The world brought unbearable pressure on Pakistan that finally resulted in the then Prime Minister running to USA and unilaterally accepting the demand of persuading the Mujahideens to vacate the heights. The Indians achieved through diplomacy what it had failed to realize through military means. That about a thousand freedom fighters had made the might of the Indian Army look helpless goes on to prove that besides the motivation and mettle of the fighters, the extreme difficulty in mounting any offensive in the hills of Kashmir. These two lessons have not been lost on the Indians.

Unable to bring the turbulent situation in held Kashmir under control through the use of brute force internally, and also not being in a position to force Pakistan to change its policy towards Kashmir liberation movement through military means, Indians saw the 11th September event in USA as a hope for other nations to once again bail her out. This present diplomatic offensive of blowing hot and cold is a part of this strategy.

 Like Generals always tend to follow an earlier winning strategy even when circumstances are not the same, politicians and diplomats also make the same mistake. The Indians should realize that the present scenario is very different from the one Pakistan faced in 1999. Then, Pakistan had been virtually isolated and Indians had successfully portrayed Pakistan as the aggressor. The economic and political pressure brought on the then Government of Pakistan forced it to back down. This time around, Pakistan is an active, in fact key ally of the world community in its fight against terrorism of the kind that had been perpetuated on 11th September. Indian efforts to paint Pakistan again as a supporter of terrorism has made little headway. To the contrary, it is portraying India as a spoilt petulant child trying to extract mileage for its own personal benefit at the cost of the coalition fight against terrorism. For as long as we stand steadfastly to our commitments to the moral stand we have taken, we need not fear the bellicose attitude of our neighbour. Their experience in Kargil has amply demonstrated to them the extreme difficulty of conducting an offensive operation in Kashmir. They are far too intelligent to indulge in any such operation unless they can turn the world opinion against Pakistan. They have failed so far. They will not succeed as long as Pakistan maintains its principled stance.