China’s Defence Policy and Its Implications for Pakistan

Columnist AHMAD FARUQUI carries out a comprehensive survey of one of our most dependant allies’ white paper on National Defence and examines the effect on Pakistan as it subordinates defence to defence.

The People’s Republic of China has recently issued a white paper on ‘National Defence in 2000.’ This paper has been given extensive publicity in China, where it has been published as an insert in the October 23 issue of the popular magazine Beijing Review. In addition, to give it a global readership, it has been posted on China’s official web site. 1As is to be expected, the paper devotes a great deal of space to discussing three issues that are of great concern to China’s defence managers. One is the long-standing dispute with Taiwan; second is the US doctrine of Theatre Missile Defence, and third is relations with neighbouring states.

However, what is of greater significance than the articulation of these issues is the statement in the paper that defence is subordinate to economic development. This has several implications for Pakistan, as discussed later in this paper.

What does it say?

The White Paper represents a continuation of Deng Xiaoping’s bold experiment with free enterprise economics. Deng sought to pull China out of economic stagnation by introducing market competition within the framework of socialist ideology. Since the experiment began 20 years ago, China’s GDP has been steadily climbing at a rate of 10 percent a year, although it has fallen in recent years with a tide of deflation.2 Per capita annual income for city dwellers has almost doubled since 1990 to more than $600. Analysts expect China to become the world’s biggest economy by the year 2020.

Deng recognized that without a strong economy, China could not become a great power. It would have to de-emphasize defence spending in the near term in order to become a stronger power. Consistent with this vision, the paper states clearly that national defence is subordinate to the nation’s overall goal of economic construction. It says that ‘developing the economy and strengthening national defence are two strategic tasks in China’s modernization efforts. The Chinese government insists that economic development be taken as the centre, while defence work be subordinate to and in the service of the nation’s overall economic construction.’ By making economic security the centrepiece of its national agenda, the communist leadership in China hopes to avoid that fate of its Soviet comrades. Seeking to attain military parity with the US, which had an economy six times bigger than the Soviet economy, the USSR collapsed under the weight of its military spending.

The White Paper calls for implementing a military strategy of active defence that seeks to ‘gain mastery only after the enemy has struck. Such defence combines efforts to deter war with preparations to win self-defence wars in time of peace, and strategic defence with operational and tactical offensive operations in time of war.’

It supports the development of a ‘lean and strong military force’ in the Chinese way. This involves two elements. First, by managing the Armed Forces according to law, and by transforming ‘its Armed Forces from a numerically superior to a qualitatively superior type, and from a manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive type,’ it hopes to comprehensively enhance the Armed Forces’ combat effectiveness.’ Second, by ‘combining the Armed Forces with the people and practicing self-defence by the whole people. China adheres to the concept of people’s war under modern conditions, and exercises the combination of a streamlined standing army with a powerful reserve force for national defence.’

The Chinese military is subordinate to civilian authority, exercised through the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). It is stipulated in the National Defence Law of the People’s Republic of China that ‘the Armed Forces shall abide by the Constitution and laws.’

China’s defence budget and the final accounts are examined and approved by the NPC. There is strict control, management and supervision of defence spending. Overall, China’s defence expenditure has remained at a fairly low level. Currently, the share of the national budget going to defence is around 8%, down by one percentage point from five years ago. Total defence spending in 2000 is $ 14.6 billion, which is only 5% of the defence spending of the United States, and 30% of Japan’s defence spending. As a percentage of GDP, Chinese defence spending is 1.31%, compared with 3% for the US and 2.7% for India. To place these numbers in perspective, it is useful to note that Pakistan is spending more than 25% of its national budget on defence, and this represents about 6% of its GDP.

China has introduced market competition in its defence industries by the creation of ten corporations. In addition, a major programme of ‘downsizing and restructuring’ is underway in the Armed Forces. ‘In September 1997, China announced an additional reduction of 500,000 troops over the next three years. By the end of 1999, this reduction had been achieved, and the adjustment and reform of the structure and organization of the Armed Forces had been basically completed.’ Several corps headquarters, divisions and regiments have been deactivated. The command structure is now leaner, more agile and efficient. A notable change is the disengagement of the Armed Forces from commercial activities. Over 290 business management bodies have been either completely dismantled or turned over to local governments.

To ensure the success of its economic modernization programme, China has made significant changes in its foreign policy with the bordering states of the former Soviet Empire. The White Paper cites several agreements to implement confidence-building measures that have been inked with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan since the first meeting in Shanghai in April 1996. In particular, it notes the importance of reducing military forces near the borders of the five parties and of not using force, or threatening to use force against each other. Most notably, the White Paper states that the five countries are united in their resolve to not use ‘the excuse of protecting ethnic or religious interests’ to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. It also expresses their combined opposition to ‘national separatism, religious extremism or terrorism’ and other activities that induce social instability. China is pursuing these policies to since it is quite vulnerable on its western and northern borders, since these areas are inhabited by ethnic minorities, many of them Muslim, and since these areas are generally the most impoverished in the nation.

Chinese relations with the United States have still not recovered fully from the embassy-bombing incident that occurred during the NATO war over Kosovo. The anniversary of the Korean War was recently observed in China with open criticism of the ‘US aggressors,’ terminology that had not been used since the Vietnam War. In addition, China continues to be deeply troubled by US political, military and economic support for Taiwan. Finally, the US efforts to develop a theatre missile defence have caused great apprehension in China.

On first glance, China’s rapprochement with Russia and its confrontation with the US appears to be a reversal of Chinese policies during the seventies and eighties when it viewed the USSR as its primary security threat, and welcomed US President Nixon to the Great Hall of the People in order to neutralize the Soviet threat to its borders. However, there is an underlying consistency in Chinese foreign policy. It is concerned about the very one-sided global balance of power in which the US dominates all other countries culturally, politically, economically and militarily. The French foreign minister, equally troubled by this development, has called the US a ‘hyper power’. In seeking to create a multi-polar world, China wants to restore harmony in global politics. It does not matter if that means reversing the relationships with Russia and the US, since the new alignment now better serves its national interests. This phenomenon is by no means unique to China. When asked whether Britain had any perpetual friends or allies, a statesman during the imperial age observed: ‘we have no perpetual friends or eternal allies; but we do have interests, both perpetual and eternal.’

To achieve its objectives, China is prepared to be patient. It has always been realistic about the capabilities of its enemies, and has never underestimated them. It will not fight a war under adverse circumstances. This thinking is deeply ingrained in Chinese culture, and dates back at least 25 centuries to the time when Sun Tzu penned The Art of War. Thus, even after half a century of political conflict, not a single shot has been fired over the Taiwan Straits, even though China remains committed to renunciation of Taiwan with the mainland. By choreographing its intent to use force should Taiwan declare independence from China, it has now brought matters to a point where the leaders of Taiwan’s Nationalist Party are preparing to visit Beijing to work out a negotiated solution.3 It has deep rooted differences with Japan, most notably over the Japanese failure to apologize for their war crimes during the Sino-Japanese war that began in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria and culminated in 1937 with the Rape of Nanking when 300,000 Chinese were put to the sword. It continues to pursue diplomatic channels to gain ownership of several islands that are disputed between the two countries. However, it has no intentions to resort to war with Japan. Indeed, it continues to engage in international trade with Japan, and to accept Japanese economic aid.

Russia has adopted a similar approach

It is important to note that Russia has also announced its decision to shrink its military forces. Current plans call for a reduction of 600,000 troops over the next five years, from a base of between four and five million troops. About one-fourth of the Russian national budget goes to defence. Yet the Russian Armed Forces are poorly equipped and trained. Several soldiers are underpaid or not paid at all, and morale is at an all-time low. It is no surprise that Russia lost its first war in Chechnya a few years ago, and has prevailed thus far in the current conflict by using firepower indiscriminately against Chechen fighters and civilians. As the New York Times stated in a recent editorial, ‘Russia can no longer afford to sustain the imperial-size forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. Conversion to a smaller, better-equipped force will allow more effective defence against any foreign threats and would decrease the risk to democracy from restive, underpaid military officers.’4 While downsizing its forces in aggregate terms, Russia plans to triple spending per soldier over the next decade. This will produce a force strong enough to repel any external threats that may develop along Russia’s frontiers in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Siberia.

Cost cutting is not confined to conventional arms alone. Russia also wants to drastically curtail the number of its nuclear warheads, and has invited the United States to follow suit. President Putin wants to draw down the nuclear warhead inventories in the two countries to 1,000 weapons each. States Aleksei G. Arbatov, a member of the Russian Parliament’s defence committee, ‘Nuclear weapons are virtual weapons, designed and deployed never to be used. [They provide] the best area to seek economy while using our available resources for peacekeeping, or for countering ethnic or religious extremists and the destabilization which follows them.’5

Implications for Pakistan

Since the early sixties, China has been a close and consistent ally of Pakistan. It has provided significant amounts of economic and military aid, helped set up an indigenous defence production capability, and more recently provided missile and nuclear technology over vociferous US objections. In short, it has proven to be an ‘all-weather’ friend. Other allies have paid only lip service to Pakistan, and some have even gone to the extent of placing arms embargoes and sanctions on Pakistan at times of crisis. Till fairly recently, China has consistently backed Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Chinese maps often show Kashmir as a region that belongs to neither Pakistan nor India.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has often ignored China’s advice, to its own peril. During the 1965 war with India, China’s Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, advised Pakistan to wage a people’s war against India, after India attacked Lahore in force on the morning of September 6. As noted by General Musa, the Chinese felt that Pakistan’s strategy was too forward, since it was designed to take on a numerically superior enemy right at the border.6 The Chinese advised Pakistan to fall back, draw the Indian army into Pakistani territory, and once the Indian lines of communication had gotten stretched, then take on the Indian army in force. These military principles had been elucidated by Chairman Mao during the Long March, and validated through successful practice against numerically superior and better-armed foreign and domestic troops. However, they required a high degree of moral courage and popular support among the people.

Unfortunately, Ayub’s political base was no where as strong as Mao’s, and he did not think he could survive the initial loss of Pakistani territory, possibly including the city of Lahore, even if that ultimately led to victory over India. The war bogged down into a stalemate, and Ayub was not able to weather the ensuring political crisis. In February of 1971, with great foresight, China advised Pakistan’s military government to seek a political settlement with the political leaders of East Pakistan. Yahya and his junta, who were loaded with machismo and little else, ignored this advice, and the resulting war with India produced even more disastrous results than what befallen Pakistan in 1965.

The White Paper mentions South Asia in only one place, and simply refers to it as an area of instability. It does not say anything that could be interpreted by any objective observer as supporting the cause of self-determination in Kashmir, let alone supporting the prosecution by Pakistan of a military campaign to wrest Kashmir away from India. In fact, the paper says that China does not have alliances with any country, and is committed to following an independent policy. Furthermore, it expounds at length its opposition to movements of national separatism and religious extremism. It should be noted that China did not support Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil in the spring of 1999. It does not want to encourage the Afghan Mujahideen and their compatriots in Kashmir to expand their campaign to the Muslim-majority regions of China, which adjoin Kashmir.

Indeed, China has been making a number of overtures to India during the past few years. It recognizes the importance of India in the new millennium, and has begun to see it as a potential partner in international trade and economic development. It also recognizes India’s rapidly expanding military strength. The Indian Armed Forces now have considerable equipment in their inventory that far exceeds in sophistication and often in quantity what is in the inventory of the People’s Liberation Army.

Pakistan also needs to recognize that China in spite of its rapid rate of economic growth during the past two decades, China remains a third world country. Most of western China resembles Pakistan in terms of the level of development. The Chinese Armed Forces are no match for India’s or Taiwan’s, let alone those of the United States. The most advanced aircraft in the Chinese airforce is a variant of the sixties-vintage MiG 21. Attempts to develop a more sophisticated aircraft have failed and in spite of its rhetoric about self-reliance, China has been forced to buy about 100 Russian SU-27s just to have something in its arsenal that is on par with Taiwanese F-16s and Mirage 2000s and Indian MiG 29s, SU 30s, Jaguars and Mirage 2000s.7 The Chinese army is similarly equipped with outdated armour and artillery and many even question the currency of its warfighting doctrine. The navy operates only a single nuclear submarine and its surface combatants are no match for the best in the Indian or Taiwanese navies.

It is evident that the Chinese Ńeven if they wanted to Ń are in no position to come to Pakistan’s aid should war break out with India. It is worth recalling that the Pakistani military leadership kept hoping that China would invade India to rescue East Pakistan, even though the Himalayan passes were blocked by the winter snows. As noted by former Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, ‘the Chinese were willing to commit themselves to Pakistan’s defence only in a very general way.’8 They issued a statement expressing support for Pakistan but ‘conspicuously missing from this statement was any reference to China’s concern for the preservation of Pakistan’s unity and territorial integrity. The Chinese in all likelihood had taken notice of the Indo-Soviet treaty and were unwilling to embroil themselves in a costly and messy conflict.’ They were not oblivious of the fact that ‘the number of Soviet divisions along the Mongolian border increased from fifteen to forty-five between 1968 and 1972, [and was] even more than in Central Europe.’ In a polite and very subtle way that preserved their honour, the Chinese had informed Pakistan through the ambassador of a third country that ‘the USSR was not afraid of China.’ But the advice fell on deaf ears.

General Musharraf and Pakistan’s defence managers can gain much from a careful reading of China’s White Paper. It clearly states the need to have supremacy of civilian control over the Armed Forces. It recognizes the need to downsize the Armed Forces in order to make them more efficient, and to permit the nation to achieve economic growth. It calls for initiating confidence-building measures with all neighbours, so that reductions in defence spending will be sustainable and lead to regional economic development. And it calls for leveraging the strength of the Armed Forces by backing them up with a well-trained civilian population that is properly educated in national defence.

Pakistan’s Armed Forces number about 600,000 today, compared with India’s 1,200,000. At least one quarter of India’s forces are deployed along the Chinese, Burmese and Sri Lankan borders and are not available for use against Pakistan. Using a well-known rule of thumb that is cited by General Schwartzkopf in his memoirs of the Gulf War,9 if Pakistan wants to have a strong and credible defence against an Indian invasion, it needs to have a troop strength that is a third of India’s available forces, i.e., 300,000 troops. Thus, the Pakistani Armed Forces can be reduced by 50%, and still present a credible deterrent to India.

There is ample evidence of waste and inefficiency in Pakistan’s Armed Force. It is estimated that about 100,000 troops are involved today in a wide variety of civilian duties. Brian Cloughley estimates that almost two division’s worth of troops are involved in domestic duties that have carried over from the colonial British Indian army. The army is organized into nine corps formation, most of them comprised of only two divisions. It would appear that at least three of these corps can be eliminated without affecting the combat effectiveness of the army. The money saved can be put into sorely needed programmes of economic and human development.

As noted by the Mahbub ul Haq Centre for Human Development in Islamabad, Pakistan, ‘India and Pakistan will spend $ 15 billion over the next 10 years to maintain their [nuclear] arsenals, enough to feed and educate more than 37.5 million neglected children.’10 The Atlantique naval aircraft shot down by India, for which Pakistan claimed $ 60 million in damages at the World Court in Hague, was worth enough to run all of Pakistan’s state universities for a period of nearly 2 years. Pakistan’s purchase of three Agosta class submarines from France cost $ 1.1 billion; this could have paid for the entire social agenda for one year. India’s purchase of 40 SU-30 MKI aircraft at $ 1.8 billion could have paid for the primary school education of 240 million children. Such exorbitant opportunity costs result in diminished national security.

For every dollar spent on social services, India and Pakistan respectively spend two and four dollars on defence and debt servicing. Forty percent of the world’s poor live in South Asia, compared with 23% of the world’s population. There were celebrations throughout India and Pakistan at the time of the nuclear tests. A few months later, reality sank in. In South Asia, ‘today begins with the struggle of survival for 515 million poverty ridden destitutes, and tomorrow threatens the future of 395 million illiterate adults.’ Living at the edge, protests over a rise in the price of onions, bread or fuel prices may bring down their government.

As noted by Eric Margolis, ‘better living conditions and more education would do much to lessen the irrational hatreds and communal tension in the subcontinent.’11 He cites a study that estimates that if India and Pakistan end their arms race, the funds saved and invested in economic development could double their annual rates of growth.

END NOTES

1http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm

2The World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000: Entering the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, 2000.

3http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid-1037000/1037454.stm

4The New York Times, ‘The Leaner Russian Military,’ November 15, 2000.

5Patrick E. Tyler, ‘With U.S. Missile Defence, Russia Wants Less Offence,’ The New York Times, November 15, 2000.

6General Mohammad Musa, My Version: India Pakistan War 1965, Wajidalis, Lahore, Pakistan, 1983.

7International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000, Oxford University Press, 2000; ADPR Consulting, Asia-Pacific Military Balance, 1998/99, Malaysia; and Syed Hussain Publications, Asian Defence Yearbook, 1999-2000, Malaysia.

8Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, Times Books, 1995.

9General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam Books, 1992.

10Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Human Development in South Asia 1999: The Crisis of Governance, Oxford University Press, 1999.

11 Eric S. Margolis, War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet, Routledge, New York, 2000.