Ethnicity, Religion,
Military Performance
and Political Reliability --
British Recruitment Policy  and
The Indian Army -- 1757-1947

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC writes about British recruitment policy in the sub-continent.

The only major bias which was given official approval was that of discouraging Hindustani Muslim recruitment in the army. The Eden Commission Report of 1879  stated that the UP Muslims were too dangerous for recruitment in the Army. The report further explained this point by stating that "the lower stratum of the Muhammadan urban population, the dispossessed landholders (many of whom were Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the cadets of old Muhammadan families were the only sections of the people who dislike British rule.48 The recommendations of this report were not agreed to by the British policy makers.This is proved by the class composition of Bengal  Army as given in GGO of 1883. General Roberts, however, translated this recommendation into practice when he became the C in C of the Bengal  Army in 1885. The major casualty of Roberts bias, however, was the Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim and the Hindustani Hindus whose numbers were rapidly reduced from majority in the fighting arms in 1884 to a minority in favour of Punjabis by 1911.49 Roberts anti-Hindustani bias was based on his experiences as a young officer during the rebellion in which the prime role was played by the Hindustanis, both Hindus and Muslims. On the other hand Roberts admired the Punjabi and Pathan Muslims for their loyalty to the British during the rebellion. Thus the anti-Hindustani bias of Roberts had a deep connection with the issue of political loyalty to the British than with any martial superiority of the races north of Sutlej over those south of Sutlej. Thus Roberts rationalised his anti-Hindustani bias by theorising that the Hindustanis had degenerated   as  a result of the benefits of the British rule and: not enough adversity.50 The recruitment policy changes which took place between 1884 and 1911, which led to the phenomena called Punjabisation of the Indian Army, was not a deliberate British policy followed after 1857, but a result of opinion of certain individuals, who were responsible for major policy decisions by virtue of their  peculiar institutional positions in the army and civil government. These included Roberts (C in C Bengal Army/IndiaÐ 1885-1893), Kitchener (1902-1909) followed by General Sir O Moore Creagh (C in C India-1909-1914). A British Indian army officer who wrote a history of the Indian Army was more near the truth about the martial races theory when he said, "Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial. To Kipling's contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to be. There was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinking Brahmins had been prominent in the mutiny, and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service.51

During the period 1885-1911 when the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non-Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major war took place; that could prove that Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops, and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history. This is a very important fact from the Indo-Pak military history point of view, since it was generally thought in the Pakistan Army till 1965 that the Hindus were non-Martial and were inferior as soldiers to Muslims in general and Punjabi/Pathan Muslims in particular. The Punjabi was regarded as better as a  soldier not because he was a Muslim essentially, but because he belonged to a more rugged area where the weather terrain and climate made him tougher and sturdier, and thus a better soldier. The Punjabi category included Punjabi Muslims, but only those north of Chenab river, Dogras from Kangra Nurpur and Jammu region of  Kashmir and the Jat Sikhs and the Mazhbi (Sweeper) Sikhs.52

In 1892-93 the British carried out a new experiment in the Bengal Army. They turned certain units into ethnically/religiously homogeneous units. Thus the following changes took place:-53

This was an important experiment and clearly dismisses all myths about the fact that there was no all Muslim unit in the British Indian Army  before 1947. As a matter of fact by 1911, the pure Muslim unit strength in infantry had reached the figure of seven units. These were the 5th 17th and 18th regiments comprising Hindustani Muslims/Ranghar Muslims, the 12th and 33rd infantry comprising Punjabi Mussulmans, 40th comprising Pathan Muslims and the 106th Hazara Pioneers comprising Hazara Mongol Shia Muslims from Quetta.54

In 1895 all three Presidency Armies were merged and the appointments of C in C Bombay and Madras Armies were abolished. In place of these armies four commands under lieutenant generals were established.These were the Punjab, Bengal Madras (including Burma) and Bombay (including Sindh and Baluchistan). The Indian Army was basically an internal security army and whatever battles it fought till 1914 except those of 1857 were of much smaller scale than European battles fought during the same period. Thus the brigade of one odd British unit and two or three Indian units was the highest formation, which normally fought battles or operated under one commander. The concept of Division existed, but there was no dedicated specialist general staff or headquarters which were maintained in peacetime to control/co-ordinate the operations  of an actual division in war. Further since most of the units were dispersed in various places for internal security, there was no room for holding exercises with large formations. This imbalance was remedied once Kitchener became the C in C India.

Another important organisational change in Indian infantry’s organisation was instituted in 1900. Till this year Indian infantry was organised in eight  company battalions, and two wings of  four companies each.55 These were now grouped as in Europe on four company basis; while retaining eight companies for internal administration, with each company under command the native officer, while on parade and in field each double company as it was called was commanded by one British double company commander assisted by another Britisher who was called double company officer.

Kitchener came to India in November 1902, he decided to reorganise the Indian Army. According to Kitchener's perception, the Indian Army was ill organised to face the external enemy i.e. a likely Russian invasion of India, which was regarded as a serious likelihood by the British since the Panjdeh incident of 1885. Kitchener may be rightly regarded as the conceptual father of the modern Indian Army. He introduced three categories under which the Indian Army was to be organised/operate. These were firstly-"Covering Troops", secondly Ð ‘Field ArmyÓ and thirdly Ð’Internal Security TroopsÓ. Kitchener also pressed for introduction of modern weapons, new artillery, latest small arms and Divisions and Corps organised under dedicated full time staffs to command/co-ordinate their formations in both peace and war. The brigades and divisions as per Kitchener’s system were to train as complete formations in peacetime Staff College for the Indian Army was established on the lines of Camberley in 1905. Kitchener stressed the fact that general officers must lead in war the field formations that they had trained in peace. He managed to abolish thirty four small military stations and managed to scrap, enough units to form nine field divisions instead of the old four which used to operate, under the old system without any full-time/peacetime divisional headquarters. He separated Burma from Madras in 1903, thereby eliminating an unnecessary and unhealthy dead-weight which had encumbered the Madras Army/Command thanklessly since 1824! Kitchener reorganised the  Indian Army in 1907, into three commands under lieutenant generals i.e. the NORTHERN COMMAND-1st  (Peshawar), 2nd  (Rawalpindi) and 3rd  (Lahore) Divisions. WESTERN COMMAND-4th (Quetta), 5th (Mhow) and 6th (Poona) Divisions.The EASTERN COMMAND-7th (Meerut) and 8th (Lucknow)  Divisions.Two Divisions i.e. the 9th (Secunderabad) which was Army Reserve and Burma Division were under the direct command of the army headquarters. Each formation was assigned a specific operational role and exactly knew what they were required to do in case of war. The Northern Commands principal operational role was to defend the northern approach i.e.-Kabul-Peshawar-Lucknow-Calcutta against a likely Russian attack into India. The Southern Commands role was similar; ie to defend  the southern approach-i.e. Kandahr-Quetta-Bombay-Mhow. Each of the Divisional commands could  in case of war put into field an infantry division and a cavalry brigade; while simultaneously setting aside troops for internal security duties. The regiments were not to be permanently allotted to Divisions but to be rotated after some years to ensure that did not become localised in habits or thought. Each unit of the Indian Army was to have an opportunity to experience semi-active service on the Frontier, which previously was not the  case and played an important role in the decline of the Bombay and Madras armies. Even today with minor improvements Kitchener’s system is followed in both the Indian and Pakistan armies. Kitchener also renumbered the Indian army units. All old Bengal cavalry and infantry regiments retained their old numbers, 20 and 50 were respectively  added to the old numbers of the Punjab Frontier Force cavalry and infantry regiments, 50 and 60 respectively to old Madras cavalry and infantry units, 30 and 100 to the old Bombay cavalry and infantry units, etc etc. There is absolutely no doubt that it was this reorganisation of Kitchener  which  saved the very weak British position in France in 1914, but this will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Indian Staff College at Quetta in 1947 was perhaps the most valuable asset that the Pakistan  Army inherited from the British! It’s a pity that this great initial advantage was not improved  upon as much as was potentially possible.

In 1906 the Indian Army was organised as following 56:----

The reserves were organised as following:--

The above mentioned figures represented a  major transition from 1857 when India was garrisoned by just 39,751 British and 226,418 Indians. On the other hand the major change in area of recruitment can be gauged from the following table illustrating  the region wise rough breakdown of Indian infantry units57:--

 By 1911 the ethnic composition of the Indian Army  may be gauged from the following rough description of its infantry units 58:--        

There are no exact figure about the ethnicity of fighting arms in 1914.However one authority places the figure of ethnically Punjabi soldiers at about 50%.These were roughly assessed from the approximate statistics of 1096 infantry companies out of which 431 were wholly Punjabi and 221 were partly Punjabi, and 155 total squadrons of cavalry out of which 95.5 were wholly Punjabi and 47.5 were partly Punjabi.59

One researcher gave the following ethnic and religious composition of the Indian Army as in 1914:--60

No discussion of this period can be completed without discussing the "Martial Races Theory" expounded by Lord Roberts and many others during the period 1880-1914. This theory had many adherents as late as 1990s while I was serving in the army, many Pakistani officers seriously believed in this ridiculous Imperialist theory! The general line of thought of these officers, which I heard hundreds of times at various forums and informal discussions  was as following:--That "THE MUSLIMS IN GENERAL AND THE PUNJABI MUSLIMS (PARTICULARLY THOSE NORTH OF   CHENAB) AND THE PATHANS WERE THE MAINSTAY OF THE BRITISH INDIAN ARMY AND THAT THE HINDUSTANIS IN GENERAL AND THE HINDUSTANI HINDU AND ALL OTHER HINDUS, AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE FROM AREAS SOUTH OF AMBALA WERE A NON-MARTIAL RACE".

The Martial Race Theory was a clever British effort to divide the people  of India for their own political ends. It may be noted that the British by expounding the "Martial Race Theory"  further improved the old Mughal policy of "Divide and Rule" which was successfully for at least 180 years adopted by the Mughals to rule India, making the Yusufzai Pathan fight against the Khattak, the Hindu Rajput against the Hindu Maratha etc etc! Thus the British cleverly and as far as their national interest dictated, rightly employed such strategies aimed at dividing people. The theory had many loopholes. The Martial Race Theory did not explain why the Gurkhas were nobodies till the East India Company made them fight for seven or eight rupees a month. The theory does not explain why the 8 or 9 percent Sikh minority was able to rule the Muslim majority areas of Punjab and large parts of Frontier including Peshawar Bannu Haripur Charsadda Mardan etc! The reason for this was not that the Sikhs were more martial. It was a complex historical phenomenon and occurred due to a large number of situational reasons. It may be noted that the toughest military resistance to the English East India Company as far as the Muslims were concerned was offered in South India by Mysore, an area where the Muslims were a minority! But after 1885 the Madras Army which had about 30% Muslims was declared non martial by the British and replaced by Punjabis.The toughest resistance to the Sikhs in Punjab was offered by the Seraiki Pathan   Saddozai/Durrani Muslims of Multan during the period 1799-1818. But very few of these Seraiki Muslims enlisted in the British Indian Army. Were these Muslims non-martial, as I unfortunately heard being confidently asserted by many officers in my army career. The Britishers successfully used the "Turi Militia against other Pathans because the other tribes in Kurram were non-Shia. Their strict division of units into Hindustani Muslim, Hindustani Jat, Brahman, Rajput, Punjabi Sikh, Punjabi Dogra, Punjabi Muslim, Afridi, Non-Tribal Area Pathans etc was aimed to divide people. Thus they first used the Hindustanis of the Bengal Army as mercenaries against all native states of India including Siraj-Ud-Daulah, Oudh, Marathas, Rohailkhand, Sikhs, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan. Later the Punjabis were elevated to Martial Races because they had due to a complicated number of historical reasons stayed loyal in 1857. Much later the Punjabis learnt their lesson in 1919, when Martial Law was imposed in Punjab and when Jallianwala massacre took place and Gujranwala was bombed. By this time the British had once again diversified their mercenary pool with Marathas once again elevated as a martial race and increased recruitment of Gurkhas. By the Second World War when Punjabis especially the Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus along with a lesser number of Punjabi and Pathan Muslims, played an instrumental role in INA the British had the Madrasis and many other nationalities in service! The Afridi was good till Mir Mast deserted with 14 other Afridis in France till 1915 and after this became unsuitable military material. The Sikhs were good in 1857 and till WW One but they became bad in WW Two for some time once the Kirti Lehar propaganda influenced them. The Hindustanis were good till 1857 when they rebelled and at least till 1883 when they constituted 43.18% of the Indian Bengal Army (three fourth of whom were Hindus) with Punjabis trailing behind at 34.09% (out of which less than one fourth were Punjabi Muslim), with the Pathans at 4.26% and the Gurkhas at about 18.46%. But by 1911 the Hindustanis and all Hindus east of  Jamna were less martial with an approximately 65% Punjabised army with Punjabi and Pathan Muslims at about 35 to 45% of the total. All these were policy decisions and even very few Punjabi Muslims from areas south of river Chenab preferred going to the army which was regarded by them as a desperate option which was reserved for people of the Barani areas north of Jhelum and parts of north of Chenab river. Thus more than 80% of the Punjabi Muslims who went to the army were from the economically backward rain irrigated barren and relatively unproductive areas north of Jhelum River. So does this mean that all-Punjabi Muslims south of river Chenab non-martial. The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor later played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by the Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965.

FIFTH MAJOR PHASE

Greater Punjabisation with bias in favour of Punjabi Muslims and relative reduction of Sikhs-1914-1939

The First World War brought certain major changes in the army. In total recruitment the Punjabi Muslims India having the largest available eligible male population out of the classes which were allowed into the Indian Army. However, in the fighting arms the Punjabi Muslims still remained a smaller group than the Punjabi Sikhs. Recruitment in army was not open to all classes, but only those considered suitable for being recruited or politically reliable. Thus Bengal had the largest population, but Bengalis were considered politically unreliable having led the anti-British sentiment in India as established on ground by acts of terrorism and also temperamentally too volatile and unruly to be recruited. In relative proportion, however, the Punjabi Sikhs contributed the highest recruits since they were a much smaller group than Punjabi Muslims. Thus the following was the province and ethnic/religious group contribution to Army recruitment in India during the First World War61:--

The contribution of each province was relative. The contribution of  Punjab was balanced community wise. Thus out of the   349, 688 combatants which enlisted from Punjab the Muslims contributed  38.89%, the Sikhs 25.16 % and the  Punjabi Hindus (Dogras Jats Rajputs etc) 35.9%. In the context of the much misused martial race theory this means that the Punjabi Hindus were as martial as the Punjabi Muslims and the Punjabi Sikhs more martial than both since the Punjabi Sikhs ratio of enrolment was much higher than their total share in Punjab’s population! The Sikhs being just around 10% while the Punjabi Muslims being about 55 to 56% and the Hindus being about 34 to 35%! Thus UP provided mostly personnel for the Hospital Corps, the Service Corps, other ancillary troops, and the largest number of non-combatants while till 1883 this province had provided bulk of the Bengal Army’s infantry. However, the Muslim Ranghars which were included in Punjab were classified as Hindustani Muslim in the British terminology but were not mentioned as a separate ethnic group in the above mentioned tables compiled by British civilians. Recruitment in combatant arms was controlled and regulated according to policy and was not a matter of free will as in western countries. The fighting arm soldiers from the UP province as in 1857 and 1883 mostly consisted of Hindu Jats, Hindu Rajputs, Hindu Garhwalis (who provided just four infantry battalions, but won relatively higher number of gallantry awards including two Victoria Crosses, both in France) and some Muslims from western districts of UP.

The policy of recruiting from selected provinces/classes also limited India’s potential contribution to the British war effort in the war. Thus while potentially it was possible to provide 219 divisions in the First World War, it was called upon to produce seventeen divisions62. On the other hand the British policy of recruiting soldiers predominantly  from the Punjab paid rich dividends in terms of unit reliability. The Punjabis whether Muslim or non- Muslim and the Pathans (the non-tribal ones) we have seen earlier had proved to be the best mercenaries in terms of reliability in 1857 and in the Afghan Wars. The Germans who knew little about the pragmatic and opportunistic approach of these two races were thus proved totally wrong in their pre-war perceptions about the Indian troops in case of war between the British and the Turks. Despite the fact that the bulk of the Indian Army was deployed against the Turks and despite the fact that the Muslims constituted at least 40% of the fighting arms no major mutiny took place in the Indian Army. The only exception to this rule at the unit level  were  the 15th Lancers and the 5th Light Infantry. Both the units were All Muslim Units, the 15th since its raising in 1858 and the 5th since 1893. But here too the Punjabi Muslim troops proved their loyalty or pragmatism. Thus while the two Pathan Squadrons of 15 Lancers defied orders to fight against the Turks (the unit had reached Mesopotamia from France) its Punjabi Muslim Squadron remained staunchly loyal and the Pathan  Muslim Squadrons were replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons from 14th Murray’s Jat Lancers! The 5th Light Infantry was entirely composed of Ranghar/Hindustani Muslims and rebelled en masse at Singapore. The unit captured Singapore for a few hours till a British-Allied force recaptured Singapore and the rebellion was crushed. More than 200 of the indomitable Hindustani Muslim Ranghars were killed/executed63! Such heroism and independent spirit, albeit based on situational reasons, did not exist in the dictionary of any other Muslim race in the Indian Army! The major reason why the Indian Army remained staunch despite having a large presence of Muslims, was the British policy of mixing Muslims with non-Muslims in each unit. Thus there were relatively few one religion units in the Indian Army. On the individual level the tribal area Pathans and the Hindustani Muslim Ranghars showed more independence of spirit and defiance than non-tribal area Pathans and the Punjabi Muslims. The 129 Baluch was an All Muslim Unit. It had  six Pathan Companies (out of which three were pure Mahsud Companies) and two Punjabi Muslim Companies. and  was thus a Pathan dominated unit. Initially this unit fought in France right from 1914, and won the singular honour of being the first unit of Indian Army which attacked the Germans!23 Sepoy Khudadad (a Punjabi Muslim from Jhelum District)  the first Indian to get a VC  was from this unit. Later the British were forced to send this unit to East Africa because it was discovered that many of its tribal Pathan Mahsuds, who were earlier presumed to be missing/dead/prisoners had actually deserted to the German lines in France; and from there had travelled all the way back to Tirah and Waziristan!64. On the other hand its Punjabi Muslims and non-tribal-Pathans remained staunchly loyal! Philip Mason well summed up the loyalty assessment of the Indian Army by saying that "A faint question mark hung over the Pathans throughput the war  but the Punjabi Muslims were steady as a  rock".65  Many Pathans defected to the Turkish lines in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Jemadar Mir Mast Afridi deserted to the German lines in France with 14 other Afridi sepoys in France in 1915 and was awarded the  German  Iron Cross. In retaliation but on some outward pretext the British awarded the Victoria Cross to Mir Mast’s brother Mir Dast who was fighting in the same sector! A unique incident where two brothers were awarded by two different European masters fighting against each other in the same sector!