Ethnicity, Religion,
Military Performance
and Political Reliability --
British Recruitment Policy  and
The Indian Army -- 1757-1947

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC writes about British recruitment policy in the sub-continent.

The only major bias which was given official approval was that of discouraging Hindustani Muslim recruitment in the army. The Eden Commission Report of 1879  stated that the UP Muslims were too dangerous for recruitment in the Army. The report further explained this point by stating that "the lower stratum of the Muhammadan urban population, the dispossessed landholders (many of whom were Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the cadets of old Muhammadan families were the only sections of the people who dislike British rule.48 The recommendations of this report were not agreed to by the British policy makers.This is proved by the class composition of Bengal  Army as given in GGO of 1883. General Roberts, however, translated this recommendation into practice when he became the C in C of the Bengal  Army in 1885. The major casualty of Roberts bias, however, was the Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim and the Hindustani Hindus whose numbers were rapidly reduced from majority in the fighting arms in 1884 to a minority in favour of Punjabis by 1911.49 Roberts anti-Hindustani bias was based on his experiences as a young officer during the rebellion in which the prime role was played by the Hindustanis, both Hindus and Muslims. On the other hand Roberts admired the Punjabi and Pathan Muslims for their loyalty to the British during the rebellion. Thus the anti-Hindustani bias of Roberts had a deep connection with the issue of political loyalty to the British than with any martial superiority of the races north of Sutlej over those south of Sutlej. Thus Roberts rationalised his anti-Hindustani bias by theorising that the Hindustanis had degenerated   as  a result of the benefits of the British rule and: not enough adversity.50 The recruitment policy changes which took place between 1884 and 1911, which led to the phenomena called Punjabisation of the Indian Army, was not a deliberate British policy followed after 1857, but a result of opinion of certain individuals, who were responsible for major policy decisions by virtue of their  peculiar institutional positions in the army and civil government. These included Roberts (C in C Bengal Army/IndiaÐ 1885-1893), Kitchener (1902-1909) followed by General Sir O Moore Creagh (C in C India-1909-1914). A British Indian army officer who wrote a history of the Indian Army was more near the truth about the martial races theory when he said, "Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial. To Kipling's contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to be. There was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinking Brahmins had been prominent in the mutiny, and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service.51

During the period 1885-1911 when the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non-Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major war took place; that could prove that Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops, and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history. This is a very important fact from the Indo-Pak military history point of view, since it was generally thought in the Pakistan Army till 1965 that the Hindus were non-Martial and were inferior as soldiers to Muslims in general and Punjabi/Pathan Muslims in particular. The Punjabi was regarded as better as a  soldier not because he was a Muslim essentially, but because he belonged to a more rugged area where the weather terrain and climate made him tougher and sturdier, and thus a better soldier. The Punjabi category included Punjabi Muslims, but only those north of Chenab river, Dogras from Kangra Nurpur and Jammu region of  Kashmir and the Jat Sikhs and the Mazhbi (Sweeper) Sikhs.52

In 1892-93 the British carried out a new experiment in the Bengal Army. They turned certain units into ethnically/religiously homogeneous units. Thus the following changes took place:-53

This was an important experiment and clearly dismisses all myths about the fact that there was no all Muslim unit in the British Indian Army  before 1947. As a matter of fact by 1911, the pure Muslim unit strength in infantry had reached the figure of seven units. These were the 5th 17th and 18th regiments comprising Hindustani Muslims/Ranghar Muslims, the 12th and 33rd infantry comprising Punjabi Mussulmans, 40th comprising Pathan Muslims and the 106th Hazara Pioneers comprising Hazara Mongol Shia Muslims from Quetta.54

In 1895 all three Presidency Armies were merged and the appointments of C in C Bombay and Madras Armies were abolished. In place of these armies four commands under lieutenant generals were established.These were the Punjab, Bengal Madras (including Burma) and Bombay (including Sindh and Baluchistan). The Indian Army was basically an internal security army and whatever battles it fought till 1914 except those of 1857 were of much smaller scale than European battles fought during the same period. Thus the brigade of one odd British unit and two or three Indian units was the highest formation, which normally fought battles or operated under one commander. The concept of Division existed, but there was no dedicated specialist general staff or headquarters which were maintained in peacetime to control/co-ordinate the operations  of an actual division in war. Further since most of the units were dispersed in various places for internal security, there was no room for holding exercises with large formations. This imbalance was remedied once Kitchener became the C in C India.

Another important organisational change in Indian infantry’s organisation was instituted in 1900. Till this year Indian infantry was organised in eight  company battalions, and two wings of  four companies each.55 These were now grouped as in Europe on four company basis; while retaining eight companies for internal administration, with each company under command the native officer, while on parade and in field each double company as it was called was commanded by one British double company commander assisted by another Britisher who was called double company officer.

Kitchener came to India in November 1902, he decided to reorganise the Indian Army. According to Kitchener's perception, the Indian Army was ill organised to face the external enemy i.e. a likely Russian invasion of India, which was regarded as a serious likelihood by the British since the Panjdeh incident of 1885. Kitchener may be rightly regarded as the conceptual father of the modern Indian Army. He introduced three categories under which the Indian Army was to be organised/operate. These were firstly-"Covering Troops", secondly Ð ‘Field ArmyÓ and thirdly Ð’Internal Security TroopsÓ. Kitchener also pressed for introduction of modern weapons, new artillery, latest small arms and Divisions and Corps organised under dedicated full time staffs to command/co-ordinate their formations in both peace and war. The brigades and divisions as per Kitchener’s system were to train as complete formations in peacetime Staff College for the Indian Army was established on the lines of Camberley in 1905. Kitchener stressed the fact that general officers must lead in war the field formations that they had trained in peace. He managed to abolish thirty four small military stations and managed to scrap, enough units to form nine field divisions instead of the old four which used to operate, under the old system without any full-time/peacetime divisional headquarters. He separated Burma from Madras in 1903, thereby eliminating an unnecessary and unhealthy dead-weight which had encumbered the Madras Army/Command thanklessly since 1824! Kitchener reorganised the  Indian Army in 1907, into three commands under lieutenant generals i.e. the NORTHERN COMMAND-1st  (Peshawar), 2nd  (Rawalpindi) and 3rd  (Lahore) Divisions. WESTERN COMMAND-4th (Quetta), 5th (Mhow) and 6th (Poona) Divisions.The EASTERN COMMAND-7th (Meerut) and 8th (Lucknow)  Divisions.Two Divisions i.e. the 9th (Secunderabad) which was Army Reserve and Burma Division were under the direct command of the army headquarters. Each formation was assigned a specific operational role and exactly knew what they were required to do in case of war. The Northern Commands principal operational role was to defend the northern approach i.e.-Kabul-Peshawar-Lucknow-Calcutta against a likely Russian attack into India. The Southern Commands role was similar; ie to defend  the southern approach-i.e. Kandahr-Quetta-Bombay-Mhow. Each of the Divisional commands could  in case of war put into field an infantry division and a cavalry brigade; while simultaneously setting aside troops for internal security duties. The regiments were not to be permanently allotted to Divisions but to be rotated after some years to ensure that did not become localised in habits or thought. Each unit of the Indian Army was to have an opportunity to experience semi-active service on the Frontier, which previously was not the  case and played an important role in the decline of the Bombay and Madras armies. Even today with minor improvements Kitchener’s system is followed in both the Indian and Pakistan armies. Kitchener also renumbered the Indian army units. All old Bengal cavalry and infantry regiments retained their old numbers, 20 and 50 were respectively  added to the old numbers of the Punjab Frontier Force cavalry and infantry regiments, 50 and 60 respectively to old Madras cavalry and infantry units, 30 and 100 to the old Bombay cavalry and infantry units, etc etc. There is absolutely no doubt that it was this reorganisation of Kitchener  which  saved the very weak British position in France in 1914, but this will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Indian Staff College at Quetta in 1947 was perhaps the most valuable asset that the Pakistan  Army inherited from the British! It’s a pity that this great initial advantage was not improved  upon as much as was potentially possible.

In 1906 the Indian Army was organised as following 56:----

The reserves were organised as following:--

The above mentioned figures represented a  major transition from 1857 when India was garrisoned by just 39,751 British and 226,418 Indians. On the other hand the major change in area of recruitment can be gauged from the following table illustrating  the region wise rough breakdown of Indian infantry units57:--

 By 1911 the ethnic composition of the Indian Army  may be gauged from the following rough description of its infantry units 58:--        

There are no exact figure about the ethnicity of fighting arms in 1914.However one authority places the figure of ethnically Punjabi soldiers at about 50%.These were roughly assessed from the approximate statistics of 1096 infantry companies out of which 431 were wholly Punjabi and 221 were partly Punjabi, and 155 total squadrons of cavalry out of which 95.5 were wholly Punjabi and 47.5 were partly Punjabi.59

One researcher gave the following ethnic and religious composition of the Indian Army as in 1914:--60

No discussion of this period can be completed without discussing the "Martial Races Theory" expounded by Lord Roberts and many others during the period 1880-1914. This theory had many adherents as late as 1990s while I was serving in the army, many Pakistani officers seriously believed in this ridiculous Imperialist theory! The general line of thought of these officers, which I heard hundreds of times at various forums and informal discussions  was as following:--That "THE MUSLIMS IN GENERAL AND THE PUNJABI MUSLIMS (PARTICULARLY THOSE NORTH OF   CHENAB) AND THE PATHANS WERE THE MAINSTAY OF THE BRITISH INDIAN ARMY AND THAT THE HINDUSTANIS IN GENERAL AND THE HINDUSTANI HINDU AND ALL OTHER HINDUS, AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE FROM AREAS SOUTH OF AMBALA WERE A NON-MARTIAL RACE".

The Martial Race Theory was a clever British effort to divide the people  of India for their own political ends. It may be noted that the British by expounding the "Martial Race Theory"  further improved the old Mughal policy of "Divide and Rule" which was successfully for at least 180 years adopted by the Mughals to rule India, making the Yusufzai Pathan fight against the Khattak, the Hindu Rajput against the Hindu Maratha etc etc! Thus the British cleverly and as far as their national interest dictated, rightly employed such strategies aimed at dividing people. The theory had many loopholes. The Martial Race Theory did not explain why the Gurkhas were nobodies till the East India Company made them fight for seven or eight rupees a month. The theory does not explain why the 8 or 9 percent Sikh minority was able to rule the Muslim majority areas of Punjab and large parts of Frontier including Peshawar Bannu Haripur Charsadda Mardan etc! The reason for this was not that the Sikhs were more martial. It was a complex historical phenomenon and occurred due to a large number of situational reasons. It may be noted that the toughest military resistance to the English East India Company as far as the Muslims were concerned was offered in South India by Mysore, an area where the Muslims were a minority! But after 1885 the Madras Army which had about 30% Muslims was declared non martial by the British and replaced by Punjabis.The toughest resistance to the Sikhs in Punjab was offered by the Seraiki Pathan   Saddozai/Durrani Muslims of Multan during the period 1799-1818. But very few of these Seraiki Muslims enlisted in the British Indian Army. Were these Muslims non-martial, as I unfortunately heard being confidently asserted by many officers in my army career. The Britishers successfully used the "Turi Militia against other Pathans because the other tribes in Kurram were non-Shia. Their strict division of units into Hindustani Muslim, Hindustani Jat, Brahman, Rajput, Punjabi Sikh, Punjabi Dogra, Punjabi Muslim, Afridi, Non-Tribal Area Pathans etc was aimed to divide people. Thus they first used the Hindustanis of the Bengal Army as mercenaries against all native states of India including Siraj-Ud-Daulah, Oudh, Marathas, Rohailkhand, Sikhs, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan. Later the Punjabis were elevated to Martial Races because they had due to a complicated number of historical reasons stayed loyal in 1857. Much later the Punjabis learnt their lesson in 1919, when Martial Law was imposed in Punjab and when Jallianwala massacre took place and Gujranwala was bombed. By this time the British had once again diversified their mercenary pool with Marathas once again elevated as a martial race and increased recruitment of Gurkhas. By the Second World War when Punjabis especially the Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus along with a lesser number of Punjabi and Pathan Muslims, played an instrumental role in INA the British had the Madrasis and many other nationalities in service! The Afridi was good till Mir Mast deserted with 14 other Afridis in France till 1915 and after this became unsuitable military material. The Sikhs were good in 1857 and till WW One but they became bad in WW Two for some time once the Kirti Lehar propaganda influenced them. The Hindustanis were good till 1857 when they rebelled and at least till 1883 when they constituted 43.18% of the Indian Bengal Army (three fourth of whom were Hindus) with Punjabis trailing behind at 34.09% (out of which less than one fourth were Punjabi Muslim), with the Pathans at 4.26% and the Gurkhas at about 18.46%. But by 1911 the Hindustanis and all Hindus east of  Jamna were less martial with an approximately 65% Punjabised army with Punjabi and Pathan Muslims at about 35 to 45% of the total. All these were policy decisions and even very few Punjabi Muslims from areas south of river Chenab preferred going to the army which was regarded by them as a desperate option which was reserved for people of the Barani areas north of Jhelum and parts of north of Chenab river. Thus more than 80% of the Punjabi Muslims who went to the army were from the economically backward rain irrigated barren and relatively unproductive areas north of Jhelum River. So does this mean that all-Punjabi Muslims south of river Chenab non-martial. The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor later played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by the Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965.

FIFTH MAJOR PHASE

Greater Punjabisation with bias in favour of Punjabi Muslims and relative reduction of Sikhs-1914-1939

The First World War brought certain major changes in the army. In total recruitment the Punjabi Muslims India having the largest available eligible male population out of the classes which were allowed into the Indian Army. However, in the fighting arms the Punjabi Muslims still remained a smaller group than the Punjabi Sikhs. Recruitment in army was not open to all classes, but only those considered suitable for being recruited or politically reliable. Thus Bengal had the largest population, but Bengalis were considered politically unreliable having led the anti-British sentiment in India as established on ground by acts of terrorism and also temperamentally too volatile and unruly to be recruited. In relative proportion, however, the Punjabi Sikhs contributed the highest recruits since they were a much smaller group than Punjabi Muslims. Thus the following was the province and ethnic/religious group contribution to Army recruitment in India during the First World War61:--

The contribution of each province was relative. The contribution of  Punjab was balanced community wise. Thus out of the   349, 688 combatants which enlisted from Punjab the Muslims contributed  38.89%, the Sikhs 25.16 % and the  Punjabi Hindus (Dogras Jats Rajputs etc) 35.9%. In the context of the much misused martial race theory this means that the Punjabi Hindus were as martial as the Punjabi Muslims and the Punjabi Sikhs more martial than both since the Punjabi Sikhs ratio of enrolment was much higher than their total share in Punjab’s population! The Sikhs being just around 10% while the Punjabi Muslims being about 55 to 56% and the Hindus being about 34 to 35%! Thus UP provided mostly personnel for the Hospital Corps, the Service Corps, other ancillary troops, and the largest number of non-combatants while till 1883 this province had provided bulk of the Bengal Army’s infantry. However, the Muslim Ranghars which were included in Punjab were classified as Hindustani Muslim in the British terminology but were not mentioned as a separate ethnic group in the above mentioned tables compiled by British civilians. Recruitment in combatant arms was controlled and regulated according to policy and was not a matter of free will as in western countries. The fighting arm soldiers from the UP province as in 1857 and 1883 mostly consisted of Hindu Jats, Hindu Rajputs, Hindu Garhwalis (who provided just four infantry battalions, but won relatively higher number of gallantry awards including two Victoria Crosses, both in France) and some Muslims from western districts of UP.

The policy of recruiting from selected provinces/classes also limited India’s potential contribution to the British war effort in the war. Thus while potentially it was possible to provide 219 divisions in the First World War, it was called upon to produce seventeen divisions62. On the other hand the British policy of recruiting soldiers predominantly  from the Punjab paid rich dividends in terms of unit reliability. The Punjabis whether Muslim or non- Muslim and the Pathans (the non-tribal ones) we have seen earlier had proved to be the best mercenaries in terms of reliability in 1857 and in the Afghan Wars. The Germans who knew little about the pragmatic and opportunistic approach of these two races were thus proved totally wrong in their pre-war perceptions about the Indian troops in case of war between the British and the Turks. Despite the fact that the bulk of the Indian Army was deployed against the Turks and despite the fact that the Muslims constituted at least 40% of the fighting arms no major mutiny took place in the Indian Army. The only exception to this rule at the unit level  were  the 15th Lancers and the 5th Light Infantry. Both the units were All Muslim Units, the 15th since its raising in 1858 and the 5th since 1893. But here too the Punjabi Muslim troops proved their loyalty or pragmatism. Thus while the two Pathan Squadrons of 15 Lancers defied orders to fight against the Turks (the unit had reached Mesopotamia from France) its Punjabi Muslim Squadron remained staunchly loyal and the Pathan  Muslim Squadrons were replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons from 14th Murray’s Jat Lancers! The 5th Light Infantry was entirely composed of Ranghar/Hindustani Muslims and rebelled en masse at Singapore. The unit captured Singapore for a few hours till a British-Allied force recaptured Singapore and the rebellion was crushed. More than 200 of the indomitable Hindustani Muslim Ranghars were killed/executed63! Such heroism and independent spirit, albeit based on situational reasons, did not exist in the dictionary of any other Muslim race in the Indian Army! The major reason why the Indian Army remained staunch despite having a large presence of Muslims, was the British policy of mixing Muslims with non-Muslims in each unit. Thus there were relatively few one religion units in the Indian Army. On the individual level the tribal area Pathans and the Hindustani Muslim Ranghars showed more independence of spirit and defiance than non-tribal area Pathans and the Punjabi Muslims. The 129 Baluch was an All Muslim Unit. It had  six Pathan Companies (out of which three were pure Mahsud Companies) and two Punjabi Muslim Companies. and  was thus a Pathan dominated unit. Initially this unit fought in France right from 1914, and won the singular honour of being the first unit of Indian Army which attacked the Germans!23 Sepoy Khudadad (a Punjabi Muslim from Jhelum District)  the first Indian to get a VC  was from this unit. Later the British were forced to send this unit to East Africa because it was discovered that many of its tribal Pathan Mahsuds, who were earlier presumed to be missing/dead/prisoners had actually deserted to the German lines in France; and from there had travelled all the way back to Tirah and Waziristan!64. On the other hand its Punjabi Muslims and non-tribal-Pathans remained staunchly loyal! Philip Mason well summed up the loyalty assessment of the Indian Army by saying that "A faint question mark hung over the Pathans throughput the war  but the Punjabi Muslims were steady as a  rock".65  Many Pathans defected to the Turkish lines in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Jemadar Mir Mast Afridi deserted to the German lines in France with 14 other Afridi sepoys in France in 1915 and was awarded the  German  Iron Cross. In retaliation but on some outward pretext the British awarded the Victoria Cross to Mir Mast’s brother Mir Dast who was fighting in the same sector! A unique incident where two brothers were awarded by two different European masters fighting against each other in the same sector!

During and immediately after WW One certain major changes took place in the recruitment pattern. The Sikhs now became unreliable and thus less martial due to their major involvement in the Ghadar Movement in WW One and in the 1919 Punjab disturbances. Thus Sikh recruitment was reduced and Punjabi Muslim recruitment increased during the period 1919-39 thus making the Sikhs a minority as compared to the Punjabi Muslims in the fighting arms. The following table illustrates this change:-66

The following Table illustrates the 1930 situation:-67

The First World War was followed by two major developments in the Indian Army. The first was massive reduction in numbers and the second was the acceptance of Indians in the officer rank in line with the long outstanding Indian demand to admit Indians as officers. Reduction in the army meant reversion to the pre-war recruitment policies. Thus by 1929 the Army was again largely Punjabised as the following figures illustrate:-

Meanwhile by 1923 the number of soldiers in the Indian Army had been reduced from 500,000 in 1918 to 120,000 in 1923.69 As per the 1922 reorganisation the number of cavalry regiments was reduced from 39 to 22 by amalgamating two regiments except the Guides and the 7th Light Cavalry, the infantry units were also reduced and the old 131 separate regiments of 1913 were reorganised  into nineteen infantry regiments of the line (each of five active battalions, one training regiment for recruits/reservists and one territorial battalion), four regiments of Pioneers  (which were later disbanded in 1931), and ten regiments (each of two battalions) of Gurkha Rifles.70

Contrary to all the rhetoric in Pakistan, about the Khilafat Movement most of the Muslim troops (particularly Punjabi Muslims); from the Muslim majority area that later became Pakistan; stayed staunchly loyal to Britain despite mostly being deployed against Muslim Turks and  this reliability gave the Martial Races Theory stronger value and more adherents in higher British Command circles. On the contrary the races like the Tribal Pathans (Afridis, Mahsuds, Mohmands) and the Ranghar Muslims (who came in the Hindustani category); who had resorted to rebellion/defiance/defection during the war became Persona Non Grata (and thus non-martial) as far as army recruitment was concerned. Thus the 5th Light Infantry  which had rebelled in 1915 disappeared from the new army list in 1922. In addition the Trans Frontier (Tribal area) Mahsuds Wazirs and Mohmands (who had given the British great trouble in 1919) enlistment was stopped in the regular army. In addition the Afridis who had whole Afridi Companies before the war suffered mostly due to defection of Mir Mast Afridi to German lines in France and Afridi enlistment to the regular army was greatly reduced.71 The tremendous setback that the Pathans received because of not having been good mercenaries for their British colonial masters may be gauged from the following figures. Before the first world war there were about 5,000 Tribal Pathans in the Indian Army and these included ten pure Mahsud Companies.72 in addition there was a larger number of Pathans from the settled district and at least 10,000 Pathans were serving in the Indian Army. By 1929 there were just 5,600 men from the NWFP serving in the Indian Army!

SIXTH AND FINAL PHASE

Mixed Recruitment  due to immensely heavy administrative demands of Burma front with Punjab in overall significant minority but in the lead as single largest province
1939-1945

On 1st October 1939 the British Indian Army was 194,373 men strong and these including 34,515 enrolled non-combatants. The Army consisted of 96 infantry battalions and 18 cavalry regiments.In addition there were four cavalry regiments and seven infantry battalions belonging to the Indian Princely State Forces. Apart from these the Indian Territorial forces numbered 19,000 troops and the Indian State Forces had a total of 53,000 troops.73 On 1st January 1940 there were 37.64%  Muslims,12.82% Sikhs (reduced as opposed to Punjabi  Muslims for disloyalty to the British during the period 1919-40), 37.55% Hindus and 10.96% Nepali Gurkha Hindus.74

The role of the Indian Army and its contribution to the British war effort cannot be understood unless relative  the role of Britain and other allied nations in the Second  World War is understood. In the First World War Britain suffered far greater  military casualties than in the Second. In the Second World War most of the fighting was done by Soviet Russia, while the Americans supplied most of the financial support and armaments to conduct the war. The Indian Army was employed in North Africa  and Italy against the Axis powers i.e. Germany and Italy and against Japan in Burma. In addition it performed operational duties of a much smaller and limited scale in Ethiopia Iraq Syria and Persia. In Burma where the Indian Army was employed against the Japanese, for the greater part of the war the odds were almost overwhelmingly in favour of the British as far as material numerical and logistic factors were concerned.Contrary to the commonly held belief the Japanese attack from Burma into India was never their major attack. The Japanese intention in capturing Burma had three major objectives; the first  was to secure their Western flank against a likely British future attack against Japanese held Malaya Indo China and East  Indies, and to secure a base using which they could later dominate the Bay of Bengal. The second major Japanese objective was to isolate China from the west, since China was keeping around 80 Japanese divisions committed in China, the main overland allied supply route to China ran from Burma i.e. the famous Burma Road. The third major Japanese objective in capturing Burma was to secure the use of its raw materials like oil rubber etc in sustaining the logistic part of the Japanese military effort. The grand Japanese strategic plan had visualised that capture of Burma would complete the great defensive  barrier visualised in their strategic design.75

The first strategic objective of the British was not  to defend the Indian provinces of Assam or Bengal which the Japanese could have threatened via Burma, but the strategic port of Colombo by capturing which the Japanese navy could dominate the Indian Ocean. The strategic priorities of the British in this regard were crystal clear. Wavell was clearly told by the British Chiefs of Staff that the preservation of Ceylon was more essential than that of Calcutta.76 It is mistakenly believed in many quarters in India and Pakistan that the rough 2.5 million men recruited in the subcontinent during the world war saved the British Empire. Burma was never the decisive battleground as far as the wider strategic canvas of the Second World War was concerned. Most of the Indians recruited were not involved in the fighting arms but in maintaining or sustaining the 14th Army in Burma,since the lines of communication,their maintenance and passage of supplies required an enormous human effort. Thus while about two million men were recruited, the actual Indian army strength in Burma, actively committed to battle at any single time, never exceeded seven or eight divisions, since the terrain/logistics  did not allow a deployment of a force of more than this level of strength. Most of the Indians recruited were involved in the supply corps or as pioneers or engineers/sappers/pioneers.In other words the "Teeth to Tail Ratio " was overwhelmingly in favour of a very long tail and much smaller teeth, at the actual fighting end of the battlefield. It was primarily a test of logistics and Japanese valour was defeated by British Indian  manpower financed armed clothed and supplied with American financial and military aid! The armwise breakdown of the Indian Army recruits recruited from 3 September 1939 to 31 August 1945 can be gauged from the following table 76:--

General Shaukat assisted by a brilliant team of staff officers in 1984-90  claims in his official history of the Pakistan Army, that in 1939  70 % of the rank and file was Muslim!77 This is not true. As a matter of fact the Muslim percentage was around 37.64% in January 1940 as we have already discussed in an earlier paragraph. As per General Tucker the ethnic composition of  Indian Infantry:-78

Even as far as the Indian Armoured Corps (cavalry) was concerned Shaukat's wild assertion has no connection with on ground realities, however hard he tried to prove that the pre-1947 Indian Army was Muslim:-79

There may be certain errors in the above statistics but there is no doubt that Muslims did not constitute bulk of the rank and file at all,or even the fighting arms (infantry and cavalry), as Shaukat Riza claims. It is important to refute this baseless claim since it led to  the formation of various baseless myths which created a false sense of superiority in the Pakistan Army which proved counter productive in both 1965 and 1971. These myths were  created  and fostered by the pre-1947 officers of the Indian Army who served in the Pakistan Army after partition and Shaukat Riza was merely one of many such people. We have already seen that Muslims did not constitute the majority of the fighting arms i.e. infantry and cavalry. Even If  we take the Indian Army of the Second World War period; statistics prove that Muslims were not in majority 80:-

If we analyse the ethnic/religious figures of the recruits who joined the Indian Army during the Second World War, nothing proves that Muslims were in majority even in the fighting arms. Now we will examine the figures of all recruits of the Indian Army ethnicity wise as well as arm wise for the entire. We have already discussed in the first paragraph of this chapter that Indian Army before the war consisted of approximately 96 regular infantry battalions and 18 cavalry regiments. This meant that approximately 90 to 95,000 Indians were in the fighting arms and approximately 100,000 to 110,000 Indians were in other supporting arms and services. We have already discussed that Muslims were about 38% of the total. The cavalry and the infantry class composition above mentioned clearly proves that Muslims were not in the majority in the fighting arms. The same was the case for services/supporting arms etc. We have earlier discussed that about 534,991 men were recruited to the fighting arms in the war, while 13,42,008 were recruited to the service. Now the following facts prove that majority of the Muslim recruits did not go to the fighting arms. These statistics cover the recruitment in the Indian Army during the period of  WW II 81:-

The above figures show 61,615  Bengali Muslims, since no Bengali fighting arm unit was raised in the second world war. This brings down the number of Muslims recruited theoretically eligible to join the fighting arms to 555,738. 109,702 Gurkhas recruited did not go the supporting arms/services as far as the large majority was concerned since Gurkhas were elite troops and not wasted in services/supporting arms. This brings the number of theoretically eligible Muslims for the fighting arms to 446,036. All 29,944 Dogras and 18,932  Garhwalis also could not have gone to the services or supporting arms since the Dogras and Kumaon regiments were single class regiments and both the communities were recruited almost exclusively for fighting arms.This brings down the total of theoretically eligible Muslim down to 397,160.

There was extremely limited quota for Hindustani Muslims in infantry which constituted  the bulk of the fighting arms men recruited during the war (43,030 recruits for armoured corps and 491,961 for infantry). Further Hindustani Muslims shared the quota to the much smaller 10.65%  quota in the armoured corps with Ranghars. This quota translated on paper meant that not more than 2,500 of Hindustani Muslims could have gone to armoured corps and much less to infantry. This reduces the Hindustani Muslims theoretically eligible for fighting arms to just about 5,000 men even if we make the liberal assumption that 2,500  recruits may have gone to infantry.Thus the remaining i.e. 22,638 out of the total 27,638 Hindustani Muslims could not have gone to the fighting arms. This brings the total number of theoretically eligible Muslim recruits to the fighting arms to 469,323. A maximum number 38.52% Muslims could go to the armoured corps as we have seen in the above mentioned tables. This means that theoretically out of 43,030 recruits of the armoured corps only a maximum of about 17,000 could have been Muslim. This reduces the theoretically eligible fighting arm  non-Muslim recruit figure as far as the armoured corps was concerned  as approximately 26,030 recruits. This reduces a further 26,030 theoretically eligible Muslims from armoured corps and thus to the fighting arms to  443,293.

We have already seen that the largest infantry group of Indian Infantry i.e. had Ñ or 1/3 Muslim quota. Therefore, it is logical that the Muslim representation in infantry could not have been more than a figure between half and one third recruits. In any case it was not possible that all 315,356 Punjabi Muslim recruits could have all constituted the total infantry recruit figure of  491,961 or that no Punjabi Muslim was a part of 13,42,008 men who were recruited in supporting arms/services like engineers artillery and other corps!

Nine infantry groups of the Indian Army were exclusively non-Muslim and did not accept any Muslims.

Chart No. 28

Muslims                        Hindus                     Sikhs                                 Others

Punjabi       314,356        Gurkhas      109,702    Jat Sikhs    44,751            243,434

Pathans       65,103            Madrasis     302,732    Mazhbi       33,244

Assamese    3,122            Brahmans    66,608     Others        34,383

Baluchis       1,195   Rajputs      73,121                        

Bengalis       61,615 Dogras      29,944                        

Dekhanis      19,354 Jats           71,339                        

Hazaras        23,884            Garhwali     18,932                              

Mindustan     27,638 Bengali      19,239                        

Madrasis       28,799 Gujars       15,865                        

Meos            2757            Mahratta     58,421                             

Ranghars      7581            Chamars     7,453                                

Others         61,949            Kumaonis    20,110                            

                                    Mahars      10,059                        

                                    Assamese   2,772                                

                                     Ahirs          38,150                        

                                     Others       220,389                                  

Grand          617,353            Grand       10,64,836  Grand        112,378   243,434

Total                            Total                        Total

% Age         30.29 %            % Age        52.25 %   % Age      5.52 %            11.94 %

Books written in Pakistan after 1947 tended to portray Muslim and particularly those of  areas which constituted Pakistan as much more anti-British in their attitude than they actually were. While good as motivational books these books cannot be called history books. One has to be province specific in order to accurately appreciate the position of various provinces. Punjab the most populous Muslim majority province remained absolutely peaceful as far as the Punjabi Muslims, its majority group were concerned. The Sikhs, however, were involved in significant revolutionary activity. Already before the Second World War  a recruitment ban was imposed on certain Sikh villages, since they were regarded as too anti-British.82 In 1940 a ban was placed on Sikh recruitment.83 The more pragmatic Sikhs, however, realised that they would lose a lot in the Army if Sikh recruitment was stopped, since the British had already decided to leave India. Thus as a result of efforts of Sardar Baldev Singh and the ruler of Patiala Sikh recruitment was resumed again in 1940-41. In Sindh   two infantry brigades were committed in anti-Hur operations in 1942. This raises the level of the Sindhi Muslims higher in the scale of defying the British than all other provinces of present Pakistan except the tribal areas of Frontier where a larger British force was committed in controlling the anti- British tribesmen! Here in the tribal area the Fakir of Ipi who was assisted by the Germans with financial support kept three regular brigades and the considerably large corps of Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts occupied. 84

CONCLUSION

In books written forty five or fifty years after partition in Pakistan one sometimes comes across the fantastic assertion that British reduced Muslim recruitment in the Indian Army during the course of Second World War! This wild assertion is as true as the famous "when shrimps learn to whistle" joke of Khruschev! The Muslims in general and the Punjabi Muslims in particular  sue to various situational reasons, proved their reliability in 1857  and 1914-18 staunchness once again in 1939-45. There was no policy deliberately executed to reduce the Muslim recruitment on part of the British during world war two. The increase in non-Muslim recruits and non-Punjabi recruits had a deeper connection with the available eligible manpower resources of Punjab which population wise was much smaller than Madras or UP. Even within Punjab most of the manpower was recruited from areas north of Chenab river which were rain irrigated and where joining the army was the only viable option in most cases. These areas contributed large recruits but the war demand was greater and the immense requirements of manpower in Engineers ASC and other arms could not be met by recruiting from Punjab alone. Thus Madras, Bombay, Bengal and  UP were incorporated. The Muslim League was regarded as a more loyalist party than congress in the period 1939-45 and Mr Jinnah was against non-cooperation with the British as far as the war effort was concerned. Outwardly defensive  and somewhat unheroic this policy was Jinnah’s masterstroke since it greatly improved British perceptions about Muslims as those who stood by their side unlike the Congress in the dark days of the Second World War! Above all it led to a great increase of Muslim League influence in the Muslim majority provinces where the Muslim League was able for the first time to form its own ministries and greatly improve its previously extremely theoretical and flimsy organisation. The policy of loyalism to the British  in which the Muslims in general and the Punjabi Muslims in particular led whole of India however unheroic, did play a major part in Mr Jinnahs success in defeating Congress-British designs during the Simla Talks. When President Roosevelt of USA exerted pressure on Churchill to negotiate with the Congress in connection with India’s freedom, Churchill bluffed Roosevelt by telling him that he could not ignore the Muslims since they constituted 75% 85  of the Indian Army (something which was factually totally incorrect). This was the result of Jinnah’s somewhat opportunistic, but essentially brilliant, approach of conditional cooperation with the British War  Effort.Brilliant;I would say; in view of  the on ground peculiar subjective realities of the Sub-Continent, with the Muslims in minority and under threat of being crushed under the tyranny of the Hindu majority (unfortunately it was later replaced by tyranny of West Pakistani majority!!!!). There is, however, no truth in the fantastic assertion advanced by many in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s that Muslim recruitment during the war was decreased because Pakistan Movement was gaining momentum! If any community really defied the British as far as the army was concerned it was the Sikh community, and this led to a temporary ban on their recruitment. The chances of failure or success in rebellion against a foreign master are  not important, as far as networth of a particular community/group is concerned. What is important is how they behaved, and there is no doubt that the Sikhs were the only community in the army who did anything close enough to real defiance. A cursory glance at the recruitment figures proves that the number of Muslims recruited in the army was much higher than their total population warranted. It has also been wrongly asserted that the Muslims suffered more in the post 1945 demobilisation and reduction of the Indian Army! No one has been able to cite any figures to prove this. Most of the recruitment had been done as we have already discussed in detail in the supporting arms and services. The overall reduction of Muslim percentage from pre-war figure of approximately 36% to 30% was the result of the fact that Muslims were not as numerous as other groups and Muslims from all areas even within Punjab had no interest, motivation or economic compulsion to join the army.

The legacy of "Martial Races Theory" played a role in destruction of democracy in Pakistan. The British left a most negative tradition in the Punjab of collaboarting with the feudals! A trend that was continued and continues to date! The East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 may also be linked to the negative legacy of Martial Races Theory! I saw its negative effects as late as 1993 in the Pakistan Armoured Corps. Naturally history is a part of every man’s personality and "Kalanaur" "Kanar" and "Jamalpur" are more familiar names for many tankmen even today! The fires of villages burnt in 1857 once the British employed Indians against Indian has not fully extnguished. It has again and again reappeared in Bengal, Baluchistan and Sindh! In India similarly the legacy continues in Punjab NEFA and in Kashmir! The elite is having a joly good time while the common man is galvanised to fight in the name of Hinduvta or Islam! Bangladesh and Nepal are somewhat better since they have lesser ego problems! The British destroyed India and Ireland through their Machiavellian albeit Imperially and colonially brilliant policy of ‘Divide et ImperaÓ. Long before the Sipah I Sahaba, LTTE or IRA came into being they employed  Sunni against Shia and Tamil against Sinhalese or Irish against Irish!

The British policy from 1857 was based on the principle of "Divide et Impera"! The "Martial Races Theory" was an imperial gimmick to seduce the "Cannonfodder". It is unfortunate that men with limited grey matter who reached the highest ranks in the Pakistan Army in the period 1950-1965 convinced themselves that  they were really more martial and that "Valour" could compensate for military incompetence at the strategic and inoperational theory. The Bay of Bengal may not contain the shipwreck of the "Two Nation Theory" but the fields of Valtoha certainly contain the wreck of the "Martial Races Theory". Wars cannot be fought simply by gambling on "martial fervour" or "ideological motivation". If this was so then the Muslim Arabs would not have stopped short of Constantinople or at Tours! If this was so then there would have no Mongol defeat at Ain Jalut or a US defeat in Vietnam!

END NOTES

1Page-170-Lord Clive- Sir Alexander John Arbuthnot-T. Fisher Unwin-London-1899. Page-33-Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the year 1895-Lieut F. G Cardew-Office of the Superintendent Government Printing-India-Calcutta-1903.

2 Page-327-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit).

3Page-333-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit. Page-335-Ibid. 1857 figures from  Appendix - Page-345- Incidents in the Sepoy War-General Sir Hope Grant-Edinburgh-1873.

4Refers- Page-66-Causes of the Indian Revolt-1858-Sayyid Ahmad Khan- Written  after 1857 rebellion and presented to Lord Canning the Governor General) Madras Army had some groupings within battalions based on classes.

5Study of ethnic records in Kaye and Mallesson-History of the Indian Mutiny and  Report of Royal Commission on the Reorganisation of Army in India-London-1858.

6 Pages-178 to 185-Fidelity and Honour--Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Viking India-1993.

7Ibid.

8Report of Royal Commission on Reorganisation of Army in India-1858.

9Page-53 & 54-History of the Baloch Regiment-1820-1939-Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad-The Baloch Regimental Centre-Abbottabad-Pakistan-Central Army Press-Rawalpindi-1998.

10 For details see  ethnic records in Kaye and Mallesson-History of the Indian Mutiny and  Report of Royal Commission on the Reorganisation of Army in India-London-1858.

11Page-135-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Gough and Innes-Reprinted by Nirmal Publishers-New Delhi-1986. Page-220-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

12Page-3- The Frontier Force Regiment ÐCompiled by  Brigadier W.E.H Condon-Aldershot-Gale and Polden- 1962.

13Page-3-Ibid.

14Ibid.

15 Pages- 6 ,8 and 9-Ibid.

16Page-241-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit. In 1851 the irregular forces in Punjab was reorganised as "Punjab Irregular Force" or the ‘P.I.FÓ to which was later added the additional title "Expeditionary Reserve" making it famous as "PIFFER". The Sindh Camel Corps raised on the Sindh Frontier in 1843 was also transferred to the Punjab Irregular Force in October 1849 and was numbered as the 6th Punjab Infantry. The Punjab Irregular Force consisted of the six  regiments of Punjab Infantry and  five regiments of Punjab cavalry raised in 1849,the Corps of Guides, the four regiments of Sikh Infantry raised in 1846, one regiment of Gurkha infantry, four mountain batteries etc. (Refers-Page-4-The Frontier Force Regiment-Op Cited).

17Pages-1 to 5 - The Frontier Force Rifles Ð Compiled by Brigadier W.E.H Condon-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1953.

18Page-171-The Cambridge History of India-The Indian Empire-1858-1918-Edited by H.H Dodwell-Reprinted by S. Chand and Company-Delhi-1987.

19Page-155-The Punjab in Peace and  War-S.S Thorburn-London-1904.  Reprinted by Usha Publications-Delhi-1987.

20Page-285- Life of the Marquess of Dalhousie-Volume Two ÐLee Warner-London-1904.

21Page-260-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

22Page-

23Page-257-Lee Warner-Op Cit.

24Page-171-Cambridge History-Op Cit.

25Page-261-Lee Warner-Op Cit .

26Page-190-Cambridge History-Op Cit.

27PunjabÐMutiny Records ÐPage-289-Punjab Mutiny Records-Punjab Government-1858.

28Page-210-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit.

29Letter Number-93-Letters to the President of the Board of Control-January to December 1857-Canning Papers-India Office Library.

30Letter Number 18-Letter to Governor of North Western Provinces-March 1856 to February 1862-Canning Papers-Ibid.

31Reconstructed table from Pakistan Army till 1965 based on details  given in  G.G.O Number  494 Dated  31 May 1861, G.G.O Number  400 Dated  3rd May 1861 and G.G.O Number-990 Dated 29 0ctober 1861-Quoted and produced on Pages 300 to 303-Lieut F.G Cardew Op Cit.

32Adjutant  Generals Circular Number 117-N Dated-9th September 1864-Also Quoted on Page-329-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

33From Tables in - Pakistan Army Till 1965-Major Agha Humayun Amin-Strategicus and Tacticus-P.O Box 13146-Arlington-VA-22219-U.S.A-17 August and The Sepoy Rebellion Reinterpreted-Major Agha Humayun Amin-Strategicus and Tacticus-P.O Box 13146-Arlington-V.A-U.S.A-September 1998. These tables were based on computations calculated from details given in the appendix of the Royal Commission on the Reorganisation of the Indian Army-1858.

34Tables as computed/constructed  by the author and published in Chapter Five of Pakistan Army till 1965-Op Cit based on Pages-405, 406 & 407-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

35Tables as computed/constructed  by the author and published in Chapter Five of Pakistan Army till 1965-Op Cit Pages-405,406 & 407-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

36Tables as computed/constructed  by the author and published in Chapter Five of Pakistan Army till 1965-Op Cit  based on details from Pages-408 & 409-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

37Tables as computed/constructed  by the author and published in Chapter Five of Pakistan Army till 1965-Op Cit  based on details from Pages Pages-408 & 409-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

38Heathcote stated that the class composition of these  Bombay troops who fought at Maiwand  was from outside Bombay and from Punjab etc. Page-88- The Indian  Army-T.A Heathcote-David and Charles-London-1974. Figures of the Frontier Expeditions are based on table given on  Pages-654 & 655-Appendix-Four- Record of the Expeditions against North West Frontier Tribes ÐLieutenant Colonel W.H Paget & Lieutenant  A.H Mason-First Published-1873-Revised Edition-1884-Whiting & Company Limited-London-1884.

39Page-129-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

40Page-138-J.W Fortescue-History of the British Army-Volume-XIIÑLondon-1929.

41Page-138-Ibid.

42 Page-138 and 456-Ibid

Chart No. 29

Name of Unit                   New Designation                   Remarks

10 Madras Infantry

10th Gurkha Rifles from September 1961

The Madrasis were mustered out/pensioned and replaced by Gurkhas/Assamese in 1890. In 1895 the unit became a pure Gurkha unit while retaining the title of Madras infantry; finally becoming a Gurkha rifles unit by name in 1901.

15 Madras Infantry

Redesignated as 3rd Madras

regiment in 1922.

Disbanded between 1923 and 1928.

17 Madras Infantry

18 Madras Infantry

13 Madras Infantry

19 Madras Infantry

26 Madras Infantry

Redesignated as 77 and 78th Moplah rifles between 1902 and 1904.

Madrasis were replaced by pure Moplah Muslims both units were disbanded in 1907 when Moplahs showed disaffection.

1 Madras Infantry

4 Madras Infantry

21 Madras Infantry

Converted into Pioneers around 1880.

Disbanded in 1933.

2 Madras Infantry

6 Madras Infantry

16 Madras Infantry

22 Madras Infantry

24 Madras Infantry

First redesignated as 62, 66, 76, 82 and 84 Punjabi in 1903 redesignated as first Punjab regiment in 1922.

Justice demands that the post-1922 Punjab unit which had nothing to do with battle honours of the pre-1880 Madras infantry be barred from claimed the old battle honours won by the Ethnic Madrassi troops!

7 Madras Infantry

9 Madras Infantry

12 Madras Infantry

14 Madras Infantry

27 Madras Infantry

The process of Punjabisation in terms of recruitment started in 1890. By 1903 these units were redesignated as Punjabi units and 60 was added to their old numbers redesignated as second Punjab regiment in 1922.

Ditto

29 Madras Infantry

30 Madras Infantry

31 Madras Infantry

32 Madras Infantry

33 Madras Infantry

Punjabi recruitment started in 1890s and the units were redesignated as Punjabis in 1903 redesignated as 8th Punjab regiment in 1922.

Ditto

43Page-289-S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

44Reconstructed in Chapter Five Pakistan Army in 1965ÐOp Cit-based on details given on Pages-349, 360 & 361-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

45Page-361-Matter of Honour-Philip Mason-Jonathan Cape-London-1974. Pages-9,130 to 142, 240,244,and 341-John Gaylor-Sons of John Company-Lancer-1994.Pages-216 and 217-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit. The following table illustrates how the Madras Army was first reduced and finally disbanded:-

46Page-217-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

47Page-157-John Gaylor-Op Cit.

48Page-10-Report of  the  Special Commission appointed by His Excellency  the Governor General in Council to Inquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in India-Government Printing Press-Simla-1879.

49This is an important point, since the general opinion held by many Pakistani officers as I personally observed was that the British preferred the Punjabi Muslims because they were more martial than both the Hindu (who were more numerous in the army till 1885) as well as the Hindustani Muslim. The facts are self-explanatory

50Pages-441 & 442- Forty One Years in India-Volume TwoÐLord Roberts- William Bentley and Son-1897.

51 Page-11-The Indian Army and the KingÕs Enemies-1900-1947ÐCharles Chenevix  Trench-Printed in German-1988

52The Hindustani Muslims included those from east of Jumna  river and those from the districts of Rohtak Gurgaon Hissar and Karnal which became part of Punjab, in 1858  were regarded after 1857 as relatively less reliable but continued to be recruited in almost the same ratio as before 1857 till 1885 when General Roberts became the C in C of the Bengal Army. Their recruitment was not reduced as a punishment for joining the rebellion of 1857, as far as British Indian Governments policy was concerned, as is mistakenly assumed, but because Roberts as an individual, was biased against them based on his experiences in 1857 as a young officer, when he saw them joining the rebellion. It must be remembered that Roberts as an individual was also deadly against Indians being inducted as commissioned officers.

53 Page-95-T.A Heathcote-Op Cit and  Pages-154 & 159-The Armies of India-Major General Macmunn-London-1938.

54 Pages-153 , 154,159 and 169-Major Macmunn-Op Cit  and Pages 428, and 460 till 466-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

55Page-217-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

56 Appendix Four-Page-202-T.A Heathcote-Op Cit.

57Page-7-Appendix Nine-Recruiting in India-Before and during the War of 1914-1918- Army Headquarters-India-October 1919.

58Pages-185 & 186-Major Macmunn-Op Cit.

59Pages-51 & 58- India and World War One- S.D Pradhan ÐColumbia University Press-1978.

60Series of Articles by Mr Chaudhris article "The Martial Races of India" published in   Modern Review    in July 1930, September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.

61 Figures of recruits have been taken from IndiaÕs Contribution to the Great War-Government of India-Calcutta-1923 and from-Page-97 Statutory Commission  Report-Volume One-. Government Of India Publications-Calcutta-1930-The population figures are not of 1914-1918 but based on the 1921 figures as given on Page-238 of Cambridge History of India-The Indian Empire-Volume-Six-.Edited by H.H Dodwell-Reprint-S.S Chand and Company-New Delhi-1988.

62Page-228-F.W Perry-Commonwealth ArmiesÐManpower and Organisation-Manchester-1988.

63Pages-425 and 426-Philip Mason-Op Cit.Pages-278 to 280-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

23 Page-164-John Gaylor-Op Cit.Class composition based on the authority of  MerwetherÕs description. The 129 Baluch was also the first Indian unit which served in Japan. This happened in 1864. See Page-496-TheIndian Corps in France-Op Cit.This unit was also greatly praised by Von Lettow Vorbeck, against whom it fought in East Africa. Later the same unit, renumberd as 11 Baluch distinguished itself at Pandu in the 1947-48 Kashmir War.

64Page-425-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

65Page-442-Ibid.

66Articles by Mr Chaudhri-op Cit.

67Ibid.

68Figures as given in map facing    page-96-Indian Statutory Commission Report-Op Cit.

69Appendix-The Army in India and Its EvolutionÐGovernment Printing Press-Calcutta-1924

70Page-402ÐCambridge History-Volume Six-Op Cit.

71Page-116- C.C Trench ÐOp Cit.

72Page-27-The Frontier Scouts-C.C Trench-Oxford University Press-1986.

73Pages-100 to 102-F.W Perry-Op Cit.

74Pages-120 to 129- Annual Return showing Class Composition of the Indian Army, Indian State Forces, Frontier Corps Levies, Military Police, Assam Rifles, Burma Frontier Force, Hong Kong Singapore Artillery-India Office Library Records-L/MIL/14/234.

75Pages-243 & 244-History of the Second World WarÐCaptain B.H Liddell Hart-Pan Books-London-1970.

76 Pages-247-Ibid.

76Calculated from various tables and statistics given in Appendix-Fifteen- Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945ÐS.N Prasad and Dharm Pal-Combined Inter Services Historical Section-India and Pakistan-1956.

77 Page-101-The Pakistan Army-1947-1949-Army Book Club-1989.

78Page-653-Appendix Seven-While Memory Serves--General Francis Tucker.

79 Based on this scribes personal calculation and may not be wholly accurate.

80 The Total Strength of the Indian Army in 1940 has been taken from Annual Return as referred to in End Note Number-2 of this chapter. The Total Recruited figures have been taken from Appendix Thirteen of the Book Cited in End Note Number-10  above mentioned in this chapter

81 Appendix Thirteen and Fifteen of  Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945-Op Cit.

82Page-95-The Indian Army-Cohen-Op Cit.

83Page-349-Ibid.

84Page-133-C.C Trench-Op Cit

85Page-362-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.