Islamabad’s Rethink On Kashmir

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA makes a very logical case for a fresh approach to the major problem be-devilling relations between India and Pakistan.

For Islamabad the negatives of Kargil appear to have been played out. Delhi is now compelled to deal with the root cause of Kargil Ñ the Kashmir issue. Islamabad too has seen wisdom in pursuing a policy more responsive to the ground situation in Indian occupied Valley and one that will ensure long and sustained pressure on the Indian government. While Islamabad has concretely demonstrated flexibility on its previously held political, military and diplomatic aspects of its Kashmir policy Delhi has been forced to moderate its inflexible position on no dialogue with Pakistan or with any other Kashmiri group struggling for the Kashmiri right for self-determination.

Change in Islamabad’s position on Kashmir was initiated immediately after General Pervez Musharraf took over. As the coup maker and the one seen as being the architect of Kargil, the general moved swiftly to take confidence building measures on Kashmir. In his first address to the nation he announced partial withdrawal of Pakistani troops from along the LoC and from international borders. This was followed by a repeated call for unconditional Indo-Pak dialogue on Kashmir between  Musharraf and the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. Musharraf’s repeated offer that he was willing to meet Vajpayee ‘at any place and at any time’ was met by a ‘no no’ by Delhi. Not until ‘cross-border terrorism’ is stopped demanded Vajpayee.  Musharraf stood his ground.

Almost in response to this Indian position which claimed that Kashmiri armed fighters entered the Valley under cover from Pakistani troop firing, in June Musharraf let the Americans know that he was willing to initiaite a unilateral ceasefire along the LoC. On June 17 the little publicized ceasefire went into operation. However, followed by the Hizbul Mujahideen offer for talks and the Satisingpora massacre,  the Indian response which appeared focused on keeping Pakistan out of the dialogue fray and the Mujahideen and Islamabad insisting on immediate involvement of Islamabad in any dialogue on Kashmir ensured that  the ceasefires would not progress towards the beginning of a dialogue process on Kashmir.

However, developments since end November when the Indian Prime Minister declared ceasefire in the Valley positive responses from the Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris represented by APHC and the armed groups suggest that the beginning of a dialogue process on Kashmir is likely. Currently as we witness what can be identified as the ‘preface phase’ to a genuine dialogue on Kashmir, Delhi has extended the ceas-fire, Islamabad has declared maximum restraint along the LoC, opted for partial withdrawal of troops from along the LoC and  have given APHC its due central position in the Kashmiri struggle recognising at the same time that without closer coordination between the armed groups and APHC the strategic strengthening of the Kashmiri struggle will not be possible. Islamabad has also demonstrated its flexibility in not demanding an immediate and very structured tripartite dialogue. While it rightly sees that as a goal, in the immediate context its hope that all three parties to the Kashmir issue will engage in talks with each other.   Initial reaction from Delhi too suggests that Vajpayee will sooner rather than later opt for a bilateral Pak-India ‘composite dialogue.’

Multiple factors have contributed to these developments. The Indian establishment realizes  that it has exhausted the propaganda dividends from Pakistan’s Kargil offensive. Delhi did  use the Kargil episode effectively to crystalize international opinion against Pakistan’s Kargil  offensive and subsequently against what the international community interpreted as Pakistan’s militaristic Kashmir policy. However, at the same time Islamabad launched a diplomatic peace offensive offering dialogue to India while on the ground the morale and the activities of the Kashmiri freedom fighters hit an unprecedented high. Kargil, therefore, did not amount to ‘getting India off the hook’ on Kashmir. The propaganda benefits from Kargil did not make the problem disappear. In fact it established, in the eyes of the Indians and the international community the centrality of the Kashmir issue in any effort aimed at diffusing explosive tensions in a nuclear-armed region. That Kargil or no Kargil, the fact that Pakistan was an integral part of the Kashmir issue and could not be by-passed, was in fact more forcefully established after Kargil.

The movements on Kashmir are linked to a rethink of  Islamabad and Delhi’s respective positions on Kashmir. In Islamabad there is realization that primacy of the political moves over military moves is indispensable to mobilizing protracted and organized Kashmiri as well as international support for the Kashmiri right of  self-determination. In Delhi there is a realization that mere negative posturing on Pakistan can no longer stave off domestic, Kashmiris and international pressure on India. While international pressure has not amounted to much, indeed the ground situation in Kashmir and the opposition’s demand that the government re-open dialogue with Pakistan have been central in the ostensible softening of Delhi’s posture on Kashmir.

Delhi’s moves can be tactical aimed at lessening international pressure, at ensuring administrative peace in the occupied Valley; at buying time to refurbish its military machine and for driving a wedge within the APHC and between APHC and the armed Kashmiri groups. Alternatively there may be a genuine desire in Delhi to resolve the half a century old ‘bleeding wound’ of South Asia. Given the Indian establishment’s constant reiteration that Kashmir is an integral part of India,  the nature of Delhi’s past engagement with APHC and with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and Delhi’s failure to have taken any concrete step to reduce the presence of its occupying forces stationed in the Valley or to engage in trilateral negotiations on Kashmir, may force many to conclude that the Indian moves are merely tactical.

Such conclusions notwithstanding it is in the best interest of Pakistan and the Kashmiris that Islamabad stays the course it has wisely adopted. Of devising a strategy through which Islamabad is giving dialogue a chance without compromising on either its fundamental commitment to the Kashmiri right for self-determination. Islamabad also appears ready to exercise patience where an Indian response is concerned. No immediate responses are demanded. No threats of scuttling what can potentially be the beginning of a genuine dialogue, have been issued. Islamabad and the Kashmiris should both recognize, that a wisely devised and pursued strategy on Kashmir will make sure that time will be on the side of the Kashmiris. India needs to recognize this factor. A genuine rethink in Delhi on the  fundamentals of its Kashmir policy can alone ensure the beginning of a genuine and fruitful dialogue on Kashmir.