Shield of Dreams
US-NMD Programme-Will It Trigger A New Cold War?

Columnist SHERJEEL RIZWAN ZEB discusses the proposed US missile shield.

INTRODUCTION

Mark Thompson wrote in Time, May 8, 2000:

‘Deep in some industrial warren, perhaps in Pyongyang, engineers carefully machine a nuclear bomb. On the other side of Asia, may be in Tehran, chemists fill bomb-lets with deadly nerve gas. Farther West, let's say in Baghdad, Scientists ladle toxins into a biological warhead. US officials believe it is happening. More important, they fear it is only a matter of time before one of those nations -North Korea, Iran or Iraq - lobs a missile towards the US. That is why, inside a secret factory in Tueson, Ariz; US. scientists are crafting 140 cm. long, 55-Kg missile killers. These exo-atmospheric kill vehicles are designed to smash invading weapons 225 Km above the earth's surface, long before they can reach a US city and kill thousands, if not millions. At the Pentagon, military officers are drafting plans for sky-scouring radars designed to stand perpetual guard against just such an attack. At the western tip of Alaska's Aleutian Islands, military surveyors assess sites at which construction of the most critical of those radars is set to begin a year from now.

With scant public debate, the US is on the verge of building an ever more costly missile shield. Although it is a fact that the geopolitical implications will resurrect the cold war. Says UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: "It could well lead to a new arms race."

The first test, over the Pacific last October, blasted a fake war head to Smithereens. But the second, in January, missed by about 135m when a few molecules of water froze inside a cooking pipe 0.09 mm in diameter, the width of a human hair and shut down the interceptor heat seeking sensors. The third test took place on July 8 also failed. Fired at a dummy warhead twenty minutes after it had been launched, the hit to kill weapon did not reach the target warhead due to its failure to separate itself from its booster rocket.

BACKGROUND

In late 1960s when, at the height of the Soviet-American Cold War, the Johnson Administration grappled with the possibility of seeking total American immunity from Soviet missile attack by building an anti- ballistic missile (ABM) defence. Faced with the irrefutable logic of the technical argument that no ballistic missile defence system could ever be devised that would provide either side with a guarantee that it could escape disaster in a nuclear exchange, the United States signed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972. The ABM treaty and its 1974 Protocol limited both parties to a single ABM deployment areas each, which may include upto 100 interceptor missiles. The ABM Treaty embodied mutual recognition of three fundamental strategic realities: (1) Effective territorial defence against nuclear weapons is technically infeasible; (2) the pursuit of such a defence would be strategically destabilizing, and (3) such a defence would preclude negotiated constraints on offensive nuclear forces. The validity of these premises was called into question by President Reagan in 1983.

In his now famous "star wars" speech of March 1983, President Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a "Comprehensive and intensive effort with the ultimate goal of elimination of the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the dissipation of the threat of missile attack by the "evil empire" put the pursuit of $ 26 billion SDI on hold. However, the Republican controlled Congress revived the idea of a limited national missile defence in 1995. Caving in to mounting congressional pressure, the Clinton Administration announced in 1996 it, "3+3" programme which would first develop and then possibly deploy an NMD System in two phases of three years each. Taking an alarmist view of acquisition of long-range missile capabilities by such countries as North Korea and Iran, President Clinton approved the National Missile Defence Act in July 1999 which committed Washington to "deploy a limited NMD, system as soon as technological feasible.1

Through the formal launching of the NMD programme on a 3+3 schedule was dated 1997, its genesis can be traced back to the first and second reviews (June/July, 1987 and Sept. 1987) of the SDI programme conducted by the Defence Acquisition Board of the US Secretary of Defence. As a fall-out of these reviews, a Phase I architecture was approved and six specific components of the SDI programme were cleared for further demonstration and evaluation. In this phase, the mission was to enhance deterrence against a Soviet first strike and the planned defence involved thousands of interceptors based on ground as well as in space.

Meanwhile, there was considerable debate within the USA calling for a realistic assessment of the SDI programme.2

In 1989, the Bush administration decided to hold a review of the national security requirements and Ambassador Henry F. Cooper3 was requested by the Secretary of Defence, Richard Cheney to carry out an independent review of the SDI programme. Cooper submitted his report in March 1990, and in it he spelt out the concept of refocusing the programme, which later came to be known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The GPALS was to protect the USA, US forces overseas and its friends and allies against limited ballistic missile strikes. The concept involved hundreds of interceptors based on the ground as well as in space. The cornerstone of the concept was a path-breaking idea that later came to be known as Brilliant Pebbles. 4

In January 1991, President Bush formally announced the reorientation of the SDI programme to the GPALS.5 The break-up of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the lessons from the 1991 Gulf War had influenced the reorientation of the US BMD efforts to a great extent. The end of the Cold War and a much meeker Russia considerably reduced the threat of a massive, sophisticated ICBM attack on the US. On the other hand, the Gulf war drove home the reality of the threat posed by the theatre ballistic missiles in the hands of Third World countries to the US forces and their allies on overseas campaigns. Moreover, the Gulf War and its consequences set the tone for future threats that could reach the US homeland by hostile or irrational entities with access to missile as well as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) technologies. With this background, the BMD efforts were channelised into two distinct thrust areas viz, the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)6 and the National Missile Defence (NMD).

In April 1997, the BMDO established the Joint Programme Office (JPO) for the National Missile Defence programme after submitting the cost-benefit analysis report that was required by the FY 1997 Defence Appropriation Conference Report. The JPO was to be responsible for the design, development and demonstration of an NMD system to defend the US from Ballistic Missile attacks, by the year 2003, which came to be known as the 3 plus 3 NMD programme of the Clinton administration. The DOD budget request for FY 2001 has

$ 10.4 billion included through fiscal 2005 for the programme. If approved, the budget would allow DOD to upgrade the existing early warning facilities, provide 100 ground based interceptors and fund additional testing. 7

National Missile Defence (NMD)

The American NMD plan consists of following major components: Ground based interceptors employing exoating morphemic Kinetic Kill vehicles comprising small rockets which use multi-spectral sensors, including long-ware infra-red, to home in on their targets outside the atmosphere; Ground-based X-band tracking radars, either collocated with an NMD site or deployed elsewhere; upgraded ballistic missile early warning radars to provide warning and cueing information to the X-band radars, and to provide track data on missile trajectories beyond x-band range; two space based sensor systems: the space based Infra-Red System High Earth Orbit (SBIRS-High) Satellites; and the Space Based Infra Red System Low Earth Orbit (SBIRS-Low) cluster of Satellites designed to provide track and decoy discrimination data on objects in space.

A battle management and command, control and communication system based at the North American Aerospace Defence headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain Colorado. This system will integrate sensor data for early-warning, tracking and decoy discrimination, allocate interceptors against incoming targets; allow human intervention in the launch decision and provide communication links with the various elements of the NMD system, including a data link to interceptors in flight.

The NMD system is to be deployed in three phases. In the first phase, the capability -1 phase, which will become operational between 2003 and 2005, there are to be 20 to 100 ground based interceptors X-band radar based in Alaska which are primarily designed to handle, Small Unsophisticated threats involving approximately five warheads and only simple penetration aids. Alaska is the preferred site because it provided maximum coverage of all fifty US States against potential North Korean attacks. During the second phase, to be completed by 2010, the system will handle larger threats and more sophisticated penetration aids. It will do so by deploying 100 interceptors; three X-band radars co-located with early warning radars in Alaska, Greenland and the UK; one additional in flight interceptor communication system deployed in Missouri and SBIRS-Low satellites. During the third phase of its deployment, to be completed by 2015, the NMD system will have a total of 250 interceptors based in Alaska and North Dakota; an additional in flight interceptor communication in Hawaii; a new ballistic missile early warning radar and an X-band tracking radars in South Korea; and four additional X-band radars at Beale Air Force Base, Cape Cod and Grand Forks, and in Hawaii.8

Now we will study the Architecture of NMD in detail:-

The Architecture

The current NMD architecture has three principal components,9

• Long range sensors

• Ground based interceptors (GBI)

• Battle Management Command Control and Communication (BMC3) element.

The long range sensors acquire, track and identify the re-entry vehicles (RV) among debris and decoys, provide tracking information to the BMC3 and gather data to verify destruction of the RV. The Ground Based interceptors, capable of intercepting the RVs beyond the earth's atmosphere, receive and process the inflight target updates, perform target selection and achieve target destruction. The BMC3 performs the integration of target warning and tracking data, preparation of engagement and the final battle execution.

Long-Range Sensors

The long-range sensors in the NMD architecture include three types of target tracking sensors.

• Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR)

• Forward Deployed and/or US-based X-band tracking Radars (XBR)

• Space Based Infra Red Satellite (SBIRS) Systems.

The UEWR is an upgrade of the existing, large, fixed, phased array early warning radar network. The primary role of these radars will be to track the targets during their mid course phase,10 mainly to cue11 the more precise X-band radars. The XBRs are X-band radars, stationed in the US and/or forward deployed, designed to acquire the incoming warheads, track them, distinguish them from decoys and assess whether they have been destroyed, after the engagement. They are configured to operate at sufficiently high frequencies and use advanced Digital Signal Processing (DSP) techniques to achieve better target resolution, superior to the existing levels. These radars are expected to perform more effectively against closely speed warheads, debris and penetration aids.12

The space-based infrared satellite (SBIRS) system is a proposed network of early warning satellite in low as well as high (SBIR low and SBIR high) geo-synchronous orbits. This network will eventually replace the existing Defence Support Programme (DSP) Satellites. Both SBIR and DSP satellites use infrared (IR) sensors to detect and track ballistic missiles throughout their fight. Once in place, the SBIRS will provide over the horizon acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles. These satellites will detect the missiles during the launch phase and will continue tracking them while simultaneously gathering information on them.

Ground Based Interceptors

The Ground-Based interceptor (GBI) of the NMD consists of a rocket booster and on Exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). The task of the rocket booster is to take the EKV to an area, probably in outer space, where it can locate the incoming missile in mid-course phase. Once separated from the rocket booster, the EKV will function autonomously. It will have its own set of sensors, propulsion, communications and guidance to undertake the interception. It is a Hit-to-Kill concept wherein the destruction is achieved by physically smashing into the target at a very high speed. The enormous amount of kinetic energy transferred is achieved by physically smashing into the target at a very high speed. The enormous amount of kinetic energy transferred in such high-velocity collisions will practically atomise the physical matter involved, whatever their original form may have been. A hundred such interceptors are budgeted in the current programme.

Battle Management - Command, Control and Communication (BMC3) System

The BMC3 is the nerve centre of the NMD architecture. It holds the key to plan, coordinate, direct and control the weapons and sensors in near-real-time situation, across the globe.13 It will be a ground based set up located in the CONTUS.

Integrated Flight Tests (IFT)

Considering that a majority of the technologies that may go into realizing the NMD programme is better described as "Cutting-edge-level" and still evolving, the most logical way to build up the architecture is to integrate them incrementally. The approach, hence, will be to begin with assessing emerging element technology capabilities, followed by system technical performance and finally, the overall system maturity. Accordingly a series of Integrated Flight Tests (IFT) are planned under NMD, which are designed to:-

• Collect system level data that addresses the system issues, and key technological parameters.

• Address the NMD element's critical issues and verify their performance and,

• Demonstrate system effectiveness.

IFT 1A and IFT2 were to provide wide an assessment of the GBI Sensor technology and performance, IFT3 and IFT4 were to evaluate the target discrimination and actual interception of RVs by EKVs and IFT5 was identified as the initial integrated system test, evaluating the feasibility of the current NMD system performance.14 These flight tests serve as an assessment of incremental system maturity. With the phased inclusion of various system components, as and when they become technologically feasible, the test structure will themselves evolve into comprehensive NMD integrated system tests.15

BMDO has used the idea of surrogation in structuring the integrated flight tests to avoid the risk of rushing with nascent technologies. Except for the exoatmospheric kill vehicle and its sensor package, surrogates have been used for all other major components, which are yet to mature, in the NMD architecture, during these tests.16  True to the philosophy of IFTs, the level of surrogation was reduced progressively as and when the actual system prototypes become available. Optimum use of existing facilities like the GPS17 and the DSP satellites are two cases in point.

EKV-Exo-Atomospheric Kill Vehicle

EKV is the weapon system of the programme. It is a hit to kill vehicle, nicknamed smart rock, which is supposed to destroy the target by crashing into it at a very high speed (2,200 m/sec). A dedicated booster will deliver the EKV at a suitable point in space from where it will function autonomously. The EKV a state of the art product will have an up-link transmission facility with BMC3, an onboard navigation and guidance package, a sensor package consisting of a high performance telescope, two multi-wave-band IR focal plane arrays sensors, one visual sensor, cryogenic cooling assembly to support the IR arrays, propulsion systems and onboard power supplies. The inertial measurement unit which is responsible for guiding the EKV to the vicinity of the target, is supplemented by a confirmation using stellar navigation.18

The EKV will use its sensors to detect the target complex based on the preliminary data supplied to it, select the right target and guide itself to a direct, high-speed collision with it using on board computers, guidance, control and propulsion system.

NMD-Russian and Chinese Reaction

The NMD has set off alarm bells in China as well as Russia, bringing home to them the in-effectiveness of their own arsenals, if the system gets finally installed.19

China, which possesses a modest stockpile of 13 ICBMs, has warned that the NMD would re-ignite a nuclear arms race. The apparently limited system could evolve in course of time and neutralize its nuclear deterrence. To forestall that possibility there would be an inevitable diversion of resources from the economic and social sector projects to the military sphere, as a result, in pinging upon the prospects of Beijing's emergence as a super power in the foreseeable future. Seen in the perspective of Washington's other moves to create problems for and, indeed contain China, it is not a far-fetched idea, rather one of the principal concerns of the United States. The undeniable encouragement which it is giving to Taiwan in its espousal of the policy of independence through political and military support in violation of its own commitments to Beijing of a restricted arms supply to what China regards as its renegade province, and the indecent enthusiasm shown in befriending India, even if it meant the soft-pedalling of its opposition to nuclear proliferation, are clear manifestations of this policy. Beijing's protests that the existing delicate strategic balance would be upset by the NMD has met with the state department's unconvincing response that the interceptor force would be too small to create worthwhile imbalance. Following China suit in the nuclear arms build up would be India, which would have a golden opportunity of fulfilling its dream of self-aggrandizement. At the same time it would be hampered in achieving economic prosperity that is a sine qua non - for becoming a world power of any stature, fitting in with Washington's overall strategic game. Pakistan with all its protestations of modesty would have to raise the level of its minimum deterrence, truly described as a dynamic concept. The NMD has obviously jolted the Russians as well who have certainly not been happy with the fall in their status in international politics, and are desperate to regain their past glory. They have voiced strong opposition to it, plainly refusing to countenance any amendments of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 that the deployment of the NMD System would entail. The recent visit of President Clinton and Defence Secretary William Cohen to Moscow failed to convince President Vladimir Putin that the emerging strategic reality resulting from the proliferation of missile technology and development had left the United States with no option but to have recourse to the NMD for its defence. The Kremlin did recognize the existence of the threat, but not the validity of the US response. Independent political and military analysts would find it difficult to disagree with the assertion made by Russian Defence Ministry lgor Sergeyov that "pulling out of the 1972 ABM Commitment would amount to restarting the arms race. Should the very cornerstone of strategic stability become eroded, we will have a big problem putting things in check in this area.20

China and Russia have joined hands in voicing their strong opposition to American plans for NMD system. The joint statement issued after the one day summit between President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin, described NMD as "a measure which sought uni-internal military and security advantages for the United States and warned that implementing this plan will have the most adverse consequences not only for the security of Russia and China and other countries, but also for the security of the US and global strategic stability."

The statement also warned against deployment of any non-strategic missile defence system that would undermine security interest of other countries and clearly said that incorporating Taiwan in any foreign missile defence system in any way is unacceptable and will seriously undermine regional stability.

According to Ambassador ShaZuKang, director-general of the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, "the real motive of the US government in developing NMD at an accelerated pace is to make use of the country's unrivalled economic and technological might to grab the strategic high ground for the 21st Century in both the scientific and military fields, so as to break the existing global strategic balance, seek absolute security itself and realise its ambitions for world domination.

According to General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of China's Military Commission during a June 9, 1999 meeting with Marshal Sergeyov Russia's minister of defence: "Any country selling the theatre missile defence system to China's Taiwan in the TMD Programme will directly or indirectly put Taiwan in the framework of Japan-US Security Cooperation, which will be a grave infringement in China's internal affairs.

Notwithstanding American denials that China is a major target of its NMD programme, Beijing remains firm in its belief that the proposed system can be directed against China and if deployed it will seriously undermine China's limited deterrent nuclear capability. To show its anti-China thrust, Beijing has advanced four arguments. One, advanced theatre missile defences and NMD systems are technically so closely intertwined that some of the former have the potential to intercept strategic missiles. Two, the introduction of advanced TMD system into North East Asia will chance US capabilities to meddle in regional affairs. Third, the US-Japan joint development of TMD systems will accelerate Japan's re-militarisation, evoking fears and feelings of insecurity among East Asian countries particularly in the Korean peninsula. These negative perceptions will undermine prospects for regional detente and hamper ongoing efforts to resolve the nuclear and missile crises on the Korean peninsula. Finally, since missile technologies and missile defences are mutually convertible, TMD cooperation between United States and Japan is seen in Beijing as a vehicle for transfering advanced missile technology from the former to the latter in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

To dissuade Washington from implementing its plans for NMD and TMD systems, Beijing has made it clear that deployment of these systems will definitely sour Sino-US relations and make China less cooperative in sustaining the global non-proliferation regime. During US Secretary Defence William Cohen's recent visit to Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi state that "we will determine our disarmament policy in accordance with the development of anti-missile systems. Mr. Sha Zukang even went to the extent of saying that pursuit of NMD by Washington will lead to serious confrontation between the USA and China. Rejecting assurances held by Mr. Cohen that the NMD plan was not aimed at China but rather at States of Concern, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Sha Zukang said that does not matter since the consequences are still terrible for US. Warning of the destabilizing regional and global impact of US deployment of NMD system, he said that instead of enhancing your security, your security policy will be further compromised. Apart from articulating its stiff verbal opposition to US plans for NMD, China has adopted certain defensive measures and also has solidified its growing military ties with Russia.21

NMD-Analysis

According to Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International peace "the decision to deploy the system would be driven by domestic politics, not by external threats. The NMD would bring dollars and jobs to Democratic majority areas and win votes for Al Gore in the coming presidential election."

Technologically the system appears to be a non-starter. The three tests conducted so far have come a cropper. Even the first touted by Pentagon as "Complete Success" was not quite so. Its officials later admitted that the kill vehicle had gone-off course and had picked out the large bright decoy balloon instead of the mock warhead. The end game where the EKV tries to collide with the RV draws from the best of engineering technologies of the day some of which are still nascent. It is like to shoot a bullet with another bullet. The endgame begins when the EKV is about 40 Km from the target. The target will be moving at a speed of about 4,400 m/sec. The EKV will be doing a speed of about 2,200 mls. Essentially the feat attempted by the EKV is equivalent to passing through an imaginary through an imaginary 50cm x 50cm x 50cm box moving through space at an incredible velocity of 4,400 m/sec. The accuracy demanded, in time as well as space is unheard of in the known history of engineering technology. An execution error of a billionth of a second can make all the difference. The first point in question is an algorithm or a guidance law that can accomplish this kind of an interception, which has an incredible element of uncertainty. The likely candidate here must be a probable breakthrough in contemporary research in the field of modern guidance laws like to 'Optional Control Guidance Law'.

According to two independent reviews of the NMD programme chaired by Larry Welch, former Air Force Chief of Staff, NMD testing programme has been very aggressive, high risk, which is being by a calendar schedule rather than by events describing the performance of the system." 22

Conclusion

Crucial to NMD's success is the theory that the sensor on a missile interceptor can pick out warhead because it gives off infrared radiation differently than a decoy does as it tumbles through space. Yet, in practice especially in the presence of multiple decoys, it has been found that the sensor lacks the ability to pick out a warhead from decoys. Apart from these inherent technical difficulties marrying the efficacy of the NMD system, it is doubtful that the successful employment of this system will have a stabilizing effect on the prevailing strategic balance between USA and the other nuclear weapon states. According to Wilkening a thin US national missile defences will have deleterious consequences for US-Russian-China nuclear triangle.23 By changing the offence defence balance in favour of the latter, deployment of NMD would force Russia and China to increase the size of their strategic nuclear forces in proportion to that of defence. Adverse Russian and Chinese reactions will undermine the US security in the long-term as they will retard progress toward nuclear arms control and unleash a new spiral of self-defeating nuclear arms race. 24

End Notes

1Dr. Riffaat Hussain, "Testing times for NMD", The News (Islamabad) July 16, 2000.

2In January 1998, Senator Sam Nunn, while speaking to the Arms Control Association, called for a re-orientation of the SDI programme to focus first on developing a "limited system for protecting against accidental and unauthorized missile launches. "In a way, it was an appeal for a long-term, realistic goal to develop a more comprehensive, economical and technically feasible defence system.

3Ambassador Cooper later became the Director of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization (SDIO), in charge of the programme, in July 1990, under the Bush administration.

4The original idea of Brilliant Pebbles was put forward by Lowell Wood, in 1986, who was the champion of emerging technologies as the answer to problem posed by the costly and vulnerable space based missile defence systems. The idea called for the use of powerful computers and sensors to develop much smaller, inexpensive satellites, which are more efficient than the existing large, expensive satellites.

5President George Bush, State of the Union Address", January 29, 1991.

6The TMD was largely intended to protect forward deployed US forces as well as its friends and allies from short-range ballistic anywhere in the world.

7Dean Mathew, "A Failure Revisited": closer look at the Jan. 2000 NMD Test, Strategic Analysis (Vol. No. XXIV, No. 1, April 2000) New Delhi, p.100.

8Dr. Riffaat Hussain, Loc. Cit.

9BMDO fact-sheet No. JN-99-07, "National Missile Defence Integrated Test Programme", March 1999, Ballistic Missile Defence organization, External Affairs, 7100 Defence, Pentagon", Washington DC.

10A typical trajectory of a ballistic missile will have three distinct phases

ĄThe boost phase where the rocket motor is still burning

ĄThe mid-course phase where the missile would have injected the re-entry vehicle(s) into outer space along a ballistic trajectory towards the intended destination.

ĄThe re-entry phase where the RVs re-enter the earth's atmosphere and head towards the designated location on earth.

11Cueing is a technical term to describe the handing-over of targets by less precise, long-range sensors to more precise short-range sensors.

12RMDO Fact-Sheet No. JN-99-07, "Component Elements of the NMD System", March 1998, BMDO, External Affairs, 7100 Defense, Pentagon, Washington DC.

13Developing an efficient software for achieving this task is admittedly one of the major hurdles, proving to be much tougher than developing the corresponding hardware.

14Ibid.

15The flight tests will not only provide the capability to test and evaluate the initial system performance but also be used in conjunction with simulations exercise emulation's, and to evaluate proposed system upgrades or improvements in the elements to incorporate technology and engineering advances as and when they become feasible.

16BMDO Fact-Sheet No. JN-99-07.

17With a GPS link assembled into the mock-warhead, the data on its exact position, in space, was available through the GPS. This data, in various levels of dilation, was used to surrogate for different sensors, cross checking the radar data as well as the post-flight analyses.

18It is one of the most advanced techniques to accurately determine one's position in outer space. It is accomplished by confirming the star constellations, which are expected to be visible along specific directions by comparing them with the star-maps stored on board.

19M.Q. Khan, "NMD, Does it have a hidden agenda", The Nation (Islamabad) data not mentioned.

20Ibid.

21Dr. Riffaat Hussain, "China's response to US missile defence, "The News" (Islamabad)" July 23, 2000.

22Dr. Riffaat Hussain, Loc Cit.

23Ibid

24Ibid.