A triangular approach to initiating talks in Kashmir

ColumnistAHMAD FARUQUI examines new options for KASHMIR.

The Stimson Center of Washington, DC, interviewed Abdul Majid Dar of the Hizbul Mujahideen in early December about the prospects for peace in Kashmir. The full text of the interview is posed on the Center’s web site.1

When asked about the state of militancy today, he stated that:

I think the militancy has matured. Gen. Padmanabhan has said that Indian forces can control the militancy but cannot eradicate it. I agree. The militancy cannot throw out the army and the army cannot eradicate the militancy. Because of this, there has to be a political solution.

Mr. Dar and Gen. Padmanabhan have come to this conclusion after eleven years of armed struggle and bloodshed. Currently, India and Pakistan are collectively spending half a billion dollars on supporting their militaries in Kashmir. While exact numbers are not available, it is estimated that they have deployed about 25% of their military forces in a region that accounts for less than 1% of their combined population, and still no military results of any strategic significance have flowed to either side.

If a military solution to the Kashmir problem was indeed possible, one of the two antagonists -either India or Pakistan - would have emerged as the victor by now. Mr. Dar is also correct in pointing out that several vested interests do not want to achieve peace. He said:

There are some vested interests that do not want to see problems solved because they benefit from bloodshed. These elements need to be controlled. International pressure is needed for India and Pakistan to come to the table.

War-lovers are unfortunately present on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) in abundance. A retired general officer of Pakistan told me last July that if Pakistan was serious about stopping militants from crossing the LoC, it would have no difficulty in enforcing a ban on their movements. In a similar vein, Mr. Dar stated that

I do not agree that Pakistan cannot stop foreign groups. It is impossible for [the foreign groups] to operate without [Pakistan’s] blessings. Day by day, they become stronger, and they will become more difficult to the [Pakistan] government. But at this point, it is not too difficult.

By the same token, one may add that if India wanted to create an environment that is conducive to peace, it would tell its security forces to avoid arresting and killing Kashmiri youth, raping Kashmiri women, and torching entire villages, thereby stopping the vicious cycle of violence.

Stating that peace was the only viable alternative, Dar stated that

Large numbers of people [in the subcontinent] would like to see an end to bloodshed. Unless there is a change in policy by the governments of Pakistan, India, and the foreign militants, the subcontinent will go to hell.

Indirectly, he was alluding to the nuclear holocaust that can ensue in the event of a future war between India and Pakistan, with Kashmir being the most likely trigger point.2 He was critical of both countries that excel at coming up with lame excuses.

Both countries are not serious about the core issue. They are not ready to make bold decisions. Both governments have their own interests. Kashmiris have become sandwiched between them. Let Pakistan come forward and do what India is asking. Then India must reciprocate. The international community must step in.

For years, Pakistan has been asking for a referendum in Kashmir, knowing fully well that India will not accept such conditions. At the same time, Pakistan has never held free elections in the Northern Territories, and the elections that have been held in Azad Kashmir have been of dubious credibility. Such hypocritical support of the right to self-determination has lost all credibility since the army seized power in Pakistan.

Elections in Indian-administered Kashmir have been of dubious credibility as well. India has been insisting on bilateral talks between the two countries for years, but when such talks have taken place, it has said simply that Kashmir is an internal matter on which no discussion is needed. After the Kargil episode, it even added a further requirement that such talks would only be held after Pakistan had stopped ‘cross-border’ terrorism. Overtures by the Swiss foreign minister and more recently by the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to mediate in the conflict have been rebuffed as a Pakistani ploy. The outsiders are told that India and Pakistan can solve the matter between themselves, since ‘we speak the same language.’

Against this tragic and checkered past, many hopeful signs have emerged during the past few months, from both sides. First was the visit to Pakistan of retired Indian General Chibber. He brought a personal message of peace from Prime Minister Vajpayee for General Musharraf. Since Gen. Chibber is recognized as the army commander who seized the Siachen Glacier in 1984, this message carried great credibility. Then came the July ceasefire offer by the Hizbul Mujahideen, followed by India’s Ramzan ceasefire offer and its extension by one month. Finally came Pakistan’s offer to show maximum restraint along the LoC and then its decision to withdraw some of its troops from the LoC.

However, in any protracted conflict, ceasefires come and go. What is needed now is the institutionalization of a durable peace process. Dar concluded by saying that:

Now we are living under undeclared martial law. We must have a representative government for the people that can discuss issues with India and Pakistan. Nobody can say at this time what the final solution will be. But I believe that a peace process must begin somewhere. Let us discuss proposals from India, Pakistan and Kashmiris. Solutions will [eventually] come that are acceptable to all.

One good role model to consider in Kashmir is the one that American senator George Mitchell developed for solving the dispute in Northern Ireland and that is embodied in the Good Friday Peace Accords of 1998. Three strands of dialogues were initiated there, to get around the difficulty of getting all parties to sit around the same table. As Senator Mitchell recounts in his memoirs 3,

Strand One was to deal with Northern Ireland: What institution(s) should be created and policies adopted to provide fair and non-discriminatory self-governance for the people of Northern Ireland? Strand Two was to take care of north-south institutions: What institution(s) should be created and policies? Strand Three concerned so-called east-west issues: What institution(s) should be created and policies adopted to further British-Irish cooperation?

As Professor Bose of the London School of Economics points out, a similar approach is now needed in Kashmir.4 Strand One would involve two sets of dialogue: one between the Kashmiris living on the Pakistani side of the LoC and the Government of Pakistan, and the other between the Kashmiris living on the Indian side of the LoC and the Government of India. Strand Two would involve dialogue between Kashmiris on the two sides of the LoC. Strand Three would involve dialogue between India and Pakistan.

If such an approach is not followed, we will remain mired in the current controversy, with Pakistan and several Kashmir groups wanting to hold tripartite talks and India wanting nothing but bilateral talks with Kashmiri groups. A triangular approach involving three sets of bilateral talks may well get us going on the essential - and long overdue - journey to peace in Kashmir.

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1http://www.stimson.org/cbm/saif/dar.hml

2Ahmad Faruqui, ‘Beyond Strategic Myopia in Kashmir,’ Strategic Review, Winter 2001.

3 George Mitchell, Making Peace, Alfred A. Knopf, 1999.

4 Sumantra Bose, ‘Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace,’ Survival, Autumn 1999.