Reassessing Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy

Columnist Zafar Nawaz Jaspal makes a case study for a pragmatic nuclear strategy.

It is almost three years since Pakistan proclaimed to the world that it is a Nuclear Weapons State, having the capability to deploy credible nuclear deterrent forces. In the foreseeable future, it is not even remotely plausible that it will reverse the actions that it took on May 28 and 30, 1998. The nuclear weapons are beneficial because of the deterrence they offer. Nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of Pakistan’s defence strategy. What most divide, strategists in Pakistan, are their varied assessments of the objective facts of deterrence, of what weapons and what strategies for employing those weapons best serve deterrence. The most important question here is whether our current nuclear policy and the nuclear capable delivery systems that support it are adequate for credible deterrence in the new strategic environment —a sword versus shield competition. The introduction of the ballistic missile defences would alter the prevailing theory of nuclear deterrence, commonly known as mutual assured destruction (MAD), which relies on mutual vulnerability. India has been developing the ballistic missile defence systems. The Indian missile defence system, though defensive in name, is not purely defensive. In fact, it is a part of an overall, integrated defensive and offensive capability that functions to enhance one country’s offensive capability by weakening that of others. The development and deployment of the ballistic missile defence system would destabilize the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

India’s Nuclear Posture

On August 17, 1999 an officially constituted advisory panel to the Indian National Security Council released India’s draft Nuclear Doctrine. It was a logical evolution of India’s nuclear ambitions that it pursued since its independence. The Indian nuclear doctrine envisages the establishment of a triad of nuclear delivery systems (mobile land based missiles, air- and sea-based assets). India has yet to openly deploy a nuclear weapons system — something, which was strongly anticipated in the months immediately following after the May tests. Part of the reason for India’s non-deployment has to do with its concerns about international repercussions. But India is also far from possessing an adequate command and control system, and may well wish to delay open deployment until functional structures and apparatus are in place. But India’s declared interest in achieving an as-yet-undefined minimal deterrent, forecloses any possibility of capping nuclear weapons and missiles in the foreseeable future. Its declared policies show that fissile material production, nuclear weapons and missile development qualitatively and quantitatively, will be sustained. And at the appropriate time these weapons will be deployed.

The dangers associated with nuclear war are so great that the nuclear optimists perceived that India and Pakistan would behave in an extremely cautious manner, while dealing with each other in the post-South Asian nuclearization. However, the Indian strategic pundits’ writings and ruling elite’s statements indicate that war between India and Pakistan has not been made obsolete by nuclear weapons. According to the thesis promoted by the former Defence Minister George Fernandes and ex-Indian Army Chief V. P. Malik last year, covert war (proxy war) and limited conventional border wars are the likely options. The recent Indian provocative military exercise Poorna Vijay (complete victory) was a continuation of the aforementioned strategic mindset. The officially stated purpose of the exercise was to evaluate concepts and practice battle procedures during offensive and defensive operations on the future battlefield, with a nuclear backdrop. Therefore, the exercise was an attempt by India to legitimize conventional war waged under a nuclear umbrella.  But conventional war remains feasible only within defined limitations. It certifies that the nuclear deterrent cannot prevent low-level conventional war in a nuclearized environment. Such policies and exercises have a serious military intent and message.

Pakistan Nuclear Posture

Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India’s substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India’s nuclear threat. India’s policy of upgrading its strong conventional and non-conventional military muscle, and the nature of relations between India and Pakistan, mean that Pakistan must continuously maintain a strong defence vis-a-vis India. Pakistan has pursued a doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence and conventional defence to balance India’s nuclear and conventional forces.

The decision to respond promptly to the nuclear tests that India carried out in May 1998, and to its Agni-II Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) test-firing in April 1999, demonstrated Pakistan’s ability to cope with complex technological and strategic issues pertaining to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems development. The May 1998 nuclear tests and April 1999 Shaheen-I and Ghauri-II IRBM tests enhanced the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent against Indian political coercion or military invasion. In fact, Ghauri missiles equipped with the latest guidance technology are able to hit all major Indian cities, nuclear facilities, and strategic installations. Ghauri-II can also engage India’s naval bases in the east with its optimal range of 2300 kilometers. Pakistan’s deterrence can be further augmented by its decision to assemble a small nuclear force rapidly, to diversify weapons by using designs that rely on both uranium and plutonium, to develop comprehensive missile programmes, and to take steps to miniaturize nuclear warheads1. Pakistan’s fissile material capacity seems enough for two to three nuclear weapons per year. The non-official estimates of Pakistan’s fissile material stockpile would enable it to produce twenty-five to forty nuclear weapons, enough for a small-scale minimum deterrence force.

On February 2, 2000, Pakistan established a well-defined National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA’s aim is to create command and control mechanisms for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, on November 27, 2000 all the strategic organizations were placed under the control of the NCA. But the perfect deterrence can only be achieved through weaponization. In September 2000, it was reported in the national press that the government had decided to give the Shaheen-I missile to the Army. Its induction in the Army would significantly enhance the offensive capability of Pakistan’s forces and re-establish the strategic balance between the Indian and Pakistani armies, undermined by the deployment of Prithvi-I. It is because Shaheen-I is considered technologically a superior missile than Prithvi-I due to its terminal guidance, solid propellant system and long-range characteristics. In addition, Shaheen-II, a missile with a 2500km range, is ready for a test flight. Besides it, the Khan Research Laboratories have been working on a 3000km range Ghauri-III, which successfully went through static engine tests in October 19992.  These missiles would be capable of striking deep into Southern India.

It seems that in the present strategic scenario Pakistan possesses enough strategic weaponry capability to provide it with a minimum nuclear deterrence. The basis of this perception is that in nuclear deterrence, parity between opponents is not based on numerical equality of the number of nuclear delivery systems, or of the number of warheads or in the yield of megatons available to each opponent. Parity requires assured destruction capability.

Destabilizing Developments

India and Pakistan both have decided that to commission their short and intermediate range nuclear capable ballistic missiles to their arms forces. The deployment of ballistic missiles would pose severe consequential security risks given the relatively short distances between major population centres in India and Pakistan and the brief time required for missiles to travel such distances, i.e. three to eleven minutes. This factor will compress decision-making cycles for national leaders and battlefield commanders, reducing stability during times of crisis.

India has been developing the ballistic missile defence systems by fusing the foreign and domestic research and missile components. Despite that thousands of Indian scientists have been working on the missile projects, India still needs the foreign assistance for the development of its Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). It has been receiving foreign technology (covertly/overtly) for its missile defence project from the Russian Federation and Israel3. India’s other preference for augmenting its TMD capability is to buy these missiles from friendly states. For example, Israel is transferring its Arrow- Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon- Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. India is also developing an AEW platform equipped with phased array radar technology, similar to be used by Phalcon, to cue its Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system. Therefore, India had negotiated an agreement with the Russian Federation for the acquisition of an advanced air defence system with ATBM capability—either the S-300 PMU-1 or the S-300V. The S-300 PMU-1 is a highly mobile surface to air missile system. In addition, the Indian Navy has recently finalized the deal regarding the purchase of the Barak anti-missile defence system with Israel. Barak missile is designed to operate in high-clutter environment against small fast targets. Its range is 6-8 kilometres. It can deal with sea skimmers coming in at under a metre in height. Moreover it was reported that three Russian-built Krivak III class stealth frigates to be commissioned to the Indian Navy in 2002. These frigates built for India under a $1 billion deal signed in 1997. Fitted with the most sophisticated weapons, the frigates can destroy Pakistan’s Agosta submarines in one-to-one encounter, much before coming into the range of their torpedoes4.

Nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which requires constant vigilance to detect and counteract destabilizing developments. Moreover, a nuclear balance is achieved when each side, after absorbing an initial blow, has a second-strike force able to destroy the opponent’s homeland. Pakistan’s geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth and the Indians’ commitment to introduce more sophisticated nuclear capable delivery systems, like cruise missile5, and ballistic missile defence systems pose challenges to Pakistan’s security. The Indian weapons procurement and development policy has potential to erode the strategic equilibrium and shift balance of power in favour of India. The calculus of real politik holds that the India safe-behind missile shield might be more likely to adopt military adventurous policies against Pakistan. For instance, by neutralizing Pakistan’s retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of anti-missile systems, the Indians could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. This indicates that Pakistan’s present strategic capabilities cannot provide it a reliable second-strike capability. Therefore, the caution against relying on forces that are too small is obvious. In fact, small forces would presumably be easier to destroy in a first strike and, therefore, would have less credibility as a deterrent because the surviving forces might not be able to retaliate. Based on this, nuclear balance requires some balance in terms of numbers of weapons and their technologies. With sizeable forces on both sides, the aggressor cannot be certain of a successful first strike.

Conclusion

The nuclear weapons capability of Pakistan has established the strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. The clear implication of it is that India’s attitude towards Pakistan would be much different in the past years, especially in summer 1999, if there had been no nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Therefore, nuclear deterrence against India is the significant defence strategy for Pakistan. Should it rely on its present strategic capabilities? Is there not greater safety in diversity? These are some of the important questions, which demand serious attention from Pakistani strategic analysts and policy-makers. One can legitimately argue that triad forces — land based missiles, bombers and submarines — make that much more certain. Possession of several systems greatly reduces India’s ability to destroy all Pakistan’s retaliatory forces and makes it far more difficult to defend against a second strike. Therefore, the components of Pakistan’s nuclear force should be land-based missiles; aircraft and nuclear-equipped air and submarine launched missiles. For the sustainability of its deterrence, Pakistan ought to initiate research in the development of more sophisticated weaponry. For example, Cruise missiles because they are accurate and very difficult to shoot as compared to ballistic missiles. Moreover, Pakistan should provide its navy with nuclear capable air and submarine launched missiles. A nuclear-powered submarine equipped with nuclear missiles is the ideal weapon to counter a conventionally superior or nuclear-armed naval force.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine has yet to be announced, but some of its salient features are known. According to them, there is more emphasis on strategic weapons. The entire reliance on strategic nuclear weapons limits Pakistan’s options in any future war with India. Therefore, Pakistan should develop counter force weapons and limited strategic defensive systems, what strategists call a war-fighting, damage-limiting capability6. Pakistan will not compromise on its option of first use of nuclear weapons option7. First, the conventional arms gap between Pakistan and India is significantly wide and it is expected to grow even wider. The scenario has become more complex after the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes’ statement on January 5, 2000, that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons does not rule out the possibility of a limited-conventional war and India’s earlier revelation that it possesses significant stockpile of chemical weapons8. The nuclear capability of Pakistan is the equalizing factor in the existing arms imbalance between two neighbours. Moreover, adopting no-first-use (NFU) policy has the effect that conventional war can be fought between India and Pakistan that probably not involve nuclear weapons. It would not only encourage but also strengthen the argument of the Indian strategic pundits, who believe in achieving certain objectives by limited conventional war. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are to deter conventional as well as nuclear aggression against it. Secondly, there is no credibility in India’s NFU undertaking in its nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan should be careful, while acquiring matching capabilities with India, not to get trapped into an arms race with India.  Pakistan should take into account only the Pakistan-specific missiles, for example, India’s Prithvi series and Agni-I and II. Pakistan does not need to match India’s IRBM, having ranges more than 2500km and Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles projects. Hence, it would be sufficient for it to have a limited number of strategic missiles — having nuclear warheads, and which can overcome the Indian missile defence systems. Moreover, Pakistan does not require ICBM or IRBM having ranges more than Ghauri-II, Ghauri-III and Shaheen-II. This is because India is the only principle threat in our external security calculus. A higher number of Pakistani missiles with longer ranges would further destabilize Pakistan’s fragile economy and make it vulnerable to accusations that the rationale of its military muscle is wider than India. In brief, Pakistan should be very careful in its calculations, in its selection and in its development of strategic nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has officially stated that it will not be the first to openly deploy nuclear weapons. It has also denounced the missile race in the region. Pakistan does not need to match India bomb by bomb and missile by missile. But nuclear weapons and modern nuclear delivery vehicles are vital for the preservation of Pakistan’s security. And at this juncture the peace between India and Pakistan could be maintained only through the effective strategy of nuclear deterrence. The credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, and through it the assurance of security and survival requires more scientific and technological advances in the nuclear and missile field.  Pakistan requires a modest nuclear weapons arsenal, which can survive against a surprise pre-emptive nuclear strike, and maintain the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence against the deployment of the Indian missile defence systems.

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End Notes

1See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Weapons (London: Cornell University Press, 2000)p 159.

2See Luke Harding, Rory Mccarthy, ‘India and Pakistan to test fire nuclear missiles’, The Guardian Weekly (October 11, 2000). See ‘Shaheen-II awaiting flight-test: report’, The News (December 14, 2000). See also Ben Sheppard, ‘Scientific rivalry overshadows Pakistan Day Parade’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (January 2000) p.6.

3For more details see table number one in Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘India’s Missile Capabilities: Regional Implications’, National Development and Security, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35 (Spring 2001)pp 43, 44.

4See ‘Indian frigates to balance Pak’s sub-programme’, The Times of India (May 29, 2001).

5See ‘India, Russia test cruise missile’, The News (Rawalpindi: June 13, 2001)p 12.

6See Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimer, Gerald Dwarkin, Robert E. Goodin, Nuclear Deterrence Ethics And Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) p 6.

7The first use option is based on the assumption that conventional weapons can be as destructive as nuclear weapons. Therefore, retaliation against a conventional attack may be use of nuclear strike. This lesson has been learned from the NATO experience. The NATO adopted a strategy permitting the first use of nuclear weapons to counter what then was seen as superior Soviet conventional forces. Similarly, as (now-a-days) Russia no longer held superiority in conventional Armed Forces over NATO, it dropped its no-first use policy, to deter a conventional war. See Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russia’s Approach to Nuclear Weapons’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No3, (Summer 1997) pp107-114. See also Sir Michael Quinlan, ‘The Development of NATO Nuclear Doctrine’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. cxxx, No, 540 (New Delhi: April-June 2000)pp.285-286

8On June 26, 1997 India disclosed to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague that it possess Chemical Weapons. See Saibal Das, ‘Chemical Confessions’, India Today (July 7,1997) p76. See also Afzal Mahmood, ‘India’s Aggressive Posture’ Dawn (Karachi: January 31, 2000).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is a security analyst based in Islamabad. He holds a Master’s Degree in Political Science and M.Phil in International Relations. He is currently a Ph.D candidate at the Department of International Relations Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad.