BOOK REVIEW

An Analysis
The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59

(The first thirteen chapters of this book were serialised in DJ from July 1999 till October last year. This analysis covers the first 150 pages, and is now being serialised in DJ).

Columnist AH AMIN re-interprets the so-called 1857 Indian Mutiny.

Exclusion an important cause

It appears that one of the main cause of the rebellion was exclusion. The sepoys perceived themselves as the main reason for British success in conquest of India. Yet a sepoy even with forty years service and with outstanding ability could not even be deemed fit to command a company. Similarly inability of Indians to participate in the higher government appears to have been perceived by the Indians in a negative way. After 1857, therefore, various measures were taken by the British government to include Indians in the government of India at various levels to act as safety valves against any further rebellion against the British. Thus as per the Indian Council's act of 1861, the Viceroys Council and also the local councils at Bombay and Madras were increased, by the addition for legislative purposes only, of non-official European and Indian members493.

The Triumph of Feudalism

The significant support rendered to the British in 1857 had another very negative impact both for the British and for the common Indian. For the British this loss was in financial terms, for the Indian this loss was in political terms. The British concluded after the rebellion that increased taxation which seriously affected the large land holders had been a principal cause in participation of the large land holders (Talukdars) in the rebellion particularly in Oudh where the British had to suppress the rebellion till the first half of 1859.

Thus in India as a whole and particularly in Bombay and Madras the rate of land tax per acre began to decline. Thus gradually land revenue diminished in terms of percentage as a proportion of government income after 1857. Thus the most unfortunate result of the successful British suppression of the rebellion of 1857 was that for the sake of preserving their colonial hold on India, the British administrators adopted a policy of not taxing the feudals in particular and the agricultural classes in general as less as possible. The British thus after 1857 lost the nerve to tax the country side. All this happened at a time when income from agriculture all over India was rising. On the other side to compensate for this loss the British adopted with greater enthusiasm a policy which successively increased taxation levied on the professional and trading classes in the larger towns. This led to increased participation of the urban classes in anti-British parties like Congress etc.! This explains why the professional and business classes became more and more anti-British after 1858 and till 1947.

It is an irony of Indo-Pak history that Lord Canning in order to quickly pacify the Oudh country side totally reversed the progressive policies of Lord Dalhousie to destroy feudalism in India. Pacifying the Oudh countryside was militarily a small affair but just to save money and European casualties the British adopted this negative policy which helped them in the short run but reduced their revenue from agricultural taxes in the long run. In 1858 he promised the Oudh Talukdars that they would regain the control of all their pre-1857 villages and land which had been confiscated during the pre-1857 period of Cannings viceregal tenure. Canning also promised them a much more lenient revenue settlement. It is true that some large estates in Oudh and other parts of UP and central India were confiscated by the British. But these belonged to those who were extremely anti-British and many of whom died in the fighting, were executed after the rebellion or went into voluntary exile to Nepal. These estates too were mostly awarded to feudals who had remained loyal to the British. Thus Ali Raza Khan Kizilbash of the Kizilbash family resident at Lahore in 1857 in recognition of his services was granted Talukdari of 147 villages in Bahraich district in Oudh494. The same was true for all districts of modern UP where land was merely re-allotted or sold to loyal Hindu and Muslim feudals!

Subconscious fear of another rebellion played  a major part in British policies after 1857

India became an easier place to govern after 1857. The Indians were convinced that unilaterally it was impossible to defeat the Britishers. The British on the other hand out of a subconscious fear of another "mutiny" as they called it started some reforms in local self-government etc, which gave birth to a movement of passive political dissent against British rule. The key concept was to provide Indians with some safety valves through which they could channelise their frustration and sense of exclusion in some direction. Thus the introduction of local self-government in the early 1870s provided the Indian with a forum where they could tactfully and respectfully keeping in mind unwritten rules and etiquette of the Victorian era present their point of view and participate in a small way in the government affairs. Thus the British keeping in view their democratic traditions and a feeling that Indians must be given a sense of participation created the municipal board and corporations of Bombay Calcutta and Madras. These local bodies provided Indians a forum where they could in a very polite and harmless way take their frustrations out and simulate a mini-conflict with the colonial governments. India by and large remained calm till 1919 as a result of these measures. Bengal now assumed the leadership of the anti-colonial movement but by and large the rest of India remained calm. Michael Edward's made a very profound observation about this subconscious British fear when he concluded his book on 1857 with the following remarks "There is no doubt that fear of another, and greater, Mutiny had its effect upon the negotiations that ended with Indian's independence in 1947" 495 Another Britisher observed this much earlier i.e. Edward Thompson who in his book published in 1925 made the following profound observation, "Right at the back of the mind of many an Indian, the Mutiny flits as he talks with an Englishman an unavenged, an unappeased ghost".496

Bengal Sepoy the Principal cause of whatever success that the rebellion achieved

Many historians have tried to portray the feudals as the principal force behind the rebellion of 1857. The Bengal sepoy who belonged to the yeoman class of peasantry  was, however, the main factor in the rebellion. The dispossessed and dissatisfied group of feudals in UP and Central India did manipulate the sepoys to some extent once the sepoys had rebelled. The sepoys also manipulated the feudals in a way by using them as figureheads to head the movement like in the case of Bahadur Shah Zafar at Delhi. Without the European trained Bengal Sepoy there could never have been a rebellion of the magnitude of 1857. The Sepoy was a patriot and only loser of 1857. The feudals were the winners whether Hindu or Muslim or Sikh! The rest is fiction. Thus in class terms the rebellion was an attempt by the lower middle class and some middle class small landowner class of soldiers to defeat the EEIC by means of an armed insurrection. In the process these brave men lost everything, but by this act of supreme sacrifice they forced the British to become more liberal and democratic, while dealing with the Indian. In this sense the rebellion was more important than any other movement launched by Indians from 1757 to 1947.

Confusion about political sovereignty removed

The removal of Bahadur Shah Zafar ended the contradiction and conflict about political sovereignty in India. The Mughal Emperor who should have been removed in 1803 was at last packed off to Ramgoon where he could devote extra time in composing his melancholic poetry.

Pre-1857 British policy attacked Hindu beliefs more seriously than Muslim beliefs

The pre-1857 policy of the EEIC was more anti-Hindu than anti-Muslim. The General Service Enlistment Act of 1856 was a serious piece of legislation which greatly demoralised the Hindu soldiers. Thus it is a simple fact that the rebellion was successful to some degree in 1857 because the Hindu soldiers who formed the majority of the Bengal Army soldiers joined the rebellion. It is true that most of the leaders of the rebellion were Muslim and the maximum casualties suffered by the British were in campaigns against essentially Muslim centres of rebellion like Delhi and Lucknow. It remains a fact that without support from Hindu soldiers who constituted the bulk of Bengal infantry the Muslims could not have lasted for as long as they did i.e. at Delhi from May to September 1857 and in Lucknow from July 1857 to March 1858.

There is absolutely no doubt about the fact that the rebellion was a lower class revolt; the sepoys being from the poorer or lower middle classes apart from the fact that they belonged mostly to good castes which had become impoverished. The feudals in most cases entered the struggle based on personal grievances; but there were exceptions like Kanwar Singh, Beni Madho etc. Thus we find this class bias against the sepoys in Sayyid Ahmed Khan when he dismisses the men who joined the rebellion as petty feudals and men of lower classes; and not from the best classes of Muslims who according to Sayyad did not join the army 497

Analysis of religious composition of troops

General histories and contemporary accounts confirm the fact that the Bengal Army and particularly the Bengal Infantry which was the predominant part of the Bengal Army was largely composed of UP Hindu Rajputs and Brahmans. A contemporary account of pre-1857 era described an average infantry company of Bengal Army composed of 40 Brahmans, 40 Rajputs, 20 Muslims and some lower caste Hindu 498

A myth was created by some British and some Indian writers that the Sikhs were the main native component fighting for the British at Delhi. The term "Sikh Infantry" used for many Sikh units fighting at Delhi apparently means a Sikh unit. In actual fact these units had Sikh troops, Punjabi Muslim troops etc. The 2nd Sikh Cavalry (present 12 Cavalry) had many Punjabi Muslims from Jhelum, Gujrat, Pindi, etc. There were many Muslim Niazis from Mianwali in the 3rd Sikh Irregular Cavalry. The same was true for all units of Punjab infantry or cavalry which fought at Delhi and Lucknow in 1857-58.

H.C.B. look placed the Hindu percentage in the Bengal Army in 1842 at four fifth of the total499. Philip Mason was surprised by the high proportion of Hindu Brahmans in the Bengal Army500.

A class composition of 34 NI Mangal Pandey's regiment at Barrackpore gives an illustration by class composition of an average Bengal Infantry Regiment 501:-

                           Religious/Class Composition of 34 NI

            1.            Brahmans                -               335

            2.            Chettryas                 -               237

            3.            Lower caste Hindus -               231

            4.            Muslims                   -               200

            5.            Christians                 -                 12

            6.            Sikhs                       -               200

                        __________________________________

                        Total:                          -              1089

An ethnic composition analysis of remaining Bengal Infantry Regiments done after 1857 again indicates the high Hindu composition of the Bengal Army 502:-

Infantry:-

(1) Muslims    - 2418    or        13.08%
(2 Hindus etc  -14680   or        79.44%
(3) Sikhs        - 1380    or          7.47%
                          Total:              18,478

The reason why less Muslims were recruited in areas east of Delhi from where bulk of Bengal army was recruited was simple. The Muslims were less than 15% of the population in these areas specially in Oudh. The cavalry, however, was predominantly Muslim. The cavalry was recruited from the west of Delhi districts of Rohtak Hissar Gurgaon Kamel and from east of Delhi districts of Meerut Saharanpur Aligarh Bulandshahr Bareilly and Moradabad from Muslim Ranghars and Hindustani Pathans. The Ranghars who were from Hissar Gurgaon Rohatak and Karnal and took a leading part in the rebellion have always identified themselves with Hindustani Mussulmans and were very unhappy once their districts were transferred to Punjab jurisdiction in 1858. Culturally these Ranghars have nothing in common with the Punjabis. Even today a Muslim Ranghar of Sahiwal Okara or Multan does not identify himself with Punjabi Muslims. Thus all regular cavalry units of the Bengal Army in 1857 either rebelled or were disbanded. Some irregular units, however, remained loyal. It is significant to note that the Madras Army which remained as staunch as the Punjabi units had a much higher Muslim %age as compared to the Bengal Army. Communal composition of Madras Army was as following 503:-

a.         Infantry

            (1)            Hindus etc        -  26,869             or             62.89%
            (2)            Muslim             -  15,856             or             37.10% 

b.         Cavalry

            (1)            Hindus etc        -   592              or            22.62%
            (2)            Muslims            -   2024            or            77.37%

The above cited fitures dismantle many myths. Firstly numerically many more Hindus rebelled as compared to Muslims as far as the Bengal Army was concerned. But since the leaders were mostly Muslims both in the sepoy as well as among the civilian leaders the British viewed it as a Muslim show. But again it was Punjab loyalty and it was from Punjab that the British recruited the maximum manpower. The composition of these soldiers according to Thorburn was nearly 60,000 sub divided as 504:-

a. 50% Muslims (Punjabi and Pathan)

b. 33% Punjabi Sikhs

c. 17% Punjabi Hindus

This mercenary trait in the so-called Punjab Chiefs was not confined to service against the Hindustanis. All the so-called Punjab Chiefs including the Tiwanas, Noons, Maliks of Kalabagh loyally served the Sikhs against their fellow Punjabi and Pathan Muslims and this fact can be confirmed with just one cursory glance at the "Punjab Chiefs" of through the various "District Gazetteers". Thus the Tiwanas served against the Pathans of DI Khan and Bannu during the Sikh rule. Imam ud Din of Lahore against the Kashmiri and Hazara Muslims etc.! this trend was not confined to Punjab alone but also widely found in UP where many Muslims loyally served the Marathas including the Sherwani Pathans of Aligarh! the anti-Punjabi historians defined it as a typically Punjabi trait. A closer analysis only merely proves that this is a typically feudal trait and transcends provincial or national boundaries.

But we are more concerned with the units which fought on the British side at Delhi. The corps on the British side at Delhi. The corps of Guides for example being based at Mardan had a much higher proportion of Muslims something more than 45%. The majority of these were Pathans and Punjabis some from Attock and Rawalpindi districts. Some of the examples of some Punjab Irregular Frontier Force units which fought for the EEIC are as following:-

a.         1st Punjab Infantry (Cokes):- Composed of chiefly Afridis, Khattaks, Dogras and Punjabi Muslims. The instructions received from the government were to recruit equal proportion of Yusufzais, Hindustanis and Sikhs. However, Coke disregarded them since he was biased against Hindustanis 505. This unit was a part of the 3rd column in the assault on Delhi.

b.         The 4th Punjab Infantry:- Raised at Lahore in 1849 was largely composed of Sikhs 506.

c.         The 5th Punjab Infantry:- Raised at Leiah and Mianwali by Lieutenant J.E. Gastrell in 1849 had the following composition after Captain Vaughan became its commandant in 1852 and introduced a class system based on his own ideas 507:-

(1) Sikh companies                   -  Two
(2) Punjabi Muslim Companies  -  Two
(3) Pathan Muslim Companies   -   Two
(4) Dogra Hindu Company        -   One
(5) Mixed Company                 -   One

d.            Hodsons Horse (Delhi 1857 & Lucknow 1857-58508    

1)         Mirza Ataullah of Kangra served as a Risaldar with 25 men509.

2)         Ali Raza Khan Kizilbash in June 1857 voluntarily raised "troop" for Hodson's Horse for service at Delhi. He was from the famous Kizilbash family of Lahore510.

3)         Mirza Imamuddin of Qadian 511 served as a Risaldar in Hodson's Horse during the siege of Delhi.

4)         Maulvi Syed Rajab Ali of Jagraon was Hodson's principals advisor and Assistant 512.

Other prominent Muslims who fought on the British side in various regiments at Delhi Lucknow and at other places in India were as following:-

1.         Nawab Ahmad Ali Khan the grandfather513 of Liaquat Ali Khan Pakistan's first Prime Minister.

2.            Shahzada Faridun Durrani of Durrani family of Lahore who was a Jemadar in 2nd Punjab Infantry 514.

3.         Sheikh Imamuddin of Lahore who raised two cavalry troops for service at Delhi 515.

4.         Khair ud din Kasuri of Lahore who raised 100 horsemen516 and assisted General Van Cortlandt in operations against Hissar Muslim Ranghars. These men, fighting under their British masters burnt many Ranghar Muslim villages like Jamalpur517, which provided many recruits for Skinners Horse and many other large Muslim villages in Hissar.

5.         Syed Mohammad Shah of Lahore District served in 5th Punjab Cavalry at Delhi and Lucknow in 1857-58 518.

6.         Mardan Ali Khan of Chib family of Gujrat served in the 2nd Sikh Cavalry (later 12 Cavalry) in 1857-58 519.

7.         Malik Fateh Sher of Mitha Tiwana raised a cavalry regiment for service against the Ranghar Muslims under General Van Cortlandt in 1857 520!

8.         Malik Jahan Khan of Jahanabad Shahpur District did well at Kalpi against Tantia Topi 521!

9.         Malik Haim Khan Nun of Mitha Tiwana fought in Mali Fateh Sher Tiwana's regiment at Hissar and Narmaul. He was an ancestor of another Prime Minister of Pakistan, Sir Feroze Khan Noon522!

10.       Raja Ghulam Kadir Chib of Jhelum began service as an orderly under Edwardes at Multan and rose to be a Risaldar of 4th Punjab Cavalry and fought in various engagements in 1857 523.

11.       Nawab Mohammad Hayat Khan of Wah was with Nicholson at Delhi as "Honorary Aide de Camp"524. This gentleman was grandfather of Sardar Shaukat Hayat. Nawab Mohammad Hayat Khan was close friend of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and presided the meetings of the All India Muslim Educational Conference in 1888, 1889 & 1890525. Hayat popularly known as "Hayatu who did well at Delhi" was also a prominent "Trustee" of the MAO College Aligarh!

12.       The Babar Pathan ancestors of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan performed excellent services in apprehending those accrued Hindustani Sepoys of 68 and 69 NI at Multan 526!

13.       Syed Ahmad Khan, later to be famous as "Sir Syed" at Bijnor527.

14.       Sayyid Azam ud Din Hussain uncle of Syed Hosein Bilgrami, a famous leader of Hindustani Muslims528.

15.       Nawab Sir Mohammad Faiz Mohammad Khan father of another post-1857 prominent Hindustani Muslim leader i.e. Nawab Fayyaz Ali Khan of Pahasu529.

The aim of listing all these men is that it is myth that only the Sikhs were the sole participants fighting for the British at Delhi. Attitudes in the rebellion were formed not by patriotism or nationalism which most Indians had not yet discovered but by proximity of the rebellious units or distance from them or simply whether a man was highly rational or highly idealistic! Realists like Syed Ahmad were in that rare category of men who did not join the rebellion even when the British authority had not broken down. Those in Punjab had little choice, since thanks to telegraph and presence of British troops the cause of the rebellion was doomed right from the start! Men like Ahmad Khan Kharral simply did not understand the nature of British power and although highly idealistic were essentially naive as far as understanding British military potential! Rana Jang Bahadur of Nepal made a very thought provoking remark when he met Sir Colin Campbell at Lucknow in 1858. The Rana told him that had he not visited England he would have been fighting against the British in 1857 530!

The Muslim Pathans formed a high percentage of soldiers who fought for the EEIC at the siege of Delhi. According to Thorbum "in all 5,667 men were thus enlisted, half in the Derajat, and the others in Peshawar and Kohat. Of the number 1,807 served before Delhi and in Oudh, and gained a high repute as skirmishers"531. Now there is absolutely no doubt that almost all these 5,667 men were Muslims since the trans-Indus region was a very high Muslim majority area. The character and the criminal background of these men who indiscriminately looted and killed Muslims and Hindus civilians with equal fervour at Delhi and Lucknow can be gauged from the following remark made by a Britisher about them in 1857; "whether these men kill the rebels of are killed by rebels will be equally beneficial for the British cause!". thus some 27 regiments were raised in the Punjab in 1857-58. There was another side of the coin. If Hindustanis could fight for the British against Tipu Sultan, Oudh, Afghanistan and against Sikh Punjab532, why could not the Punjabis fight for the British! Nevertheless India did lose a significant chance to gain independence because it was one country in 1857! It is not one country even today, except the ethically homogeneous state of Bangladesh!

The rebellion was a mixed affair, and a highly complicated one! The Muslims were undoubtedly the leaders of the rebellion, and fought for both sides, but were not in majority among the total rebel strength. It was not even a wholly Hindustani affair but most of the Hindustani area was involved because most of the Bengal Army was Hindustani and once the rebel regiments occupied Delhi and Lucknow the Hindustani feudal who as far as the law of averages was concerned was as opportunistic and despicable as any other feudal; Punjabi or Pathan had no choice but to accept the fait accompli of joining the rebels! The loyal forces had a large percentage of Punjabi, Pathan and Mardrassi Muslims. The "Rebels" had a large proportion of Hindustani Muslims as far as the cavalry was concerned and as far as the overall leadership was concerned. The Hindus by and large at least numerically had the largest contribution in the rebellion. There were far less Hindus from India (Gurkhas are Hindus but from Nepal) in the EEIC force opposite Delhi and many more Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, and Pathan Muslims. So it was a mixed affair. Even some Hindustani Muslim units like Skinners Horse remained loyal533. The 21 NI at Peshawar and the 31 NI at Saugor were some of the infantry units which stayed loyal.

The General return of the Bengal Army dated 01 April 1858 is another good indicator of the class composition of the Indian Army which stayed loyal534:-

a. Muslims        -   10,452

b. Hindus          -   27,706

c. Sikhs            -    4,472

d. Punjabis       -   18,374

e. Hindustanis   -    2,153

   Total             -   63,157

Now this return included the following troops which had been disarmed but not disbanded or who had not rebelled being far away from Oudh and Doab but were not used in actual battle against the rebels535:-

a. Hindus    -    14,680

b. Muslim   -      2,418

   Total:      -     17,098

We are left with 46,059 troops, of these 18,374 are shown as Punjabis. Who were these Punjabis? These were either Muslims Hindu Jats, Sikhs or Dogras. If we only take into account the exact meaning of the return the Sikhs are shown under a separate heading as 4,472. The Punjabis are shown as separate from Sikhs. But even then term Punjabis is misleading since till 1901 the NWFP was also called Punjab. If we follow Thorburn's cited in the earlier part of this analysis we can divide the 18,374 Punjabis as 50% Muslims i.e. 9,187, 33% Sikhs i.e. some 6,124 and remaining as Hindus / Mazhbi Sikhs/Dogras.

The very fact that the Britishers compiling the Army return in 1858 were not bothered whether the men shown as Punjabis were Muslim or Sikhs or Pathan, however, illustrates that pre-1858 Britishers were not really bothered whether anyone was a Muslim or otherwise. There is no reason also for us in Pakistan to think that the Britishers were anti-Muslim since they thought that Muslims were their main enemies in 1857. They may have thought so about the Hindustani Muslims or the Gugera Punjabi Muslim, but not the Multani Seraiki Muslim, not the Punjabi Muslim or the Pathan Muslim, or even their west of Khyber 100,000/- Rupees per month Afghan servant Dost Muhammad Khan!

Now we will approach the General Return of the Bengal Native Army from another angle; fighting arms i.e. Infantry and cavalry both Regular and Irregular. First of all we will analyse the detailed class / caste composition of the remnants of Bengal Army which did not rebel but were still viewed as unreliable and were not employed in actual fighting against the "rebels" since the great majority of these were "Hindustanis", most of whom were Hindus and a smaller proportion were Muslims.

a) Regular Infantry - Bengal Army536

1) Muslims           -    1195

2) Hindus             -    6686

(a) Brahmans       -     2676

(b) Rajputs          -     1930

(c) Other Castes  -     2080

            Total:       -    7881

b) Irregular Infantry - Bengal Army 537

1) Muslim       -   1223

2) Hindus       -    7994

a) Brahmans   -      872

b) Rajputs      -     2770

c) Others       -      4352

    Sikhs         -      1326

    Total:         -    10543

Now we will compare and correlate these figures with the ethnic compassion of the Bengal Army Infantry as shown in the "General Return of the Bengal Army dated 01 April 1858"538:-

a. Regular Infantry - Bengal Army

1)  Muslim           -            3590

2)  Hindus            -          16935

    a) Brahmans    -            6205

    b) Rajputs       -            6404

    c) Others         -            4326

3) Sikhs               -             135

4) Christians         -             486

5) Punjabis           -            192

6) Gurkhas           -            590

    Total:               -          21928

b. Irregular Infantry - Bengal Army

1)  Muslims               -        1853

2)  Hindus                 -       14806

3)  Other Muslims     -            55

4)  Punjabis              -       15286

5)  Sikhs                  -          3504

6)  Christians            -            20

7)  Gurkhas            -            271

8)  Trans/Cis Sutlej  -          5137

9)  Hindustani          -            896

Total                       -         41828

Now this return is not specific. The religious composition of the following is not clear:-

a.  Punjabis            -         15286

b.  Hindustani         -            896

     Total:                -         16182

Now we will compare the first state of loyal Bengal Army Regiments with the General Return:-

Regular

Irregular Regular Irregular Difference

Muslim

1195 1223 3590 1853

Hindu

6686 7994 16935 14806

Sikhs

54 1326 135 3504

Others

7935 10543 21928 41828

Grand Total

18478 63756 45278

The difference of 45,278 means that apart from 18,478 old Regular and Irregular Infantry Regiments 45,378 more troops were part of the Bengal Army in April 1858. The maximum number of these irregular troops were those "15,286" which are shown as Punjabs. Now there is no separate entry for Pathans in this state, however, there is an entry for "Afghans" and "Hazara Tribes" but there are only 137 and 23 respectively. It appears that at least half of those shown as Punjabis are Muslims while a third may be Sikhs as Thorburn states while the remaining are Hindus etc. Of the Regular and Irregular Hindus the following facts are self-explanatory:-

a.         The post-rebellion loyal regiments were not employed against the rebels539. In these, there were 14,680 Hindus. So of the total 31,741 Hindus of Regular infantry as shown in the Return of 01 April 1858 14,680 were not employed in operations. This leaves 17,061 Hindus of both Regular and Irregular infantry. Of these Hindus the following were not employed in any British operations at Delhi, Lucknow or Canpore, three major areas where 90% of the fighting was done keeping in view the casualties. These were the following:-

1)   Hillmen    -   3679

2)   Mahars    -     566

3)   Mhairets  -     915

4)   Bhils        -     803

5)   Misc.       -     223

      Total:       -   6086

End Notes

493Pages-235 & 236 Cambridge History-The Indian Empire-1858-1918-Op Cit.

494Page-257-Punjab Chiefs-Volume-One-Op Cit.

495Page-209-Battles of the Indian Mutiny-Op Cit.

496Page-30-The Other Side of the Medal-Edward Thopson-London-1925.

497Page-46-Causes of the Indian Revolt-Op Cit. On Page-7 the Sayyad says that most of the Mutineers were men who had nothing to lose and from the governed classes!

498Page-4-Organisation of a Bengal Regiment-By one who served under Sir Charles Napier-London-1856.

499Page-28- The Sikh Wars - The British Army in Punjab-1845-49 - H.C.B Cook-Leo Cooper-London-1973.

500Pages-125 & 126-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

501Page-23- The Sepoy revolt- Its Causes and Consequences - Henry Mad-John Murray-Able Marle Street-London-1857.

502Computed from various statistics given in the "report of the Royal Organisation of the Indian Army" as reproduced by Kaye-volume-Three of the "History of the Sepoy War in India" from Page-621.

503Pages-622 to 624-Ibid.

504Page-210-S.S Thorburn-Op cit.

505Page-3-The Frontier Force Rifles-Op Cit.

506Page-9-Ibid.

507Page-12-Ibid.

508Pages-

509Page-99-Punjab Chiefs-Volume One-Op Cit.

510Pages-256 & 257-bid.

511Pages-41 & 42-Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab-Volume Two- Sir Lepel Griffin and Revised by W.L Conran and H.D Craik-Civil and Military Gazette Press-Lahore-1910, henceforth to be referred as "Punjab Chiefs-Volume Two".

512Page-202-Punjab Chiefs-Volume One-Op Cit.

513Page-32-Ibid.

514Page-291-Ibid.

515Page-322-Ibid.

516Pages-332 & 333-Ibid.

517Page-38-Punjab District Gazetteers-Hissar District-Volume-II-A-Part-A-P.J Fagan-Revised by C.A.H Townshed Government Printing-Punjab-Lahore-1916.

518Page-396-Ibid 

519Page-151-Punjab Chiefs-Volume Two-Op Cit.

520Page-179-Ibid.

521Page-189-Ibid.

522Page-195 & 196-Ibid.

523Page-203-Ibid.

524Page-276-Ibid.

525Page-205-Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan-S.M Ikram Sh Mohammad Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar-Lahore-Second Edition-July-1965.

526Page-325-Punjab Chiefs-Volume Two-Op Cit.

527Pages-15 to 23-The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan -Major General G.F.I Graham Oxford University Press-Karachi-1979 

528Page-395-Francis Robinson-Separatism Among Indian Muslims-Op Cit.

529Page-412-Ibid.

530Page-428-End Note-33-C. Hibbert-Op Cit.

531Page-204-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit.

532Page-234 & 235- This argument may be old but as far as I understand it was forwarded by one of the most brilliant but least read Punjabi Muslim intellectuals Abdullah Malik - (The Basic Realities of Pakistan and the Initial Era of the Pakistan Army-Abdullah Malik-Maktable-I-Fikr-o-Danish-Mozang-Lahore-December-1988. This book is in Urdu.

533Skinner's Horse was a purely Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit. The Ranghars it may be noted identified themselves as Hindustani being close to Delhi. The Hindustani Mussulmans, who served in the cavalty, on the other hand consisted mostly of families with foreign origin who had settled around in the area around Delhi or in the Doab, Rohailkhand or Oudh. There were two important reasons why Skinners Horse did not rebel, as discussed earlier. Firstly its distance from the Rebel controlled areas, coupled with being surrounded by Seraiki speaking area and secondly the great cohesion in the unit thanks to the fine traditions of comradeship set by the great Colonel Skinner, who loved the Hindustanis (having a Hindustani Rajput mother) and took great pains to create a legendary esprit d corps in Skinners Horse!

534General Return showing the Races and Castes of which the Native Army (Bengal Army) was composed on April 1858-Part of Report of the Royal Commission on the Organisation of the Indian Army-London-1858

535Page-621-Kaye-Vol-III-OP Cit.

536Ibid. Calculated from the details of ethnic and religious composition of various Bengal Army Infantry units which survived the rebellion.

537Ibid.

538As earlier quoted.

539 The Regular Infantry units of the Bengal Army were not employed in active role against the rebels.

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