The Musharraf-Vajpayee Summit
From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA analyses the difficult road upto the summit and beyond.
hai...aap apna mun saaf rakhain too phir baat ho ghee” ,Vajpayee recognized that the Kargil-triggered anger in the Indian establishment and political circles still persisted. He must have also understood the negative
perceptional fall-out on the Indian opinion-making circles.of other factors like Dehli’s continued ‘milking’ of the Kargil ‘cow’ for its anti-Pakistan propaganda, the military success of the Kashmiri freedom fighters in Indian Held Kashmir , Dehli’s continuous complaints against the so-called cross-border terrorism, its relentless effort to get Pakistan suspended from the Commonwealth and postponing the SAARC summit and Delhi’s refusal to play cricket with Pakistan. Hence the initial Pak-India dialogue conducted under public gaze could make it susceptible to the anti-Pakistan energy that the Indian government itself had been instrumental in generating.
In Pakistan too anti-India energy is in abundance but in this particular case Pakistan faced no problem since it was Musharraf himself who repeatedly made the public offer for talks. In India meanwhile defending what appeared to be his government’s abrupt change the Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said in his May 28 press conference that "India's position on talks with Pakistan has not been absolutist…we felt that an atmosphere conducive to dialogue must be there. Such an atmosphere now obtains."
What the Vajpayee government sought from the Musharraf government and got was its commitment to the Lahore process. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister issued a statement early this year reiterating Pakistan’s commitment to the Lahore process. Significantly the Army leadership has never been an opponent of dialogue. It has however advocated for the centrality of the Kashmir issue in any Pak-India dialogue. In fact it was during the military dictator General Zia ul Haq that summit and cricket diplomacy both gained momentum.
Pakistan’s current military ruler however has taken his diplomatic peace offensive to new heights. In fact on India, compelled largely by reasons similar to those of the man he removed, Musharraf virtually followed in the
foot-steps of the former Prime Nawaz Sharif.
Like Nawaz Sharif , General Musharraf too sees the obvious advantages in working for the resolution of the Kashmir problem and for normalization of ties with India. However the speed with which Musharraf launched his diplomatic peace offensive with India was prompted by perhaps his calculation of how an India initiative could contribute to off-setting the negative characteristics of his two major liabilities, the Kargil legacy and
his government’s unconstitutional status.
Understandably therefore, Musharraf, widely labeled as the ‘Kargil man’ launched his major diplomatic peace offensive. This was backed by practical steps aimed at de-escalating tension and to some extent addressing Indian complaints about influx of Kashmiri freedom fighter from Pakistan under cover of artillery firing by Pakistani troops stationed along the LOC. Musharraf began with his first October 1999 speech to the nation. He offered peace to India, but with honor and dignity. He talked of the need to resolve the Kashmir issue but also announced a unilateral reduction of Pakistani troops stationed at the LOC. Around end May 2000 the Musharraf government quietly informed Delhi and Washington of Pakistan’s unilateral cease-fire along the LOC. Delhi’s announcement of an Indian cease-fire along the LOC came months later. However since Delhi was not nervous about the domestic reaction, it had gone public with its decision thereby earning international
goodwill. Thus the fact that the Indian cease-fire infact was in response to the Pakistani cease-fire went unnoticed. Pakistan’s commitment to the cease-fire was even acknowledged by the Indians. Holes began to appear in the Indian assertion that all guerilla activities of the Kashmiri freedom fighters was conducted by “foreign intruders” entering IHK under cover of Pakistani artillery fire. Although guerilla activities of the freedom fighters continued inside the Valley the Indian External Affairs Minister finally acknowledged that there had been reduction of mujahideen activity along the LOC.
Then came Musharraf’s repeated offer for dialogue with the Indians “at any place, at any time and at any level.” On India he was his own one-man public relations outfit meeting endless numbers of Indian journalists,
retired Indian armed forces personnel, the Indian ambassador and Indian women's delegation. Most were charmed by the candor and casualness of this “military dictator” that the Indian government kept declaring it could not engage with. His message was peace is necessary but not possible without addressing the Kashmir issue. On India, not unlike Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf spoke with firmness and flexibility. Kashmir was a “core” issue he said but flexibility and imagination by both sides was a necessary pre-condition for resolving the issue. He urged India to accept ground realities and to show flexibility by going beyond stated positions on Kashmir.
If there is a difference between the Musharraf and the Nawaz Sharif approach towards Pak-India relations it is on the Washington factor. In his written and verbal communication with US President Bill Clinton ,Nawaz eulogized him as the “historic peace-maker” in the Middle East and urged him to play a similar role in South Asia. Musharraf has no illusions about what role Washington can and even wants to play on the Kashmir issue; given its own interests perhaps no more than of seeking ‘containment’ of the problem. This notwithstanding his government, like all others before him, recognize that the ‘peace with India’ card will endear them to Washington. Given the absence of his government’s political legitimacy the ‘peace with India’ card acquires special significance for Musharraf. Nevertheless a self-serving ‘overplay’ of this card will damage him fatally. While Musharraf fully comprehends Pakistan’s economic problems there is no indication that, like the predecessor of his recently acquired friend President Hosni Mubarak, Musharraf will opt for a Camp David route to either Pakistan’s economic ‘well-being’ or to his own political durability.
Meanwhile Musharraf’s persistence in wooing the Indians has paid off. Many factors have prompted Vajpayee to opt for a dialogue with Musharraf. These include Delhi’s inability to politically ‘contain’ or militarily crush the Kashmiri freedom struggle, Islamabad’s continued support to the Kashmiri struggle , the negative fall-out of the unresolved Kashmir dispute on Delhi’s global agenda which includes acquiring a seat in
the UN Security Council, striking major economic partnerships, becoming the dominant economic and military player in the Indian Ocean and United State’s strategic partner in the South and South-West Asian region.
Significantly the fact that despite the absence of any real ‘pressure’ from the outside, both India and Pakistan are willing to talk because of their own ‘home-grown compulsions is in itself a positive fact. Infact leaders of two countries have been eager to praise each other’s positive attitude towards the summit .
This mutual admiration notwithstanding in the run-up to the summit no miracles should be expected on the Kashmir front. The ground situation in Indian Held Kashmir will not begin to alter. In fact since the ground
situation is viewed by both the parties as one of the principal determinants of each other’s ‘bargaining power on Kashmir-for the Indians how effectively is their counter-insurgency measures and for the Pakistanis how successful are the guerilla campaigns of the kashmiri freedom fighters – and therefore logically we should expect greater insurgency and counter-insurgency activities by the Indian state and the Kashmiri guerilla fighters.
While the improvement of the ground situation in Kashmir is tied to what transpires during the dialogue, what then should be the minimum expectation from the summit proceedings ? Perhaps a broadly defined commitment by both the Pakistani and Indian leadership to certain principles promoting the ‘rights’ of or justice for the Kashmiri people that will guide the negotiations on Kashmir. Such a broadly defined commitment will alone provide any hope of even initiating a process aimed at finding a trilaterally acceptable solution to the Kashmir issue. Infact such an articulation will also be necessary for creating an atmosphere conducive to discussing other bilateral issues that both Pakistan and India are proposing to discuss under the rubric of “composite dialogue.”
Expecting any breakthroughs other than the commitment by both sides to uphold the wishes of the people of Kashmir, will be unrealistic. Clearly in the first round of talks the spirit of Lahore lost along Kargil will have to
be revived. On the broader bilateral front reaffirmation by India and Pakistan to the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed upon by all NAM members at the Bandung Conference could be the first desperately needed confidence-building step.
Ultimately, there is hope for this latest peace initiative. The Musharraf-Vajpayee summit is not the mere product of two personalities operating for short-term gain. Rather, it is the result of two leaders guided by a powerful logic flowing from the very context within which they operate. Strategic thinking and lessons of history are the drivers here, not expediency. Hope for rapid progress must naturally be tempered by both the
reality on the ground and the complexities of the issues at hand. Nonetheless, movement is in the right direction and for the right reasons.
