Slow dance at the Summit

Columnist SULTAN AHMED  thinks that the Summit will be more sparring than coming to grips with the core problem between the two countries, Kashmir.

The forthcoming meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been making the headlines and filling the air waves since the Indian decision to invite the Pakistan leader was announced suddenly on May 24.

There has been spirited speculation on both sides of the border in respect of the factors motivating the Indian invitation, reversing the earlier Indian stand of no-truck with the military regime in Pakistan and Gen. Musharraf in particular, the possible course of the negotiations between the two countries which in the past had been very protracted and pretty tedious, and the likely eventual outcome of the process, if completed, and not abandoned as had happened too often in the past.

The announcement of the meeting, which the world had been urging in the past insistently, has been welcomed by the world's capitals, led by Washington and Moscow. The world does not want to see an escalation of the tension between the two countries which could eventually lead to a horrendous nuclear war after they had fought three conventional wars since Independence 54 years ago.

The letter of Mr. Vajpayee is very smoothly phrased and speaks of his visit to Lahore in February, 1999, and says: "We have to pick up the threads again, including renewal of the composite dialogue so that we can put in place a stable structure for co-operation, and address all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir". He told Gen. Musharraf: " I invite you to take the high road with us.

Gen. Musharraf on his part wrote back: "At the beginning of the new century, our two countries must do their utmost to overcome the legacy of distrust and hostility in order to build a brighter future for our peoples." Gen. Musharraf wants "the legacy of distrust and hostilities" to cease, and a sincere and candid dialogue on Kashmir, while he is agreeable to talk on other issues as well.

The summit has been scheduled not soon after the invitation but following a holiday by the Indian PM, his knee operation and a period of re-cuperation thereafter, which now means the meeting may take place by the middle of July.

Meanwhile, both sides have to take positive steps not to vitiate the atmosphere for the talks and ensure new issues do not crop up to divert the attention of the leaders from their prime agenda. Both sides should avoid publicly taking hard line positions on any major issue before the meeting. But that is not what India seems to be doing.

Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has said that while it was time for Indo-Pakistan relations to leave behind confrontation and enter a new era of peaceful cooperation, Kashmir remains an integral part of India. He also rejected the Pakistani call for a referendum in Kashmir. And he also shrugged off involvement of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference leaders in the talks as a non-issue.

At the same time reports come from New Delhi are talking of the possibilities of a conventional war with Pakistan. India, meanwhile, is setting up a strategic command to manage its nuclear forces, tighten-up border management and establish a defence intelligence agency as a part of its biggest national security revamping.

The decision of India to talk to Gen. Musharraf instead of boycotting the military regime and embarrassing it at international conferences is not surprising to perceptive observers. Not talking to Pakistan or its military leaders was not the permanent policy of India or perennial strategy. What is far more important for India is its permanent interest, and that calls for peace and cooperation with Pakistan but at its own terms. So it seeks resolution of disputes and cooperation thereafter, from time to time. And when Pakistan does not agree to the Indian terms it gives up. And the stalemate lasts until the next round of negotiations.

After the break up of Pakistan in 1971 following Indian intervention, Pakistan and India signed the Simla Pact agreeing to settle all disputes mutually. Prior to that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Sardar Swaran Singh as the Indian Foreign Minister had a series of meetings to settle India-Pakistan disputes in the post Tashkent era, but they could achieve no success. As India did not want to budge from its stated hard line stand on Kashmir.

After the 1972 Simla Accord there has been no real war between the two countries, although military tension rose in the later period of Gen. Zia particularly in 1987. After that the Kargil episode threatened to blow up into a real war between India and Pakistan in 1999, prior to the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces from there following the intervention of President Clinton of the US.

In the 1990s there had been four summits between Pakistan and Indian Prime Ministers. Benazir Bhutto met the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1989. And later met Narasimha Rao in 1994, Nawaz Sharif met Inder Gujral in 1997 and later met Vajpayee in New York in 1998, and thereafter Vajpayee came to Lahore by a bus to sign the Lahore Accord. In addition the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met on the sidelines of international conferences.

But there was no real continuity in the work done at such summits or agreements reached. Most of the agreements founded on the rock of Kashmir with Pakistan wanting a settlement of Kashmir issue first or positive moves in that direction, and India wilfully dragging its feet or wanting to focus on lesser issues.

Ever since India went openly nuclear (for the second time since 1974) there has been strong international pressure on its leaders to open a dialogue with Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf on his part has been saying he was ready to meet the Indian Prime Minister any time, anywhere and driving home that point effectively. India now finds talking to Pakistan or seeming to talk is good for its global image and is in harmony with its quest for big power status, even a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. That can facilitate larger international assistance and greater foreign investment in India. And it regards it prudent to have such talks before the second phase of its major economic reforms begins and to make it bear rich fruits ten years after the first phase began. For such varied reasons it regards it wise to abandon its policy of containing or isolating the military regime in Pakistan and embarrassing Pakistan to the extent possible.

The question is asked why this sudden volte-face. The fact is Mr. Vajpayee likes dramatic moves and taking the other side by surprise. The series of agreements he reached with Nawaz Sharif in New York where they had gone to attend the golden jubilee celebrations of the UN was one such step. The bus journey he understood to sign the Lahore Declaration was another. The unilateral ceasefire he announced in November, 2000 and extended twice was another such step. And he loves the publicity such moves produce and the surprises and speculation that follows such announcements.

His decision to talk to Gen. Musharraf rather than have prolonged negotiations with too many Kashmiri leaders in New Delhi or Srinagar is also a smart tactical move. He tried to talk to the Kashmir leaders indirectly; but the problem is they are too many. The All Parties Hurriyet Conference alone has 22 parties or more. And there are parties outside that as well. And there are the Mujahideen groups aligned to them or outside them which want to dictate terms to the APHC parties. Hence the negotiations could make no headway.

Several of the parties in the APHC wanted to visit Pakistan and consult the Azad Kashmir leaders as well as leaders of Pakistan. While India allowed two of the leaders to come over to Pakistan it was not in favour of such confabulations as it did not want Pakistan to influence them or call the shots at the negotiations in Srinagar between the Kashmiri leaders and India.

Mr. K.C. Pant who was assigned to negotiate with the Kashmir leaders invited far too many, including odd individuals which enraged the APHC leaders who declined to negotiate with him. So the negotiations were a non-starter.

And the Kashmir leaders had been saying that Pakistan should be associated with the talks, if not immediately, in the second phase or when substantive issues came for discussions. Anyway the Pakistani representative would not be meeting Mr. Pant.

Due to all these factors Mr. Vajpayee called off the unilateral ceasefire and decided to talk to Pakistan direct.

The ceasefire was, in fact, a non-ceasefire. During the last five months over 1,000 persons had been killed in Kashmir, and they included a large number of Indian soldiers, state policemen and civilian officials. India is now going all out to hunt for the Mujahideen and killing far more of them than before. So the present Indian policy is to talk to Pakistan and enjoy the international approbation, and exterminate as many of the Kashmir freedom fighters as possible.

Undoubtedly, the first meeting between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen Musharraf will not produce great results. While the Pakistan leader will try to focus on Kashmir, the Indian leader will talk of "resuming the composite talks" on all issues, including Kashmir. He may talk of appointing a series of committee, like the eight committees proposed after the Nawaz Sharif-Inder Gujral meeting. Mr. Vajpayee will play for time and Pakistan has to be patient and tactful.

While India abhors all mediation in Kashmir it wants to prescribe its own pace for the negotiations, and try to hold on to Kashmir to the maximum possible extent.

India wants Pakistan to help in creating the right climate for attempting a settlement in Kashmir. But Pakistan wants to focus on Kashmir, and argues settlement of other disputes and cooperation between the two countries on all other fronts would follow a Kashmir settlement.

Pakistan has to agree to strive for creating the right climate for the talks and seeking settlement of all disputes instead of insisting on Kashmir first and breaking the talks. The Indian stand and strategy are obvious. What matters is how smart is Pakistan going to be or what kind of cards it is going to play at the summit. Breaking off the negotiations or stalemating the talks following the initial deadlock in Kashmir will not be the right strategy. We should avoid that, play for time and try to win slowly, keeping the Kashmiris as a whole on our side.

P.S. After this was written Mr. Vajpayee suddenly struck a very optimistic note and voiced the hope the upcoming visit of Gen. Musharraf would help solve the Kashmir dispute. I hope we will find a solution to the Kashmir dispute. He added "some concrete way will emerge out of the talks."

But others like Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has cautioned: "It is long road to walk again, which means despite the sudden optimism of the Indian Prime Minister we should be prepared for a long haul and disappointments and upsets along the way while some final solution may emerge at the end with the Kashmiri leaders playing their part realistically.