Bearings in a rapidly changing Asia

Columnist MB NAQVI analyses the changing situation.

Much of the global action in the next 25 years is going to be in and about Asia. After the bipolar world of the second half of the 20th century ended, a unipolar world has emerged. This has left many dissatisfied. Today, there is nothing more attractive to the people outside America than the idea of a multipolar world. That includes Europeans, Latin Americans, Africans, and above all most Asians. Relationship among major nation states is changing rapidly as a result of changes inside their respective economies and political lives that make them more or less vital, powerful or cognisable. This imposes a duty on us, Pakistanis, to be wide awake and find a bearing for ourselves.

Pakistan came into being just before the second half of the 20th century began and virtually sleepwalked into the anti-Communist alignment with the US. How did that happen needs to be assessed with a clear vision. It happened because the old Hindu-Muslim politics of pre-independence India in the 20th century was, with slight unavoidable alterations, carried into the new state’s foreign policy. Our foreign policy thus became India-centred or even India obsessed. Kashmir dispute contributed mightily to this bent of mind, though the latter pre-existed the Kashmir dispute. With anti-Indian sentiment and purpose dominant, we acquired a dependency syndrome vis-a-vis the US. What we gained was aid from the west worth about today’s $ 80 billion or thereabout. Out of which we owe to the rest of the world something like $ 50-60 billion and our debt servicing payments are now, if computed on an average basis for the next decade, come to about $ 6 to 7 billion a year. We have a respectable military establishment and are caught in a hopelessly deadlocked situation with India. Much can be said for the policies that we adopted in the sense that Pakistan foreign policy was at bottom rational, though in a limited and rather blinkered sense. It depended on the way we define our national interests: the latter was equated with Pakistan’s security interests that were further defined by its mediocre governments on the advice of its military as military security in the arms race with India for the final showdown with or over Kashmir. That this was blinkered and not well thought out is the real cause for our present difficult situation.

As the latest annual report by CIA to the American Congress shows, the rest of the world and the Americans are particularly worried about India-Pakistan relations. The CIA’s conclusion is that a war between India and Pakistan, with a nuclear dimension, is quite possible, indeed may be likely. Who is for Pakistan and who is against it in that conflict should be made clear to most Pakistanis. Pakistan would stand alone if a war were to break out between India and Pakistan now, no matter who starts it or why. Iran is more or less alienated and China is so much more distant without becoming hostile —- largely as a result of our Afghan policies. Pakistan is otherwise badly isolated. In a manner of speaking, the US needs to be counted as a power that would want Pakistan to promote peace and stability in Asia a la American ideas. But it is not a partisan of Pakistan. Whether it would be much closer to Indian than to Pakistan is a matter of much speculation. But the likely conclusion of most Pakistanis would be that the Americans are strongly inclined on the side of India. A clearer assessment of the status of Pakistan- American relations is called for. Just as necessary is the question of defining the national interests of the country into a more accurate and comprehensive formulation. Formally, the US is a friend of Pakistan, though the former has slapped many sanctions on Pakistan, not one but at least three set of them. And if we count the sanctions of many other countries the number of sanctions on Pakistan would be very considerable, indeed.

The Americans are contemplating serious military action against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. So is Russia. There are of course others like Shanghai Five who are struggling against Taliban in a political manner rather than using military methods. What is Pakistan to do? Pakistan itself is in a difficult situation vis-a-vis India, as noted. But the recent history makes it absolutely certain —- recent visit of Lt. Gen. Moinuddin Haider to Kabul and Kandhar has shown it conclusively —- that Pakistan feels to be in no position to withdraw its recognition of Taliban or diminish its support for their survival. Too much investment has been made in the Taliban and Pakistan has no line of retreat open for it. If so, Pakistan stands on the other side of the fence from the US and Russia — and so many others in central Asia. Insofar as Pakistan’s possible conflict with India is concerned, it is too early to say how seriously would the new Bush government oppose Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its accompanying missile development plans. But insofar as seems likely, the America’s political opposition to them will continue along with its insistence that Pakistan should sign the CTBT in good faith, without attaching any conditions.

As for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is concerned, it is hard to see if President Bush’s State Department would take any different view of Jihad in Kashmir. The need for stability in South Asia would be felt as strongly by Bush as was done by Clinton and of much the same sort. Insofar as the new South Asian policy of the new Bush administration is concerned, its major contours are likely to stay unchanged. Pakistan should certainly befriend the US; frontally opposing it would be foolish. But our future friendship should be different from what it used to be. We should not aim at becoming the stooges of the US again or to go on wallowing in the dependency syndrome: foreign aid on government to government basis is steadily declining and Pakistan is not a good candidate for such aid, though it is likely to continue as such for many more years. But its secular trend would be to decline and Pakistan’s eligibility would seem lesser and lesser with the passage of time —- unless of course Pakistan refashions its economic as well as political life. Pakistan should aim to refashion its economy on a more self-sustained basis and set it on a rapid growth trajectory through means that are more self-reliant rather than being dependent on foreign aid. It should not depend even on foreign investments in the way that IMF and World Bank thinking would suggest. Foreign investors will fall over one another once the processes of growth are truly fast; they cannot be depended up to initiate that growth process. It is a big challenge. But it has to be met. In the needed effort, the US is unlikely to be a major source of initial aid and encouragement.

Before examining what changes we have to make in our thinking and agreeing on new priorities and purposes, it may be good to take a broad bird’s eye view of the current trends that are likely to remain operative in the next 20 to 25 years —- insofar as it may be possible to discern them, though the trends might or might not persist. The name of the game for most Asian powers, with the possible exception of Japan, will be to promote multipolarity in the world affairs, on the one hand, and build up the economic sinews of their own polity, on the other. The concept of power itself is undergoing a change. It does not so much exclude the military power as it emphasises the inherent strength of an economy and to build up on that strength to make it impregnable. That is the new recognised economic reinforcement without which the concept of military power is no longer cognisable. The quantum of military power must now remain coordinated with the economy’s strength. The two together should support each other and reinforce each other. This conclusion forms the substance in the new formulations concerning national interests as well as the definition of what constitutes security of a state. But a prerequisite must also be noted, as was illustrated by the thinking of the builder of the new (post-1978) China Deng Xio Peng: It is the overriding need for preserving peace so as to gain time for building up the economy as rapidly as possible with no military entanglements anywhere. This is a lesson that needs to be imbibed and assimilated by all, particularly Pakistanis. This is a vital prerequisite.

The second is, of course, again a borrowing from Deng: the paramount importance of building up the economy as rapidly as may be with the clear understanding that economic strength cannot be built with, say half the population remaining below the poverty line. India’s radical weakness, despite the glittering accumulation of power and military strength is the abject poverty of too many Indians. Even if the military strength can be supported by the Indian economy as it is, the poverty of a large number of Indians, something close to 700 million, who are below or close to the poverty line is sure to drag India down and make for its radical weakness. We have to avoid that. The concept of state security must be understood in the sense of the security that the people of the state feel. And the people’s security includes their economic wellbeing as well as fullest possible enjoyment of all human rights. These human rights should now be understood to include the right to job, as Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt formulated as far back as in 1941: freedom from want. These additions or elucidations of the term security have to be imbibed in the senses that are now current after the contributions made by Deng, including the paramount need for preserving peace and avoiding military entanglements.

What lessons do we learn from China apart from the paramount need for preserving peace and giving economy the highest priority? This is to ensure maximum good to maximum number within the state or, put another way, ensuring empowerment of the disadvantaged people. Still another way of saying it is enabling the largest number of people to fullest enjoyment of all human rights ordinarily written in the constitutions but supplemented by the right to economic security. Specifically the right to gainful employment for all able-bodied people needs to be recognised very clearly. This is an insistent requirement of the new concept of national security. A people do not become strong simply because they have a strong army. A strong army when faced with a stronger army would be at a decisive disadvantage. But if the people become stakeholders in the state through their own economic security and come to the aid of their army, the two together, by giving their shoulder to the wheel, will overcome. The idea of pure military strength unrelated to making the people contented stakeholders through participation and decision-making as well as in implementation, insofar as may be possible, and giving them the economic security that the economy can sustain is the high road to acquiring national or state security. This requires long periods of hopefully permanent, peace and quiet in which maximal energies are spent in economic development with a view to actually improving the economic wellbeing and cultural progress of the people. Insofar as the defence part is concerned, the role of a standing army is small. Nevertheless, a small Army has to be kept as a nucleus of national defence as close to the cutting edge of war technology as possible. It has to be given the best possible equipment, made mobile and high tech, but only a kernel or nucleus for the people to come and flesh it out in times of need. This is the new vision for the 21st century.

Now it is time to take in the broad outlines of what Asia is. The largest geographical power in Asia is Russia. After 1989-90 it has been the sickman of Asia as well as of Europe. It is painfully trying to recover its economy’s bearings and may hopefully begin to grow again. It has been decelerating most of the time during the 1990s. Unless it begins to grow again at a substantial rate Russia will remain unlikely to emerge a strong or remain a major power. The stake for Russia are very high: either it develops and grows into a major economic powerhouse that can sustain a major military muscle or its future may be at stake. Only rapid economic progress can prevent internal ethnic explosions. But as of now the government of Vladimir Putin seems to be trying hard to stabilise the situation and to put the economy on a growth path.

Japan is still the biggest Asian economy. It is already world’s number two economy, the most developed and the most high tech country in Asia. In terms of security arrangements, it is a part of the US military empire. It is inextricably linked with the US. It has a moot point whether at any time during the next quarter of a century it will move away from its moorings in the American military strength or fold up America’s nuclear umbrella over it. The question occurs and recurs because the motivations of China and Russia would be greatly influenced by what the Japanese decide; if they remain anchored to the US diplomacy and political purposes, and also remain pacific themselves, the Japanese political stature will stay minimal —- far less than its economic potential justifies. But if it takes on a new course and a new road, it will then be a wholly new ball game in Asia. Much will depend on what orientation does Japan take. There is no way of going on further with meaningful speculation on it except to think that a repetition of the 1930s may now be out of the question and hopefully no Japanese mind would recommend that. Short of that a truly collective Asian security system should seem logical to the Japanese and to many other Asians.

The role of China and Russia in Asia would be truly decisive. So far they are trying not so much to resurrect the 1950s ideological partnership between the two. That went into ruins in later 1950s and no one is likely to resurrect it in its original shape. But on a more realistic basis the Russians and the Chinese are trying to take a measured rapproachment and cooperative but strategic understanding in Asia. That is specific in intent and non-militaristic, though still an entente. This has a great potential depending upon how other units of Asia react. Which the other units one is referring to?

There is the ASEAN; then the four or five Asian tigers call attention; there is the technically weakened South Asia by internal fissures; and of course the complex and complicated Middle East or West Asia has to be taken note of. None of them will the shots. The Middle East, except for Israel, is a known category and continues to be attached as an appendix to the US military machine, allied to the US diplomacy and purposes, the home region has no independent role. The region is also inwardly looking and immersed in its internal strives and disputes. Turkey is a noted exception in the sense that it is sitting on the borderline between the Middle East and Europe, with the hope in most Turkish hearts to join Europe formally. For the rest it remains a self-satisfied nation-state that has no major disputes with any other power except Greece over history’s legacy. The Arabs and the Israelis are a particular American worry rather than anyone else’s.

Iran did go out of the US power system. It remains an isolated nation. So far only the Europeans seems to have the motivation to reach out to Iran and to take part in its development. China and Russia are cultivating it and hopefully it will remain an independent state with an independent policy, though its internal developments point toward stormy times ahead a few years down the line. It is hard to imagine what Iran would be like in say by 2009, after it has gone through the internal convulsion that seems to be unavoidable.

The South Asians seem, as noted earlier, jinxed by the Indo-Pakistan rivalry and cold war with its nuclear and missile dimensions. The Americans, as noted, feel that there is a threat of a nuclear war here. A war is built into the situation because of the Kashmir dispute in which a determined people, Kashmiris, want a change and another determined set of people, Indian government, want no change at all. The point to make is that a warfare between India and Pakistan cannot but escalate into a nuclear exchange. That will by definition be the most undesired tragedy. But neither Indians nor Pakistanis are striving hard to avoid that tragedy; all their policies are such as would make this tragedy happen quickly rather than later. Few in the two governments consciously want a war. But then neither government is able to do anything to prevent it. Every thing will depend on whether the trend of peace and cooperation reaches their shores. But that is a different subject.

These are still the formative years in the new century for the next phase of inter-state relationships in Asia. Before too long we may have to talk about a proper Asian architecture for security. As of today talking of Asia-wide security arrangement, something on the lines of Helsinki arrangement, looks wildly Utopian. As of now it is. But if peace is to be kept on this populous continent on a stable basis —- where there are four nuclear powers in comparison with Europe’s one and one in the two American continents —- a lot more popular politics has to be invented. Most of the action is going to be here in the next quarter of the century. Utopian or not, we have to start thinking and talking about an Asia-wide security arrangement.