COVER STORY

DJ interview
An encounter with an Indian hawk

“Pakistan’s geography is such that it can never use nuclear weapons against India. Almost all Pakistan’s major cities are about 100-150km from the Indian border. So are Pakistan’s high dams. Lahore is only 18km from our border. They are all within the range of Indian aircraft and missiles. Given this extreme vulnerability, you cannot afford to use a nuclear weapon against India”.

K. Subrahmanyam

Ambassador (Retd) AFZAAL MAHMOOD had a detailed conversation with K. Subrahmanyam without whose advice no Indian government has taken a major initative in the last 50 years.

Mr K. Subrahmanyam is an internationally known Indian expert on defence and strategic issues. Though selected for the coveted Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in 1951, he chose to serve his country not as an administrator but as a thinker and expert of pre-eminence on defence and security matters concerning India. During the past fifty years, Subrahmanyam has been largely instrumental in shaping and influencing New Delhi’s defence and strategic policies.

It is generally believed that during this period, no major decision on defence and security has been taken by India without consulting Mr K. Subrahmanyam.

After his retirement from government service as Director of Defence Studies, in 1987, Mr Subrahmanyam has continued to pursue his life-long passion-defence and strategic studies. At present he is Consulting Editor on Defence and Foreign Affairs of Times of India and Economic Times.

His most recent assignment was as Chairman of the Kargil Committee, appointed by the government of India, to enquire into the events leading to the Kargil conflict and recommend measures to avert such conflicts in future.

Mr Subrahmanyam recently visited Islamabad as a member of India and Pakistan Neemrana initiative, involved in Track II diplomacy to improve relations between the two countries. Ambassador (Retd) Afzaal Mahmood, who himself is a participant in the Neemrana dialogue from the Pakistan side, availed of the opportunity and interviewed Mr. Subrahmanyam on defence and strategic issues as well as India-Pakistan relations.

Q. Mr Subrahmanyam, before we discuss serious issues, our readers would like to know some details about your personal life?

A. I was born in Triuchirrappli in Tamil Nadu on 19-01-1929. I was locally educated before joining Presidency College, Madras (Chenai) for my masters degree in Chemistry. I was selected in IAS in 1951. It was not the government’s but my choice to do the work that I have been doing since then. At age 7-8, during World War II, my father used to ask me to read to him news from English newspapers. That was how I got interested in defence matters from an early age.

I got married in 1952 and have four children: three boys and one girl. Karnataka music is my only source of relaxation, though I must say I am not a very relaxed person. I am conditioned to eat South Indian vegetarian food. I am diabetic, but I like very spicy food.

Q. What is your daily routine?

A. I get up at 5:00 AM in the morning and after listening to news, my work schedule starts at 6:00 AM when I do most of my writing. After breakfast I go to the office of Times of India for advisory work for their editorials. I remain there till 2:00 PM. Depending on work, I some times work in the afternoon.

Q. Mr Subrahmanyam, you have written a number of books on defence and strategic issues. Please tell us about them?

A. I have written 14 books, but amongst the important ones, one was on “Bangladesh Liberation War”, co-authored with Dr. Mohammad Ayub. Other well-known books, some of which were edited by me, are: “Defence and Development” (which are two sides of nation-building), “Nuclear Myth and Reality”, “India — the nuclear challenge” and “Security in deterrent age”.

Q. You also played a major role in the formulation of Indian Nuclear Doctrine?

A. I was convener of the National Security Advisory Board which drafted the Nuclear Doctrine.

Q. You have also been in the news in connection with the Kargil enquiry?

A. Yes. I was Chairman of Kargil Committee set up by the government of India to enquire into the review of events leading upto the Kargil intrusion and recommend measures to avert such intrusions in future.

Q. What were the main findings of the Kargil Committee?

A. There were four conclusions:

a) The failure on the part of intelligence agencies.
b) This was an attempt by Pakistan to salami slice the territory on the Line of Control (LoC).
c) It was an irrational act in the eyes of the Indian military.
d) The entire Indian decision-making process needed to be revamped.

Q. What was your finding with regard to the involvement of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif?

A. On the basis of evidence we have, Mr Nawaz Sharif was fully in the picture. He visited the area in February 1999. The captured diaries of a captain of Northern Light Infantry show that the Pakistani intrusion started after Ramzan in January 1999.

Mr Nawaz Sharif congratulated General Pervez Musharraf on the downing of Indian plane when the latter was in Beijing. Even in the conversation between General Pervez Musharraf and Lt. General Aziz Khan (intercepted by Indian intelligence services) there is a reference to Nawaz Sharif which clearly indicates he knew all about it.

Q. How do you look at India-Pakistan relations?

A. The late Altaf Gauhar wrote 4 articles in The Nation in September 1999 titled “Four wars and one assumption”, in which he referred to Ayub Khan’s view that the Hindus would not be able to put up sustained fight against the Pakistanis and a hard blow at the right time and place would be able to take care of them.

This is the kind of assumption that has led to four wars, initiated by Pakistan. You hear the same view again and again amongst Pakistani generals. For instance, Lt. General Javed Nasir in his recent articles in The Nation has said that the Indian army is fatigued and would not be able to stand up to Mujahideen in Kashmir.

As long as Pakistani establishment functions with this view, you pose a problem for us.

Q. Mr Subrahmanyam, I think you are over-stretching the argument?

A. No, I am not. How would you explain your references to proxy war all the time. Not only that. The Jehadi literature nowadays says that liberation of Kashmir is not the ultimate aim: it is the disintegration of India which is the ultimate aim.

Q. In India you seem to be obsessed with ISI and hold it responsible for anything that goes wrong there?

A. ISI is an important factor in India-Pakistan relations. In our view ISI is operating in India and carrying out acts of subversion and terrorism. This is based on our intelligence assessments.

If one goes by what Benazir Bhutto has said about ISI and what Nawaz Sharif has said about it and what has been written in Pakistani press about ISI, this is an organization which is not accountable to anybody.

Q. But don’t you have an Indian version of ISI in the form of RAW?

A. There is a lot of difference. RAW functions directly under the Prime Minister of India. RAW’s budget is fully funded from our national budget. Thirdly, it should be obvious to anybody that RAW and intelligence agencies in India are more under the tight control of the government than they are in Pakistan.

Q. RAW has been responsible for sectarian violence and bomb explosions in Pakistan?

A. I am not in a position to say yes or no to this question. But RAW is totally accountable to the Prime Minister and RAW, as an agency, is much more under government control and discipline than the ISI. No Prime Minister of India has levelled charges against RAW for conspiring against him or indiscipline. Both countries should discuss the allegations about RAW and ISI.

Q. Pakistan has held RAW responsible for much of the violence in the country?

A. Both countries should discuss this issue. We have seized faked currency coming from Pakistan. Pakistan has been supporting Khalistani separatists. To make Lt General Javed Nasir President of Sikh Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee is a provocation for India.

Q. You once said that Pakistan’s geography is such that it can never use nuclear weapons against India?

A. Almost all Pakistan’s major cities are about 100-150 km from the Indian border. So are Pakistan’s high dams. Lahore is only 18 km from our border. They are all within the range of Indian aircraft as well as Indian missiles. Given this extreme vulnerability, you cannot afford to use a nuclear weapon against India.

Q. Are not major Indian cities within Pakistan’s range?

A. While there are some cities which are within your range but majority of Indian cities are not within the range of Pakistani missiles.

Pakistan has got about 60 Chinese M-11 missiles whose range is less than 300 km. Then you have some 12 North Korean missiles whose range is not fully known but they are claimed to have 1200 km range.

Q. But what about Ghauri?

A. Ghauri is not a Pakistani missile, it is a North Korean missile.

Q. Are not your major cities within the range of Ghauri?

A. Yes, some of them are. But in order to hit some Indian cities, would your like to commit suicide?

Q. Does it show that because of nuclear weaponisation and missiles, neither India nor Pakistan can use nuclear weapons against each other?

A. Oh yes. That is why we have offered ‘no-first use’ pledge.

Q. What steps the two countries should take to create transparency about their nuclear programme?

A. I don’t think we need more transparency than we have.

Q. What in your opinion is the minimum nuclear deterrent in the case of India and Pakistan?

A. We estimate that Pakistan has 20-25 nuclear weapons and if Pakistan wants to increase it to 30 or 40, it does not matter one way or the other to us.

About Indian nuclear arsenal, there are various estimates from foreign experts. They talk about 60.

Q. Could you tell us what is your estimate of Indian nuclear arsenal?

A. I have no independent way of estimating Indian arsenal, so I go by foreign experts. India can add 5-6 bombs every year. Originally, 100 bombs were planned, I am not in a position to say when we would reach that target.

Q. Is there anything like nuclear deterrent?

A. There is a misconception about nuclear deterrent because of western literature produced in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. In 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in a joint statement, said a nuclear war cannot be won and, therefore, should not be initiated. All the earlier Western literature is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons can be used for fighting wars. That is totally wrong as one American strategist said: “One bomb on one city will cause unacceptable damage”. Therefore, there is no political, military, economic or any other objective for which it would be worth while to risk the use of nuclear weapons. If this is understood by both sides, then deterrence prevails. Therefore, between India and Pakistan, there is no objective of either nation which would justify the use of nuclear weapons. That is why Mr Abdul Sattar, Mr Agha Shah and Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, in their article of Oct 25, 1999, in The News have drawn the right conclusion that even during the Kargil war, nuclear deterrence prevailed between India and Pakistan and neither side escalated the hostilities further.

Q. Do you agree that in our region, the danger of nuclear disaster comes not so much from design as from a mishap or an accident?

A. I do not know what is meant here by accident. If you mean that somebody uses it by accident that is not likely to happen because the numbers are not high and the nuclear weapon is not issued to the forces. I do hope Pakistan follows the same policy and the weapons can be taken care of by command and control system. In the West, the danger of accidental use was considered high because the weapons were issued to the forces and commanders were delegated powers to use them. Thirdly, in the West, they have nuclear weapons on continuous alert.

Regarding mishap, yes the danger is there which can be decreased but not entirely ruled out.

Q. What Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) can be taken by the two countries?

A. The biggest CBM is an agreement between the two countries that they will not resort to use of force to alter the territorial status quo.

The two blocks, East and West, arrived at such an agreement at Helsinki in 1975 and that was the beginning of detente.

The second CBM is analogous to Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ‘ostpolitik’ which means throwing channels open to trade, tourism etc.

Once these two basic steps have been taken, then follow other measures like notification of exercises etc.

Q. Does India want to play a role in the Asian balance of power?

A. It is not a question of India playing a role. There is so much of talk these days about human rights and democracy. If that is so, then 1/6 of humanity, which is India, should have an appropriate share in international decision making. In fact if all the South Asian countries can come together in terms of understanding, then the collective weight of South Asia will be higher in international decision making.

Q. What is the future of SAARC?

A. The future of SAARC depends upon two factors: First, all SAARC countries should jointly renounce the use of force against each other. Second, irrespective of established religions in various SAARC countries (we have Islamic Pakistan, Buddhist Sri Lanka and Bhutan, Hindu Nepal, and secular India and Bangladesh) in their international relations, especially amongst themselves, the approach of SAARC countries should be secular. And lastly, they must attempt to harmonise with global international trends and value system. Any country which does not adopt the above policies is likely to get isolated and create local tensions.

But I am confident in the longer run all the SAARC countries will come to terms with these realities.

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