DEFENCE NOTES

The Economics of Defence

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Brig (Retd) SAEED ISMAT, SJ makes a comprehensive case for cost-effectiveness.

National Security depends upon many factors, the morale of a country’s soldiers, the number and ingenuity of its scientists, the character and skill of its political and military leadership, its geographic position, “and even in the nuclear age the prevailing winds that blow across its lands and seas”, but fundamentally it depends upon economic factors. “Military strategy and national economy are as interdependent as the front and the rear sights of a rifle”, according to the authors of the Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Age. It does not make sense to ask the correct position of the rear sight except in relation to the front sight and the target. It remains a national obligation of the defence policy-makers to rationalize their decisions keeping in view the vital aspect of “Cost Effectiveness”.

The stereotypes amongst the defence policy-makers continue to look at the Armed Forces of Pakistan in terms of separate services of army, navy and the airforces. Procurement of any major weapon system like tanks, ships, aircrafts, missiles should contribute directly to an integrated over all military strategy rather than the individual service force development plans and programmes. The existing approach and procedures are inefficient and wasteful. In determining the strength of our defences and weapon systems, we must make precise and crucial judgements. We should spend no more than is absolutely necessary. There has to be a proper relationship of ‘means and ends’ and security concerns must relate to the economic challenges bearing down on the country, which, because they are so serious place a heavy burden and responsibility on the present day military leaders. There is a fundamental conflict between national existence and economic condition, on one hand and there is incessant search for strategic security and on the other hand its search for economic stability.

We need to undertake a comprehensive and far reaching consideration of the premises and procedures for threat evaluation. Correct, accurate and realistic threat evaluation (not misplaced threat perception) is the single most important factor in determining the defence policy, military strategy and ultimately development of force design and weapon systems to support such a policy. The resultant force designing and force structuring is going to cost money. Exaggerated and unrealistic threat evaluation can thus put unbearable burdens on an unstable and highly fragile economy with catastrophic consequences. Perhaps it is equally important to rely upon other elements of national power as a response to the threat to our national security. If this is not possible or the desired effects are not likely to be satisfactory then as a final resort we might consider using accommodation, for that matter even temporary regression to gain time. Later, when the situation improves we could pursue our national interest with renewed strength. Threat is never constant, it is ever changing, therefore, threat evaluation and responses are parts of a dynamic process.

Unrealistic slogans and ultra patriotic semantics must not be allowed to dictate our defence policy. We should realistically and continuously analyze threat perception, improve our defence management, increase professional efficiency and create a new culture in the defence forces where leadership at all level must consider ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’. Along side strategic and tactical appreciation we should develop institutionalized methods of working out a ‘Cost-benefit Appreciation’ before taking any decision relating to manpower, equipment and weapon system. Political and military leaders should realize that the economic performance of the country is an all important national security issue. Low economic growth, high inflation, high unemployment are often as serious if not more serious threat to the national political and social order than the perceived threat from an outright military aggression by India. In brief, we need to reform our thinking in handling important national security concerns. Concurrently, the Armed Forces urgently need to put their own house in order and instead of becoming a national liability (as perceived by many) should aim to be seen by the people of Pakistan as a national asset. For this we shall need military reforms and a strategy for change to make the Armed Forces more effective, efficient and ‘less expensive’.

In order to initiate the process of cutting down of defence expenditure, creating awareness in the field of defence economics and encouraging civilian participation in the affairs of the Armed Forces, it is intended to present a series of articles through the courtesy of Defence Journal. Hopefully, this shall generate interest and debate. The first article deals with Pakistan Navy on priority basis since it demand immediate attention.

Pakistan Navy

The official announcement of Pakistan Navy to purchase four surface warships in the next financial year is outrageous in these gloomy economic times. Pakistan Navy has apparently been inspired by Mahan, the great naval strategist of the nineteenth century who expounded the view that sea-power is essential for national greatness. The notion of command of the sea was the centre of his philosophy. But what we often forget is that his philosophy was for great nations and major economic powers. It was not designed to spur poor and weak nations like Pakistan to aspire for an incompatible sea-power status. In this regard, particularly striking is the observation by Paul Kennedy, ‘there is a constant interaction between economic and military power. Wealth is needed to build and sustain military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the national resources is diverted from wealth creation and given instead to military purposes then in the long haul it is bound to weaken the national power’.

Vulnerability of Surface Warships — Anti-Ship Missiles

All major weapon systems particularly large surface war ships including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyer and frigates are the most vulnerable in the modern naval environment. Inspite of the enormous resources invested in the development of naval anti-air warfare and anti-submarine warfare systems, large ships are becoming increasingly vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and submarine attacks. War ships are highly capital expensive than weapon system that can destroy them. Anti-ship missiles have an easy job and it is much easier to guide missiles accurately over sea then over land and it is easier to locate and track enemy surface warships than submarine and small crafts. In 1967 Israel was shocked when their naval ship ‘Elath’ was hit by a small boat armed with ‘Styx’ missile, an anti-ship missile fired by the Egyptians at a range of over 20 kilometer. Air launched sea-skimming missiles became famous during the Falkland war when Argentineans used French supplied Exocet missile to sink and severely damage British warship. HMS Sheffield was hit two meters above the water line, was set on fire and sunk. The 4000 tons warship carried some of the world’s best ship defences, including Sea Dart ship to air missiles, yet it was sunk by US $ 250,000 missile. Argentina fired six Exocet missiles out of which four hit their targets. This represented a success rate of nearly 70 percent. Missile that sunk H.M.S. Sheffield was launched from fighter-bomber aircraft at a range of 35 km. The Argentinean success rate was very ‘cost effective’ given that an Exocet cost a tiny fraction of the cost of a very tiny frigate.

The other typical anti-ship missiles are American Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles. Both the missiles can be fired from the standard torpedo tubes in submarine or from the platform of surface ships and boats. Harpoon is cruise missile with a range of nearly 100 kilometers, well over the horizon. Although normally carried on ships and submarine, it can also be dropped from aircraft. Another modern fire and forget anti-ship missiles is the British Sea Eagle. Sea Eagle is mainly carried on aircraft or helicopters, but there is a ship launched version. The warhead contains about 100 kilogram of high explosive and is designed to detonate after it has penetrated the enemy ship. It is more effective because it explodes inside the target ship rather than on impact.

It is not intended to get into the technologic detail of the anti-ship missile but to make a point that intelligent anti-ship missiles make large warship obsolete, at least for any naval combat against a sophisticated navy like the Indian Navy. Large war ships are prohibitively expensive, a destroyer can cost over US$ one billion, a modern updated frigate US$ 400M to 800M. Such war ships can be destroyed with a high probability, for example, a Harpoon Missile costing will under one million dollar.

Vulnerability Warships by Fast Patrol Crafts

In fact the only naval surface ship that makes any sense today are fast, small patrol boats armed with missiles. We must not forget in the context of Pakistan the future naval confrontation will take place in coastal waters, especially in and around our vital shipping channel. Fast patrol boats in the modern terminology are sometimes referred to as Fast Attack Crafts. These crafts are small with dash speed of upto 50 knots and can be effectively used in darkness and bad weather. They are equipped with smart anti-ship missiles and automated gunnery system to pose formidable threat to any surface ship. With its small size and shape of super structure the reduced radar signature makes its detection rather difficult. It is now much cheaper to destroy large warships than to deploy them. This is a fact of modern military technology.

Vulnerability of Warships - Submarine

Warships are not only threatened by anti-ship missile but also by submarine. The most distinguishing character is its ability to operate submerged and silently, thus it relies on concealment and stealth giving it a great edge over other naval vessels. In the vicinity of our coastline and our adjacent sea, where we enjoy superior knowledge of oceanographic conditions, the submarines can be used with relative impunity. Pakistan Navy is proud of the fact that its submarine sunk an Indian frigate “Kukri” during the 1971 war. Presence of submarine alters the complexion of naval operation in selected areas as it would be hazardous for the enemy surface ships to venture in those areas unless they employ a lot of efforts and naval assets to counter the threat. In other words submarines have an inherent deterrent value. They are also very versatile platform, they can fire missiles, lay mines and operate in open ocean and as well as shallow waters. They have an offensive ability and a great element of surprise. They have, therefore, a very versatile role in naval warfare. It is an excellent weapon for sea denial since they pose considerable threat to even the most sophisticated surface vessel.

Conclusion

In summary, surface warships are most vulnerable of all naval elements. The modern technological advancements have rendered them increasingly vulnerable to anti-ship missiles fired from land, air, sea and also from under sea submarine attacks. Warships are certainly much more expensive than the weapon system that can destroy them, if this be the case, why are the great powers still building and aspiring power are still keen to buy them? We must understand that traditionally, naval power has been used by the great powers to influence international events. In fact naval power has historically been used more often for political coercion than for military action. Major powers will continue to use their warships in peace time to extend their influence globally and regional powers to exert their influence regionally. In fact, the ability to project naval power has become a necessary characteristic of a power in being or for a potential power in the making. Indian navy falls in the later category and this explains the Indian compulsions to expand their naval power since it perceives itself as the most powerful actor in the Indian Ocean littoral states. It also harbours ambition to become a major power globally in the future.

It makes no sense for small countries like Pakistan, even to contemplate developing projectable naval power and purchase capital intensive highly vulnerable surface warships. Neither the role of navy nor the economic condition of country permit such wasteful expenditure. On top of that it makes no professional and operational sense. Whereas, one can understand the natural desire of our naval professionals to augment Pakistan Navy’s surface warships fleet to perform the mission in different scenario but this procurement is total unrealistic since it shall not enhance the fighting potential of PN or its defence capability.

Pakistan shall be totally out of step with the modern trends where the major power may continue to sail large warships in the world’s ocean, primarily as a part of super power global politics, smaller countries are increasingly relying on smaller, cheaper ships, fast patrol crafts and diesel powered submarines for sea denial, coastal defence, for defending EEZ and to police the national interest at sea.

Pakistan has invested very heavily in the Pakistan Navy, which is a modern three-dimension force, with the ability to effectively operate in and monitor Pakistan maritime interests. Pakistan Navy operates modern and updated type 21 frigates, advanced Agosta submarines and an effective naval air arm — all with state of the art weapons and sensors. Pakistan Air Force aircraft’s equipped with stand off anti-ship missiles are dedicated to the navy to reinforce its operational capability. Pakistan Navy has very recently revealed its plan to invest in indigenous construction of frigates in near future. When we take into consideration Pakistan legitimate operation needs and the vulnerability of surface warships, such a venture like the proposed purchase of warships and building of frigates is wasteful, unwarranted and economically unthinkable. Pakistan Navy must re-examine the proposal of purchase and construction of surface ships in light of the prohibitive costs and operational vulnerability. If the navy still remains adamant and the government complies with the proposal, history shall remember this is yet another grand folly of a military regime.

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