| DEFENCE NOTES |
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The
Economics of Defence From
the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Brig (Retd) SAEED ISMAT, SJ makes a
comprehensive case for cost-effectiveness. National
Security depends upon many factors, the morale of a country’s soldiers,
the number and ingenuity of its scientists, the character and skill of its
political and military leadership, its geographic position, “and even in
the nuclear age the prevailing winds that blow across its lands and
seas”, but fundamentally it depends upon economic factors. “Military
strategy and national economy are as interdependent as the front and the
rear sights of a rifle”, according to the authors of the Economics of
Defence in the Nuclear Age. It does not make sense to ask the correct
position of the rear sight except in relation to the front sight and the
target. It remains a national obligation of the defence policy-makers to
rationalize their decisions keeping in view the vital aspect of “Cost
Effectiveness”. The
stereotypes amongst the defence policy-makers continue to look at the
Armed Forces of Pakistan in terms of separate services of army, navy and
the airforces. Procurement of any major weapon system like tanks, ships,
aircrafts, missiles should contribute directly to an integrated over all
military strategy rather than the individual service force development
plans and programmes. The existing approach and procedures are inefficient
and wasteful. In determining the strength of our defences and weapon
systems, we must make precise and crucial judgements. We should spend no
more than is absolutely necessary. There has to be a proper relationship
of ‘means and ends’ and security concerns must relate to the economic
challenges bearing down on the country, which, because they are so serious
place a heavy burden and responsibility on the present day military
leaders. There is a fundamental conflict between national existence and
economic condition, on one hand and there is incessant search for
strategic security and on the other hand its search for economic
stability. We
need to undertake a comprehensive and far reaching consideration of the
premises and procedures for threat evaluation. Correct, accurate and
realistic threat evaluation (not misplaced threat perception) is the
single most important factor in determining the defence policy, military
strategy and ultimately development of force design and weapon systems to
support such a policy. The resultant force designing and force structuring
is going to cost money. Exaggerated and unrealistic threat evaluation can
thus put unbearable burdens on an unstable and highly fragile economy with
catastrophic consequences. Perhaps it is equally important to rely upon
other elements of national power as a response to the threat to our
national security. If this is not possible or the desired effects are not
likely to be satisfactory then as a final resort we might consider using
accommodation, for that matter even temporary regression to gain time.
Later, when the situation improves we could pursue our national interest
with renewed strength. Threat is never constant, it is ever changing,
therefore, threat evaluation and responses are parts of a dynamic process. Unrealistic
slogans and ultra patriotic semantics must not be allowed to dictate our
defence policy. We should realistically and continuously analyze threat
perception, improve our defence management, increase professional
efficiency and create a new culture in the defence forces where leadership
at all level must consider ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’. Along side
strategic and tactical appreciation we should develop institutionalized
methods of working out a ‘Cost-benefit Appreciation’ before taking any
decision relating to manpower, equipment and weapon system. Political and
military leaders should realize that the economic performance of the
country is an all important national security issue. Low economic growth,
high inflation, high unemployment are often as serious if not more serious
threat to the national political and social order than the perceived
threat from an outright military aggression by India. In brief, we need to
reform our thinking in handling important national security concerns.
Concurrently, the Armed Forces urgently need to put their own house in
order and instead of becoming a national liability (as perceived by many)
should aim to be seen by the people of Pakistan as a national asset. For
this we shall need military reforms and a strategy for change to make the
Armed Forces more effective, efficient and ‘less expensive’. In
order to initiate the process of cutting down of defence expenditure,
creating awareness in the field of defence economics and encouraging
civilian participation in the affairs of the Armed Forces, it is intended
to present a series of articles through the courtesy of Defence Journal.
Hopefully, this shall generate interest and debate. The first article
deals with Pakistan Navy on priority basis since it demand immediate
attention. Pakistan
Navy The
official announcement of Pakistan Navy to purchase four surface warships
in the next financial year is outrageous in these gloomy economic times.
Pakistan Navy has apparently been inspired by Mahan, the great naval
strategist of the nineteenth century who expounded the view that sea-power
is essential for national greatness. The notion of command of the sea was
the centre of his philosophy. But what we often forget is that his
philosophy was for great nations and major economic powers. It was not
designed to spur poor and weak nations like Pakistan to aspire for an
incompatible sea-power status. In this regard, particularly striking is
the observation by Paul Kennedy, ‘there is a constant interaction
between economic and military power. Wealth is needed to build and sustain
military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and
protect wealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the national
resources is diverted from wealth creation and given instead to military
purposes then in the long haul it is bound to weaken the national
power’. Vulnerability
of Surface Warships — Anti-Ship Missiles All
major weapon systems particularly large surface war ships including
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyer and frigates are the most
vulnerable in the modern naval environment. Inspite of the enormous
resources invested in the development of naval anti-air warfare and
anti-submarine warfare systems, large ships are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and submarine attacks. War ships are
highly capital expensive than weapon system that can destroy them.
Anti-ship missiles have an easy job and it is much easier to guide
missiles accurately over sea then over land and it is easier to locate and
track enemy surface warships than submarine and small crafts. In 1967
Israel was shocked when their naval ship ‘Elath’ was hit by a small
boat armed with ‘Styx’ missile, an anti-ship missile fired by the
Egyptians at a range of over 20 kilometer. Air launched sea-skimming
missiles became famous during the Falkland war when Argentineans used
French supplied Exocet missile to sink and severely damage British
warship. HMS Sheffield was hit two meters above the water line, was set on
fire and sunk. The 4000 tons warship carried some of the world’s best
ship defences, including Sea Dart ship to air missiles, yet it was sunk by
US $ 250,000 missile. Argentina fired six Exocet missiles out of which
four hit their targets. This represented a success rate of nearly 70
percent. Missile that sunk H.M.S. Sheffield was launched from
fighter-bomber aircraft at a range of 35 km. The Argentinean success rate
was very ‘cost effective’ given that an Exocet cost a tiny fraction of
the cost of a very tiny frigate. The
other typical anti-ship missiles are American Harpoon and Tomahawk
missiles. Both the missiles can be fired from the standard torpedo tubes
in submarine or from the platform of surface ships and boats. Harpoon is
cruise missile with a range of nearly 100 kilometers, well over the
horizon. Although normally carried on ships and submarine, it can also be
dropped from aircraft. Another modern fire and forget anti-ship missiles
is the British Sea Eagle. Sea Eagle is mainly carried on aircraft or
helicopters, but there is a ship launched version. The warhead contains
about 100 kilogram of high explosive and is designed to detonate after it
has penetrated the enemy ship. It is more effective because it explodes
inside the target ship rather than on impact. It
is not intended to get into the technologic detail of the anti-ship
missile but to make a point that intelligent anti-ship missiles make large
warship obsolete, at least for any naval combat against a sophisticated
navy like the Indian Navy. Large war ships are prohibitively expensive, a
destroyer can cost over US$ one billion, a modern updated frigate US$ 400M
to 800M. Such war ships can be destroyed with a high probability, for
example, a Harpoon Missile costing will under one million dollar. Vulnerability
Warships by Fast Patrol Crafts In
fact the only naval surface ship that makes any sense today are fast,
small patrol boats armed with missiles. We must not forget in the context
of Pakistan the future naval confrontation will take place in coastal
waters, especially in and around our vital shipping channel. Fast patrol
boats in the modern terminology are sometimes referred to as Fast Attack
Crafts. These crafts are small with dash speed of upto 50 knots and can be
effectively used in darkness and bad weather. They are equipped with smart
anti-ship missiles and automated gunnery system to pose formidable threat
to any surface ship. With its small size and shape of super structure the
reduced radar signature makes its detection rather difficult. It is now
much cheaper to destroy large warships than to deploy them. This is a fact
of modern military technology. Vulnerability
of Warships - Submarine Warships
are not only threatened by anti-ship missile but also by submarine. The
most distinguishing character is its ability to operate submerged and
silently, thus it relies on concealment and stealth giving it a great edge
over other naval vessels. In the vicinity of our coastline and our
adjacent sea, where we enjoy superior knowledge of oceanographic
conditions, the submarines can be used with relative impunity. Pakistan
Navy is proud of the fact that its submarine sunk an Indian frigate
“Kukri” during the 1971 war. Presence of submarine alters the
complexion of naval operation in selected areas as it would be hazardous
for the enemy surface ships to venture in those areas unless they employ a
lot of efforts and naval assets to counter the threat. In other words
submarines have an inherent deterrent value. They are also very versatile
platform, they can fire missiles, lay mines and operate in open ocean and
as well as shallow waters. They have an offensive ability and a great
element of surprise. They have, therefore, a very versatile role in naval
warfare. It is an excellent weapon for sea denial since they pose
considerable threat to even the most sophisticated surface vessel. Conclusion In
summary, surface warships are most vulnerable of all naval elements. The
modern technological advancements have rendered them increasingly
vulnerable to anti-ship missiles fired from land, air, sea and also from
under sea submarine attacks. Warships are certainly much more expensive
than the weapon system that can destroy them, if this be the case, why are
the great powers still building and aspiring power are still keen to buy
them? We must understand that traditionally, naval power has been used by
the great powers to influence international events. In fact naval power
has historically been used more often for political coercion than for
military action. Major powers will continue to use their warships in peace
time to extend their influence globally and regional powers to exert their
influence regionally. In fact, the ability to project naval power has
become a necessary characteristic of a power in being or for a potential
power in the making. Indian navy falls in the later category and this
explains the Indian compulsions to expand their naval power since it
perceives itself as the most powerful actor in the Indian Ocean littoral
states. It also harbours ambition to become a major power globally in the
future. It
makes no sense for small countries like Pakistan, even to contemplate
developing projectable naval power and purchase capital intensive highly
vulnerable surface warships. Neither the role of navy nor the economic
condition of country permit such wasteful expenditure. On top of that it
makes no professional and operational sense. Whereas, one can understand
the natural desire of our naval professionals to augment Pakistan Navy’s
surface warships fleet to perform the mission in different scenario but
this procurement is total unrealistic since it shall not enhance the
fighting potential of PN or its defence capability. Pakistan
shall be totally out of step with the modern trends where the major power
may continue to sail large warships in the world’s ocean, primarily as a
part of super power global politics, smaller countries are increasingly
relying on smaller, cheaper ships, fast patrol crafts and diesel powered
submarines for sea denial, coastal defence, for defending EEZ and to
police the national interest at sea. Pakistan
has invested very heavily in the Pakistan Navy, which is a modern
three-dimension force, with the ability to effectively operate in and
monitor Pakistan maritime interests. Pakistan Navy operates modern and
updated type 21 frigates, advanced Agosta submarines and an effective
naval air arm — all with state of the art weapons and sensors. Pakistan
Air Force aircraft’s equipped with stand off anti-ship missiles are
dedicated to the navy to reinforce its operational capability. Pakistan
Navy has very recently revealed its plan to invest in indigenous
construction of frigates in near future. When we take into consideration
Pakistan legitimate operation needs and the vulnerability of surface
warships, such a venture like the proposed purchase of warships and
building of frigates is wasteful, unwarranted and economically
unthinkable. Pakistan Navy must re-examine the proposal of purchase and
construction of surface ships in light of the prohibitive costs and
operational vulnerability. If the navy still remains adamant and the
government complies with the proposal, history shall remember this is yet
another grand folly of a military regime. |