Weapons and Tactics

Chapter 4

Columnist Brig (Retd) ZA KHAN gives an overview of the changing concepts over the years.

The Beginning of Paid Armies  (1200-1500 AD)

1. The Mercenaries

The Feudal System of raising levies helped to repel raiders and invaders specially where the property and the lives of the local landowners was involved but it had many shortcomings; a limited service liability, the shifting of loyalties of the feudal lords, the requirement of large tracts of land and the disadvantage that a feudal army could only be used to invade another country with promises of awards in the conquered country. As kingdoms grew more stable and their treasuries grew richer rulers found it more convenient to have paid armies.

King Henry II of England, at about the end of the eleventh century, commuted the feudal obligations of service by the payment of money known as ‘scutage’ and the money was used for hiring mercenaries for the duration of hostilities. Edward III, of England, in 1345, for the invasion of France, introduced the ‘indenture system’, a system in which a contractor undertook to raise troops and keep them in the field for a fixed time for a fixed sum of money, this system combined the paid volunteer with the feudal system.

In Europe, from the thirteenth century onwards, mercenaries sold their service to the highest bidder. Initially these mercenaries appeared in Italy, called ‘condotti’ and their leader the ‘condottieri’, there the small rich states warred with one another but did not have the population or extent of territory to create feudal armies so they resorted to mercenaries. The Italian ‘condotti’ developed a bad reputation, they made their living from the discord of the Italian princes and did every thing to keep at war. Mercenary armies did not fight for patriotism, soldiering for them was a way of life, it brought prestige, an income and a career; if their employers lost control or the will for success the mercenaries looked for new pay masters.

As professional soldiers, the condotti, studied their trade and profession, as rivals they sought their own advantage but they always kept the interest of their profession in mind. They prolonged campaigns as much as possible as the end of a campaign meant the end of a contract, they manoeuvred incessantly and casualties, if there were any, were due to occupational accidents. These ‘Free Companies’, as they were known, were a nuisance to the local population when disbanded.

Swiss infantry consisting of pikemen and halberdiers, German ‘landsknechts’ infantry and Genoese cross bow men were the main source of mercenary soldiers who made mercenary soldiering the main industry of their countries. Genoese mercenary cross bow men were employed by almost all European armies except England,

 In the first half of the fifteenth century, King Charles VII of France banned the raising of ‘Free Companies’ and started the system of appointing ‘captains of companies for King’s service’. Initially fifteen ‘ordnance’ companies were constituted, each of ‘100 lances’; a lance meant a mounted armoured cavalryman, his squire, his groom and three archers. The captain was responsible to the king for the discipline of his company. Till about the beginning of the sixteenth century this heavy cavalry, of companies of 100 lances, remained the dominating arm, the fighting formation was two or three ranks of cavalry with their flanks protected by archers; the manoeuvre was a charge.  Mercenaries and paid troops marked the beginning of a new era in the profession of arms.

2. The Spahi and the Janissary

The Ottoman Turk ruler Murad I, who succeeded to the sultanate in 1359 and ruled for thirty years, created a unique regular army about two hundred years before the Europeans started raising regular armies. The Turkish army of this period, like the armies elsewhere, was largely a militia settled on agricultural land in return for military service. The governors of provinces governed their provinces and commanded their armies. These feudal troops were augmented by irregular unpaid infantry and cavalry who served for the plunder.

The elite of the Turkish army were regular soldiers, ‘spahi’ cavalry. The ‘spahi’ numbered approximately 15,000, they were highly paid, and each man was responsible to recruit and train two to six other men. They were armed with a bow, a sword and a lance and did not wear any armour thereby retaining their capability of manoeuvring; with this system the Turks produced about 100,000 cavalry.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Turks organised regular paid infantry but this proved unsatisfactory as the Turks were not accustomed to fighting on foot and did not conform to the necessary discipline. In 1330 it was decided to recruit Christians from the conquered provinces, they were called ‘yeni cheri’ meaning new troops and the words corrupted to ‘janisarry’.

 The janissary were recruited by means of blood tax on the Christian provinces, each of which was compelled every year to surrender a quota of boys, between the ages of seven and twelve, distinguished for their strength and intelligence. In the beginning they numbered 20,000 but gradually increased and numbered 135,000 when they mutinied and were destroyed.

 The Christian boys while under training received Islamic religious instruction, in 1362 AD special privileges were conferred on them and Turks started to volunteer. In peace time they received no pay, the government provided meat, bread and candles, the commanding officer provided rice, vegetables and butter.

The basic janissary organisation was an ‘orta’, a company 100 - 300 strong. Each ‘orta’ had a red and yellow flag and set of cauldrons for boiling soup and rice; there was a tradition that the ‘orta’ should not lose its cauldrons in battle and these were guarded by junior officers, if they were lost all the officers were disgraced and the ‘orta’ was not allowed to parade at public ceremonies. The commander of the janissary was called ‘aga’, he had a white banner with verses of the Quran embroidered in gold, four flags and three horse tails.

The code of the janisarries was: implicit obedience of their officers; perfect accord among themselves; abstinence from luxury, extravagance and practices unseemly of soldiers and brave men; observance of the religious laws and the tenets of Haji Bektask their patron ‘pir’; rules regarding the death penalty, punishment only by their officers; promotion by merit and seniority; rules regarding pension; the keeping of beards, marriage and indulgence in trade was not permitted; they were required to spend their time drilling and practising the trades of war.

 In 1443 they mutinied for the first time, by the middle of sixteenth century the system was corrupted because of the privileges granted to them, in the seventeenth century they started interfering in politics and even dethroned the Sultan.

 In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II, obtained a ‘fatwa’ from Sheikh-ul-Islam that it was the religious duty of the Muslims to do military service and organised the Turkish army on the European pattern; when the Janissaries mutinied against the new organisation they were driven to their barracks and thousands of them were killed or burnt ending the system.

With these changes in the ways of raising armies and compensating the officers and men the method of compensating military service changed to paid armies which gradually became regular armies.

CHAPTER – V

THE ADVENT OF FIREARMS

1. Siege Artillery

 After the stirrup the change which affected tactics and organisations was the advent of firearms. Firearms were first used at the end of the thirteenth century, they were first applied to the problem reducing castles and fortified cities to which the weaker side tended to retire to and hence the development of firearms started with cannons for the reduction of fortress walls.

 The Chinese were the first to use firearms, Arabs probably used cannons at about the end of the thirteenth century, mills to make gunpowder appeared in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century. Edward III, of England, had three cannons when he invaded France in the mid-fourteenth century. In 1436 the French established ‘artillery’ as a separate arm under a ‘Master of Artillery’ and all firearms belonged to it including what are now called “small arms” then called “hand cannon”.

These early guns were siege weapons which fired stone and iron balls of about fifty pounds, the largest guns were known as ‘cannon royal’ or ‘basilisk’ (a fabulous monster serpent), guns were either fortress guns or siege guns. Smaller guns were known as ‘demi’ and ‘quarter’ canons or were named after birds of prey, falcon, falconet etc;

Siege warfare was transformed by the use of cannons, before the advent of the siege cannon cities and fortresses could hold out for long periods of time and usually had to be starved to force them to surrender or the walls had to be stormed. With the siege cannon walls of fortresses could be reduced in a short time, about a month, the defenders’ problem became that of keeping the besieger’s guns at a distance and by mid-fourteenth century fortresses had mounted guns.

By mid fifteenth century siege artillery was in common use, Sultan Mohammad II, of Turkey, who in 1453 besieged and sacked Constantinople to bring to an end the Eastern Roman Empire, is considered the first great siege gunner in history. At Constantinople he had twelve or thirteen great cannons and fourteen batteries with four small guns in each. The largest cannon’s barrel had a circumference of 96 inches, it fired a stone shot of about 1500 pounds, it required a team of 60 oxen to drag it, 200 men to level the ground over which it passed and 200 men marched alongside it to keep it straight; it took two hours to load and could fire six to eight times in a day; it is said to have blown up killing the man who had cast it.

The Muslim kingdom of Granada, in Spain, was rapidly conquered by using siege artillery, fortresses, that had to be starved to surrender or their walls had to be scaled, were now reduced in a few days.

The early mortar, called ‘pot-de-fer’ also known as ‘a dart throwing vase’, was in use by the beginning of the fourteenth century as a siege weapon used to lob projectiles in fortresses.

 The early cannons were cast in iron, later the bronze cannon replaced the iron cannon.

2. Small Arms and Field Artillery

The ‘arquebus’, or hand gun, came into use by the end of the fifteenth century but did not have an effect on organisations and tactics till the end of the sixteenth century when it replaced the cross bow and the long bow. The ‘musket’ (morchetto - sparrow hawk) was a light weapon used by the infantry, it required a stand to rest the weapon on.

In the cavalry, the ‘petronel’, a light cannon attached to breast plate was an early weapon, it was replaced by the wheel lock pistol and it became customary to have a mounted ‘shot’ in the cavalry.

A weapon called ‘ribauldequin’ a primitive mitrailleuse, a many barreled gun with iron tubes so arranged that they could be fired simultaneously came into use about the beginning of the fourteenth century; Edward III used one in 1387 in France with 144 barrels grouped in batteries of twelve firing salvoes of twelve balls.

All firearms worked by applying fire to gun powder. Weapons in which fire was applied by burning a string were called ‘match locks’ while those where the fire was lighted by a spark created by a mechanical device were called ‘wheel lock’; wheel locks were used by cavalry because they could not use a match lock; finally a flint was used to create a spark and the weapon became known as the ‘flint lock’. The range of the firearms at this time was about two hundred yards and the men had to retire out of the firing line to reload.

The main infantry weapon remained the pike with the halberd and the sword as auxiliary weapons used when own or the enemy’s ranks became disordered. Up to the beginning of the sixteenth century the Swiss pikemen had flattened everything that had stood in their way till they were met with a storm of case shot and defeated by a newly acquired mobility of the artillery working in cooperation with infantry and cavalry.

The sequence of the development of firearms was siege artillery, followed by field artillery and then the arming of infantry with firearms. Before the age of the firearm, war was considered a trial of courage and moral values, guns blasted the feudal knights and their strongholds raising the common foot soldiers in importance to the level of the mounted gentlemen-at-arms.

The cost of artillery and the expense of equipping arquebusiers centralised power in the hands of monarchs who could meet the expenses from the state. From the seventeenth century military service ceased to be prerogative of a class and national armies began to emerge.

The use of guns on the battlefield brought technology to warfare with a search for improvement in firearms, from then onwards he who wielded a superior weapon was more formidable.

3. Effect of Firearms on Tactics and Organisation

The battle of Cerignola is regarded as the first battle where hand held firearms defeated an enemy.

In 1495, France and Spain the two most powerful countries in Europe clashed over the control of southern Italy. Gonzale de Cardoba, commanding the Spanish army in Italy in 1495, after being defeated by French pikemen and heavy cavalry concluded that the key to success on the battlefield lay in firearms. He reorganised his troops increasing the number of arquebusiers and gave each a bullet pouch, powder in tubes hung on a bandolier, a ram rod, a match, cleaning materials and armed them with a sword in addition to the arquebus; these arquebusiers wore no armour except a helmet.

Cardoba after reorganising and being reinforced selected a battlefield on a hill at Cerignola. The slopes of the hill had a vineyard and a ditch ran at the base of the hill, he deepened the ditch and entrenched his arquebusiers to fire and break-up the enemy’s cavalry and infantry attacks, pikemen protected the arquebusiers at close quarters; he held his heavy cavalry in reserve and his light cavalry acted as a screen. The French attacked in three ‘battles’ in echelon, of mixed infantry and cavalry, the Spanish artillery opened fire but a spark exploded their powder stock, then the French charged under the cover of their guns but the fire of the entrenched arquebusiers broke up the attack and a subsequent flanking movement after which the Spanish swordsmen dealt with the attacking troops and defeated them.

The battle of Cerignola was of little political significance, small armies were involved but militarily and tactically it was a turning point, the infantry, relegated to a secondary tactical role after the battle of Adrianople in 378 AD, regained its importance by combining the use of fire arms, the pike and the halberd.

In 1492, the Spanish defeated the Moors in Granada to end the Moorish rule in Spain. After defeating the Moors, the Spanish raised professional bodies of troops out of the veterans of the war with Moors. These Spanish ‘battles’, known as ‘tercios’ were of 2000 to 3000 foot soldiers, one third musketeers and the rest pikemen. Some of these ‘tercios’ had princes from the royal house known as “infantas” as honorary colonels and the new foot soldiers became known as ‘infantaria’ - infantry. These ‘battles’ deployed thirty ranks deep with squares of musketeers at the corners until the progress in artillery forced a reduction in the depth to ten.

Because of the large proportion of pikemen, cavalry could not charge with the lance and the sword. Wearing armour against musket fire, the Spanish cavalry relied on the wheel lock pistol, the squadrons marshalled in depth rode up to the enemy pikemen by rank, fired their pistols wheeled to the rear to reload. By 1570 the arquebus was replaced by the musket which was heavier, it required a stand for firing, it had a slow rate of fire and the musketeers had to be protected at close quarters.

The usual deployment was the skirmishers up front, the field artillery next then pikemen and musketeers in the centre with cavalry on the flanks; there were pioneers and foragers and two new innovations by Queen Isabella, a corps of field messengers and a medical service. Tactics were slow and methodical, battles were fought on open grounds.

 Spain now became an important military power, in their organisation the Spanish adopted an innovation of the Italian mercenaries of grouping companies into a ‘colonello’, meaning ‘little column’, for independent missions. A new unit appeared in the Spanish organisation called the ‘coluneo’ commanded by a captain called the ‘cabo de colunelo’ which was corrupted into ‘coronel’. A force consisting of a number of ‘colunelos’ was commanded by a ‘coronel general’. About the middle of the sixteenth century the Spanish introduced the brigade called the ‘tercio’ which consisted of three battalions called ‘coronelia’; each ‘coronelia’ had four companies called ‘banderas’ of about 250 men each.

Kings continued to command their armies, their assistants were called ‘constables’, ‘master of horse’ etc, in the absence of the king the ‘king’s lieutenant’, ‘captain general’ or ‘marshal’ commanded.

Each category of troops had a chief responsible for the organisation, equipping and training. The army staff included officers for supply, provisions, foraging, wagons under a forage master general, camp, provost and judge marshal for administration, a scoutmaster general for intelligence and a sergeant major general for organising the deployment of the army.

The raising, equipping, training, maintenance and leadership required the prestige of nobles but since the nobles could not be expected to busy themselves with the tedious routine of supervision, two channels of command developed, one of captain, colonel, general and second of sergeant, sergeant major and sergeant major general, with the latter attending to routine matters.

The necessity of combining armoured pikemen, unarmoured pikemen, halberdiers, arquebusiers, guns and wagons required a complicated deployment procedure which included the calculations of frontages and depths for which elaborate tables were prepared and used.

Maurice of Nassau, (1584-1625), of Holland, in the Wars of Religion between the Protestant powers of Holland, Sweden and England and the Catholic powers of France and Spain studied the Roman military system and concluded that Roman successes were due to a flexible organisation, a drill for quick and orderly deployment in the face of the enemy and discipline.

Maurice formed regiments of 250 pikes, 100 muskets and 200 arquebuses; for battle artillery deployed ahead of pikemen, the pikemen formed the centre, ten or twelve ranks deep; musketeers ten deep deployed on the flanks of the pikemen, each rank firing and falling back to the rear to reload, this ensured continuous fire; arquebusiers protected the flanks of the musketeers. Gaps equal to the total frontage were left on each flank in which a similar formation deployed forming a second line and sometimes a third line was similarly formed. Cavalry protected the flanks of the army and trenches were dug for protection.

The battle procedure was that the commander carried out a reconnaissance, made a battle plan and the sergeant major made the deployment according to the plan. The sergeant major general, from ‘returns’ giving the names of captains of various troops and the strength of their commands, calculated the number of ranks and files to form a ‘ground square’ with each man having a yard of front and about two yards of depth.

After making his calculations the sergeant major general passed orders to sergeant majors regarding the ground, location of units and the formation. The sergeant majors returned to their units briefed their officers who took post, dismounted pike in hand, the sergeant majors then passed orders to company sergeants who marched their men and marshalled them according to the deployment requirement. Once the troops were deployed in the required formation complete silence and immobility was insisted upon.

In the advance the cavalry provided the vanguard; the advance guard had light guns, infantry, pioneers and quartermasters; the main body consisted of infantry and ammunition wagons; the heavy artillery, reserve ammunition and the supply train, escorted by cavalry brought up the tail.

Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden during the Wars of Religion, laid the foundations of future national armies. He started his military career when still a boy and had an experience of war comparable to Alexander the Great, he studied warfare and Maurice of Nassau was a special favourite of his. He founded his leadership on efficient administration and strict discipline; he provided food, clothing and tents; tactically he introduced the use of massed artillery.

 Sweden did not have a feudal system for the raising of armies, Gustavus Adolphus raised an army by introducing a selective conscription through which every district furnished men according to its population. Local juries selected every tenth man between the ages of fifteen and thirty exempting some professions, miners, armourers and peasants who had one son in the army.

 The disciplinary system introduced by Gustavus Adolphus was based on Articles of war written by his father in which two types of court martial were introduced. For some offences such as despising divine services, violence to superiors, sleeping on a post or deserting a post, the penalty was death. For collective misbehaviour every tenth man was taken by lot and hanged and the rest were relegated to menial tasks in the army; those who surrendered without sufficient cause were hanged.

Gustavus Adolphus introduced the wheel lock muskets, which he made lighter so that they could be fired without requiring a rest and introduced paper cartridges of powder in bandoliers. While retaining the organisations of Maurice of Nassau, he made his fighting formation a brigade of two or four regiments of three battalions of four companies of 72 muskets and 54 pikes. He reduced the depth to six ranks with the three front ranks kneeling so that all could fire. The infantry formed up for battle in alternate groups of muskets and pikes with the pikemen ahead, making an inverted T formation. Infantry regiments had their own small and light guns which deployed ahead of the infantry, making artillery important. The Swedish army usually formed two lines of four and a half brigades each with one brigade in between the two lines.

On the flanks of the infantry, the cavalry formed up in three ranks, with the front rank armed with pistols in addition to sabres, groups of musket men alternated with the cavalry to protect it from the enemy cavalry charging and firing pistols. The cavalry advanced with drawn sabres at a brisk trot, when in pistol range the front rank fired their pistols then all three ranks charged with sabres. Generally a charge was made under cover of smoke to drive back the enemy skirmishers to allow the infantry to advance. After driving in the skirmishers a second charge was made on the enemy’s flanks to drive them in towards the centre to cause confusion and to break up the ordered and controlled front which was essential for success.

While Mohammad II is considered the first great siege gunner, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden is considered the first great field gunner. To make guns mobile he shortened them, reduced the calibre, lightened the carriage and adopted three types of guns, siege, field and regimental. The siege guns weighed three tons, one and a half tons and three quarters of a ton, field guns were about one and a quarter ton, little under one ton and a little over half a ton; siege and field guns were 24, 12 and 6 pounders. The regimental guns were light four pounders, two to a regiment, with fixed ammunition in wooden cases which enabled them to fire eight rounds in the time a musket could fire six. Grape and canister were fired by field and regimental guns and round shot by the siege guns. The Swedish army now had a ‘General of Artillery’, Torstensson held the appointment in 1630 AD at the age of 30 years.

For supplies dependence was on fortified magazines with a staff of commissars, 10 baggage wagons were allowed to a squadron of cavalry and 8 to a company of infantry.

In this organisation of small groups more officers were required and an hierarchy began to emerge; command and control became more complex and a more responsive system began to develop. Officers had to be more professional, several academies were founded in Europe to instruct officers in military knowledge, science and geography,  officers were now required to train their commands in peace time. 

Gustavus Adolphus is regarded as the father of modern war. His infantry organisation gave the infantry the required combination of firepower and protection, cavalry the necessary mobility and shock, and he laid the foundation of the field artillery; above all he made the combined use of infantry, cavalry and artillery.

The Battle of Breitenfeld (1631)

The Thirty Years War, a misleading term for the struggle from 1606 to 1659 for European hegemony in which almost all the European countries were involved, was fought on German soil. When Wallenstein, the Imperialist Habsburg general, overran Jutland and Shleswig and threatened control of the Baltic, Sweden entered the war in 1630. Gustavus Adolphus, at the head of a well trained army of 13,000 landed on the island of Usedom, reinforced to 40,000, he advanced to Stettin which surrendered to him.

In the 1631 campaign Tilly the Habsburg general invaded Saxony and a battle was fought between him and Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfield a village about five miles from Leipzig. Tilly, an old general, master of Spanish tactics set up his battle order of ‘tercios’ between the villages of Breitenfield and Stenberg, in 17 great squares of infantry of 1,500 to 2,000 men each; he had only 26 guns, the heavy guns were placed between his centre and right and the light guns in front of his centre. One quarter of Tilly’s army was cavalry which was deployed on the two flanks, the left flank commanded by Pappenheim, a fiery cavalry commander.

Gustavus advanced from the north, made contact and camped for the night a mile away from Tilly. In the dark of the early morning he deployed his infantry brigades and half brigades parallel to the enemy’s order of battle in such a way that the musketeers were covered by pikemen and could file between their ranks fire a volley and retire. This made each brigade a movable fortress instead of an immovable castle.

Gustavus placed his Saxon allies on his left, he himself commanded the centre in which in the first line had four infantry brigades supported by two infantry brigades and a cavalry regiment; in the second line there were three infantry brigades supported by one cavalry regiment; in reserve there were two regiments of cavalry. On the right, commanded by Baner, six cavalry regiments were deployed with bodies of musketeers between them, in support there was one cavalry regiment; the second line consisted of four cavalry regiments. On the left, commanded by Horn, there were three regiments of cavalry with musketeers between them in the first line and two cavalry regiments in the second line. The regimental guns were drawn up in front of the regiments and brigades and the heavy artillery, under General Torstensson, was massed in front of the centre.

Gustavus instructed his commanders regarding their particular charges, stations and the way they were to fight; he also gave instructions to officers, particularly artillery officers, on how they were to conduct themselves.

Both sides started the battle with artillery fire, the cannonade continued for two and half hours, the cavalry and the infantry stood firm in their lines with the cannons making breaches amongst them which were filled; Swedish artillery, was more numerous and had a rate of fire of three rounds to one of the Imperialists.

Pappenheim, commanding the Imperialist cavalry on the left flank, irked by the Swedish artillery fire, without orders, charged the Swedish right flank with his 5,000 cavalrymen, the Imperialist commander Tilly when he saw the charge remarked that Pappenheim had robbed him of his honour and glory. The groups of musketeers placed between the Swedish cavalry regiments, out ranging the pistols of the Imperialist cavalry, fired volley after volley into the massed cavalry. Pappenheim charged seven times and was repulsed each time, on the seventh charge, Baner commanding the Swedish cavalry on the right, charged with his reserve and drove Pappenheim off the battlefield in rout.

Tilly’s right wing, mistaking Pappenheim’s charge as a general engagement, charged the Saxons on the Swedish left flank and drove them off the battle field, this reduced the Swedish strength by one third and uncovered the left. Tilly taking advantage of this ordered his cavalry on the right wing to attack the Swedish rear from the right and his infantry on the right to make an oblique march to the right and then to wheel to the left to come down on the Swedish left flank.

Gustavus, observing Tilly’s manoeuvre, ordered Horn, commanding his left wing cavalry, to wheel left and change front and at the same time reinforced him with two cavalry brigades from his centre. The Swedes manoeuvred twice as fast as the Imperialists, refused the flank and repulsed the Imperialist attack.

While the action on the Swedish left flank was being carried out, Gustavus decided to deliver the decisive blow, he ordered Baner to charge the Imperialist’s left flank and Gustavus leading four regiments himself, charged the enemy guns, swept through them, turned them around and pounded the Imperialists with their own guns and attacked Tilly’s left flank. Torstensson, the artillery general, wheeled his reserve guns and fired into the dense Spanish squares till the Imperialists lost all order and fled losing 7,000 killed, all their artillery, their baggage train, 6,000 wounded and prisoners. The Swedes lost about 3,000 killed, mostly by gunfire.

 Breitenfeld was the test and trial of new organisation and tactics, the massing of artillery to devastate the opposing infantry and cavalry standing shoulder to shoulder, it was the basis of the dictum “it is with artillery that war is made”.

4. Beginning of  Modern War

During the Thirty Years War, the organisation, deployment methods and tactics introduced by Gustavus Adolphus were universally adopted in Europe in the 17th Century.

Due to the change in weapons and the change from the feudal system to standing armies the system of command and control, responsibilities, terms of service and rules of advancement changed.

Cardinal Richelieu, minister of King Louis XIII, of France (1610-1643), established a war ministry for the raising, equipping and the administration of the French army; the planning and the direction of a war remained the prerogative of the king, he was assisted by a defence minister and a cartographer; the king made the plans and he gave his orders to a ‘Marshal of France’ who commanded the army in the absence of the king; no deviation from the plans and orders were permitted.

Under a ‘Marshall of France’ there were several lieutenant generals who were assisted by officers of lower ranks, one was a chief of staff, one made camping arrangements, others commanded detachments. One general officer under the chief of staff, called ‘marshal de bataille’ planned the battle formations and supervised the deployment for battle; the ‘marshal de bataille’ was assisted by a ‘sergeants de bataille’ who were of the same rank as the regimental commanders.

Marquis de Louvois, who became the war minister to the young King Louis XIV of France in 1666, improved the system; he centralised the administration of the army, eliminated the power of the nobles and made the King’s authority paramount. Louvois changed the command system of the army by creating seven Marshals of France with one in command and the others subordinate, the next rank was lieutenant general followed by ‘marshal de camp’. Command ceased to be a privilege of birth, qualifying service was required and to avoid favouritism in appointment in commands and other coveted posts, a central roster was introduced.

The introduction of the bayonet marks the end of the medieval war and the beginning of modern war. The bayonet first appeared, in Flanders in 1648, as a dagger attachable to a musket, the socket bayonet evolved around 1687, this required the standardisation of the musket barrel and the bayonet. With the bayonet fitted on the musket, infantry drill became important for good weapon handling involving gunpowder and muzzle loading in a close formation, precise actions for loading aiming and firing were developed.

By the beginning of the 18th century the bayonet replaced the pike and the pikeman disappeared from the battlefield. Tactically this was an important change, the pike, necessary to protect the musketeer from the cavalry and as an assault weapon, had the disadvantage of being limited in range to its length and either the musket or the pike could be employed at one time. The introduction of the bayonet made all infantry alike and available for fire and shock actions. The bayonet though designed for shock action increased the firepower and shock action because all the men could fire and charge with the bayonet.

The musket, besides being made standard to accept the bayonet, was reduced in calibre and the flint lock replaced the matchlock and wheel lock firing mechanisms. For the cavalry a variation of the musket called the ‘musketoon’ and a new rifled piece called the ‘carbine’ was introduced.

 With the introduction of the bayonet the tactical formation reduced to a depth of three or four ranks since the bayonet could not reach beyond this. The battle formation became two long lines of battalions, the company now became a fire unit which delivered controlled volley fire.

Infantry battalions, usually about 800 strong, were organised in right and left wings, each divided into ‘divisions’ (companies), platoons and sections; the English platoon was 50 strong whereas the French was 100. Firing, which previously was by ranks, now changed to ‘divisions’ or platoons at intervals of 30 to 50 paces and under cover of the smoke created by the fire the assault was driven home.

The Prussians experimented with a battalion firing at a target 100 feet long and 6 feet high, they obtained 25% hits at 225 yards, 40% at 150 yards and 60% at 75 yards; drill and discipline improved the volume and accuracy of fire.

 With the introduction of the bayonet deployment became simpler and the ranks of sergeant major general and sergeant major were abolished, the rank of brigadier was introduced to command permanently established brigades. The bayonet raised the status of the infantry.

When trenches appeared skirmishers known as ‘bombers’ were formed and later termed ‘grenadiers’. Companies of grenadiers were formed in battalions of selected men for patrolling, skirmishing and other duties which required initiative, later grenadier battalions were formed to allow commanders to use these troops without breaking up units.

 Several battalions, five to eight hundred strong, constituted a regiment, the colonel of the regiment commanded one battalion, a lieutenant colonel commanded the second battalion, the others were commanded by ‘commandants’. Two or more regiments were commanded by a brigadier and above him was a major general, the chief of staff was called the quartermaster general and another staff officer the ‘adjutant general’ began to appear.

 The cavalry regiments of this period consisted of six or more troops of a hundred or a hundred and fifty men, the fighting formation was a squadron of an ad hoc number of troops placed two or three deep. In the attack, the front rank fired their musketoon at close range, the weapon was held by a bandoleer and was dropped after firing, then all ranks charged with the sabre; the cavalry now started protecting its own flank with musket fire instead of pikemen protecting it.

 The artillery, up to this time was organised under contractors, was made an arm and organised on a military basis; the ‘corps of engineers’ was created, ‘inspectors’ for cavalry, infantry, artillery and engineers were appointed to check and report, directly to the ministry of war, the strength, discipline, status of equipment, clothing and the state of troops; needless to say, inspectors were not liked by commanders who claimed that it undermined authority.

A new department came into being to look after marches, camps, supply, transport, military hospitals and magazines, the department dealt with its own representatives up to the regiment level.

The seniority of regiments was jealously guarded, units were numbered serially for seniority and formed right to left in seniority, officers of the same rank, belonging to a senior regiment, were considered senior; officers formed in front of their units according to their seniority and not according to their commands.

 The training of troops now became marching and wheeling of bodies of troops, perfection in weapon handling and controlled volley firing. Battlefield mobility remained the same as in the previous century, the battle line could not be formed quickly and once formed had to be maintained at all costs. Armies usually assembled near fortresses which were stocked with supplies and stores and acted as the maintenance base.

The reconnaissance and the layout of a camp was the responsibility of the senior marshal of the camp who represented the commander. The reconnaissance party consisted of the quartermaster general (the chief of staff), a major general representing the infantry, the quartermasters of the cavalry and artillery and an escort. Camps were laid out in accordance with pre-determined battle formation, infantry in two lines with cavalry on the flanks; the direction of the front was matter of convenience except in the vicinity of the enemy.

In laying out the camp the senior camp marshal started at the right of the camp and rode with his party along the camp line, he allotted about fifty paces for each cavalry squadron with a similar gap between squadrons; the quartermaster of the cavalry dropped off a regimental major and a non-commissioned officer, at suitable intervals to form regimental camps. Next space was allotted to infantry at 100 paces per battalion by the infantry major general and majors from brigades and representatives of regiments supervised the sub-allotment, the second line of infantry was similarly formed. The artillery was usually placed about four hundred yards ahead of the forward line and was guarded by ‘fusiliers’, men armed with ‘fusils’ a light musket, who were specially organised for this task. The supply train, organised to issue bread every four days, was usually placed from where it could conveniently function.

When troops moved into the camp, arms were stacked, regimental colours were planted and a guard placed over them; battalions had their own guards in the centre of their area and detailed a piquet for emergencies. Around the camp in a radius of about a mile and a half, a ‘grand guard’ consisting of about fifty men was placed at intervals to form a perimeter and the gaps were patrolled.

 In the camp, a ‘camp marshal’ of the day, was detailed by roster, who supervised all guards, a ‘lieutenant general of the day’ received the orders of the day from the army commander and through the camp marshal passed them to majors who informed their colonels and brigadiers and sergeants informed captains.

On the receipt of the order to move, the lieutenant general of the day and the quartermaster general (chief of staff) prepared a march order and submitted it to the commander. The march was always conducted in the order of battle, keeping in mind the direction in which the enemy was located and the availability of roads. Movement was either by ‘wings or lines’; in a march by ‘wings’ the reserve, artillery and supply train took the best available route while the wings marched on the flanks, across country if no routes were available. Each column was led by cavalry or dragoons, engineers with road repair material and equipment followed the cavalry; in the rear the supply train followed, escorted by a ‘military police’ called ‘archers’. If the enemy was on a flank the army moved off in the ‘lines’ formed in the camp. Troops usually marched in columns of platoons and troops so that battle lines could be formed by a simple wheel.

 Movement with the intent of giving battle was made in as many columns as possible to facilitate deployment, generally the first line consisted of five columns, cavalry of the right, infantry of the right, artillery, infantry of the left and cavalry of the left. The second line was similarly organised without artillery and the reserve brought up the rear.

 In deployment the effort was to extend the front beyond the enemy’s front, in doing this care had to be taken to ensure that gaps were not too large so that battalions and squadrons could be isolated by the enemy and defeated; when the front could not be made longer than the enemy’s flanks it had to rest on an obstacle, woods or a village. The second line formed 300 to 600 yards behind the first line and the reserve also maintained a similar distance from the second line.

Once the battle line was formed, the brigadiers and below formed in front of their commands while the general officers formed in their order of precedence with the first, second and reserve line.

 After the battle line was formed, the artillery started the battle, when it was decided to advance, the concerned formation advanced dressing by the centre with the guides frequently halting to correct the alignment. Firing was not permitted till a close range was reached to allow a bayonet charge after firing; the maxim was “he who fires first is defeated”.

 In the case of a partial success the successful unit was not allowed to push ahead as that caused a gap in the battle line; it was important to maintain the battle line.

While the musket and the artillery had increased firepower, cavalry still remained the decisive arm and strategy was dictated by forage, water and transport; the necessity of magazines made siege warfare predominate field battles. Campaigns were conducted in the summer while the winter was spent in training recruits in the elaborate drills.

 In England a system was adopted where a colonel enlisted his own men and received a money grant to pay and clothe his men. This led to corruption and the drafting of criminals as soldiers.

The Battle of Blenheim (1704)

The battle of Blenheim, 1704 AD, fought in the war of Spanish succession (1701 - 1714), is described as an example of a battle of this period. This war was fought between European coalitions, England, Holland, Austria, Prussia, Savoy and Portugal formed an alliance against France, Spain and Bavaria; campaigns were conducted and battles were fought in Holland, Germany, Italy, Spain and in the European colonies.

 On July 31, 1704, the Duke of Marlborough after winning the battle of Shellenberg on July 3, decided to bring the combined forces of Marshal Tallard, Marshal Marsin and the Elector Bavaria to battle and informed his ally, Prince Eugene of Savoy, of his plan.

The French and the Bavarians with the intention of defeating the isolated force of Prince Eugene crossed to the left bank of the Danube and took up a position west of the village of Blenheim on August 12 thinking that Marlborough would be forced to retire because they did not consider the possibility of their numerically superior force, entrenched in a strong position, being attacked frontally.

 The two armies were about five miles apart with a defile of wooded hills between them, the Franco-Bavarian army camp was pitched on the top of gentle rise about a mile west of a marshy stream called the Nebel. The Franco-Bavarian centre and right, commanded by Marshal Tallard, had its right flank resting on Blenheim, close to the Danube, it had 36 battalions, 44 squadrons of cavalry and 16 dismounted squadrons; Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria commanded the left and had 42 battalions and 83 squadrons of cavalry; the total artillery was 90 guns. The camp was protected by four villages, it had a marshy stream, the Nebel, running in front and the left was protected by woods and hills.

At the dawn of August 12, Marlborough reconnoitred the Franco-Bavarian position by means of a telescope and saw their quarter-master general marking the camp from Blenheim westwards to Lutzingen. After sunset Marlborough put out a protective screen of 20 battalions and 15 squadrons, including three brigades of English infantry, then at two o’clock on the night 12/13 August, led by 40 squadrons of cavalry, with Marlborough’s army on the left and Eugene’s army on the right, each formed in four columns, the combined force advanced along marked routes and crossed a stream over prepared bridges, the artillery and pontoons followed on the road Donauworth-Hochstadt. A halt was made after crossing the stream to call in the screen which was now formed into a column on the left of Marlborough under the command of Lord Cutts.

The advance was continued to the village of Schwenningen where a halt was made, Marlborough and Eugene at about six o’clock in the morning, with 40 squadrons went to high ground north of village Wolpertstetten to reconnoitre the enemy positions, an hour later the mist rose, the enemy took alarm and fired two cannons.

 Though surprised, the Franco-Bavarian commanders thought that the screen covering the retirement of Eugene had made contact but as columns continued to advance Marshal Tallard realised the truth and ordered deployment. Signal guns were fired to recall the foragers, alarm and assembly were sounded and every effort was made to form battle lines without striking tents. Foraging parties responding to signals returned one by one, the difficulty of having to think and act at once, on many things, in the presence of the enemy, acted on the nerves of those in command and those who had carriages packed with valuables.

Marshal Tallard hastily decided on a defensive plan; he placed his left, commanded by Marshal Marsin, and centre, commanded by the Elector of Bavaria on the bank of the Nebel to prevent its crossing; he commanded the right from Oberglau to the Danube which was positioned 1000 yards from the bank of the Nebel to enfilade it with fire from his centre and drive the enemy back into the marshy swamp with cavalry. Blenheim was garrisoned with 9 battalions, with 7 in support and 11 in reserve in the rear of the village; between Blenheim and Oberglau he deployed 44 squadrons in two lines supported by 9 battalions and 4 squadrons of dragoons; 14 battalions and 32 squadrons of Marshal Marsin were to hold Oberglau and further to the left 32 squadrons and 17 battalions of Marsin linked with the 51 squadrons of the Elector of Bavaria while 12 battalions held Lutzingen and refused the flank.

 Marlborough and Eugene determined from their reconnaissance the Franco-Bavarian right was stronger than the left so an attack on the right would be least expected; that the defence hinged on the village strong points of Blenheim and Oberglau and these garrisons had to be contained when an attack between these villages was launched to prevent a flank counter-attack. Expecting an opposed crossing of the Nebel and to cover a withdrawal if the attempt to cross the stream failed, Marlborough drew up his order of battle in four lines, the first of 17 battalions of infantry was to gain the far bank, the second and third lines of 36 and 35 squadrons respectively were to conduct the main assault, the fourth of 11 battalions to hold the near bank to cover the withdrawal of the cavalry if the assault failed; on the extreme left was Lord Cutt’s column to assault Blenheim; the engineers were ordered to build five bridges and repair a broken one. Eugene with 18 battalions and 80 squadrons was to maintain a link with Marlborough with 23 squadrons and to vigorously attack the Franco-Bavarian left to distract the enemy command while Marlborough delivered the decisive blow.

The battle started at about half past eight with the Franco-Bavarian cannon fire which was answered by the English batteries. While Eugene moved his columns over hilly and wooded ground west of Wolpertstetten, Cutts secured the near bank of the Nebel then crossed it and took up a position east of Blenheim which was overlooked by Blenheim from where six cannons fired on his men. For four hours the English waited under artillery fire for word from Eugene; to sustain morale Marlborough ordered his chaplains to conduct service and in full view of the French gunners he rode up and down the front; at about half past twelve a messenger arrived to inform him that Eugene was in position, Marlborough then asked his generals to go to their posts and the attack began.

 Lord Cutts ordered his leading brigade to assault Blenheim, the general commanding the brigade ordered that no one was to fire his weapon till he had struck the French palisade with his sword. The attack on Blenheim was made by a slow advance in dressed lines, the brigade advanced to within thirty paces of the enemy when a withering volley struck down one third of the brigade, the attack was repulsed and the disorganised English infantry was charged by the French cavalry which was in turn charged by English cavalry. The French general defending Blenheim called up his seven supporting battalions and then losing his head, he called up his reserve of 11 battalions, this placed 12,000 additional men in Blenheim where they were of no use. The English attack failed and a second one was also beaten back, the French cavalry moved forward from both flanks of Blenheim and were driven back, a third attack on Blenheim was called off by Marlborough when he saw that the French reserves were fixed in the village and his object had been achieved.

At the other pivot of the defence, Oberglau, 10 battalions of Eugene, under the Prince of Holstein-Beck, attacked the village, they were repulsed and driven beyond the Nebel exposing the flank of Marlborough’s centre. Marshal Marsin concentrated a large cavalry force behind Oberglau to attack Marlborough’s right through a gap created by the flight of infantry commanded by Prince Holstein Beck. Marlborough requested Eugene to detach a cavalry brigade to close the gap; Eugene, fighting a desperate battle in difficult ground, complied and as Marsin’s cavalry charged they were charged in the flank and driven back then Prince Holstein-Beck’s infantry returned to Oberglau and contained it.

By three o’clock in the afternoon the two pivots of the defence, Blenheim and Oberglau, had been deprived of their offensive power, English infantry crossed the Nebel and secured an area in which the cavalry formed up, then Marlborough passed his cavalry through the infantry and formed it in two lines with two lines of infantry behind; he marshalled 90 squadrons of cavalry and 23 battalions of infantry thereby achieving an overwhelming superiority at the decisive point over the 50 to 60 squadrons and 9 battalions opposing him; Marlborough waited till half past four when Eugene informed him that he had worked around the French flank at Lutzingen, he then ordered his centre to advance.

When the advance started, Tallard realised what was in Marlborough’s mind, he deployed his nine reserve battalions at Oberglau to impede the advance, Marlborough ordered up three battalions and some cannons but his infantry was driven back and the cavalry also fell back giving Tallard a chance to counterattack with his cavalry but this did not materialise; Marlborough then ordered his artillery to fire ‘grape’ into the nine battalions at Ogerglau, under this covering fire the British cavalry charged, drove the French cavalry from the battlefield and broke the French front.

At about the time the French front was broken, Prince Eugene turned the flank at Lutzingen; at this stage of the battle the Elector of Bavaria and Marsin decided to withdraw, Blenheim with 27 battalions held out till about 9 O’clock and then surrendered.

Marlborough and his allies lost 4,500 killed and 7,500 wounded, his enemies lost 23,600 killed and wounded and 15,000 prisoners.

The revolution in war went deeper than weapons, organisation and tactics. Feudal levies could no longer be called up by kings to settle their disputes, armies now had to be equipped, trained and paid. The War of Spanish Succession lasted 12 years, it cost the English 80,000,000 pounds sterling, half of which was met out of taxation, the remainder was borrowed and added to the National Debt which gave the banker merchants political power and allowed them a voice in national policies.

5. The Oblique Order March of Frederick the Great (1710 - 1775)

In the first half of the 18th century there was no major change in weapons and organisation but a lot of literature appeared on organisation and tactics.In this period four infantry and a grenadier company made a battalion, two battalions made a regiment, a brigade was of two regiments and a grenadier battalion which could be detached. In battle the infantry battalion formed three deep in four divisions and eight platoons; fire was by platoon volley with an opening range of one hundred yards.

The cavalry consisted of heavy cavalry called ‘cuirassiers’, light cavalry called ‘hussars’ and mounted infantrymen called ‘dragoons’. Cuirassiers and dragoons were armed with carbines and swords and could fight mounted or dismounted; hussars fought mounted and avoided closing with heavy cavalry. The limited effective range of the musket allowed the cavalry to charge infantry.

By 1732 the French improved the artillery, standardised siege guns into 24 and 16 pounders and field guns into 12, 8, 4 pounders. The artillery fired solid shot, grape and canister while mortars fired shells; the effective range was 1500 to 2000 yards with solid shot and 400 yards with canister. Howitzers and guns could fire explosive shells but fuses were not yet perfected.

Army transport was divided into light and heavy; the light transport consisted of pack animals and carts which followed the brigades with ammunition, rations and medical supplies; the heavy transport consisted of wagons which were escorted. As armies grew larger logistic trains became a necessary encumbrance, roads were dirt tracks and weather played a big part in the planning of campaigns. The ration was two pounds of grain per day which was carried in the baggage train or stored in a magazine or requisitioned by foragers; the grain was ground in portable mills, baked in towns or field ovens.

When an army operated in a hostile area light irregular troops, with little or no discipline, were employed to protect the lines of communications.

The deployment and forming up for battle was fixed for a campaign and the order of movement was based on it. Infantry formed two lines, the front line with small intervals between battalions, the second line about two hundred and fifty yards behind with larger gaps between battalions. The cavalry formed in two or three lines on each flank.

Prussia emerged as a power in the 17th century, it was a land-locked small country with a population of 2 1/2 million compared to 10 million of Austria and England and 20 million of France and had three hostile powers around it. Frederick II, known as Frederick the Great, became the king of Prussia in 1740, he inherited an army of 80,000, well disciplined and the best trained in Europe, he is considered one of the most offensive minded Great Captains of war. He realised how slow and lacking in mobility tactics had become, that an army formed up for battle by an elaborate and slow procedure, once formed up it was not able to move easily, out flanking was recognised as desirable but difficult to carry out. Manoeuvring by detached elements was not carried out because adequate sub-divisions within the army were lacking and extension of the front to overlap was dangerous because the centre was weakened.

Frederick reasoned that if the mobility of one side greatly exceeded that of the other side, once the slower had deployed it would be possible to concentrate on one flank and attack it and the enemy would not be able to reinforce it; he decided to base his tactics on this manoeuvre with mobility and fire power.

He drilled his infantry till they attained a rate of fire three times that of other armies, giving the Prussians infantry a superiority of three to one.The Prussian artillery was divided into light regimental guns and field batteries; to make his artillery mobile, Frederick the Great created the ‘horse artillery’ in which the gun crews were mounted on horses and dragged their guns at a gallop when other armies were using slow moving wagons; ‘horse artillery’ was adopted by other armies over the next thirty years. The Prussian cavalry was trained to charge the infantry with speed and to attack with the sword.

The tactical problem of overlapping the flank of the enemy he overcame by drilling his army to form at an oblique angle to the enemy thereby overlapping and enveloping his flank. He based the manoeuvre on accurate intelligence of the enemy’s deployment gathered by an efficient intelligence system and his hussars who were trained for reconnaissance. He depended on surprise due to darkness, fog and terrain, he held the enemy immobile by threatening with strong advance guards which prevented the enemy from reinforcing his threatened flank and attacking the Prussian columns moving into positions. The inherent inflexibility of the linear formation also prevented the enemy from reinforcing his threatened flank. Having deployed overlapping the enemy, Frederick the Great attacked holding back a reserve; the attack was conducted with extreme violence by concentrating artillery at the point of attack and using intensive infantry volley fire.

He explained his ‘Oblique Order March’ as follows “You refuse one wing to the enemy and strengthen the one which is to attack. With the latter you do your utmost against one wing of the enemy which you take in the flank. An army of 100,000 men taken in the flank may be beaten by 30,000 in a very short time. The advantages of this arrangement are (1) a small force can engage one much stronger than itself; (2) it attacks an enemy at a decisive point; (3) if you are beaten, it is only part of your army, and you have the other three-fourths which are still fresh to cover your retreat.”

Frederick’s tactics were simple based on superior mobility, Napoleon commented “his oblique order could only prove successful against an army which was unable to manoeuvre.”

Battle of Leuthen(1757)

The battle of Leuthen fought between the Prussians and the Austrians, during the Seven Years War, illustrates the oblique order march. This war was fought between an Austrian, Russian, French, Swedish and Polish coalition against England, Portugal and Prussia. England and France mostly fought at sea and in their colonies, Frederick the Great made an alliance with England to guarantee the integrity of Hanover because the English king was the Elector of Hanover.

Frederick the Great fielded two armies, he commanded one and the Duke of Bevern commanded the other. Frederick defeated a combined French-Austrian army at Rossbach on November 5, 1757; after a week to refit he with 13,000 men marched 170 miles from Leipzig to Parchwitz in 15 days arriving on 28 November. On 22 November, Bevern was defeated at Breslau, under the command of General Ziethen the remnants of Bevern’s army was ordered to concentrate at Parchwitz on December 3. Frederick then advanced to Neumarkt, captured it and learnt that the Austrians were deployed with their right flank resting on the village Nippern and their left at Sagschutz.

The Austrians deployed on 4 December, they had 84 battalions, 144 squadrons of cavalry and 210 guns, in all between 60,000 and 80,000 men drawn up in two lines. The right, commanded by Lucchessi, was protected by the bogs of Nippern; the centre was at Leuthen; the left, under Nadasti, behind the village Sagschutz was refused and was protected by an abattis. The right wing cavalry was at Guckerwitz and left at Leuthen. Defensively the Austrian position was strong, the front was 5 1/2 miles long and over extended; the battlefield was an open plain.

Frederick had 24,000 infantry in 48 battalions,12,000 cavalry in 128 squadrons, 10 super-heavy guns, 61 heavy guns and 96 other guns. At 8 PM on December 4, 1757, Frederick received information about the Austrian location and started the advance from Neukarkt on December 5, 1757, at 5 A.M. Half way to Leuthen he halted, assembled his generals and told them that he was going to attack the Austrians who were three times as strong as he was, against all the rules of the art of war, that they must defeat the Austrians or perish before their batteries. He ordered his generals to repeat what he had said to the regiments.

Frederick’s plan was to advance on the Breslau road, feint at the Austrian right and taking advantage of the extended front, to march across the front, place his whole army on the Austrian left, refuse his left, attack and drive Austrians off their communications.

Frederick advanced in four columns covered by an advance guard of 12 battalions and 50 squadrons of cavalry commanded by Nostitz who made contact with Austrians cavalry at Borne at dawn, he charged and pursued the Austrians towards their right. The pursuing Prussians deployed before the right and centre of the Austrian front giving the Austrian right wing commander, Count Lucchessi, the impression that he was going to be attacked in strength. The Count called for assistance, the Austrian reserve cavalry and part of the left wing cavalry reinforced him.

From Borne Frederick examined the Austrian dispositions which were clearly visible and decided to concentrate his whole army except the advance guard on the Austrian left. Borne and the terrain in front of the Austrian centre and left hid the advancing Prussian columns from the Austrian view, when the Prussians disappeared from view the Austrian commanders, Prince Charles and Marshal Daun, assumed that the Prussians were in full retreat.

At Borne, the Prussians formed in two columns, wheeled to their right and hidden by the terrain, advanced to the left flank of the Austrians. The Prussian order of march was the ‘right wing’ under Prince Maurice of Dassau consisting of an advance guard of three battalions under General Wedel, the main right wing with 43 squadrons and six battalions under Ziethen; the ‘left wing’ followed under General Retzow, 39 battalions, 40 squadrons flanked the infantry under General Driesen. Each body of cavalry was supported by 10 squadrons of Hussars while the rear guard was 25 squadrons under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg.

A little after noon the Prussians were seen advancing between Lobetinz and Sagschutz threatening the weakened Austrian left, Nadasti the Austrian left wing commander, sent messenger after messenger to Charles asking for reinforcements.

At about 1 P.M., Wedel, supported by six guns and six battalions of Prince Maurice, stormed the defences of Sagschutz. Nadasti charged Ziethen’s squadrons and drove them back on to the supporting infantry where the Prussian infantry fire held back the Austrian cavalry. Ziethen reorganised his men, charged Nadasti and drove him to Rathener Wood. The Austrian left wing was routed, the area between Sagschutz and Leuthen was covered with fugitives pursued by hussars; the Prussian infantry advanced in double line, Wedel on the left, Maurice in the centre, Retzow on the left, the whole supported by heavy artillery in enfilade.

Charles taken by surprise, recalled the cavalry with which he had reinforced Lucchessi earlier and sent his infantry forward piecemeal to form a new line facing the direction of the Prussian attack, this led to overcrowding in Leuthen where troops, in places, stood 30 to 100 ranks deep.

Leuthen was captured by Fredericks’s guards after a number of battalions had failed, further Prussian advance was held up by Austrian artillery north of Leuthen under whose cover the Austrian infantry deployed at right angles to their original front. Frederick ordered his left wing to advance but it was driven back by artillery fire, he then positioned his artillery, including super-heavy guns, on high ground at Butterberg and swept the Austrians with artillery fire.

By about four O’clock the Austrians were swept back, at about dusk, Lucchessi, who had assembled the Austrian right wing at Frobelwitz saw Retzow’s infantry held up and moved to charge them in the flank, hidden from the Austrian view, behind the village of Radaxdorf, were Driesen’s 40 squadrons of Prussian cavalry, 30 squadrons charged Lucchessi in front, dragoons attacked him in the flank and hussars in the rear, Lucchessi was killed and his cavalry scattered. Driesen then wheeled to his right and charged the Austrian infantry in the rear while Wedel attacked them in the flank from Leuthen, by nightfall the Austrians were routed.

In the battle the Prussians lost about 6,000 killed and wounded, the Austrians 3,000 dead, 7,000 wounded, 12,000 prisoners, 116 guns, 4,000 wagons and 51 colours. In the battle of Leuthen, Frederick the Great attacked a victorious Austrian army, superior in strength and in battle positions, with an army a part of which had been recently defeated and gained a complete victory.

Napoleon’s comment on this battle was “The battle of Leuthen is a masterpiece of movements, manoeuvres and resolution. Alone it is sufficient to immortalise Frederick and place him in the ranks of the greatest generals. All his manoeuvres at this battle are in conformity with the principles of war.”