India Launches a Space Satellite

Patron Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR F.S. LODI takes a look at India’s space initiative.

On April 18, 2001 India put a satellite in orbit around the earth which was boosted into space on board a new and more powerful rocket. The Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) took off on schedule at 3.43 pm (IST) after a 57-hour countdown from the Sriharikota launch site 100 km north of Madras (Chennai) on India’s south eastern coast in the state of Andhra Pradesh. This effectively puts India into the elite club of nations capable of launching commercial satellites.

The previous launch attempted on March 28, 2001 was aborted by the computerised launching system a second before the countdown was due to end, because one of four strap-on booster rockets failed to achieve the required level of thrust. The faulty engine was replaced and the 49-meter rocket given more flame protection after foam insulation pads caught fire following the aborted launch. This time 17 minutes after take-off the GSLV-D1 placed a 1.54-tonne experimental satellite, GSAT-1, into “a perfectly determined orbit,” said an Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) officer.

At the mission control room, the ISRO Chairman Mr K. Kasturirangan and his colleagues took a sigh of relief at the success of their mission of placing a satellite into orbit. The ISRO had invested 10 years and Rs 14 billion ($ 305 million) in developing the three-stage, 49-meter high GSLV which was the most urgent and strategic project undertaken by India’s space programme. With this launch India joins China, Japan, Russia the United States and the European Space Agency in the exclusive global club of satellite launchers who can park heavy communications satellites deep into space.

After detonating a nuclear device in 1974, India has been trying to enter the satellite launching status since the late 1970s. The first flight was attempted in 1979 when the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) failed due to a jammed valve in the second stage of the rocket, it was reported. The next two SLV flights in 1980 and 1981 were successful in placing small 40-kilogramme “Rohini” satellites into orbit.

The next generation of Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicles (ASLV) which were to carry 150-kilogramme satellites were initially not successful. The first two ASLVs launched in 1987 and 1988 plunged into the Bay of Bengal a few minutes after take-off. These failures forced a four years delay as the engineers and scientists involved in the project re-evaluated the results and added extra inputs, some available at home and others imported or obtained from abroad.

The tests resumed in 1992, when an ASLV carrier blasted off successfully and was able to place a satellite payload in orbit. Another mission two years later in 1994 was also a success. India was later able to develop the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) which was powerful enough to carry a one ton satellite. The first PSLV mission was a failure, the rocket falling into the Bay of Bengal a few seconds after take-off. But the following four PSLV flights carried out between 1994 and 1999 were all successful.

On January 18, 1991 the government of India signed a contract with the Russian space directorate ‘Glavkosmos’ for the purchase of cryogenic engines and their related technology. The contract was worth $350 million. “This stemmed from India’s desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India’s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) programme. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational,” writes Jerome M. Conley in his paper on “Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation.”

Conley goes on to say that over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTRC). The growing threat of missile proliferation become well-known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India’s Agni IRBM missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the US Executive Branch changed administration from President Bush to President Clinton.

“From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine was legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of ‘peaceful space ventures.’ Furthermore, India asserted that US attempts to block the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics (of USA) and the French space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.”

The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India’s leadership that it would not give in to US diplomatic pressure. This promise was compromised however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures. On July 16, 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the scale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was given bidding rights on over $ 950 million of future US space projects.

In 1993 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) signed a fresh contract for $ 120 million with Russian space agency ‘Glavkosmos’ to acquire cryogenic engines. Russia handed over the first cryogenic engine to India in September 1998. India is in the meantime reported to be developing its own cryogenic engine since 1994 and has by now achieved a test-firing of 13 seconds. Was there some form of transfer of technology to enable India to shorten her development time, from the earlier estimate of 15 years, is the moot question.

It should be noted that under the guise of “peaceful space ventures” India has succeeded in acquiring the much-needed technology and material for her missile programmes. These have unfortunately, been provided by the former Soviet Union and now Russia as well as the developed countries of the West.

Most Indian newspapers have hailed the success of GSLV mission for propelling India into the elite club of nations sharing the lucrative commercial satellite launch market, which consists of China, French-led European Consortium Arianespace, Japan, Russia and the United States. The world space launch market is estimated to be worth $ 3 billion a year. The ISRO has a commercial wing called Antrix Corporation, which will be making efforts to obtain orders worldwide.

A statement from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) said initial “orbit raising operations” were carried out successfully early on April 19, 2001 from the Master Control Facility in Karnataka. “With this operation, the orbital perigee (closest distance from the earth) of GSAT -1 has been raised to 3,000 km... further manoeuvres are planned in the next few days,” the statement said.

Roddam Narasimha, a member of India’s Space Commission which oversees the national space programme said that the GSLV success was a great leap forward and felt that India’s space programme had come of age. “The programme is getting to a stage where India has a range of capabilities, not just one. Now the range is extensive.” Range was what India has been aiming at for her ballistic missile programme under the garb of space research.

According to Narasimha, the country now needs to build satellite payload capacity as high as three tons, which will help pull in more clients. “If India can build this capacity, it can emerge as a significant player in the world,” he said. “We cannot become a strong competitive force to reckon with overnight. It takes a little time,” Mr Narasimha said, adding that cooperation and support from the public and private sector would be crucial to making Antrix a commercially sensitive outfit.

By international standards, India’s space programme runs on a shoestring budget of around $ 400 million annually but by South Asian standards it is a very large amount that India is prepared to set aside for obtaining missile technology. The cost of launching a satellite aboard the GSLV has been estimated at between $ 15,000 to $ 16,000 per kilogram. A three-ton satellite payload capacity that India is planning for, would cost around $ 48 million to launch. Can India afford this tremendous cost without outside financial assistance. Although the chairman of ISRO Mr K. Kasturirangan feels “this (the cost) is quite competitive when compared with some other contemporary launch vehicles.”

The Times of India newspaper ran a headline saying “GSLV launches India into elite space club.” The Times also pointed out for all to know that the GSLV success also signalled the ability of India, which conducted shock nuclear tests in 1998, “to build long-range inter-continental missiles.” Was this not India’s overall aim all along, to obtain missile technology at any cost and from any source. She has succeeded with the willing cooperation of many countries. What this will mean to the region, which is already somewhat volatile and on the brink of a conflict, is another matter.