Dear
Sir
The
recent decision by Moscow to provide nuclear fuel for India’s Tarapur
Nuclear Reactor is a violation of the non-proliferation treaty signed by
Russia. The cash-starved Russians are after a big slice of the $20 billion
allotted for India’s so-called minimum nuclear deterrent.
The
Indo-Canadian collaboration in 1960 paved the way for building the
Canada-Indian Reactor (CIRUS). The plutonium derived from the re-processed
spent fuel from CIRUS was used for the 1974 explosion. France helped in
fabricating the "un-safeguarded" Fast Breeder Test Reactor at
Kalpakkam. It also supplied low enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur
Atomic Power station from 1983 to 1993 and established two heavy water
plants with a combined capacity of producing 138.5 tons of heavy water per
year.
Germany
supplied un-safeguarded heavy water plants, which were installed at Nangal
in Himachel Pradesh and at Talsher in Orissa. Bonn also secretly supplied
natural lithium useful in making tritium to boost nuclear bombs. India
covertly imported 1,000 Kg of beryllium from Germany in 1984 for Bhaba
Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Mumbai. India is running a beryllium
project illegally supplied by a German firm, which has enabled India to
its next wonder production- thermo-nuclear device.
In
1998, Russia secretly sold about 100 tons of heavy water to India for its
un-safeguarded reactors. Moscow earlier helped Indian nuclear programme by
providing two 100MW nuclear reactors for the Kudan Kalan power project in
Tamil Nadu at a cost of $2 billion. The US, besides helping in the
construction of Tarapur Atomic Power Station also supplied heavy water for
the CIRUS reactor that made plutonium for India’s first nuclear bomb.
Now Israel is also cooperating with India in the field of nuclear
technology for their common mission against Muslim countries.
It
is useless to warn India and its collaborators on the consequences of
India’s nuclear pursuits. However, the ever-increasing diversion of
resources from economic development to nuclear toys means continued
sacrifices on the part of India’s teeming millions still below the
poverty line.
New
Delhi hopes that Pakistan’s decline can be realized by luring it into an
open-ended arms race. But Pakistan is not going to fall into the trap.
India already has around 8,000 Kg of rector-grade plutonium, sufficient
for over 400 nuclear weapons. I wonder how many more will guarantee India
a sense of security?
Instead,
it should learn to live in peace with its neighbours by settling
outstanding disputes by giving up its hegemonic designs. Otherwise, it
will end up just like its role model, the Soviet Union.
Mohsin
Meer
Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia
Letter
to Editor
Tuesday, April 17, 2001
Dear
Sir,
I
read in the March edition of
your Magazine the very comprehensive article on The Battle of Chawinda.
However, I feel, there are some other important aspects which need to be
added and some minor corrections/additions.
First,
it has been said by the Indian historians that in '65, India had no
strategic plan. If they are talking about military plan then India
certainly had one, and a very good one at that. The very same that
Napoleon employed at Austerlitz and Manstein for the invasion of France in
1940 with great success,. viz: attack a sensitive enemy objective to make
him react by way of committing his reserves and uncovering the path of
your own Main Effort. The strategic plan succeeded in both its
requirements but at the tactical level it floundered because they had no
Rommel !!
Secondly,
it was India's own propaganda that America had supplied to Pakistan Patton
tanks which were superior to Centurions that back-fired on them so that
when their Armoured Division faced the Pattons in the first encounter they
were afraid and at a psychological disadvantage.
Thirdly,
according to Indian Intelligence only Pakistani Armoured Divisions were
equipped with Pattons. So when they saw the Pattons at Gadgor they
concluded that it must be the Armoured Division.
Fourthly,
the manner in which the 25 Cavalry squadrons were deployed and met them
the visions of the Armoured Division being there must have been confirmed,
and they probably, thought that they had walked into an ambush set up by
the Pakistani Armoured Division. No wonder they retreated into a box! And
lastly, 16 Cavalry, being the COAS’s old Regiment, was given the honour
of spearheading the Indian advance but when on the very first day the
Regiment had lost (destroyed) 16 tanks it must have shaken the entire
command, GOC downwards, hence the paralysis.
Now
some minor points:-
-
It is true we did not know what we were going to face on that morning of 8 September, but at the very first contact I recognized the Centurions, reported to my CO, reported duly upto the Corps HQ who did not believe and sent down their Brig General Staff to Chawinda to confirm. The rest is history.
-
Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went to Pasrur. The little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went 'Up to' Pasrur, the others were turned back half-way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.
-
I think it needs to be mentioned that the TDUs were equipped with very old SHERMAN tanks.
-
And lastly, Gen Sahibzada Yaquoob's name has been mentioned along with Gen Niazi's as MCs from WW II, but Gen Yaquoob is not.
Your
sincerely
Mohammad
Ahmed
Brig (Retd)
From:
<STiwana@aol.com>
To: <defjrnl@cyber.net.pk>
Cc: <editor@nation.com.pk>; <editor@jang.com.pk>; <editor@nawaiwaqt.com.pk>;
<mail@paktoday.com>; <UKHALID786@aol.com>; <ali_maula@yahoo.com>;
<gpiracha@yahoo.com>; <tft@lhr.comsats.net.pk>; <STiwana@aol.com>
Subject: Some Reflections On 1971
Date: Monday, April 30, 2001 6:37 PM
Agha
Hamayun Amin has given an apology, political matters, mainly, which caused
the debacle in 1971.I pose two questions:
1.
Is there anyone in the Pakistani Armed Forces who held the view that
“NOT DEFEAT BUT VICTORY WAS KNOCKING AT OUR DOOR; VICTORY IN
EAST-PAKISTAN, IN 1971.?
Justice
Hamood told me that I was the only exception in the entire rank and files
of the Armed Forces. I went there and proved that VICTORY was banging our
door down.The reasons:
a.
If I could write a letter in 1969 in daily Pakistan Times, Lahore, on 14
July 1969 that, Indra Gandhi (having been ousted from Congress by the
Congress Syndicate) is planning an Election in India after giving Pakistan
a military thrashing in an isolated sector (East-Pakistan, where we had
only one division, where the irresponsible Military Leadership of Pakistan
Army thought that it could be saved from a counteraction from West
Pakistan, therefore we never seriously prepared for its defence). If I
could write that we still have some TIME to prepare for the coming
military Indian Campaign, why could men in uniform placed at the top NOT
realize that.
b.
We had all the things necessary to lick India in 1971 by letting go the
territory; Saving the Army and fighting by decisive engagements, the
classical concept of Defence. We had 90 tons of gold to buy hovercraft to
rapidly withdraw and shift all forces in any one desirable direction (Agarthala,
57 Mtn Indian Div.) engage it with 15 ragtag brigades, attacking one of
the Indian Brigade with nine of ours. Then shifting the effort to floor
the other timid brigade. In 45 days, as I proved to the Hamood Commission,
we could have first finished off the Indian 4 Corps (three battles against
57 Div. one against 23 Div. and four against 8 Mtn Div.) After defeating 4
Indian Corps, the backyard route to China would have opened, enabling us
to introduce AIRFORCE in future war efforts. A brief period of rest and
parleys; then to lug at 33 Indian Corps, defeating it piecemeal. Finally
to settle the old score with the Dacca conquerors, 2nd Indian Corps;
cutting it off from Calcutta and proceeding to Calcutta instead of
fighting it.
If
you go to the Tomb of Napoleon, or Jomini, they would be rubbing their
heels at the most fantastic INTERIOR-EXTERIOR LINE WAR SETTING which was
available to Niazi. God gave only one General of Pakistan a chance to
become a true Field Marshal. He lost that chance because our generals
believe in the Li-Li-SAN line, which Mao decried: To sit in positional
defence and wait. To go for territory. To avoid MAJOR TACTICS (Strategy
that enables a general to defeat the rival Army). We have minor tactics;
Section level minds. Our C-in-C is no better than a lady telephone
operator. Having committed the two most obnoxious military crimes (Sectorisation
of the entire front; passing responsibility of war to successive
subordinates. It is Naik Phattoo vs Maneckshaw contest. AND MILITARY
EQUALITARIANISM, even density employment of forces at the entire front;
weak everywhere, strong nowhere) THE RECENT KARGIL BATTLE (putting
guerillas in passive positional defence,
shows how strong has the Army become after the 1971 war) “nach na janey
angan tera” The general is not equipped with the Knowledge of
MAJOR TACTICS, so he loses the War and blames it on the politicians
and other possible political, ethnic and sociological factors like
geographic incoherence (Will USA let go Hawaii and Alaska because of
that?), Dictatorships, political campaigns like six points,
alienation of population, language, ‘durbaris’ etc. That is throwing
‘dust in the eyes’.
A
military defeat enables the opponent to take a surrender. He establishes
his own power. He goes visiting the land he has conquered. How about
enabling India to do that, once again? How about blaming the inevitable
forces that surround us always?
M.S.
Tiwana
Some
errors, some just and some unjustified criticisms — Reflections on
feedback from readers
It
is heartening to get feedback from readers . It’s a rare occurrence in
Pakistan where the multitude is either engulfed in “the vicious cycle of
inflation” , “ involved in personal career planning”
“self-advancement” “preparing booby traps against rivals, real or
perceived” etc.
This
is not exactly an article nor a rejoinder. It is merely a humble effort to
bridge the communication gap. We as a nation are allergic to criticism. We
can easily be placed on the top of any list which rates the sycophancy
level in any country! I remember the last military exercise that I
attended as a major in late 1993 as an umpire. It was a corps exercise and
in my opinion it was the biggest hoax that I ever saw. The corps commander
was a supposedly great military commander who later became one of the army
chiefs. I noted many points which I thought were worth mentioning in the
debriefing scheduled to be held at the end of the exercise. Unfortunately,
I made my intentions known to the Chief Umpire, which I think was a faux
pas! After some days while the exercise was still in progress we received
an order “umpires of major rank will not attend the debriefing”. This
was 1993 and it was a changed army. Outwardly, more professional but
essentially more demonstration oriented. There were exceptions to this
rule but these were rare. I remember another debriefing that I gave in
Sibi in late November 1983 as a company commander in the final exercise of
the Junior Officer Leadership course. I had nine months service and did
not make my intentions known to anyone. My debriefing contained criticism
which made the Commandant Brigadier Arif Bangash actually foam with anger!
Bangash was a thorough soldier and the whole course which included the
instructor platoon commanders was punished with a repeat punishment
exercise in the much colder Ghazaband Pass area in late November
-December.
Brigadier
Ahmad’s feedback received by E Mail was thought-provoking. I regret the
error that I rewarded Sahibzada Yaqub Khan with the gallantry award
Military Cross. However, I did not assert anywhere that the Indians had a
bad strategy in 1965 nor did I state that they had a bad plan. Once I
stated that 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of them when Gadgor
was fought it was not meant as an adverse remark but merely an academic
observation which in no way reduces 25 Cavalry’s decisive role in
repelling the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Gadgor on the fateful 8th of
September. As far as the statement implying the link with Centurions is
concerned the only point that is important to note that “Centurion in
itself” was no guarantee that the 25 Cavalry was confronting the 1st
Indian Armoured Division since Centurions were also held by other Indian
formations including the Indian Armoured Brigade in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.
If the TDUs had old Shermans all if not
most of the Indian tank units of infantry divisions also had the same
Shermans.Yet the withdrawal of 4 Mountain Division was successfully
covered by two Sherman squadrons of Indian tanks against Pakistan’s 1st
Armoured Division equipped with Pattons.I may add that Indian armoured
corps historian was intellectually honest enough to admit that beyond
800-1000 metres Centurion was superior in penetration and armour
protection to Patton.
Major
Saeed Tiwana has been kind enough to comment on my article on the 1971
fiasco. I have never had the opportunity of meeting the worthy major but I
did meet his dear son Saadullah while he was attending a course at School
of Armour Nowshera in mid-1991 and I was on the staff of the Tactical
Wing. I have always followed the writings of Major Saeed Tiwana with great
interest.
In
one of his articles in Jang or some other paper many years back he had
proposed that the Eastern Command should have broken out North West Wards
towards Nepal or Bhutan. It was a thought-provoking article, a bit wishful
but interesting.
In
his recent thought-provoking letter Tiwana proposes a new plan. In
addition he states that more could have been accomplished and also hints
that the line of thinking advanced in “1971- Another Perspective” were
flawed .
I
hold Major Tiwana in very high esteem. I would say much higher than 99% of
officers of far senior rank that I saw in my service . I have the
following submissions regarding Major Sahib’s criticism/positive
suggestions:—
a.
The Pakistan Army was a marginally reformed version of the British Indian
Colonial Army. The German General Staff or the French Army were not
created by a sudden flight but through centuries of labour. Germany
(Prussia) went through the trauma of total defeat in 1806 and was a French
subject for seven years. In addition the Prussian Army was built not in
thirty years but was culmination of a process that started in
mid-seventeenth century. Frederick, its father was not an ex service man
but son of a king and later king of Prussia. Napoleon about whom Major
Tiwana writes was not a product of two decades of sycophancy pleasing
fifteen Commanding Officers or Brigade or divisional commanders but a
product of the French Revolution which made him a general at the age of 27
!
b.
The Pakistan Army before partition was an internal security army designed
to fight its own people or the Kings Enemies. Dynamism unorthodox tactics
were never institutionalized in it. It was not designed to fight the
dynamic battles of interior lines that Tiwana hypothetically thinks that
it should have in 1971. The roots of Pakistani military failure go back to
1848 and to the period 1950-71 when mediocrity was institutionalised in
the Pakistan Army.
c.
The article “a different perspective” was a two page article
encapsulating things as they happened and not a defence of any individual
. In history, individuals must be judged by the circumstances they were
placed in and not as things should have been.
d.
I dispute Major Sahibs assertion regarding practicability of interior
lines in East Pakistan. The terrain in which Napoleon and Frederick
operated had rivers which could be forded , while in East Pakistan the
rivers were inland seas. In addition movement by night was almost
impossible ( if anyone cares to ask those who were there in that terrible
year) because of Mukti Bahini, while movement during day was impossible
due to Indian air.
e.
Then there is the element of friction of war. In war movement is highly
complex and this fact has been well explained by Clausewitz.
f.
The only place where Niazi can be faulted with is not fighting a more
coherent defensive battle and in not fighting longer than he did.
g.
The comparison with Alaska and Hawai is also incorrect for Pakistan since
the USA had one of the most powerful navies in the world. As early as 1830
the US Navy was raiding Algiers. Naval power is difficult to be
understood. Even Britain with the world’s most powerful navy could not
save her American colonies because of French Navy’s limited
interference.
h.
It’s a never ending discussion.
No
one is infallible and it is heartening that at last DJ is receiving some
feedbacks, dispelling my earlier conviction that it was only distributed
in Sakhi Hassan, Uch Sharif and Miani Sahib.
Kind
Regards
A.H
Amin
Pavocavalry@Hotmail.Com
87
D Naval Officers Housing Scheme
Zamzama
Clifton Karachi
Tel: 5863084
Mr.
Ikram-ul-Majeed Sehgal
Managing Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi
E-Mail: defjrnl@cyber.net.pk
11
May 2001
Dear
Sir,
This
is in reference to the article ‘The Economics of Defence’ by Brig
(Retd) Saeed Ismat, published in your magazine of March 2001.
The Brigadier has suggested that because of the anti-ship missile
threat, Pakistan Navy must not acquire large surface ships like destroyers
which are vulnerable to these missiles.
His arguments are not valid as the same lines can be stretched to
the conclusion that the Pakistan Army should not be operating tanks as
these are expensive and vulnerable to enemy air and missile attacks.
There is no doubt that the advent of anti-ship missiles have
changed the complexion of war at sea and pose a substantial challenge.
But then the defender’s counter to this is to fire his equivalent
missile first and to destroy the attacking platform before it has the time
to launch its weapons. There
is nothing new about this principle of active defence.
The defender can seek to mislead the incoming missile by a variety
of electronic counter measures which are very sophisticated.
Besides these, there are variety of tactical moves the defender can
undertake to protect his forces. Moreover
there are rapid firing gun systems to shoot down the missile.
Generally navies can be categorised as:-
-
Global Navy
-
Blue Water Navy
-
Regional Navy
-
Coastal Navy
India
is aspiring to become a Blue Water Navy with capacity to conduct distant
operations. Pakistan should
at least develop into a Regional Navy which needs to be strong in its own
local seas. A regional navy
will need a number of major surface warships and modern submarines.
Reducing the Pakistan Navy to a coastal one comprising only of
patrol boats, tantamount to surrendering our waters to the Indian Navy.
One point more, Pakistan received destroyers from the Royal Indian
Navy at time of partition. Pakistan thus inherited the expertise to run large ships.
Few countries of the world have the expertise to operate large
ships. By reducing ourselves
to a coastal navy, we will lose this expertise over the years, an
expertise for which our sailors were sent on deputation to the Gulf
States. There is no doubt
that high cost of naval armaments makes them controversial but then again
there are cheaper but less capable ships which can suit our requirement.
And
finally, why the economics of defence be applied such drastically to the
Navy only. I would request
Brigadier Ismat to first examine the ‘economics of defence’ for our
experiments in Kashmir for which the country is being burdened heavily in
terms of finance. Why not
give up the Kashmir issue and save all the funds to improve the lot of the
Pakistanis, if that is all the economics of defence stands for.
With
Warm Regards
KHALID
WASAY
Rear Admiral (Retd)
From:
“Asad Ali” <asad@lsil.com>
To: <defjrnl@cyber.net.pk>
Subject: A personal view
Date: Friday, May 11, 2001 5:36 AM
Dear
Mr. Sehgal,
It
is always a joy to read through the Defence Journal. I look forward to
every new addition and one of these days I will also subscribe to it, for
now I make do with the internet version. I am an engineer by profession
but I enjoy reading historical and political commentaries, especially when
they concern Pakistan. I hope you will have the time to read through the
passage below where I try to make a small observation about Pakistan. The
need of the hour is, I am sure, to deal with big and complex issues but
better men than I would have to attempt analysis of such matters. I would
be overjoyed if you feel able to give me your response to my views.
When
I look through western publications on recent military or political
history there is scarce mention of any of the Indo-Pak conflicts or any
major political events. Perhaps this is in part because the subcontinent
has neither at times matched the conceptual brilliance in war and politics
of the Western powers nor at other times their level of defeat or
disaster. There may, therefore, be little to learn for them in the antics
of the subcontinent. I exclude, of course, the events of the partition.
Please
don’t misunderstand me, for to infer from this that we may also proceed
to ignore or be selective with our own history and consequently that of
the subcontinent would be very foolish. Both peoples of India and Pakistan
come from the same ‘house’ and we have more in common with the Indians
than we do with the Afghans, Persians or the Arabs, whether we like it or
not.
In
my view, in one respect we have been lacking as far as the Indians and
that is in politics. The exception and brilliance of the Quaid hid the
inadequacies of the others and after his unfortunate death from illness
the depth of political and strategic outlook as well as his stature and
dignity was significantly lacking. Since then there has not been any clear
idea of where Pakistan needs to be heading, except in any direction
opposite that of India. It was very clear that we as a Nation needed to be
aligned in our early days and we chose to go with the US and western
powers. This suited the interests of these powers as well as ours. Our
folly was to mistake geo-political interest of other nations as signs of
undying friendship. We may be about to make the same mistake with the
Chinese. Our need for ‘friends’ borders on obsession; perhaps it is
due to our economic insecurities.
When
in 1962 the Chinese PLA advanced into territories they claimed was theirs
on the Tibetan border the Indian army’s capitulation came, I am sure, as
a severe shock and shame to the Indian nation. But it is entirely possible
that the shock was felt much worse by the western powers. Sudden crumbling
of the Indians was a strategic nightmare for the west in the midst of the
‘Cold War’. Strategic calculations had to take in the new realities
and the whole balance needed to be adjusted. Friendship with Pakistan was
I am certain not at the top of anyone’s agenda. Clever mandarins in
Pakistan would have noticed the shift as military aid began to dry up.
Pakistan
too had to adjust to the changes as it saw them. The Chinese experience,
the Run of Kuch incident, the arming of the Indians indicated that the
time was short and a sudden assault may achieve magic results vis-a-vis
Kashmir. The Field Marshal in charge would become an everlasting hero and
we would once again show the supremacy of the martial Muslim Punjabis
against the Hindus. What this didn’t take into account was the reaction
of the Western powers. Would they have ever allowed Pakistan to fulfil its
military aims and within such a short period after the Chinese action show
the Indians to be as weak and ineffective as they had been. It is in fact
imperative for the West in the current geo-political climate to have a
belligerent and confident India. To achieve this Indian must be seen to be
strong both militarily and economically. Of course this is not meant to
change the status quo in other respects and India understands this very
well. In fact the Indians have understood this all along, just as the
Pakistanis seem to continuously misjudge their strategic value to the
West, and possibly now to China. Indians have always been cautious and
calculating in their posturing knowing exactly who will respond in which
fashion and the boundary of their influence. Pakistan has repeatedly
blundered outside the boundary of global acceptability, its focus being
myopic giving an appearance of being unpredictable and irrational. What
did we think would be the outcome of the Kargil episode, where a military
embarrassment for India was turned into a National shame for Pakistan.
What else could we have expected, it had to be this way once we were set
on our actions. Do we know where we are going with Afghanistan and how it
affects our and other’s interests in the Global sense. Do we know what
we want from our long-term relationship with India, for whether we like it
or not we are going to be neighbours for a long time to come.
I
am sure it is some form of ailment for when Pakistanis go to live abroad
they become more Pakistani than the Pakistanis. I confess I too probably
suffer from this ailment and look forward to the visit of the Pakistan
cricket tour to the UK.
Regards,
Asad
.................................................................................................
Asad Ali, Engineering Manager,
LSI Logic, Optimum House,
Clipper’s Quay, Salford
Quays, Tel:
+44 (0)161 8730 730
Manchester, M5 2XP.
Fax: +44 (0)161 8730 701
Email: asad@lsil.co
