The threat of yesterday the war of tomorrow

Columnist MARIA SULTAN analyses what Sept 11 means to past and future conflict.

Since September 11, there seems to be a world wide concern regarding the  enhanced prospects of nuclear terrorism, in this regard there has been renewed emphasis by Washington that there is great possibility of an unauthorized launch or an accidental launch so much so that the age-old theory regarding the reliability of the Pakistani command and control and  nuclear assets is being questioned. In this climate of uncertainty which is  gripping the US, home to approximately over 113 nuclear power plants, the  fear of nuclear terrorism which has always been referred as high risk low  probability threat is reaching new heights. However, in this state of  enhanced fear there seems to be a deliberate focus on the credibility of the  Pakistani nuclear capability. The rationale being that Pakistan may be the  first target or that the zone of conflict in Pakistan may extend to a degree  that there might be some extremists elements taking control over them. The focus of threat, however, at this moment in time is not based on objective  realities but is a result of the increased US frustrations with its failed  policy of combating terrorism and war against Afghanistan. For one by  declaring war against terrorism, US has attempted to juxtapose  unconventional threat with a conventional military response. Secondly, almost  appoximately, four weeks of relentless military campaign against the  Taliban regime has not given Washington any strategic breakthrough, rather  there are various reports of US operational failures and total lack of  credibility of the US claims that there will be any near term success for  the US. Where the US seems to be pushing ahead on the political forefront of  talking about a post-action-post-Taliban government in Afghanistan the  fact of the matter is that at the military level the level of US success is  negligible and there seems to be total stalemate. The military campaign so  feverishly expanded by the US totalling more than 2-3000-sorties has but  resulted in the deaths of innocent people and an increased sense that the  war aim is not to fight against terrorism but a war against the Taliban  regime, a deliberate attempt to hoodwink the war aim according to some to  have a tangible access to the Central Asian and Caspian oil. According to  others an attempt to undo the price of the first Afghan war, that had been  the Pakistani nuclear capability and the explicit perceived threat of  weapons proliferation to other Muslim states.

Hence, in this war against terror the threat of nuclear terrorism or country  which can fall victim to it is being cornered on Pakistan. The contingency  planning which is currently being floated by US-based academics is that in  case that if there is a lapse in the command and control, the US nuclear  emergency search team should be deployed in Pakistan, whose primary task is  to locate and disable nuclear devices and limit the effects of  decontamination due to the radiation fall outs.

The argument and threat from Pakistan’s nuclear capability is being further  expanded on the rationale that the suspected terrorists Osama bin Laden  acquired the materials necessary for constructing a nuclear device and may  be the material had come from Pakistan, a high improbable and misconceived  notion, on account of the fact that Pakistan has very stringent nuclear  export control laws in addition to the existence of nuclear command and  control authority based on the principles of centrality rather than the  principles of delegation.

As early as 1993 the US federal government had accused bin Laden of trying  for years to attain nuclear material from the black market to have crude  device, where these allegations have reached new grounds after the  September 11 attacks. However, there are basic problems with the theory for  one that even if we are to believe that Al Qaida has access to fissile  material for a nuclear device it would be sufficiently difficult for the  group to move it in the form of nuclear device across international borders, even if we are to assume that it is currently in Afghanistan. Secondly,  the theatre of operation directed by Al Qaida will remain Western Europe and  America. In addition to this, experts have registered the most effective  form of nuclear terrorism as that when nuclear reactor is either over taken  by terrorists for potential sabotage or face a truck bomb incident, in which  a truck filled with conventional weapons may cause a reactor meltdown or  after September 11, a Boeing attack. Even in these cases the likelihood  will remain high for radiological terrorism that is that terrorist group try  to cause radiation expansion may be by release of radioactive material in  subway ventilation areas or so on and so forth. However, the threat expounded by  Europe and America is not only a high risk low probability factor in  Pakistan because of multiple reasons, Pakistan does not have large number  of civilian nuclear power plants that can be overtaken by terrorists,  secondly Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons which are deployed the  national command authority is so designed that it gives Pakistan decision  making times of at least a couple of hours and in the case of conventional  attack by India, a strike reaction time of approximately ten days, will be  present for the Pakistan to respond. However, if we are to assume that New  Delhi might opt for if there is pre-emptive launch, to incapacitate  Pakistan’s nuclear capability, it is important to bear in mind that a  certain level of deterrence exists between India and Pakistan that means  Pakistan has second strike capability and in practical terms it is virtually impossible for India to launch an attack without anticipating a retaliatory  strike by Pakistan.

The only possibility of an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets can by and large emerge from a US led strike or misfire or an accidental hit of one of our assets. Most importantly if the US considers options regarding a reactive policy of employing or deploying nuclear emergency search teams in  Pakistan. The nuclear emergency search teams which are US-based require Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) to support routine scientific and  engineering functions and emergency response requirements. The reason for  such dependance springs from the fact that RSL support work involves the  separate areas of nuclear data analysis, multispectral remote sensing,  aircraft scheduling, geographic data collection, inventory control,  archiving, systems design, scientific and engineering analysis, photographic  image processing, and communications. An objective which is highly  unachievable in a conflict zone, which has the capability to become nuclear  in terms of engulfing a region, besides there will be no warning time if  there is an accidental launch, besides the work is aimed at detecting rogue  weapons not military weapons.

Similarly, the objective of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team is to search  for, identify, assess, and disable any nuclear weapon directed against the  United States for purposes of terrorism, coercion, or extortion. The bigger  question what happens if the next nuclear attack is in the form of a truck  bomb incidence or radiation effects due to fallout from a facility. In  addition to this NESTS is a multi-agency effort, primarily involving DOE,  DoD, FBI and FEMA. D. DOE. The bigger question being how will these  organizations function in third sovereign independent country with full  access. NEST supports several of DOE’s national security objectives (goals)  by safely and securely dismantling nuclear weapons, maintaining nuclear  weapons technology and competence that is responsive to national security  needs, and achieving continual enhancement of the technology infrastructure  and core competencies related to the national security mission, however by  no means this is an international organization having an international  mandate or reach.

Similarly, they according to the Americans are qualified to disable almost  all kinds of nuclear weapons in real time. Their efficiency and capability is  highly debatable as they have never actually disabled a live nuclear device  under a crisis situation. In addition in the case of Pakistan or anywhere  else in the world there will remain the question of their access to such  assets cannot be voluntary and without certain resistance by Pakistani  forces, and there is no way that Pakistan’s nuclear assets be vulnerable to  an attack like WTC as here the target identified is across Atlantic. It is  usually argued by Pentagon that almost the case study of 25 war games in the  region the end result has been a nuclear exchange and total decapitation of  the Pakistani ability to react, however, while analysing the reports of such  kind it is necessary to bear in mind that it is much different ground to fight a war and do contingency planning for crisis as things are not always  as they seem, a lesson which the US must have recognized by its failed war  games in Afghanistan evident from the degree of resistance it is still  facing from Afghanistan.

Lastly, nuclear terrorism is defined as an extreme form of violent crime, in  which groups not under state control (but possible state-sponsored) create  fear or terror through the credible threat or actual execution of nuclear  explosions in order to achieve their politically perceived goals. There has  been no single case in which a non-governmental organization, a terrorist  group or an individual offender has come anywhere near attaining “nuclear  capability” through any means, hence even the colourful assumptions  regarding Al Qaida’s access to it is debatable, atleast in the form of  device or warhead. In addition to this the threat of nuclear terrorism was  by no means born with the end of the Cold War or after the September 11  attacks it has always existed since the first time the destructive power of  atom was discovered. Fears of nuclear terrorism were incorporated into the  risk analysis of Western security policies even before illegal trading in  nuclear material began. In 1983, for example, President Reagan referred to  the risk of nuclear terrorism when justifying his Strategic Defence  Initiative. But until recently, the subject of nuclear terrorism was not a  great focus of public attention, because it was categorized as a “high risk-low probability” threat, the bigger question is the threat of nuclear  terrorism real or this to provide the new cutting edge for US to prolong its  unipolar moment.

So, when considering the methods of nuclear terrorism prevention, the main  focus must be on how effective this method will prove to be against such a  disastrous incident, much close to the US soil than may be wished for by  selecting a battleground, it is not necessary that the terrorist might  choose the same battlefield as anticipated. Secondly, a consideration that  must be kept in mind throughout this military escapade of US is that it  fights a war against terrorism, not the force wing of the Non-Proliferation  Treaty.