Ownership of Air Power Assets

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN analyses a vital issue.

 

Introduction

Air power is a widely understood term by the general public.  Its precise definition, however, is not so well-known even within the military circle including those directly involved with military aviation. I have deliberately used the term military instead of Air Force, as there exists a general misconception that Air Forces hold monopoly over air power. This is not true. While Air Forces are the greatest exponent of air power projection, it is by no means their exclusive domain. Air power forms a crucial part of land and naval forces of all modern nations. In fact, the air power assets of US Navy would dwarf the combined air power resources of more than a dozen nations. Even US Army boasts of a very sizeable air power component. A clear understanding of air power and military components that fall under its purview should help remove some of the present misconceptions. It should also enable us to better understand the factors that should determine the ownership of the various components of air power amongst the three services.

 

Air Power Definition

RAF’s official definition of air power is “the ability to use platforms operating in or passing through the air for military purpose.” With the introduction of space as an added dimension for military power projection, a proposed amendment by RAF’s Air Vice Marshal R A Mason, which has since been accepted by Royal Australian Air Force as well, is “ air power represents the ability to project military force in the third dimension, which includes space by or from a platform above the surface of earth.” USAF definition covers the same grounds and in their latest thinking they have recommended a change in nomenclature from air power to aerospace power.

Air Power definition has three ingredients. First, the power projection should involve a platform, second it should utilize the medium of air/space (third dimension) and finally it should be for military purpose. To qualify for categorization under air power/aerospace power, a weapon system should meet these three criteria. An examination of what does and what does not fall under air power category should help clarify some ambiguities.

Military aircraft, military satellites and all the communication, detection (ground based or airborne) and weapon systems associated with them from what is universally and classically accepted as part of air power. Opinions about certain other modes of warfare regarding their classification vary.

A bullet or an artillery shell traverses through the air before finally causing the desired military effect.  Would a gun or artillery piece be classified under air power? Probably not. Although they do meet two of the three requirements, bullets or shells are not what is generally understood to be platforms. They are basically free falling projectiles that have been imparted enough energy at source to reach their intended targets. Even if the bullets/shells have some sort of terminal guidance (generally through laser), they would still not qualify as platforms. Unless they are meant primarily as defensive weapons against air power assets, guns or artillery pieces do not qualify to be a part of air power.                                      

How about anti-tank missiles, especially the wire guided ones. They do use the medium of air, they have their intrinsic propulsion and guidance system and they have a very definite military purpose. Yet these are not weapon platforms and they are not meant to be used against the air threat and, therefore, they should not constitute a part of air power.

What about surface-to-surface missile of the Shaheen/Ghauri/Prithvi/Agni/Scuds class, including the IRBMs and ICBMs? Do these form a part of air power arsenal? These weapons meet all the three requirements of air power definition and should, therefore, be a part of air power. Surface-to-surface missiles, especially the longer-range versions, which normally carry a nuclear warhead, are strategic weapons and they form a part of the overall strategic bombing assets of a nation.

Now let us look at anti-aircraft guns and their more sophisticated and longer range cousins, the various categories of surface-to- air missiles (SAM). Theoretically these are basically guns/artillery pieces and, therefore, should not be considered a part of air power. However, they are solely meant as defence against aircraft, both the manned and unmanned versions. Like the ground based air defence radars, these also logically form a part of air power. Perhaps the following addition to air power definition may help to remove the ambiguity: any weapon system exclusively meant for defence against the air threat also falls under the classification of air power.

Creation of An Independent Service

No air power doctrine had existed on the eve of WW1. However, following H.G. Wells’ famous best selling novel ‘The War in the Air,’ published in 1907 which portrayed ‘terrifying battles between aircraft culminating in the destruction of civilisation,’ the Second Hague Convention in 1907 prohibited air attacks on towns, villages, churches and the likes. Just four years later in1911, the Italian forces fighting the Turks in Libya were the first to employ powered flight for military purposes when they flew bombing, reconnaissance, artillery fire observation and leaflet dropping missions. When WW1 started, air services were a part of armies and navies and their roles were restricted to reconnaissance and artillery fire observation. As the war progressed, an escalation of air power employment was witnessed along with a rapid technological advancement in aircraft capability and performance. By the time the war ended four years later, the air doctrines of control of air, and support to surface forces had been firmly established and there were a spate of visionaries who predicted dominance of air power in future conflicts through strategic bombing. Strategic bombing envisaged massive bombing effort against the enemy forces as well as civilian targets in line with the scenario that had been presented by H.G.Wells.

During and after the war, strategists began to forecast the enormous potential of warfare from the third dimension. Foremost amongst the earlier visionaries were Major Douhet, General Trenchard and Brigadier General Mitchell, an Italian and an Englishman and an American Douhet predicted, rather forcefully (for which he was subsequently court-martialled and later resurrected) that air power would soon be the dominant medium of warfare and through massive aerial bombardment of the enemy’s population, a war could be won without the need to defeat its Armed Forces, a theory in contradiction to the Clausewitzian philosophy which advocated the need to defeat the enemy’s Armed Forces for achieving victory. Doubet’s postulation gave rise to the concept of strategic bombing of which Trenchard was a very strong advocate. Trenchard, along with General Smut argued that air power, besides providing support to the surface forces had an independent mission of its own in the shape of strategic bombing, which in addition to lowering the will of the enemy’s population, would cripple its war fighting potential and thereby lead to its subsequent capitulation.  Trenchard further declared that the art of aerial warfare was very different from ground battles and air warriors’ training had to follow its own concepts quite apart from the training doctrines of the Army and the Navy.  He and General Smut advocated the need for separation of Air Corps from the command and control of the army and the creation of an independent service, the Air Force. Their views eventually prevailed and RAF was created in 1918. The Germans had also come to similar conclusions by the end of the war. Despite the treaty of Versailles, which had put severe restrictions on the composition of German Armed Forces, General Hans Von Seeckt had secretly proposed the creation of an independent Air Force. An Air Ministry was formed in 1933 and Luftwaffe, the official nomenclature of German Air Force, came into being in 1935.

The American experience in WWI, compared to the Europeans, was rather limited. They too had an Air Corps as a part of the Army outfit. After WWI, Brigadier Billy Mitchell, an American visionary foresaw the enormous impact air power would have on future conflicts and he claimed passionately that aeroplanes properly utilized could neutralize enemy battle ships/battle groups. His views understandably were very unpopular with the American Navy’s admiralty. Mitchell proceeded to demonstrate his theory practically, yet he could not prevail in convincing his superiors. He gave vent to his frustrations at the obduracy of US Military high command for which he was eventually court-martialed. The Pearl Harbour attack by the Japanese and the entire Pacific Campaign during WW II was to vindicate Mitchell.

America entered WW II with a very sizeable and potent air arm but its Air Corps was still a part of the US Army. The entire war was fought with this arrangement. American air power was to play a decisive role in allied victory both in the European and Pacific theatres.

After WW II the Americans reviewed their air power doctrine. The war had brought out two major lessons. First, air power did indeed have its own independent mission of strategic bombing that was clearly demonstrated in both the European and Pacific theatres. Second, the American air strategy in African Campaign where air assets were distributed in penny packets to individual army commanders was a blunder. Although numerically the American air assets were superior to the Germany’s Luftwaffe in Africa, because their (American) assets had been divided amongst the army formations, Germany was selectively able to concentrate superior numbers on individual American units and cause substantial damage. American air power had violated two of the cardinal principals of war, unity of command and concentration of forces. The glaring lesson gleaned from WW II for air power was that air assets must have centralized command and control and decentralized execution. The creation of an independent service, United States Air Force (USAF) was inevitable. USAF was established in 1947. Since then, all nations possessing air power assets have independent Air Forces.

Ownership of Air Power Assets

A historical analysis of air power development has brought out that the need to create an independent service was based on two key factors, that is: air power has an independent mission of its own and, all air assets must be under an independent command to avoid frittering away of resources. Yet modern Army and Naval forces of a number of nations have their own integral air arms. Is that a violation of one of the principles of war, unity of command? Should the Army and Navy be totally dependent on the Air Force for all their air power requirements? Given the diversity in strategic thoughts amongst the three services, and the resource constraints in the face of shrinking defence budget world wide, is placing all air power assets under one service, the Air Force, the most cost effective solution? These aspects have been fiercely debated by nearly all nations and each one has adopted a course of action best suited to its environment. It is an on-going debate where there is no single solution and the course adopted by a country will be dependent on a number of factors. It is imperative that the key issues involved in this debate are clearly understood so that a correct decision is arrived at.

First, let us look at the air power needs of the navy. Some navies have their own fleet air arm, complete with combat and support aircraft and helicopters. US Navy, Royal Navy, Russian Navy, French Navy and the Indian Navy amongst others, fall in this category. All these navies have two things in common: they are considered to be blue water navies whose aim is to project their states’ power well beyond their shores; they also are in possession of aircraft carrier task force(s). Naval Air Arms of all other nations possess maritime patrol aircraft/helicopters, long range Anti-Surface Vehicles (ASV) aircraft, of the Atlantique/P-3C class and some transport planes for communication. Most also possess their own integral anti-aircraft defence systems comprising ack ack guns and surface-to-air missiles and point defence radar network for terminal guidance of their weapon systems. The responsibility of providing control of the air especially over their vulnerable points through an integrated air defence network consisting of radars and fighter interceptors rests with the Air Force. Naval forces have a legitimate requirement for high speed combat aircraft in the ASV role to take on enemy shipping.  It also would require fighter cover during convoy escort missions. Invariably for both these roles Navy has to rely on the Air Force. Should a navy have its own integral air defence fighters and high speed combat jets for ASV role?  To answer this question, two factors need to be examined. First, if the navy’s prime mission is to operate at a distance from its shore beyond the reach of its air force, the answer is in the affirmative. There is a genuine requirement of the navy to have its own air arm that would meet all its essential air power needs at sea. A carrier task group then becomes the obvious answer.

Second, assuming that a navy is not a blue water navy, the next factor to consider in determining the ownership of air power assets is whether the weapon system being used to perform the naval mission is exclusive to the naval requirement or will it have some other war roles in support of the army and air force. Given the cost of modern combat planes, multi-rolled aircraft is the only practical option for all nations.  A majority of today’s combat aircraft, more so the high-speed jets are multi-rolled and this poses a dilemma for the defence planners. A Mirage fighter configured for ASV role with Exocest missile, for example, is also used in the ground strike role, army support role and as an air defence fighter. To be able to dedicate a squadron or two of these aircraft exclusively in the ASV role may be desirable from the naval viewpoint but it will not be viable financially and will amount to negation of the basic characteristics of air power, flexibility, which allows air power to shift from one role to the other at a short notice.

Now, let us look at the army’s requirement. They need close support, air defence over their area of operation and transport planes to ferry equipment and troops. Practically all nations have assigned the task of providing air defence cover, air support with fixed wing aircraft and transport support (not counting a small contingent being used for light communication) to their air forces. Ground defence (based on ack ack guns and SAMs) is normally an integral part of the army formation.   Command and control of armed helicopter varies. In India, Israel and a number of smaller Arab States it is a part of their Air Forces’ inventory. In India particularly, their experience has not been very good. Most other nations including USA and Pakistan have these assets with the army.

There is a school of thought within the armies of a number of nations that like the armed helicopters, close support fixed wing aircraft should also form an integral part of the army. The logic behind such a rationale is similar to the naval thinking of having its own ASV capable combat jet aircraft. The reason such a course has not been adopted so far is also the same. Close support aircraft are invariably multi-rolled and it will amount to violation of air power doctrine if these aircraft were restricted to only one of their functions.

Conclusion / Recommendation

Inter Services rivalry is a reality and in the face of shrinking defence budget, each service tend to project their own requirements forcefully. It is for the higher defence planners to allocate resources to the three services in a manner, which optimally meets the nation’s security concerns within the available resources. The allocation of air power resources among the air force, army and navy remains a burning and at the times contentious issue. While air force tends to argue that all air power assets should be under their command, the other two services want to develop their own air power capability to avoid dependence on another service. Before deciding what should be with whom it must be remembered that air forces were made into independent services after some of the bitter lessons of the great wars. Taking away the key missions of air power from the air force and giving it to the army and navy would amount to repeating the earlier mistakes. Having said that, it does not mean that each and every aspect of air power must remain with the air force. Such a decision would not result in optimal utilisation of resources.

The aspects of air power that may be given to the army and navy can best be decided on one fundamental principle: any element of air power whose utility is exclusive to the army or navy, should form an integral part of the respective service. All others should be with the air force. Using this criterion, all ground based point air defence systems of army formations/naval units are best put under them. Combat helicopters also have little utility besides anti-armour missions and for their optimum utilization these should form an integral part of the army. Similarly long-range maritime patrol aircraft and ASV helicopters should form a part of the naval air arm.  All light communication aircraft/helicopters should also belong to the service that is using them. If a nation has a blue water navy, a carrier task group with its attendant air fleet component becomes an essential requirement. All other aspects of air power including the surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) should be with the air force.

SSMs constitute a part of the overall strategic bombing capability of a nation. Strategic bombing force is one of the most sought after capability by all air forces and nations who can afford to, has developed this key capability. SSMs, along with nuclear weapons carriage capable aircraft traditionally form an integral part of an air force. Alternatively, as is the case in USA, it could form an independent Command with a strong air force representation especially in its planning and targeting divisions. In USA, given the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal, these two elements of the nuclear triad, (the third being the nuclear missile carrying submarines) have been made into an independent Strategic Air Command.

Ownership of air power assets exclusively meant for the army and navy by them will make them more potent and will also result in lowering of the inter service rivalry in this field. However, while the two services may own these air assets and will be free to raise, train and utilize them as they wish to, for the sake of proper air space management, all their activities must be coordinated at the Command and Control Centre (COC), which is a part of the air force. All previous wars involving air power has vividly brought out the stark lesson that lack of proper air space management has led to increasing number of own aircraft being shot down by friendly fire (fratricide). If fratricide is to be kept to the minimum, very efficient air space management becomes imperative.