Air Power Equation in the Middle East

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN looks at the balance of air power in the Middle East.

The two World Wars aside, the Middle East has witnessed the greatest number of armed conflicts during the 20th century, The Arab/Israeli wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, the Suez Canal conflict of 1956, the ten years long Iran/Iraq war and finally the Gulf War of 1990/91 were all fought in the region. The Bekka Valley operation of 1982, the on going Intifada struggle of Palestinians against Israel and the continuing aerial bombardment of Iraq by US and UK forces and numerous other minor conflicts have also occurred there. In all these conflicts air power has played an increasingly dominant role with the Gulf War brutally demonstrating the ability of air power to almost single handedly defeat the adversary. Is it surprising, therefore, that the region has seen an upsurge in the sale of modern combat aircraft and their associated weapon systems? Nations big and small with or without the technological base to support a modern Air Force have all opted for rearming and strengthening of their Air Forces. How effective are their air arms and does it make economic and military sense for some of the smaller nations to raise and maintain an Air Force at a considerable economic cost. There are some of the aspects this article will examine.

The Major Air Power Players in the Region

In the Middle East imbroglio, there are six major players including Israel whose air power assets are in excess of 300 combat planes. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran represent the Muslim block. All these nations have the necessary wherewithal to project air power within their spheres of influence. While some of them have very modern aircraft and weapon systems and have also the benefit of advanced training facilities of the west, their entire dependence on the developed world for both equipment and training and their lack of technological base within are their major weaknesses. All these Air Forces have developed into reasonable tactical Air Forces, but they do not possess strategic bombing capabilities. In any future conflict among them the Air Forces will play an important but supportive role.

Israel Air Force (IAF) by contrast is fairly potent and advanced, in terms of equipment and training. What makes IAF apparently very powerful is the absolute support of USA both in supply of equipment and financial support; ensuring the security of Israel being a stated American policy. In a conventional war between the Arabs and Israel, the West in general and USA in particular, will in all probability, in the initial stages, allow IAF to win the air battle on its own steam while ensuring massive re-supply and equipment and transmission of intelligence data to them while blocking them to their adversaries. If, however, IAF is unable to subdue their opponent or comes under pressure, USA will pull out all stops and the other side will have to face the might of USAF. They will be subjected to an air campaign even more potent than was witnessed during the Gulf War. This aspect has to be understood by the Arab world and they have to realize that undoing of Israel through conventional military warfare is a remote possibility. Some alternate means have to be found to undo some, if not all the excesses of Israel. Unconventional means are likely to achieve greater results. Coupled with it if the Arab world can further increase their financial attractiveness to the West, the Europeans, if not USA, can be wooed away from blind support of Israel. To some extent this phenomenon is taking place.

In summary as things stand today, Arab Air Forces including Iranian Air Force will be unable to win a conventional war with Israel and hence will not be of much help in promoting the political aims of the Arabs to break Israeli hegemony in the region. While air power may play an important role in any intra Arab conflict, it cannot deliver against the might of Israel and USA.

The Smaller Arab States

Even small states (in terms of population and area) have developed national  Air Forces, most of them with a handful of squadrons with fairly modern equipment of western origin. Pre-Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had a decent size Air Force compared to some of its smaller neighbours but against Iraq, its principle adversary, its air power baled by comparison. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait Air Force did not last for more than a couple of days and only provided token resistance to the invaders. All the expenses, time that Kuwait had invested in their Air Force amounted to nothing when the crunch came. Surely the lesson must be that all other factors kept constant, air power in particular must not be below a minimum level (in terms of total effectiveness) compared to the perceived threat to be of any value. Spending resources on a couple of squadrons against a much larger air threat may amount to frittering away of resources and will only benefit the western arms manufacturers. Which begs the question as to why do so many of the smaller countries invest so heavily on developing small and apparently ineffective Air Forces.

Perhaps one of the reasons could be the romance and aura of air power. Most of these states are small but they are wealthy and have the luxury of space wealth. Also their prosperity has come mostly on the basis of oil exploitation by the developed world. They have become rich, fast and without much effort on their part. In such a situation there is a tendency to adopt quick but expensive solutions to any external threats through acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems without laying down the necessary foundations through training and infrastructure of development for their proper utilization. This invariably leads to a high degree of dependence on the exporting nations with the resultant compromising of national sovereignty. Also, for the developed world, it is a bonanza where they can dump their surplus military hardware at an exorbitant profit and they spare no effort to convince the rulers about the dire need to acquire the expensive and sophisticated weapons for their security. This may be one of the factors but there could be other reasons as well.

As has been witnessed in just a hundred years, air power has come to play a dominant role in any future conflict. Development of air power is a major investment by a nation both in term of resources and time. For a country to build up its air power from a scratch will take upward of a decade to become operationally effective. These small but wealthy Arab States have the financial freedom to engage in the luxury of developing an Air Force no matter how nascent or ineffective it may be in the initial stages. With the nucleus of an Air Force on ground, these states can then work to enlarge their technological base so as to reduce the total dependence on the west for its effectiveness. Today, this investment may appear not to provide any meaningful security but a decade hence with proper focus and conscious effort towards greater self-reliance, they could well become a potent force. What is likely to be the political scenario down the line cannot be predicted and if air power is then required, these nations will be a decade behind. Viewed from this perspective, their investment in development of an Air Force does make some sense.

Individually the Air Forces of the small Arab States do not amount to much. But taken collectively, they will form a handful and can deter and defeat a larger state with predatory intention. If these small states form a regional defence alliance where they pledge to come to the aid of any one of their colleagues under attack, each of these seemingly small forces will make a difference. Looked at from this angle, the development of air power no matter how small by each state will add to the overall strength of the alliance and will be effort well spent.

So what is the conclusion? Given the importance of air power, any nation ignoring its development will do so at its own peril. However, what must be remembered that air power does not come cheap. It requires a major investment in terms of human development and resources allocation. A nation has to strike a balance where air power development is done in a manner that its economy and its aviation industrial base can sustain. All efforts should be made to achieve high skill levels in flying and maintenance and towards rapid development of maintenance infrastructure to reduce dependence on repair, overhaul and spare support of its combat inventory.

The degree of development of aviation-based industry in a country is one of the key determinants of a nation’s air power prowess. Mere acquisition of modern fleet of combat aircraft and weapon systems along with professionally competent and motivated personnel by itself is not enough. Without a well-developed aviation industry, including the civil aviation sector, a nation cannot hope to exercise the full potential of its air power assets freely. Besides military application, a vibrant aviation industry, in the 21st century, will act as a catalyst for furthering economic progress. Developing nations vying to join the ranks of the well-developed ones will need to seriously concentrate on this aspect.