DJ’s A H AMIN interviewed our former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, a decorated soldier who has been in the thick of things, both in peace and war.

Remembering Our Warriors

Lt Gen (Retd)

Imtiaz Waraich, SJ

Please tell us something about your early life and background?

I am an old soldier who has fought two wars (1965 and 1971) and have been through painful insurgency operations in East Pakistan. I have witnessed the finest hour and some sad moments during East Pakistan debacle. Therefore, allow me to make a departure from routine and employ an element of requisite finesse in my discourse. In the Army methodology, it is practised that when you want to present a perfect plan of action, start from reverse/backward. Let me then in the outset delineate the last letter which I wrote to my friends, seniors, colleagues and comrades on my retirement. Each word came out from the pit of my heart. It may shock my readers with the same emotions and help in portraying my ruthless devotion and deep commitment to the Army which I served for long years in humility and unfailing courtesy:-

Lt Gen Imtiaz Waraich

Deputy Chief of the Army Staff

General Headquarters

Rawalpindi

Telephone: GHQ 32405

No. 5064/5/PA

09 July 1991

Today in all humility I take up my pen to say ‘Khuda Hafiz’. An eventful period of almost 39 years has come to an end. It has been a lifelong commitment spreading over boyhood, youth and now the oldage. These four decades have moved with incessant speed, embracing two major wars, insurgency of 1971, ignominy of captivity, hectic collective trainings, highly competitive professional involvements, honours and awards — many finest hours both in peace and war and some retributions.

In retrospect, I can say with pride that our service is the healthiest limb in the body of the Nation. It is just, forthright and noble. It has its own culture and character. It is the best institution. How magnanimous Almighty ALLAH has been — how much one has gained from this institution.

My dear friend, believe me that I claim no brilliance, and despite all my limitations I do claim having given my best to the service with ruthless devotion and total resolve. My greatest asset has been the able guidance of seniors, sincere cooperation of the colleagues, and the mutual trust and respect of subordinates. You have always been kind. I pray for your success; for your eternal happiness; and may ALLAH keep you close in your future life.

Today I can listen in the far distance bugles sounding the last post. It is my time to fade away. With lot of emotions and veneration I will peel off my Uniform which has become part of my skin. I have nothing to owe to you and this great Army but my sincere gratitudes. May God bless Pakistan Army and the Country”.

With best regards.

Yours Sincerely

Imtiaz

Now, I start answering your question. I was born in 1936 in District Faisalabad, then known as Lyallpur. I belong to a land owning Jat family. My father is from Waraich and mother from Goraya clan, who have predominantly settled in District Gujrat (along river Chenab) and Sialkot respectively. During British rule our ancestors were granted land in District Sargodha; a colony district. During World War II British raised a Waraich Company in Gujrat and to motivate people and to draw manpower my father who was then 18 years old was appointed as the Company Commander. After a few months when the battalion reached my father was allowed  to return home. My late father who served as Tehsildar in revenue department was a very kind hearted, noble and loving soul. He expired in 1966 while I was doing my Staff College Quetta. All mothers are alike, a shady Bannian tree. Same was the case with MY MOTHER. She was a pious and noble lady with very little wordly ambitions. As usual one early morning she woke up for her morning prayers and then went to sleep. When she did not wake up we found that she had breathed her last very peacefully like a saint. May Almighty Allah bless their souls in peace in heaven.

Please tell us something about your life as a student?

I passed my matriculation in 1950 from Municipal Board High School Faisalabad, and then joined Govt College as FSC (Non-Medical) student. In the School and College I was member of Hockey Eleven and also took part in boxing while I was in the College. On the academic side I was a keen and fairly pedantic student. In July 1952 I was selected for Commission in the Pakistan Army and on 09 Oct I reported in Joint Services

Pre-Cadet Training School Quetta. As it is apparent I had left my studies half way, but was lucky that at a later stage Army enabled me to obtain BA degree in the Pakistan Military Academy and Msc War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad while I was in National Defence College. I was fully compensated.

Please tell us something about your selection in the Army, Cadet’s life in the PMA and impressions on joining your first unit?

As was customary in good old days very few people planned/designed their career. I also was in the same category. My uncle Lt Col Bashir Ahmed Waraich was in service and at times his uniform motivated and inspired me to join the Army. On reading the advertisement in the newspaper I appeared for the examination. After couple of months roll numbers of the successful candidates were published in all the daily newspapers. I was lucky to be amongst the successful candidates. I recall it was indeed a day of rejoicing and celebration. All near and dear ones, relatives, teachers and friends assembled to congratulate me and my parents for this enviable achievement. Suddenly, one was ushered into an absolutely new life and environments. For the first six months we the cadets from all three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) were to report JSPCTS Quetta. Army cadets who qualified would then join Pakistan Military Academy Kakul for two years of rigorous physical, academic and military training. Life in JSPCTS was tough and demanding. It was an initial breaking-in phase from civil to military life. Exposure to officer instructors from Army, Navy and Air Force and other Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) was a novel and exciting experience. By and large they were the pick of the respective service, hence they were very impressive and capable.

Please tell us something about your experiences in PMA?

On passing out from the Pre-cadet School Quetta we reported in our respective academies, in my case at PMA Kakul. The only mode of travel from Rawalpindi to Kakul was by bus, hence I reached in the Academy rather late in the evening. The senior cadets gave us a terrible but interesting reception. Ragging was the order of the day. In retrospect, I recall that though the routine was extremely tough, highly demanding and disciplined it was an honour for anyone to be in the Academy. Ragging by the seniors in the first term was inescapable. I think it had its positive side and enabled the young cadet to inculcate virtues of obedience, self-discipline, sense of motivation and comradeship. Acquisition of academic excellence, physical fitness in highly competitive environments remained the hallmark of our existence in the Academy. Great emphasis were laid on sports, obstacle course, weapons training, physical training, leadership training etc. The Army spared and selected the best lot of officers, JCOs and NCOs as instructors for the Pakistan Military Academy. Indeed it was the singular honour for a young officer to be instructor in the PMA.

Any senior or contemporary who had a deep influence on your personality in PMA?

Most of us have been in numerous institutions where we come across many teachers and professors. However, bulk of the Army Officers who have been through the Academy would agree with me that the imprints and impressions left on cadet’s mind by the military instructors in PMA are deep and everlasting. Their appearance, level of professional knowledge, the way they wear their uniforms/dress, their accent and connotation even their mannerism is ever remembered by their cadets. In short I think this interaction between instructor and cadet becomes part of one’s happy memory for all times to come. Even today I can vividly reflect the brilliance of my Platoon Commander, Capt Riaz-Ul-Haq (Armoured Corps) and Company Commander Maj Muhammad Anwar (Baluch Regt). Late Capt Qadir Bux Mella (Punjab) our Physical Training Officer (PTO) was exceedingly popular with cadets for his simple and straight forward approach and long cheverlet car. The tough, efficient and graceful weapons training officer (WTO) Capt Fateh Khan (FF) was held in high esteem for his efficiency, immaculate dress and caustic sarcasm.

On the academic side Dr Hayee (History) and Dr (I am sorry for not remembering his name) (English) were institutions by themselves. The Commandant Brig Piggot was a fatherly figure who was inspiring and omni-present. The premises of the Academy were enchanting and congenial. The professional atmosphere was par excellence.

Please tell us something about your service profile from passing out till you joined the Pakistan Military Academy as an instructor 1965 war?

On Commissioning from the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul I joined 4th Battalion of the 14 Punjab Regiment, now 8 Punjab at Lahore Cantonment. In March 1955 Lahore Cantt was peaceful and very quiet place, absolutely insolated from civil population. It was entirely a military garrison where only military activity and training was in full swing. On small roads units would get out for morning physical training (PT) without any fear of traffic hazards. It was ideal to undertake night training in the close vicinity as there were not many lights around. One would be surprised to learn that in 1955 there were only six taxis in the entire city of Lahore. On joining 4/14 Punjab Regiment I was assigned as Company Officer in C Company, Commanded by Maj Iftikhar-i-Bashir (Later Brig) a spirited soldier. Lt Col Said Ali Khan and Maj BAK Malik were the Commanding Officer and Second-In-Command respectively. They were matured, efficient and professional. Maj Ijaz, Maj Mansibdar, Maj Akbar, Maj Bhatti, Maj Abbas were Company Commanders. Capt Anis (Adjt) Capt Amir (QM), Lt Ashiq, Lt Nasim and Lt Rashid were the young officer force. They were all dedicated and totally involved in professional without any other interests. Acquisition of property, house, plot or land was unheard of. Life was simple, comfortable and inexpensive. Our monthly salary was Rs 435.00 whereas our messing never exceeded Rs. 200.00 per month with a very rich menu.

Regular physical training in the morning, sports in the evening, attendance on four ‘dinner nights’ a week, religious attendance and supervision of individual training cycle, twice a week night training, full concentrated summer and winter collective training, fortnightly 20/24 miles route march, quarterly physical training tests, short and long range firing by the Companies were resorted to regularly. It was a good professional environment. I was incharge and active Captain of Hockey, Basketball, Athletics and Football teams. When I look back I feel that I learnt a lot from the sports ground, ie physical fitness, tenacity, will to fight and competitive spirit which stood me to good stead both in peace and war. This battalion, the 4/14 Punjab became my home, hearth and passion, for which no sacrifice was considered too great.

On completion of five years in the unit I was posted out to 4 AK battalion as Adjt. Soon I became part and parcel of that outfit at Shinkiari, Kel and finally on the border at Padar (Bhimber Sector). They were highly disciplined, stout, hardy and dedicated troops one would rarely come across.

One fine morning when I had put in about one year service in the battalion Commanding Officer Lt Col Khurshid Rabbani a tough, proficient and resolute officer called me in his office. He handed over a brief case containing pencil and rubber, message pad, copying pencil and carbon papers, footrulers etc and told me that he had decided to appoint me as an intelligence officer (I0) of the battalion. He gave me a peptalk to do my innate best. To be picked up amongst all the subalterns as an I0 was a great honour and recognition of the hardwork.

Later, as the time passed I performed the onerous responsibilities of Adjt, another coveted appointment and then C Company Commander in the unit. At this juncture when things were moving smoothly I was posted to 4 AK infantry battalion. The unit was located in Batrasi (Azad Kashmir). On completion of two years of eventful tenure in the fine outfit, I was posted to 11 Punjab Regiment, at Lahore. During this period I attended communications course in USA.

On 6 June 1960 while we were doing our night training in Lahore Cantt a posting order from GHQ was received. According to which I was posted as an instructor in the Pakistan Military Academy, a greatest reward to any young officer at that time specially when the Army was small and compact. As I was performing the duties of Adjt 11 Punjab my Commanding Officer Lt Col Waqi-uz-Zaman an exceedingly brilliant professional, personally travelled to GHQ and had my posting order cancelled saying that as the battalion was moving to East Pakistan he could not spare his Adjt. He took an undertaking from the DMS that once the move was completed Capt Imtiaz Waraich would be available for posting to the PMA. For me, it was a great setback and in those young days I felt demolished and let down. In Oct 1963 when we were in East Pakistan doing collective training in Chittagong hill Tracks I was once again posted back to the PMA. Lt Col Waqi-Uz-Zaman gave me a tremendous send off in the exercises area and spoke highly of my performance in the unit. Lt Arif Bangash retired a Lt Gen/Governor NWFP was the Mess Secretary who arranged the dining out.

Please tell us something about your tenure as instructor in Pakistan Military Academy (PMA)?

On 10 Oct 1963 I joined PMA as a Platoon Commander. I travelled from Comila to Dacca and to Lahore by PIA paying only Rs. 225.00 for economy class ticket. Is it not surprizing? On reaching the Academy I was attached with 30th PMA long course, and after a few months I took over a regular Platoon in Qasim Company of the 34th long PMA course. After 2 terms I moved to a Platoon in Salahuddin Company. I am proud to mention that my platoons, produced some outstanding generals in the Army ie Lt Gen (Retd) Amjad Shuaib, Maj Gen (Retd) Salim Malik, Maj Gen (Retd) Khurshid Alam, Maj Gen (Retd) Khalid Bashir, Maj Gen (Retd) Sultan Habib and Lt Gen (Retd) Mohammad Akram served as the Prelim Corporal of Qasim Platoon when I  took over. In the  Academy, Khalid, Qasim, Tariq and Salahuddin companies constituted the First Pakistan Battalion (Quaid-I-Azam’s Own.) It was a fabulous outfit, highly well organized, well knit, meticulously woven, matured to a level of perfection owing to long process of trial and error. The finest lot of officers, JCOs and NCOs were posted to the Academy to sharpen the cutting edge. Prior to confirmation every newly posted officer instructor was put through a test lecture. A military subject was assigned on which one was required to give a lecture in the presence of Commandant, Chief Instructor, GSO-II (Training), available Company commanders etc. I was to speak on patrolling and one week’s notice was given. I vividly remember, like others I did my very best to refine the substance, prepared effective training aids ie transparencies, charts etc. For the actual presentation and delivery I would sneak out late at night to the football ground and carry out full dress rehearsal at an optimum pitch. In the process I had almost memorised the subject matter. To make it natural during the actual presentation, I managed to muffle it with correct pauses, connotation and mannerism. I think I did fairly well in the test lecture and was confirmed/selected. Allah be praised. Assessment system of the cadets except for the human error was highly refined, accurate and unbiased. Under the Staynine system, every cadet was assessed continuously. Moral and physical courage, integrity, intelligence, endurance and stamina, physical fitness, application of theoretical knowledge to practical problems, self-confidence etc were the factors on which each cadet was graded on competitive basis at Platoon and then at company level. Platoon Commanders were required to enter their observations on each cadet on daily basis. In the first term one cadet from every course was selected to represent Pakistan Military Academy at Royal  Military Academy, Sandhurst UK. Each Platoon Commander would field one name of the cadet whom he thought was the best in academics, physical fitness, personality, expression etc. From my platoon I recommended G.C Ikram Sehgal (Publisher of Defence Journal) who in fact was the youngest cadet in 34th PMA Long Course. After hectic discussions in Platoon and Company Commander conferences his name was endorsed as the No 1. cadet for the whole term. Somehow in the final selection at higher level in GHQ another G.C. was nominated, possibly due to higher weightage which they allotted to a particular factor. Ikram Sehgal later became Company Senior Under Officer (the whole 34th PMA was consolidated as Khalid Company during 1965 War) and passed out SECOND in the Course. He was Runner-up for both the Sword of Honour and Norman’s Gold Medal, and Winner of the Tactics Plaque. The Academy till 1965 war had a small intake. About 100 cadets would pass out from each course. Every instructor, Platoon Commander and Company Commander was personally known by every cadet irrespective of his company. On the academic side highly experienced and qualified instructors were available. Foreign cadets from Muslim Countries, Sri Lanka, Africa came to acquire knowledge from this Academy. Indeed it had an international fame and stature.

Please tell us something about your war experiences as a field officer in the 1965 war?

I was Major and Company Commander in 22 Punjab Commanded by Lt Col Abdul Qayum Chaudhry (Later Brig). Battalion remained in Fazilka sector throughout the war.

In the early hours of the morning on 6 Sept 1965 India launched a naked aggression against Pakistan. She committed a corps size composite force each against Lahore and Sialkot sectors simultaneously. Indian Army Chief Gen Chaudhry boasted to take ‘Chota Whiskey’ in Gymkhana Lahore by the evening. FM Muhammad Ayub Khan the President and the Commander-In-Chief went on the air and addressed the nation on the same fateful morning. It was a galvanizing, emotionally charged address which really electrified the whole nation. “Not knowing our determination and will to fight a treacherous enemy has challenged our honour. My valiant soldiers go forward and relentlessly destroy his aggression. Fight on till his guns are silenced.” I recall I had tears in my eyes, my hair stood at the ends ready to make any supreme sacrifice.  Even today I possess the tape and usually listen to that speech especially when we have some operations with the enemy on Kashmir border, Kargil or Siachin. It would purify anybody’s soul.

When the 1965 War started I was posted from PMA to 22 Punjab. The battalion after raising moved from Mardan to Sulemanki sector. The move took place in the hours of darkness by train. In the early hours of the day when the battalion was disembarking from the train two enemy hunter aircraft appeared in the sky. We dispersed and took cover. Aircraft went back without any hostile action probably they had already discharged their weapons elsewhere. Later in the day we relieved 10 Punjab Commanded by Lt Col Amir Hamza (Later Gen) inside enemy territory (ahead of Sulemanki Headworks) which they had captured earlier.

During the next couple of days our battalion crept forward and captured area ahead of Packa Village, Muthikartar Singh, Wazir Ali etc. On the main road, axis Sulemanki- Fazilka was held by my company. Asif Wala tower was with the enemy approximately 500 yards away from the FDLs.

On 16 Sept 65 the Brigade Commander Brig Muhammad Akbar Khan (Punjab), a conspicuously bold, confident and intrepid Commander decided to attack and dislodge the enemy from his main defences and capture Fazilka, the main communication centre. In the afternoon Brigade Commander gave out his attack orders. Attack was to commence at 2100 hours

(9 PM). We made all preparations, consumed our evening meals, filled our water bottles, collected our ammunition and finally after the men were briefed and given the motivational talk, we moved to our Forming Up Place (FUP) at about 8-30 PM. Our guns were about to start in Pre H-hour bombardment when Gen Muhammad Musa the Commander-In-Chief came on the line and stopped the attack. Later we learnt that Army could not provide an additional battalion to defend the expanded area upto Fazilka.

In this sector the major battle was fought on 23 Sept 1965 when Indians launched a battalion size attack to recapture a salient which was held by 4 Punjab Commanded by Lt Col (Later Lt Gen) Jahan Zeb Arbab. Late at night Gurkha Battalion under the cover of heavy artillery shelling attacked 4 Punjab which was immediately on my right flank. My Company also remained under heavy bombardment, not knowing what was in the offing. Anyway, enemy attack was drowned in their own blood. In the morning one Capt and 80 Soldiers were captured as prisoners by 4 Punjab. This action broke their back and will to fight.

In 1965 war we remained in captured Indian territory throughout. Morale of the whole Army was sky high. We were convinced of our superiority of manpower, martial powers and religious ascendancy.

My Company remained in eye ball to eye ball contact with the enemy throughout the war. Our morale was very high and we had the feeling of being victorious.

How was the experience as a student in Command and Staff College Quetta?

Our Staff College Quetta is universally recognized as one of the premier institutions of military learning. I passed my written test and became eligible to attend Short Staff Course 1967. Gen Sharif was the Commandant and Brig Shaukat Riza was the Chief Instructor, both brilliant professionals from all angles. During my first term Lt Col Syed Wajahat Husain (Armour) was my DS, an able and impressive speaker with very pleasant personality, immaculately dressed both in uniform and civies. In the second term Lt Col Asgher (Punjab) was my instructor, embodiment of a decent, polished officer with lofty principles of personal conduct and an astute professional. On termination of the course all officers attending the short course were posted to various assignments.  

Please tell us something about your service profile after graduating from Staff College till promotion to Lt Col rank?

I was posted as BM 10 Bde Sialkot. Prior to my arrival in Sialkot my posting order was amended and I was ordered to move to Infantry School on the recommendation of Brig Mahmood Jan, Commandant Infantry School. For me once again it was not a pleasant change. As remarked by FM William Slim “A good soldier goes where he is sent and does what he is told”. When I recall my two years stay in Infantry School as instructor and then as a GSO-II with the Commandant Brig Mahmood Jan was exceeding fruitful and rewarding. I learnt my profession with incessant clarity and developed a synthesizing approach to sift the dross from grain, eliminate non-essentials from imbignities. I served as GSO-II for over two years with Brig Mahmood Jan. I may mention here that I was highly impressed by his clarity of mind, indomitable spirit and prompt decision making. He had a vast experience on infantry matters and had an over bearing personality.

I was promoted Lt Col in May 1970 and under orders from GHQ I took over the command of 21 Punjab (R&S) in Sialkot. Lt Col Abdur Rehman and Lt Col Siral-Lee-Anan had commanded this unit prior to me and had trained it to optimum pitch. I was new to the R&S setup but I took life seriously and tried to further improve the professional standards. In July 1970 unit was ordered to move to East Pakistan where military and political situation was rapidly deteriorating.

Please tell us something about your war experience as a Commanding Officer of an Infantry Battalion in Eastern Theatre in 1971 War?

In 1971 I was the Commanding Officer 21 Punjab in Jessore Sector in East Pakistan. I will endeavour to give my impressions of those epic, crucial and most eventful days of my life as a soldier.

As Commanding Officer 21 Punjab (R&S) in 1971 War East Pakistan Officers and men of my unit were not very happy on this move. In August we were in Jessore taking over stores, equipment and the operational responsibilities from 27 Baluch (R&S). Looking back at the events I marvel at the valour, loyalty and simplicity of our men. They obeyed and never flinched even under most adverse conditions. Prior to the war some of the tasks given to us were as follow:-

i. Clearance operations to establish the authority of the Government against insurgents.

ii. Surveillance of the border, protection of roads, bridges and other installations.

iii. Preparation of anti-tank defence on vital approaches in the area of divisional responsibility.

b. When the hostilities broke out the unit operated like any other infantry battalion. It had tremendous anti-tank and firepower with highly reliable wireless communications. Our employment was as follows:-

i.          Bn HQ with-under HQ 14                    Div, A and C Companies                   at Jessore.

ii.          B Coy -Under HQ                              107 Bde Jessore.

iii.         D Coy-Under 57 Bde                         Dangmarka (Kushtia                            Sector).

c. In Nov 1971 when enemy launched an undeclared aggression the battalion fought number of actions. Out of many I venture to record one blood warming and valiant operation which we fought in Jassore Sector. This may also restitute and nullify the slanderous propaganda against the men whose bravery alone was unparalleled under most traumatic circumstances in East Pakistan.

I would like to describe Helsa/Brunda operation in which my unit performed excellently. This operation took place in November 1971.

Village Helsa is located on axis Benapol-Jessore and was the shortest penetrant/route to the Jessore City, an important communication centre. Capitulation of Brunda position would tantamount to not only premature capture of Jessore city but worst of all it would help the enemy to bypass all fortified and well prepared defensive positions in this sector. In that eventuality the entire responsibility of the debacle would rest on 21 Punjab and its Commanding Officer. The operation developed into a saga of blood and sweat and proof of our intrepid and tenacious soldierly. At about 1930 hrs (7:30 PM) night 27/28 Nov 1971 all forward positions of the battalion came under intense Arty shelling. The bombardment lasted for over one and a half hour with incessant furosity. At about 2100 hrs (9 PM) Brunda (8r) right forward platoon locality started receiving special attention the like of which was never experienced in the past. The intensity and rate of fire was felt at Jessore, both by the Brigade and Divisional Commanders.

I was sure that the attack was in the offing. Indeed it was a pre H hour bombardment, a prelude to the main attack. Moon was just appearing on the horizon. Everyone had been alerted. In the meantime Observer was instructed to engage targets (DFs) in front of our own position with whatever meagre Arty resources we had. At about 2200 hours (10 PM) nerve wrecking suspense was broken by a message from Brunda position (about 600 yards ahead of Battalion Headquarters), that the enemy was advancing in great number in assaulting formation against the frontage of our two platoons located on the extreme right flank. Well, visualizing the importance of this position I had also provided a direct telephone line. Hence, line as well as wireless communication existed between Battalion Headquarters and this position. At this moment of great trial men were instructed to hold fire till enemy closes in upto 200 yards (killing ground) a line which had already been identified on the ground. My heart, soul and body was in concentric unison, I heard Subedar Haq Nawaz the Platoon Commander on ordering his men to open fire.

He shouted (Narai Haideri) and left the telephone. He himself manned 75 mm RR with which he fired 7 rounds of HEAT. This devastating fire along with other automatic weapons broke/blasted the attack and inflicted grievous losses to the enemy at point blank range. Enemy battalion size he had drowned in their own blood. Dead bodies in olive green littered the area right upto 5 yards of our trenches. Then came a relative lull and all types of fire died away. We immediately proceeded to replenish ammunition and evacuated casualties from the forward position. This job was done by my Adjutant Captain Farooq Ahmed who remained undaunted, cool and calm under fire. He carried the ammunition in an ambulance under intense Arty fire. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the enemy the second phase of attack did not materialize. Our losses were very light where as we counted forty two dead bodies of the enemy in the close vicinity of our FDLs. A battalion size attack was blunted and finally destroyed by a small force of two platoons. I was sure enemy will certainly come in a big way to avenge their defeat and recover their dead bodies at first light. He might use tanks in the morning. Hence, an additional Machine Gun and 106 Recoilless Rifle was moved to forward position. Exactly at 0530 hours (5-30 AM) next morning tanks with some infantry moved and formed up against our position. Move was covered by accurate artillery fire. With added confidence and indomitable spirit men repulsed the attack and stood there like a rock. We then recovered maximum weapons and some enemy dead bodies while his tanks were still engaging our position from long range. Amongst the casualties one Havildar (Bansi Lal) with five other ranks were still alive. They were brought immediately to the Battalion Headquarters for first aid and interrogation. They gave useful information regarding the battalion attack. One Officer, Junior Commissioned Officer and three Other Ranks were recommended for gallantry award. Special feature of the day was that a battery of foreign correspondents and photographers visited our Battalion Headquarters immediately after the attack. They met the prisoners of war and asked many questions from them. They also saw the dead bodies of the enemy soldiers and other captured weapons and equipments. This was an ample proof of the blatant aggression which was being denied by the Indians. For my battalion it was a historic moment. Under all odds it was a great tribute to the grit, determination and above all the spirit of sacrifice of our men and officers.

How would you sum up your experiences of the 1971 War?

No troops should ever face such a predicament in which we found ourselves, in then East Pakistan. It was a proper civil war, insurgents had a total enemy support from across the border. Our adversary not only trained and equipped them but also provided physical support and kept our border posts under concentric artillery fire. Our logistics and lines of communication were disrupted by ambushes and by laying mines on roads and tracks. The most difficult thing in war is the acquisition of intelligence which under the obtaining circumstances became easiest for the enemy. With the result he could implement her evil designs with ease and alacrity. It was apparent that the debacle could only be averted by speaking the military truth by our senior commanders and simultaneously by initiating bold and timely political decisions by our leaders. It is stated that the Army should only be taken to the battlefield when it has maximum chances of success. It was absolutely the reverse in our case. “Let us salute those who laid down their lives for the glory of the Motherland; those who died today for our tomorrow”.

We lost the war in East Pakistan. We cannot blame the organizational set up, devotion and sense of sacrifice of our Army. We had the brave soldierly without which there can be no victory in war. The blame lies in the ineffective incumbents who allowed the system to atrophy and years of neglect and inapt attitude by our political leaders and governments. Responsibility of military debacle rests squarely on the shoulders of our senior military leaders and not on the valour of our young officers and bravery of our men. As Vegetius remarked “Let him who desires peace prepare for war”. Let me submit with element of pride that in Hamoodur Rehman Report, 21 Punjab is one of rare units which has been praised for its operational performance. It is a unique example.

You have not mentioned anything about your army courses, would you be kind to say something about it?

A lot of time has lapsed. However, I will try to produce the sequence of courses through my memory. I attended the following courses:-

a.             Weapons Course at                             Infantry School-1955.

b.         Junior Officers leaders                               Course (JOL)-1955.

c.         Basic Intelligence Course                           at Murree.

d.         Signal Communication                               Course at Rawalpindi.

e.             Administration Course at                        Kuldana Murree.

f.            Communication Course                            Fort Benning USA.

g.         Staff College Quetta.

Lt Col rank and specially the appointment of a Commanding Officer is the lynch pin and the cutting edge, what has been your experience having served in six different battalions and have commanded two units for fairly long period, both in peace and war?

I have served in six infantry battalions ie 4/14 Punjab, 4 AK, 11 Punjab, 22 Punjab, 21 Punjab and 40 Punjab. I served with many good Commanding Officers and came in contact with many fine officers.

Military historians maintain that the worst thing that can happen to a soldier in war is to be a company or a battalion commander, and if he comes out valiantly successful it is the best reward which can be bestowed upon him. It is the most effective rank that demands personal example, sharing of not only the physical discomfort, but also the psychological and mental problems of the subordinates. It is the rank where you can spontaneously see the fruits/results of your hard labour. Commanding Officer has to carry out his responsibilities with excessive diligence. He is not to follow but lead from front.

Please tell us something about your service profile after return from prisoner of war camp till promotion to the rank of Major General?

After having suffered ignominy of captivity at Agra for about two years I returned to my country in Oct 1994. I feel during this period from our weaknesses we discovered our strength as well. After rest and recuperation I was posted to Command 40 Punjab Regiment at Sialkot.

With all the venom and may I say element of guilt of defeat in my heart I took this command as a challenge. I set out to improve the standard of training, physical fitness and administration through personal example. I could run two miles with the unit in morning PT, go for Physical Efficiency Tests with my men, march at head of the battalion irrespective of the distance etc. I claim with all humility that with the help of an excellent team of officers the unit excelled in all fields. It would go to war and produce enviable results. Due to this reason during a Corps exercise 40 Punjab was selected to infiltrate deep behind the enemy lines in the first phase of Corps attack. The battalion gave an excellent account of itself.

Please tell us something about your service profile from the promotion to the rank of Brigader till promotion to the rank of Major General?

From 40 Punjab (Sialkot) I was promoted direct as a brigadier. I took over 105 Bde in June 1966 in Okara Cantt. We were part of 14 Inf Division commanded by Maj Gen N.U.K Babar; an excellent professional and an inspiring leader. 105 Brigade took part in many field exercises at Brigade, division and corps level. During one of the defence exercises Gen Zia-ul-Haq, Commander 2 Corps visited the brigade. He was so impressed to see the defence works of 7 Punjab and 16 Baluch that on return to his HQ he instructed all commanding officers of the Corps to visit my brigade defences. Later in Aug 67; 105 brigade was ordered to move by C-130 aircraft from Okara to Dadu (Sindh) to combat unprecedented floods. After about two months we returned to Okara Cantt.

From 105 Bde I was posted as Commander 111 Bde Rawalpindi. This indeed was a sensitive appointment. Being next to the seat of government, the brigade had to perform multifarious responsibilities i.e provision of guards to VIPs including Prime Minister House, protection of vulnerable areas and key points, provision of ceremonial guards, internal security duties etc. There was no relaxation as far as the individual and collective training was concerned. In 1976 PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) started agitation and movement of defiance against PPP government which was headed by PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Over a prolonged period my units remained deployed in the sensitive areas of the city (Rawalpindi). For the troops, duties like controlling and stopping processions, preventing miscreants from burning property and transport, vigilance against bomb blast was really nerve wrecking. With every passing day political as well as law and order situation rapidly started deteriorating. In July 1977 Army imposed Martial Law and the COAS Gen M. Zia-ul-Haq became the Martial Law Administrator.  During these onerous days units were stretched to their maximum potential. In the line of duty we delivered our best. In Oct 1977 I was selected to attend War Course in National Defence College Rawalpindi.

From War Course I was first posted as Chief Instructor War Wing NDC which was later amended as COS 10 Corps. It was a very professional job which I really enjoyed. Gen F.A. Chishti was my Corps Commander. He was a large hearted and kind commander. On his retirement Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan took over as the Corps Commander.

How was the stint as Force Commander Northern Area?

In the middle of the night Gen Zia-ul-Haq the COAS rang up and informed me that I had been approved to the rank of Major General. He also informed me that my new assignment would be at Gilgit as Commander FCNA. From June 1982 to June 1984 I remained in that wonderful region. I did my utmost to improve the standards of training, administration and above all the quality of defence works / bunkers located at a very high altitude, in the face of enemy. I was also Martial Law Administrator Zone E; which took lot of my time and attention. I found that people of Northern Area were very hospitable, simple and straightforward. Indeed, I enjoyed my stay and substantially contributed in improving the quality of life in Northern Area?

We understand that you commanded another division after your first tenure of command in the Northern Areas. How was this experience?

On completion of exact two years I was posted GOC 15 Division Sialkot Cantt. I had four brigades under command with highly proficient brigade commanders. Once again we set out to improve the defence works i.e. bunkers antitank ditches etc on the border. The division moved to Mallianwala and Tilla field firing ranges and conducted firing competitions of all weapons culminating into a live firing exercise, where divisional artillery also participated.

It has been said that it was you who initiated major changes in the School of Infantry and Tactics Quetta. Please tell us something about your tenure as Commandant Infantry School?

From 15 Division I proceeded to take over as Commandant Infantry School Quetta. I took this job as a challenge and proceeded to improve the following: -

a. Training standards, improvement of precis, syndicate rooms, model rooms, renovation/rewriting of model discussion, central discussion and field exercises.

b. Face lifting of the school; and making it highly presentable and congenial place to work.

c. Acquisition of Modern Training Aids.

d. Improvement of Auditorium and rest of the accommodation.

e. Establishment of school bakery.

f. Improvement of officer messes with officer like menu and controlled messing.

g. Installation of three tube wells to make the environment of the school more congenial.

Towards the end of my tenure, permit me to say that by the grace of Almighty Allah Infantry School became a premier institution of the Army. Even today I derive tremendous satisfaction and pleasure that I was able to provide good quality instructions and above all a decent administration to the students (Officers, JCOs and NCOs). We tried to handle our students with respect and requisite dignity. In infantry school we undertook to train 250 officers from a friendly country Sri Lanka. Due to our dedication and unfailing courtesy in due course of time they became our ambassadors.

You were Commander 111 Brigade in 1977. Please describe in detail all that you saw, and all the actions connected with Zia’s military takeover on 5th July 1977?

111 Brigade is located in West Ridge Rawalpindi and was under command Headquarter 10 Corps. Lieutenant General F.A Chishti  was the Corps Commander. This operation took place on the night of July 5, 1977 resulting into the imposition of martial law.General Mohammad Zia ul Haq the then COAS became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Normally a question is asked as to how  early were you as Commander 111 Brigade taken into confidence. My answer is only a few hours prior to the commencement of the operation on night  July 5, 1977.

I recall that about fifteen days earlier I had requested for one month leave to prepare for my war course. Initially the leave was sanctioned  but after three to four days I was recalled. In retrospect, gives an impression  that at higher level this contingency might have been considered much earlier. I also recall that two three days  prior to this operation Zia remarked that negotiations between the government and PNA  are reaching a dead end and the situation is likely to worsen .I spontaneously remarked “Sir, if they are given some more time  Sihala Parleys might see some tangible results”.On my uncalled for remarks the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was startled and uneasy. Later I learnt that due to an element of uncertainty a major general was called and the impending operation was not changed. It appeared that the new incumbent was either not considered exuberant enough for the task in hand or due to shortage of time status quo was accepted.

On the fateful night at about 11:30 P.M, Chief of Staff 10 Corps personally came and conveyed the orders to me. There was a danger of civil war situation emerging, therefore, army had decided to intervene and take the higher political leadership both of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) into custody. Names of eleven leaders from PPP mostly Federal Ministers and nine senior leaders from PNA were identified who were to be brought to Officers Mess, Headquarters 10 Corps Chaklala.

Within half an hour on receipt of the orders I held my orders group (O Group).On night July 5, 1977  I had six infantry battalions under command, four of my own and two ex 23 Division Jhelum, which were already there on Internal Security Duties in Rawalpindi. The principal task that we were required to perform was to constitute about twenty parties each headed by an officer with six other ranks, each to escort one VIP/Leaders from their  residences to Chaklala. Guard Battalion 6 Baluch at PM House was to remain in location without any task. There were many other duties for which units were earmarked but these were not of great consequence.

We discovered that most of the ministers were living in Islamabad. Officers and men who had gone to escort them found it very difficult to locate their residences. Luckily within the stipulated time we were able to bring all the leaders of both parties to Chaklala.I may point out that all junior officers and men were given explicit orders to remain very respectful and courteous to the senior politicians and ministers, hence, no untoward incident took place.

When the task was accomplished by 0330 hours and all leaders had assembled in Headquarters 10 Corps, the army chief General Zia spoke to the ex Prime Minister on telephone that he had imposed Martial Law in the country therefore,Prime Minister would be escorted to Murree at seven O’clock in the morning. I may point out that during the whole operation no officer or troops entered the PM House and no disturbance was caused.

When I recall the events I find that when the morning came bigger people took over the charge and we once again were absorbed in our humble daily routine. During the subsequent years as we observed that a grand political manipulation commenced. Self- aggrandisement efforts to acquire most powerful jobs became the order of the day on part of most senior generals, some eminent politicians and technocrats. National interest as usual took the rear seat and was of secondary importance.

Please tell us something about your service profile from 1987 till retirement?

In June 1987 while at Infantry School President Zia informed  me that I had been promoted to Lieutenant General. After a month or so I moved to Gujranwala to raise 30 Corps. An uphill task as there was no accommodation for units officers, offices, messes etc. One had to start from the scratch. With the help of GHQ and by grace of Allah withion 6 months time the corps became operational. 8 and 15 Divisions at Sialkot Cantonment were placed under Command 30 Corps and we were assigned to defend the area of responsibility previously held by 1 Corps. Brigadier Mohammad Akram, 20 Lancers was my COS (Chief of Staff). Major Generals Naqvi and KLM Mughal General Officer Commanding (GOC) 8 and 15 Divisions respectively. Being in defence role in a very strategic area renovation of defence works and improvement of obstacles system was our main achievement. We took immediate care to improve the training and administration of units  and formations. General Aslam Beg then Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) later coas visited the corps both in peace and in field locations and was extremely satisfied.

Director General JS HQ (Joint Services Headquarters):— Once the exercise was over where I was assigned the responsibility of Foxland Army Chief I received my posting order as DG JS HQ Chaklala. Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman was CJCSC. I worked with him for about an year till his demise in the air crash. He was very cautious, dutiful and extremely hardworking. He used to take a lot of pains in minor details. In JS HQ we used to conduct monthly meetings of  JS Committee  where all three Services Chiefs and Secretary Defence used to attend. All foreign defence related dignitaries were briefed in JS HQ regarding the  mission role and weapon systems of our three services. I recall when the Operation Desert Storm commenced in Saudi Arabia and American forces had already concentrated there we briefed the President, PM, FM, Foreign Secretary etc along with three service chiefs. It was at this juncture when the decision to despatch Pakistani troops  was taken and communicated to Saudi Government and US authorities. We also conducted and undertook the briefing of Commander, Central Command USA General Schwarzkopf. Let me point out that General Schwarzkopf of US army was exceedingly helpful to Pak Armed Forces and held a high opinion about them. I developed very cordial working relationship with the General who had a very pleasant personality  and was pro- Pakistan to my mind. You may note that he used to visit Pakistan once every three months unlike the present  incumbent. We conducted regular annual triple XXX (Joint Services) Exercises in JS HQ. When Admiral Sirohey (Pak Navy) took over as  CJSCS he undertook some research activity with regard to the feasibility and usefulness of JS HQ in the obtaining operational environments, he also completed the construction of underground national operational centre where in the war the President/PM and three services chiefs could meet to take timely and crucial decisions in war. One word about the then COAS, Gen M.A Baig. I found him exceedingly intelligent, futuristic in developing military strategy and acquisition of weapon systems. I found him to be a visionary who could plan, conceive, design and implement. He held a number of map and field exercises culminating into his famous Zarb-e-Momin. I felt by his continuous and aggressive planning a word was conveyed to the Indians and they were convinced in the process that Pakistan Army can deliver a hurting blow to the enemy.

Deputy Chief Of Army Staff (DCOAS):— From JS HQ in early 1990 I was posted as DCOAS in GHQ. As number two man one carried out functions delegated to me by the COAS! I tried to contribute more on operational and other organisational matters wherever possible. During my tenure, we briefed the newly elected PM Mr Nawaz Sharif on our operational preparedness and particularly on Kashmir. About seven to eight days before my retirement Secretary Foreign Affairs Mr Akram Zaki who told me that the PM and Gen Mirza  Aslam Baig had decided to send me as Ambassador to Beijing. Next morning after having ruminated I humbly declined   for personal reasons. On 9th July 1991 after a long service I retired.

How was the stint as the Head of Fauji Foundation?

Managing Director Fauji Foundation:— In Nov 1991 while leading a retired life I was assigned the job of MD Fauji Foundation. Gen Asif Nawaz was the COAS at that time. I may add that the Army Chief had declined to accommodate name of another incumbent proposed by the then President (1991) saying that it is purely the prerogative of the army chief. My four years stay in Fauji Foundation turned out to be a highly fruitful and productive period for the Fauji Foundation. I had an excellent team of directors and after a long time we completed the feasibility and actual implementation of the following:—

(1)            Construction of oil terminal known as FOTCO  at Karachi which was completed within two years.

(2)            Construction of Cement Plant based on latest technology on the outskirts of Rawalpindi.

(3)            Kabirwala (near Multan) Power Plant approx 140 MW. The only project in the country based on the indigenous fuel of gas. It may be noted that all other power plants are based on imported furnace oil which is far more expensive.

(4)            Renovation and upgrading of three Fauji Sugar Mills. Permit me to say that in 1992 the annual profit of Fauji Foundation and Fauji Fertilizer was less than 90 and 100 crores respectively. While in 1996 the annual profit rose to 120 and 274 crore respectively.

(5)            Construction of a respectable modern office complex of Fauji Foundation.

Fauji Foundation is a unique institution designed to look after the welfare of retired JCOs and other ranks and also provides number of jobs to retired officers.It caters for the technical training, education and medical care of poor ex servicemen and their wards which is a very pious and rewarding enterprise.

It has been said that 65 War was a failure at army and higher command level (div etc). What is your opinion.?

I have personally been through this war and, therefore, I do not entirely contribute to this assertion. Despite enemy superiority of numbers, strength and armament he failed to achieve her main objective/mission. In an undeclared war when we were not fully prepared an offensive of a corps size force by the enemy was blunted both on Lahore and Sialkot sectors by a much smaller force on our side. Every offensive in most of the sectors came to a grinding halt with no major penetration. To negate the idea of our failure it is enough to remember that when the war ended a three times smaller  but well trained and highly motivated Pakistan Army had successfully captured large chunks of  enemy territory. The style and lustre with which our young officers fought the  1965 War was enviable and elating. Yes, about the performance of senior leadership much left to  be desired, specially in the offensive operations like launching of 1st Armoured Div along with infantry opposite Amritsar and initial operations at Akhnur etc.

It has been said that 1971 fiasco was avoidable if someone other than Gen Niazi was GOC Eastern Command. How far is this correct?

In 1971 once again as it was destined I was in East Pakistan commanding 21 Punjab (R & S). The East Pakistan fiasco was not the making of Gen Niazi. It was by the government of Gen A.M Yahya Khan and senior political leaders of Pakistan. It was their inept and callous handling of the crisis which brought the country to that pass. Yes, I agree with you that Gen Niazi could have demonstrated better strategic vision by taking a bold decision to reorganize the deployment of Eastern Command from counterinsurgency operations to a proper defensive posture to meet the main Indian aggression well before the time. He failed to implement any change. However, nothing can exonerate him from such a defeat and debacle.

Don’t you think that the Pakistani GHQ particularly the DMO failed in giving Niazi correct higher strategic direction/operational guidance?

There is no denying of the fact that GHQ had an important role to play to guide and supervise the operations in East Pakistan in which they failed.The MO Directorate did not perform their true role of operational  and strategic guidance. An Indian general Candeth wrote in his book  that if the Pak Army had attacked in Oct 1971 prior to the war in East Pakistan all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would have gone to the winds. Unfortunately all reports from Eastern Command regarding The Mukti Bahini operations and losses being suffered were fallacious and unrealistic. In one operation an infantry battalion launched an attack against the insurgents and suffered over 216 casualties in one day, unheard of in any military operation. The Commanding Officer was directed by higher headquarter to distribute the casualties over various weeks. If Commanding Officers had been truthful and firm. It also shows that responsible people in GHQ failed to visit the deteriorating situation, had they done so situation would have been reversed.

It has been asserted that promotion/supersession in Zia era were made on personal likes and dislikes?

I have been sitting in number of promotion boards for a long time. In my humble opinion our system of promotion is scientific, matured and fairly foolproof. Element of human error would exist in any such system. My experience also shows that at junior levels our promotion system does not allow much of manipulation. To support my contention during one of the promotion boards Gen Zia had promised one of his staff officers

(a Brig) that he would be promoted as a Major General next morning. When that officers name came up for consideration two Corps Commanders opposed his promotion saying that he was not a Maj Gen material. On this Gen Zia remarked that he had promised promotion to this officer last evening but the system did not allow it and the officer was not promoted. Let me confess in the same breath that in Zia era, some senior officers were promoted who were not professionally fit and not general like. I may add that this happened in every era right from the earliest stages.

How do you sum up Gen Zia?

I did not see him closely as a Lieut Col or Brig. First time I came in contact with him he was Comd 2 Corps and I was Commanding 105 Brigade which was part of 14 Div at Okara under his Corps. I found him a pleasant and God fearing person. On the professional side in my opinion he was upto a high average standard. In various war games or exercises he remained in middle of  the road and did not demonstrate professional or strategic brilliance. At a later stage I found that he was not fond of authority, nor he was looking for moon and stars. In my humble opinion the events and circumstances pushed him into the limelight. He took over the helms of affairs under pressure from his Corps Commanders who thought that he has succumbed to PM Bhutto’s pressure and was ordering the army to take action against the civilian population. As the time passed he for his survival and prolongation of rule started political manipulation. Islamisation and creation of Majlis e Shoora and Referendum of December 1984. At the last stages of his rule I found that he had become  an effective orator. He ruled the country and was also Army Chief for over 11 years. During this period Russian occupation of Afghanistan and US influence in Pak was a prominent historic event. The ramifications and its effect on Pak Army of which Gen Zia was the chief unfortunately were grave and long lasting.

You were Comd FCNA in 1980-81. The Siachen failure occurred in 1983 and 1984. How in your opinion did this happen and was it avoidable?

It is a very interesting question. The army thought that in this hostile terrain no operations were possible. No movement ever took place in this snow covered area where logistic support was considered extremely  infeasible. During my tenure as Comd FCNA in early 1982 I personally visited Goma (the base camp of Siachen Glacier on our side) a small village with few mud houses at a height of about 14,000 feet plus height along with a patrol on foot. Beyond this point it was difficult to go because of excessive snow and so we returned. No intelligence report ever mentioned of any enemy activity at Zing-Rulma which on the map we thought belongs to us. I am told that our SSG boys have visited Zing Rulma in the past. As this region  was not visited in the past by our troops the closest was the 62 Brigade at Skardu. In my opinion a nucleus of two general officers motivated by personal ambition recommended to their army and HQ to occupy Siachen Glacier area which would accrue many political and military  benefits. It will facilitate control of K-2 where many international mountaineering expeditions visit to conquer high peaks. It would also be a fait accompli to and retrograde  step for the Pakistan Army. This excursion will also help the Indians to embarrass the Chinese to some extent. Unfortunately, due to comprehensive planning by the Indian Army at an exceedingly high cost both of logistics and manpower succeeded. Our higher Intelligence agencies failed to provide early warning of the impending debacle.

Please tell us about the Gulf Crisis and the various developments which led to Pak Army being sidelined as major participant in the Gulf War?

In my opinion the Americans and the Saudis wanted the Pak Armed Forces to play a prominent role during Desert Storm Operations. Somehow, on the contrary our response was rather slow, we only allocated an Armoured Brigade and Infantry Brigade to participate and that too at a late stage which was not appreciated by the Saudis. During a meeting chaired by President GIK and caretaker PM Jatoi it was suggested by JS HQ a composite force of a fighter Squadron, a naval ship and an army contingent be dispatched with alacrity to Saudi Arabia. It was finally decided that an army continhgent should go with max speed. Unfortunately the move of contingent was delayed deliberately or otherwise which proved counterproductive for the country. After the war Saudi government started pruning our presence on the Saudi side bulk of army contingent and Air Force personnel.

Bravery at junior level aside it has been asserted that Kargil was a strategic blunder, poorly executed at logistic level. How far is this correct?

As you know that I have served as Comd FONA and have visited this area a number of times on foot and on horseback. One has also to analyse  the strength of the terrain which overlooks Srinagar-Dras Road and the Kargil Cantt. The decision to occupy this highly dominating and advantageous area in my opinion was a bold decision specially when compared with occupation of Siachen Glacier by the Indians. As mentioned earlier due to masterly and indepth planning and particularly the logistic support the Indians successfully occupied and retained the Siachen Glacier. We initiated this operation and the capture of Kargil heights but failed to support it with comprehensive operational planning and above all build up for essential logistic support without which no operation can succeed. The difference between Siachen and occupation of these heights was that our capture of these heights would totally stop all movements and logistic buildup for forces deployed in Leh and Siachen sectors. Unlike us India had no other option but to do or die and keep this lifeline open or accept  total capitulation of forces employed in the regions already mentioned. If the Indians had not reacted so aggressively accepting very high casualties, one reason was that elections were in the offing and Mr Vajpayee went out of the way to secure the area we had captured. If you ask me in retrospect  I feel  that retention of this area even when captured would be very difficult, keeping in view the international pressure and Indians changed relationship at USA. The principal reason for our heavy casualties and lack of progress was unimaginative and callous logistic operations to support the units. These were not carried out and were utterly inadequate. No commander would commit its troops for such operations unless he has fair chances of success. Unfortunately, indepth preparation and analysis were lacking at theatre level. Had we succeeded in quick capture of this area as planned we could have sought tangible concessions from India in Kashmir and elsewhere. However, there is a possibility that any further successes in this area might have triggered violent reaction on some Sectors in Kashmir.

Your opinion on an idea envisaging having a coordinating army group HQ to control operations of 1 and 30 Corps and 2 and 31 Corps respectively?

Its a brilliant idea, having many advantages specially when the chips are down. While I was in uniform in GHQ an empirical study was undertaken, a number of advantages on raising of these two army group headquarters  so much so that support units for both HQs i.e artillery signals and limited engineer resources were also defined and worked out. The financial effect for raising of these two Headquarters was worked out. The proposal was accepted in principal but remained held in abeyance for lack of financial resources.